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
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Social movement thinking beyond the core: theories and research in post-colonial and post-socialist societies

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Table of contents (pp. i – iv)

Editorial

Social movement thinking beyond the core: theories and research in post-colonial and post-socialist societies
Laurence Cox, Alf Gunvald Nilsen, Geoffrey Pleyers (pp. 1 – 36)

Call for papers

Call for papers volume 10 issue 2
Political parties, trade unions and social movements: emancipatory reconfigurations of popular organisation (pp. 37 – 44)

Themed pieces

Simin Fadaee,
Bringing in the South: towards a global paradigm for social movement studies
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 45 – 60)

Agnes Gagyi,
What it takes to compare non-core movements: a world-systems perspective. Two cases from contemporary East Central European movements
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 61 – 82)

Pepijn van Eeden,
Politicisation and depoliticisation of ecology: Polish and Romanian perspectives
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 83 – 113)

Dina Kiwan,
Emotive acts of citizenship, social change and knowledge production in Lebanon
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 114 – 142)

Erin Fitz-Henry,
Grief and the inter-cultural public sphere: "rights of nature" and the contestation of "global coloniality"
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 143 – 161)

Tanja D. Hendriks,
Collaboration and competition: market queens, trade unions and collective action of informal workers in Ghana's Makola Market
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 162 – 187)

Tomás MacSheoin,
What happened to the peasants? Material for a history of an alternative tradition of resistance in Ireland
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 188 – 275)

General pieces

Leah M. Fusco and Angela V. Carter,
Toward an anti-fracking mobilization toolkit: ten practices from Western Newfoundland's campaign
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 276 – 299)

Sophia L. Borgias and Yvonne A. Braun,
From dams to democracy: framing processes and political opportunities in Chile's Patagonia Without Dams movement
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 300 – 328)

Signe Thydal and Christian F. Svensson,
Facilitating dissident action: perils and potentials of a self-organising initiative
(event analysis, pp. 329 – 343)

Iván Carretero-Navarro and Eva Espinar-Ruiz,
El tractament de les vagues a la premsa espanyola: anàlisi de la informació sobre causes i conseqüències
(research note, pp. 344 – 352)

John Foran, Summer Gray and Corrie Grosse,
Not yet the End of the world: political cultures of opposition and creation in the global youth climate justice movement
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 353 – 379)

Bert Lewis,
Ghosts at work: notes on workplace hauntings
(research note, pp. 380 – 388)

Reviews [single PDF] (pp. 389 – 444)

Donna Haraway, 2016, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*. Review author: Carolyn Elerding

Chris Robé, 2017, *Breaking the Spell: A History of Anarchist Filmmakers, Videotape Guerrillas, and Digital Ninjas*. Review author: Beth Geglia

Sharpe, Christina, 2016, *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being*. Review Author: Shannon Walsh

Robbie Shilliam, 2015, *The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections*. Review Author: Lewis B.H. Eliot

Ingeborg Gaarde, 2017, *Peasants negotiating a global policy space - La Via Campesina in the Committee on World Food Security*. Review Author: Maria Vasile

Wesley Lowery, 2017, *They Can't Kill Us All: The Story of Black Lives Matter*. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, 2016, *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation*. Christopher J. Lebron, 2017, *The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History of an Idea*. Review Author: Andrew Kettler

Jodi Dean, 2016, *Crowds and Party*. Donatella della Porta, Joseba Fernández, Hara Kouki & Lorenzo Mosca, 2017, *Movement Parties Against Austerity*. Richard Seymour, 2016, *Corbyn. The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics*. Review Author: Andy Mathers

Dylan Taylor, 2017, *Social Movements and Democracy in the 21st century*. Review Author: Laurence Cox

Harald Bauder, 2017, *Migration Borders Freedom*. Review Author: Sutapa Chattopadhyay

Nandini Sundar, 2016, *The Burning Forest: India's war on Bastar*. Review Author: Sutapa Chattopadhyay

Kristian Lasslett (2014), *State Crime on the Margins of Empire: Rio Tinto, the War on Bougainville and Resistance to Mining*. Review Author: Alexander Dunlap

Adam Greenfield, 2017, *Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life*. Review author: Harry Warne

General material

List of editorial contacts [no PDF]

List of journal participants [no PDF]

Call for new participants [no PDF]

Cover art

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About *Interface*

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Social movement thinking beyond the core: theories and research in post-colonial and post-socialist societies

Laurence Cox, Alf Nilsen, Geoffrey Pleyers

Decolonize this?

> After three long years as a Cambridge English student, the thing that is most memorable about my degree and the thing that has caused me the most frustration is just how unbearably white the curriculum is. Myself and countless others have written at length about the ways in which a white curriculum is nothing more than the maintenance of structural and epistemological power. Decolonising the curriculum is a process – a process that requires thought and consideration. It means rethinking what we learn and how we learn it; critically analysing whose voices are given priority in our education and for what reason. It is not an easy process and why should it be?

So began an open letter, written by Cambridge student Lola Olufemi, which reflected on what it would entail to move beyond scholarly and literary canons defined by Eurocentric frames. Her critique echoes an ongoing churning that has animated campus activism across the North-South axis for several years now.

In South Africa, where parts of this editorial are being written, university campuses were sites of turmoil in 2015 and 2016, as students mobilized against tuition fees and around the demand for a decolonized curriculum. At the University of Cape Town, students successfully fought for a statue of Cecil Rhodes to be dismantled. As critical scholars at the university has noted, students articulated a substantial challenge to "the hurtful milieu they live and study in – replete not just with colonial era statues and symbols but also with pedagogical and conversational modes that regard black students as deficient, necessarily lagging in the civilizational race, and with course content that tells their history and describes their African present as above all a site of failure and lack" (Chaturvedi 2015).

Among the central demands of the Rhodes Must Fall movement, as it became known, was the implementation of "a curriculum which critically centres Africa and the subaltern. By this we mean treating African discourses as the point of departure - through addressing not only content, but languages and methodologies of education and learning – and only examining western traditions in so far as they are relevant to our own experience."

Significantly, Black and Minority Ethnic students in Britain have articulated similar demands. At the University College of London, the initiative #WhyIsMyCurriculumSoWhite? focused attention on the fact that "BME students find themselves unrepresented, their histories and cultures completely ignored in the academic field because for many years white writing and history has been given a higher standing, and universities continue to perpetuate this idea of certain sources holding academic privilege" (Hussain 2015). Oxford University witnessed the upshot of its own Rhodes Must Fall movement. The activists wanted to rid the university campus of colonial iconography, but also advanced a wider agenda by arguing that it is essential to change "the Euro-centric curriculum to remedy the highly selective narrative of traditional academia – which frames the West as sole producers of universal knowledge – by integrating subjugated and local epistemologies. This will create a more intellectually rigorous, complete academy" (see also Roy and Nilsen 2016).

The Eurocentrism debate

Student movements for decolonized curricula have run parallel with academic debates over the Eurocentric knowledge structures that shape and inform work in the social sciences and the humanities. In recent years, scholars such as Gurminder Bhambra, Raewyn Connell, Sujata Patel, Julian Go, Ari Sitas, Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, Achille Mbembe and Syed Farid Alatas have invested significant efforts and energy in both delineating how Eurocentrism works to obscure the global relations and connection that undergird modernity and conceiving of alternative paradigms and approaches that can bring these connections and relations squarely into view.

Struggles over knowledge production, then, traverse the boundaries between activism and the academy. This is nothing new – whereas struggles to bring marginal voices to the core of knowledge production, to paraphrase W. E. B. Du Bois, have always unfolded in the university, they are not strictly of it. The close relationship between feminist theory and the women's movement is one example of this, and that between anti-imperialism and postcolonial theory another. In other words, the recognition of movement theory – that is, theory that is grounded in the lived experience of subaltern groups and their collective action to transform current structures of power – as valid knowledge never comes about without a fight (Nilsen 2017).

In the postcolonial world that makes up the majority of our planet, these discussions are often a couple of generations further on than in the universities of their ex-colonial masters. In then-dominant fields such as history and literature, anti-colonial intellectuals had articulated ways of reading their own history which did not place the forward march of Euro-American society and knowledge at the centre, and did not position their own societies as previously barbarous and now passive recipients of western enlightenment. As these alternative readings became new orthodoxies in independent states, they too were challenged, for their own often triumphalist, ethnocentric and state-centred narratives, for their willingness to become instruments of new kinds of power and for their marginalisation of subaltern voices.

This much is familiar to students of Indian literature or Irish history, but remains new and surprising in much of the western academy. As globalisation and the pressure to publish in international, English-language journals have intensified, the limited intellectual independence gained by postcolonial academies has often been undermined by a new orientation of knowledge towards that which is acceptable in the US and UK in particular, the states which dominated the present and previous world-systems (Arrighi 2010).

Consider, for example, three interventions in 2017 around the need to reform the discipline of economics. Leading academics and policy experts published "33 theses for an economics reformation"[1]. This call is best understood as a belated response to the activists of the International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, although it fails to acknowledge the latter[2]. Feminist economists rightly challenged the theses' failure to engage with gender[3]. None of these three interventions, however, mentioned the global dimension: today's divided world, the processes of imperialism, colonialism and slavery, and the ways in which global inequalities are maintained or deepened today are absent from these considerations.

Similarly, the call by scholars of non-western philosophy to take non-western traditions of thought seriously has met with so little resonance in that discipline that scholars of Asian philosophy Jay Garfield and Bryan Van Norden recently proposed, to some bafflement from their colleagues, "that any department that regularly offers courses only on Western philosophy should rename itself 'Department of European and American Philosophy'[4]." The Cuban philosopher Raúl Fornet Betancourt's call for an "intercultural philosophy", meanwhile, aims at promoting an open and comprehensive dialogue with critical and emancipatory traditions and thoughts of other cultures, in personal and collective approaches that fully integrates the epistemic diversity "that has been excluded from the academic world" (Fornet Betancourt 2004). It mobilizes an international and interdisciplinary research network across Europe and Latin America.

We can thus reasonably raise the question of how far social science as currently conceived is specifically western in origin, structure and / or method. Scholars have increasingly been asking after the possibility of a "sociology of the global South": if so, is a "social movement studies of the global South" (Bringel and Dominguez 2015) possible? How can we "think globally" (Wieviorka et al. 2015)? Or, with Sousa Santos (2006), should we rather be thinking in terms of "ecologies of knowledge" that connect different forms of movements' own theorising, different languages of communities in struggle and different kinds of emancipatory research?

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[1] http://www.newweather.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/33-Theses-for-an-Economics-Reformation.pdf

[2] http://www.isipe.net/open-letter/

[3] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/19/delving-deeper-into-an-economics-reformation

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/opinion/if-philosophy-wont-diversify-lets-call-it-what-it-really-is.html

Sociological Eurocentrism

So what is sociological Eurocentrism, and why is it a problem? In 1978 the Palestinian-American intellectual Edward Said published *Orientalism*, a powerful challenge to the western tradition of essentialising other societies, in particular in cultural representation. Eric Wolf, in his seminal book *Europe and the People Without History*, argues that this approach is shared by western social sciences, which have become accustomed to thinking that "there exists an entity called the West, and that one can think of this West as a society and civilization independent of and in opposition to other societies and civilizations" (Wolf 1982: 5). According to Wolf, this way of thinking is related to an underlying assumption that societies and civilizations can be conceived of as "internally homogenous and externally distinctive and bounded objects" (Wolf 1982: 6). Sociology, he argued, had become particularly wedded to the idea of the charmed circle of the nation-state as the container of social relations, institutions, and processes (see Roy and Nilsen 2016).

As a result, modernity tends to be understood as a way of organizing society that emerged from a historical rupture that was unique to the West, while the non-Western world is relegated to a realm of traditional otherness. Colonialism is written out of the story of the making of modernity, and so are the key contributions that the non-Western world made to what was a quintessentially historical process (Bhambra 2007). Moreover, as Raewyn Connell (2007) has pointed out, sociological theories that claim to be universally valid and relevant skirt engagement with colonialism as a historical process and experience when analyses of social relations, societal institutions and structural change are articulated.

The same pattern characterizes sociological theories of globalization: a system of theoretical categories created in the West is focused on the global South and filled with data. The global South is consequently reduced to being a passive object of social science – not an active site of innovative knowledge production (Roy and Nilsen 2016). Ultimately, this yields a series of conceptual blind spots that make genuine understanding of what Bhambra (2014) has referred to as an "always-already global age" extremely difficult and which most certainly fail to provide analytical tools that can address the realities faced by subaltern groups and popular classes in the majority world today (Patel 2010; Sitas 2014).

… and social movement studies?

Canonical social movement studies reflect many of these tendencies – in particular, perhaps, the claim made by Latin American intellectuals which was at the core of dependency theory in the 1970s (see for example Marini 1992): social scientists attempt to understand the reality and challenges of Latin

America applying concepts and categories forged in the West, which do not correspond to the continent's reality but remain prevalent and shape policies as much as academic knowledge across Latin America. More recently, Connell's indictment of the westernness of the theoretical categories that animate and inform analysis shows how little has changed: "The common logic is that a system of categories is created by metropolitan intellectuals and read outwards to societies in the periphery, where the categories are filled in empirically." (Connell 2007: 66).

Prevailing paradigms in the field can generally be traced to North America. In particular, the dominant trajectory from resource mobilization, political process, and framing theory to contentious politics unfolded in the context of the US, in the construction of a canon which remains dominant internationally. This tradition's origin myths were first framed in the US 1960s and 1970s, but conventional PhDs in "social movement studies" still reproduce the same *terra nullius* assumptions of the founders: that nobody (or nobody who mattered) really existed outside their own world, and nothing significant had been thought or written about social movements outside this world, often defined purely in terms of the US academy.

As two of us have observed elsewhere (Barker et al. 2014), one would not know from most such accounts that Marxist and other forms of activist thought had developed their own analyses of social movements far before the putative "virgin birth" of social movement studies as a "scientific" discipline. In the 1980s, largely for legitimation purposes, a spurious "European tradition" defined in terms of new social movements was constructed on the basis of a misleading reading of a handful of texts (Cox and Flesher Fominaya 2013), a token acknowledgement which simultaneously erased Europe's far more extensive and often more strongly movement-linked traditions in languages other than English.

While this now generically Northern theory has been extended to studies of collective action in the global South – for example, Chinese popular resistance has been analyzed in terms of political opportunities and cultural framings (O'Brien and Li 2006) and in the Indian and Latin American contexts, waves of mobilization in the 1980s and 1990s have been interpreted as signalling the rise of new social movements (Omvedt 1993) – it is very difficult (but not entirely impossible) to identify conceptual and analytical currents flowing from South to North within this form of social movement studies. (Exceptions that prove the rule include "buen vivir" and positionality, discussed below.)

This begs two questions: firstly, whether northern theories are at all capable of grasping the particular form and dynamics of social movements in the global South; after all, it is not hard to observe how the history of colonialism, independence struggles and post-colonial state formation shapes characteristic "social movement landscapes" (Cox 2016) which are distinct from those assumed in northern theory. Secondly, whether the marginalisation of southern paradigms amounts to a lost opportunity to push theoretical and analytical boundaries in the study of social movements. Comaroff and Comaroff (2012: 19) have recently argued that, precisely because of their adverse incorporation into the world system, it is in societies and among populations in the global South that the consequences of modernity are most advanced. And as a result of this, the knowledge produced in these societies to understand these consequences are rich in insights that can illuminate nascent processes of change in the global North.

Social movement studies and its discontents

"Social movement studies", as an academic entity with (some) power, resources and legitimacy, now has its institutional centre of gravity in the US, Canada and western Europe, and the same is true for pretty much all the thinkers who are routinely cited in general "social movements" textbooks. Similarly, some of the most "powerful" (insofar as the term has any meaning) theories used *within* social movements also have roots in these societies and are shaped by their specific historical experiences. These specificities, however, are often not recognised or discussed, including in those contexts elsewhere in the world where academics or activists are importing such theories as ways of thinking about local (and global) realities.

Tomas MacSheoin's (2016) article in *Interface* 8/1, and the article by Poulson, Caswell and Gray (2014) in *Social Movement Studies* 13/2 (see also the 2014 response by Graeme Hayes), have discussed the question of how far social movement studies, in their academic form, are a product or reflection of specifically northern / western approaches (primarily as opposed to those of the global South). *Interface* vol. 5 no. 1 (May 2013) was dedicated to anticolonial and postcolonial movements (see Choudry et al. 2013). Elsewhere, Agnes Gagyi (2015) has recently asked how adequate the subdiscipline is to post-socialist experiences (cf. Piotrowski 2015, Císař 2016), while *Interface* had a special issue on movements in post/socialisms (vol. 7 no. 2, November 2015; see Navrátil et al. 2015).

As noted, there are other histories of academic social movement studies. Several substantial schools of European writing which have not been translated into English have been "invisibilized" (rendered invisible) by the growing global domination of English. Some of these, however, have a very fruitful relationship with Latin American scholarship, as for example the work of Alain Touraine. There is a strong Latin American scholarship on social movements in both Spanish and Portuguese, crossing national borders but rarely noticed in the Anglophone world and other contexts relying on English as an academic language. Conversely, the extensive Indian literature in English on social movements is rarely exported far beyond the country's borders.

Beyond these again, as we shall see, the framing of the subject as "social movement studies" is itself a historically and culturally specific way of organising knowledge in this area (Cox 2017). Even within the western academy, the study of social movements is equally undertaken within social history, the study of revolutions, feminism, resistance studies and literature (to name but a few), while movements' own indigenous traditions cast the matter differently again. As we move beyond the west altogether, this diversity and multiplicity increases.

Terra nullius thinking in this area, in other words, served the purposes of developing an intellectual monoculture within a tightly bounded zone (reliant, to extend the metaphor, on the brutal use of intellectual pesticides to exclude alien modes of thinking), and identifying this with "science" *tout court,* but this has always been a small subset of the much wider ecologies of thought existing in a bigger world.

Our own work has increasingly explored these questions: for example, Geoffrey has been organising discussions around this theme within the International Sociological Association's research committee 47 "Social Movements and Social Classes" and in his dialogues with researchers from the Global South (Bringel and Pleyers 2015); Alf has been working on the question of sociologies of the global South in his research on India (Nilsen 2016); while Laurence has been working on understanding social movements in Ireland as a post-colonial society now increasingly located within the "West" (Cox 2016), and on religion as a mode of anti-colonial organisation in turn-of-the-century Asia (Cox 2013).

Such questions have several dimensions. They include the distinctive empirical experiences of social movements and revolutions in different regions of the world; the varied roles of academics and intellectuals in different societies; the diverse kinds of relationships between academics and movements; the complex trajectories of particular disciplines; linguistic barriers and the new globalisation of academic work mentioned above.

Other ways of thinking movements

There are, then, *other* histories of thinking about what might be called social movements, both academic and activist, which are typically excluded in western scholars' accounts of the development of "social movement studies". Indeed it is a true indictment of the provincialism of this approach that it situates the origins of systematic thought on social movements within a particular lineage of US scholars – as though writers in states whose very existence is the product of social movements and revolutions do not reflect on those experiences.

Often these other reflections do not use the term, or only in a very general way and for external purposes. Of course there are also locally-specific forms of apparently Northwestern thought which are radically different in practice from their originators, whether that fact is celebrated or obscured. Southern Marxisms and feminisms, for example, often bear little resemblance to dominant forms of these approaches in the global North, even when they seek academic legitimacy by citing Northern authorities.

But there are also both activist and academic traditions of thinking about movements which have fundamentally different histories. Articulating these is a way of challenging the intellectual power relations that automatically place

Northwestern thought at the centre, and contributes to the creation of a genuinely global dialogue about social movement experiences and learning.

In much of the core, social movement studies are understood as relatively marginal to the central concerns of the social sciences. However, in much of the postcolonial world, many of the intellectuals and academics have at times had particular concerns with social movements and revolutions – arguably in far deeper ways than in the West, given the impact of anti-colonial movements and the centrality of postcolonial movement struggles in many societies, but also in terms of expectations of intellectuals around social change. In postcolonial societies from Ireland to India[5], it is in history and literature that many of the key debates about popular struggles have taken place. Social movement studies' limited engagement with these fields is its own loss – a gap often made up by postcolonial theorising.

In movement thinking too, since the development of articulate forms of activist theory in then-colonial contexts, the anti-imperial and anti-capitalist revolutions which shook much of the twentieth century, and later waves of movements and revolutions against the newly-independent states (and those of Latin America, officially independent since the 19th century), Southern voices have become increasingly central to global dialogues. From the early 20th century Ghadar movement (Ramnath 2011) and the Baku "Congress of the Peoples of the East" via the Bandung Conference of 1955 to the Zapatistas and the World Social Forum, movement thinking from beyond the core has increasingly set the agenda – and regularly had more to show for its efforts than many movements in the global North.

Actors, intellectuals, ideas, experiences and epistemologies from the South provide insights into their own reality, but also challenges for democracy and possible emancipation paths in the global North. How can research on and analysis of social movements go beyond the various borders noted here, and fully include sociologists from all regions of the world?

At the broadest level, then, this issue asks how people talk and think about collective action and social change on a global level (both as activists and as academics). There can be no single answer to this question: the majority world is itself deeply divided in this respect. Latin America, Asia and Africa have very different histories of movement thought and thought about movements, with massive internal differentiation. In Africa, for example, as between the relatively well-resourced study and politically significant study of social movements in South Africa, research on collective action in North Africa, often in closer dialogue with work on the Middle East, and the resource-limited situation of work in sub-Saharan Africa; in Asia, it is enough to contrast India and China to see the scale of the problem.

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[5] Internal colonisation was an important part of European state formation. In the Irish case, this involved an initial 12th century Anglo-Norman conquest; 16th and 17th century population expulsions and settlements ("plantations"); and a 19th century reduction to provider of migrant labour and raw materials. The early 20th century war of independence, based in rural guerrilla actions, was noted by Gramsci and by anti-colonial activists across the British Empire. See Cox 2016 on how the resultant social movement landscape has been theorised. There is an extensive literature on the relationship between Ireland and India in particular; see e.g. O'Connor and Foley 2006; O'Malley 2009.

This special issue also explores social movements research in the post-socialist world, itself equally complex but where East and Central European scholars in particular have increasingly "answered back" to west-centric approaches. Finally, it also addresses "Europe's internal colonies", particularly in relation to Ireland, one of the few west European colonies to have achieved independence, but also indirectly through discussion of Antonio Gramsci, a migrant from colonised southern Italy to the industrial (and deeply racist) North[6].

Latin America: social and epistemic struggles

In Latin America, the rise of the "decolonial perspective" is one of the most striking illustration of the fact that most major debates in social sciences started among social movements before progressively penetrating the academic world (Cox and Nilsen 2014).

1992 became the year of the affirmation of indigenous people as social, political and cultural actors across the continent. While state leaders planned to celebrate "500 years of the discovery of America" by Christopher Columbus, indigenous movements rose up all over the continents to make 1992 the commemoration of 500 years of resistance to the conquest, bringing down statues of "conquistadores". They reasserted their aspiration to live under their own values and their opposition to the modern, individualist and capitalist society. As stated by Luis Maca, the leader of the Ecuadorian national confederation of indigenous people (CONAIE[7]), "our struggle is political and epistemic". This self-assertion built on two decades of increasing indigenous struggle and networking in the Americas, North and South.

The spread of postcolonial perspectives were eased by the existence of intellectuals of previous generations that had developed a perspective on emancipation based on Latin American values and cultures rather than on Western values and concept of progress, such as Mariátegui in the 1930s. Since the 1950s, interaction with local indigenous and peasant communities had also led to the strengthening of a progressive trend in the local Catholic Church that was later known as "liberation theology" (Gutiérrez 1971). This proposes seeing the world through the eyes of the poor, considering them as actors of the transformation of society. Their emancipation is often expected to pass north through modernization and assimilation to the Western culture, but should rather be based in the values of their community and their cosmovision (worldview).

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[6] Gramsci's 1926 "On the Southern Question", left unfinished on his arrest by Mussolini's police, is a powerful analysis of the relationship between the two. Welsh cultural theorist Raymond Williams' work (e.g. 2003) similarly explores the political and cultural dimensions of such internal colonisation.

[7] Confederación Nacional de los Indígenas del Ecuador.

Deeply rooted in and inspired by practical experience among indigenous communities, liberation theology has spread across Latin America and contributed to the rise of a range of movements throughout the continent, including the Zapatista movement in Mexico. The Zapatistas, influential since the late 1990s in inspiring struggles around the world, drew from indigenous experiences of resistance, the organising traditions of liberation theology and third-world Maoism, and the specific history of the Mexican left between nationalist and peasant revolution and Marxism.

Progressive intellectuals, such as Enrique Dussel in Mexico, took part in the movement of liberation theology and closely followed the rise of the new wave of indigenous, popular and ecological movements. Dussel's *Philosophy of Liberation* (1996) proposes rethinking emancipation in ways which are not only different but opposed to modernity. With Anibal Quijano and Walter Mignolo, he argues that the conquest of the Americas is not a project to expand modernity but its foundational moment. These authors stress the oppressive side of modernity, which has its roots in the oppression imposed by the colonialization process. This perspective continues and radicalizes the "theories of dependence" which questioned the modernization and "developmentalist" project and challenges the very concept of development (Escobar 1995) that used to be the cornerstone of modernization projects.

Radical criticism, alternatives and intercultural encounters

The renewal of critical perspectives "from the Global South" combines two dimensions: a radical criticism of the dominant (colonial, modern and capitalist) epistemic perspective, including the claims of universality of the Eurocentric emancipation theories, and a focus on alternative perspectives and practices from/in the Global South.

A third component of this renewal of the critical perspective should not be missed: an invitation to an open, intercultural dialogue that takes into account the positionalities of the actors and that draws on the plurality of alternatives, cosmovisions and emancipatory practices. After developing a radical and very convincing criticism of the colonial dimension of modernity and of current times, the leading critical African intellectual Achille Mbembe concludes his major essay *Critique of Black Reason* (2017) with an epilogue entitled "There is only one world".

He insists on the connectedness of humanity and on the need to develop a new cosmopolitan perspective: "the great challenge of our times is the progressive emergence of a planetary consciousness". "Whether we want it or not, we are tight and these ties will only straight in the times to come". "Our aim is thus to rebuild common histories, not only histories of the global South". On this point too, social movements have paved the way. The World Social Forum was created to open spaces for a dialogue among activists from all continents based on the assumption of the multiplicity of alternatives to neoliberal policies.

These three dimensions of the renewal of emancipatory perspectives (the critical assessment of coloniality and modernity, the alternative proposal and the open dialogue) should not be understood as successive stages: they need to be combined at every step of theoretical and practical projects.

Epistemic justice

The new wave of movements since the 1990s increasingly breaks down the division between socio-economic and cultural claims. The defence of alternative cosmovisions is a complementary side of the claim for social justice. Epistemology, forms of knowledge and cosmovisions are thus part of the battlegrounds and of any emancipation project. As synthetized by Sousa Santos, “There is no social justice without epistemological justice”. To defend the cosmovisions (worldview) that have been “invisibilized” and denied by the modernization process is a major part of indigenous people’s and emancipatory movements.

These often challenge dominant and modern forms of knowledge pointing to asymmetries, power relations and dependencies in the relations between cultures and peoples. It shows how modernity built itself and keeps reproducing itself through coloniality and how Western subjectivity (which Bolívar Echeverría calls *blanquitud*, “whiteness”, and Achille Mbembe “black reason”) has constructed itself in a relation of domination over the “others”.

Such struggles for epistemic justice combine the three critical operations stated above. First, they aim at unveiling power and domination within what is presented as “objective knowledge” or the official perspective of history. In the global South as in the North, radical historians unveil a different account of history, unveiling the agency of popular actors and movements and the perspective of the victim of domination and colonialism that are “invisibilize” in modern and colonial perspectives.

The second operation is to shed light on and analyse alternative forms of knowledge (Sousa Santos 2013) and their potential contribution to solving both local and global problems and to provide elements to rethink emancipation outside and often against modern ways of thinking. Thirdly, however, epistemic justice is not reached by replacing the domination of another knowledge but the co-existence and articulation of diverse forms of knowledge. The aim is to replace Western universalism by “pluriversalism”. Likewise, there is not a uniform counter-project to neoliberalism but a multitude of alternatives. Consideration of plurality is an integral part of the process and is seen as a direct challenge to the very idea of a single path to emancipation and happiness.

A long-standing global dialogue

In the Indian context, the futility of thinking in terms of absolute epistemological divides between North and South becomes evident if we consider the Subaltern Studies project. As is well known, this project was conceived as an attempt to overcome the deep-seated elitism of the historiography that informed prevailing approaches to the Indian freedom struggle. According to Ranajit Guha (1982), the project's founding father, this elitism was manifest, above all, in a tendency to marginalize the involvement of subaltern groups in the independence struggle and to portray it as a passive response to mobilization from above.

The Subaltern Studies project sought to challenge this elitism by studying the active resistance of subaltern groups to oppression and exploitation under British rule. In opposition to elitist perspectives, Guha asserted the existence of a "politics of the people" constituting an autonomous domain, parallel to and isolated from the elites' mental world and sphere of influence, which found expression in the countless uprisings and protest movements that developed among the small peasants and indigenous populations of the Indian village and among India's dawning urban proletariat in the course of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century (Guha 1982: 4). And these movements came to constitute the main empirical subject of the many volumes produced by the Subaltern Studies project (see Nilsen 2017: chapter 1).

However, the project cannot be credibly portrayed as a purely Indian or South Asian initiative. First of all, several of the scholars who initially propelled the project were of British and other western backgrounds, and many of the Indian scholars who were integral to Subaltern Studies were and still are part of an elite group of Southern academics who, as Arif Dirlik (1994: 329) has put it, "have arrived in First World academe".

Secondly and more significantly, the Subaltern Studies project was initially based theoretically on the intersection between British Marxist historiography, Gramsci's perspectives on hegemony and popular resistance and the study of peasant movements in the colonial world (see Ludden 2003; Chaturvedi 2000). The goal of writing "history from below" was drawn from the British Marxist historians' analysis of the bourgeois revolution in England and the transition to industrial capitalism.[8] The assumption that subaltern political consciousness and repertoires of action constituted an "autonomous domain" was taken from Gramsci's programme (1998: 52) for the study of what he called "subaltern classes".[9]

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[8] E. P. Thompson, who was elected president of the Indian History Congress in the late 1970s, was perhaps particularly important in this respect; see Chandavarkar (2000) and Sarkar (2000) for commentaries.

[9] But as David Ludden (2003: 15) notes, Guha used the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* rather than Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* to define 'subaltern' in the first volume of *Subaltern Studies*. This hints at the series' unresolved and unclear relationship to Gramsci's theories on hegemony and resistance (see Green 2002; Nilsen 2017: chapter 1).

Finally, the fact that Subaltern Studies largely concentrated on political protest among small peasants in the Indian village is tied to the re-orientation then taking place in the study of the role of peasant movements within anti-imperialist struggles: contemporary revolutionary transformations in China, Cuba and Vietnam forced new analyses and debates on the political significance of the peasantry within the historical development of capitalism and its global expansion (Wolf 1969; Scott 1976; Alavi 1965; Hobsbawm 1973). None of this is meant to belittle the significance of Subaltern Studies as an advance in the study of popular resistance to colonial rule, and more generally as an innovative approach to the study of collective action from below. It is, however, an example of how the epistemologies that guide such advances refuse easy compartmentalization into Northern and Southern silos.

This is of course also true in terms of conceptual currents that flow from South to North. Consider, for example, the idea of social movement unionism. As Karl von Holdt (2002: 284) has pointed out, Southern labour scholars introduced the concept “in an effort to understand the militant, mobilized industrial unions emerging in the newly industrializing countries … in the 1980s” (see also Lambert and Webster 1988; Lambert 1990).

This effort, in turn, was rooted in the perception that metropolitan industrial sociology, with its focus on institutionalized trade unions, was inadequate to the task of understanding organizing and mobilizing strategies that emerged in authoritarian contexts in the global South, which were embedded in wider community and political alliances, and committed to both “internal democratic practices as well as to the broader democratic and socialist transformation of authoritarian societies … (von Holdt 2002: 285).

However, the concept was soon taken up by northern labour scholars – for example, Kim Moody (1997), Peter Waterman (2001), and Fantasia and Voss (2004) – in an attempt to both criticize the atrophy of established forms of unionism in the American context and to grapple with new organizing and mobilizing initiatives that were emerging, often propelled by immigrant and minority workers (see also Milkman 2006; Voss and Bloemrad 2011; Milkman and Voss 2014). This is not to deny the very real fact of persistent Northern dominance in the academy – and also in the more progressive and radical parts of the academy – but again to caution against a simple counterposing of Northern and Southern epistemologies as watertight compartments or incommensurable opposites.

Majority world Marxisms

This last point is true for Marxism more generally, as for feminism (or indeed for liberation theology as a form of Latin American Catholicism). Since the Russian Revolution of 1917, the leading force in global Marxism has been a once-peasant state on the fringes of Europe with its own contradictory history in relation to anti-colonial nationalisms (an issue discussed by Irish Marxist James Connolly in the same period). The Soviet Union, and its peculiar readings of

Marxism, became central to many of the left nationalisms that would win out in the post-WWII wave of independence struggles, leading in short order to the formation of Maoism as a distinctly "Third World" Marxism. More broadly, in this period, the revolutionary edge of Marxism was increasingly understood – in the majority world where these struggles were burning ones, as in the west – as one to be found in Asia and in Latin America.

The net effect, whatever the rhetoric, was the development of a wide variety of often mutually-hostile majority world Marxisms; nowhere was this more visible than in India where some communist parties held power, while others fought a guerrilla war against the Indian state. Still today, indigenous Maoism is officially seen as one of the main threats to the latter.

This history, perhaps, reminds us that the later Marx paid particular attention to the colonised world, in Europe and beyond: to India, Indonesia and Poland, to Ireland and the struggle against slavery in the US, to non-western and pre-capitalist societies (Anderson 2010). This perspective is, perhaps, less surprising when we cease to think of Marx as a bearded 19th-century German (an image favoured by US sociologists seeking to legitimate their own discipline as suitably authoritative), and think of him as a political refugee in a Europe marked by anti-semitism and struggles over the future and meaning of being Jewish as well as by struggles against imperialism within Europe (Poland, Italy, Ireland) and beyond.

The example of revolutionary Marxism as a theory mostly used in the majority world makes visible a situation which is characteristic of majority world movement thinking more generally: it may speak minority world languages, literally and metaphorically, but it speaks its own form of these languages, with its own centre of gravity and to wrestle with challenges arising in its own context. Similar relationships exist for anarchism or autonomism, feminism or ecological thought, anti-colonialism and nationalism.

To list these is, of course, at the same time to pose a problem. If "movements-become-state" are particularly visible in the majority world, this also means that nationalism and Marxism as ideologies of power, co-opting theories formed in struggle to serve the interests of new state elites, are also particularly powerful; so that the challenge for movement thought in such contexts is often to *distinguish* itself from how the powerful use the same words to mean something different. This is of course similar to the situation of liberation theologians in Latin America, deploying their own dialect of Catholicism against hierarchies often deeply complicit with the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s. These days, the same problems are emerging for indigenous movements in states such as Bolivia and Ecuador which use indigeneity and ecology as part of their rhetoric for an international audience and to maintain their local power bases.

Souths in the North, Norths in the South

As noted above, we cannot think imperialism and colonialism as histories which neatly separate two parts of the world. European states were launched on a process of empire-building and colonisation within Europe well before 1492, a process which continued into the 19th century and indeed past the rise of subaltern nationalisms and the transformation of empires into nation-states; the experience of Ireland, Poland or southern Italy are good examples of the complexities involved, including what happened as such societies became part of the "First World" in various ways. This imperial past was paralleled in a number of majority-world empires; in contexts such as China and Burma the relationships between dominant and peripheral ethnicities survived the colonial period, albeit in transformed ways.

The process of external colonisation produced long-standing settler states with often irreducible indigenous populations pushed into marginal contexts, a situation shared with many states in the majority world where farmers had squeezed hunter-gatherers or dominant ethnic groups had displaced indigenous populations and where such conflicts remain important today (not least, the struggles of Indian *Adivasi* populations). Latin American societies, where settler populations became dominant but lost the privileged position still held by settler states in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have a particular history in this respect; South Africa's future is, perhaps, still to be decided. The struggles of indigenous and nomadic populations also remain significant in a number of European countries today.

Slavery constructed different types of diaspora across the Americas in particular, while empire's chickens came home to roost in Europe's once-imperial homelands in the form of labour migration after WWII, and more recently new types of refugee movements across the global North. Finally, the one socialist revolution of the early post-WWI period to succeed – the Soviet Union – took place in a peripheral state, itself a multi-ethnic empire with an ongoing colonisation project in its eastern regions. After WWII, the spread of the Soviet model to East and Central European states which had in most cases been subordinate to the German, Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Russian empires produced a new type of unequal relationship – replaced after 1989 by a newly unequal relationship with western economic and political interests.

Empire and colonialism, slavery and diaspora, ethnic and racial domination and the oppression of indigenous and nomad populations, then, are relationships writ large across the world. If they mark out a global South and global North, they also mark out a "South within the North" and a "North within the South", or more exactly many different Souths within Northern states, and a variety of Norths within Southern ones.

Our solidarities mark out moments of recognition, as with international support for Palestinian struggle against the settler state; they also mark out moments of choice, where in the South or in the North we choose to speak and act from a recognition of these realities of oppression, exploitation and cultural stigmatisation. Other choices are also possible, as today's racist upsurge across the post-imperial North reveals – and the rise of racism in East and Central Europe, in South Africa or in Myanmar among other places.

Epistemologies of the South: absences and emergences

Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) has attempted to summarize some of the main epistemological proposals of this wide set of critical thoughts in what he calls the "epistemologies of the South". The concept highlights the contributions of actors and intellectuals from the Global South and invites us to see the world from the cosmovisions of indigenous movements, peasants, oppressed and rebels, notably based on the contributions of "subaltern studies" with their origins in India, and decolonial and postcolonial thought developed by Latin American intellectuals and rooted in struggles of the continent.

In this perspective, rethinking social justice and emancipation is a task which is not limited to the South of the planet, but which concerns all regions of the world. This "South" in the proposed epistemology does not refer to a geographical entity. It is rather a metaphor for a way of seeing and thinking the world "from below", from and with the oppressed, combining practical and cognitive resistances. While populations of the Global South have been particularly affected by capitalism and colonialism, this “South” also exists in the North, among excluded, silenced and marginalized populations, such as undocumented migrants, ethnic and religious minorities, victims of sexism, homophobia and racism (Sousa Santos 2014; EZLN 1996: 243). Conversely, oligarchies in the southern countries that take advantage of the dominant order and reinforce it.

A sociology of absence

Sousa Santos proposes a concrete implementation of “epistemologies of the South” in an approach combining two complementary perspectives: the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences. The *sociology of absences* is based on premises that "what does not exist (or is invisible) is actively produced as non-existent (or invisible)" (Sousa Santos, 2014). It aims at “making visible” the actors that have been “made invisible” by mainstream perspectives and modernization processes. To reintegrate these actors, these alternatives and these perspectives, leads to a very different vision of the history and struggles (Zinn, 2005). The idea of epistemologies of the South is a powerful heuristic tool for re-reading the history and timeliness of the emancipation practices put in place by social actors and movements. Social movements, resistances and alternatives then appear to be much more numerous, more diverse and more central than in what is presented in the sociology of social movements mostly focused on institutional visions of politics, and state-centred perspectives of emancipation centred.

A sociology of emergence

The other side of the “epistemologies of the South” is a sociology of emergences which aims to identify and analyse existing experiences that embody concrete alternatives to the dominant colonial and capitalist society. For Sousa Santos, the alternative to the dominant society will not happen after the rupture of a "big revolution" – after all, many states in the South have already had one or several of these – but it is plural and already exists in a multiplicity of experimentations and prefigurative practices which are at once utopian and realistic (Laville 2011; Pleyers 2010).

Without denying their limits or the existence of internal contradictions and although they are constantly being watched for by marginalization or recovery, such alternatives nevertheless indicate that "another world is possible", to use the slogan of the World Social Forum. These practical experiences are valued both because they embody the ability to act and transform the world of social actors but also because, however small they are, they must be considered as alternatives to hegemony and constitute therefore a political stake.

The epistemologies of the South, in this formulation, echo the decolonial perspective and point to the fact that today's major problems find their roots in modernity but that "there are not sufficient modern solutions". If so, we need to think emancipation and life in a different framework, looking at and diffusing existing solutions such as those implemented by peasant and indigenous movements that have inspired ecologists around the world.

Sousa Santos' reflections draw in large part from the history of the World Social Forum, which in turn reflects the histories of a range of well-developed forms of social movement thinking: the conversations between French and Latin American movement intellectuals that underlay the Forum, the conversations between peasant movements that underlay Via Campesina, the conversations between movements, parties and intellectuals that made it possible for the Forum to be housed in Brazil, and so on. Such reflections could be paralleled from other sources: for example, the Zapatistas as a learning moment bringing together the urban left and Mexico's unfinished revolution, long-standing indigenous resistance, Maoism and liberation theology – and pointing forwards to Peoples' Global Action and the alterglobalisation movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

As movements, and associated academic milieux, enter into dialogue with one another across geographical distance, political differences and different issues or social bases, such questions naturally arise, and have long existed both formally and informally within the various "internationals" of social movements. Thus the "sociology of absences" has similarities with the "history from below" long practiced by Marxist and feminist researchers, oral historians and students of subaltern movements. The "sociology of emergences" connects closely to the question of *potential* and *social transformation* as a central aspect of social movements. And so on.

What do these perspectives change in substance?

On the widest scale, these perspectives should help us think differently about what social change consists of. They hold out the possibility of connecting more systematically the study of social movements, the study of forms of everyday life and the study of revolutions[10]: for example, to say that in the majority world social movements have frequently given rise to revolutions, but also to new forms of everyday life shaped by the overthrow of colonialism. These are not, in the final analysis, separate terms; even though to think them together is challenging[11].

In Burma, for example, the Buddhist revival of the later 19th and earlier 20th century offered emerging urban and educated groups during the colonial period a new way of articulating themselves (Turner 2014). The Burmese struggle for independence thus also became the process whereby, parallelling European ethno-nationalisms, these new formations produced an ethno-religious domination over Burma's many other ethnicities and religious diversity. Contemporary anti-Muslim pogroms are the most visible face of the wider remaking of everyday culture through religious movements and ultimately state-formation processes.

It is, perhaps, the relative stability of many states in the global North, and the relative strength of their institutional boundaries, that lead to "positivist" definitions of social movement studies as a neatly-bounded subfield, separate from revolutions, affecting the state only through legislative change, and relating "externally" to other aspects of society which are also understood as separate and fundamentally distinct areas of life.

The revolutions that shaped the foundations of the British, French and US states – and the social movements that reshaped them again – are easily overlooked in favour of a more institutional definition of reality within which movements are not expected to have such an effect. Similar operations are often performed, with a slightly greater mental effort, in European states whose twentieth century experience was one of repeated reshaping by revolutions and warfare. Even in the majority world, scholars can readily fall for such globally dominant perspectives: in any university, they offer a distancing from politically awkward struggles of the present, simplify workloads and increase the chance of publication in prestigious locations.

Social movements in the global South, 1918-2018

We would argue, not only from the perspective of our political engagement but as scholars who take our intellectual tasks seriously, that this approach goes beyond oversimplification and produces a serious misunderstanding of what movements are and how they work.

The social movements which are unfolding in the global South today are best understood as the latest stage in a century-long trajectory of waves of popular mobilization. The broad-brush sketch below shows the inadequacy of any theorisation of social movements which separates them from the revolutions and state-formation processes which they repeatedly fed into, or from the structures of inequality and everyday life which they constantly challenged and remade (see also Nilsen 2015, 2017). As we shall also see, movement waves in the North and the South are coeval and imbricated in each other; it is not possible, on any serious scale, to understand our own local histories in isolation.

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[10] In very different ways, scholars as different as James Scott (1990), John Holloway (2010) and Bayat (2010) have attempted to make these connections with a focus on the majority-world experience and outside the framework of conventional social movement studies.

[11] See e.g. the *Interface* special issue (vol. 4 no. 1, May 2012) on the "Arab Spring"; Shihade et al. 2012.

Anticolonial nationalism

Between the two World Wars (1918-1940) the politics of anticolonial nationalism in Asia and Africa transformed in important ways. Initially, demands for national self-determination had been raised by elite groups who "made little attempt to mobilize the mass of the population into the nationalist struggle" (Silver and Slater 1999: 200). In the wake of the revolutionary upheavals in Mexico and Russia, this changed as nationalist leaders began to mobilize peasants and workers in large-scale popular movements, and increasingly linked their political projects between countries and regions (Motta and Nilsen 2011b; Prashad 2007). With a broader scope of mobilization, the substantive content of anticolonialism was also altered: the imperative of national liberation was connected to ideals of social justice and an end to poverty. Anticolonial movements, then, began to assert not just "the liberty and equality of peoples", but also "liberty and equality among the people" (Wallerstein 1990: 31).

As colonial gave way to national independence for the Third World in the post-war era, anticolonial nationalism changed once again – from a collective oppositional project to a nation-building project in which *development* emerged as the central ambition of newly independent states (Desai 2004; Patel and McMichael 2004). The postcolonial development project was constructed around strategies of "national capitalist development" (Desai 2004: 171) that sought to modernize agriculture and industry through the initiatives and leadership of the developmental state (see Kiely 2007: 49-57).

To secure a social basis for the postcolonial development project, the erstwhile leaders of anticolonial movements forged a network of horizontal alliances between dominant agrarian and industrial interests, and vertical alliances between these dominant groups and the subaltern groups that had previously rallied to the cause of anticolonial nationalism (Walton and Seddon 1995). Within such "developmentalist alliances" (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) industrial and agrarian elites held on to their property rights and privileged access to the levers of political power, while subaltern groups were given somewhat better access to expanded public employment and public services and a minimal "social wage guarantee" through different types of subsidized consumption (Walton and Seddon 1995).

This was a configuration of compromises and concessions that won the consent of subaltern groups to elite-led nation-building projects. However, the unraveling of these projects signaled the emergence of a new long wave of popular resistance that can be referred to as postcolonial social movements.

Postcolonial social movements

In 1968, the world erupted in a global revolt that "cut across the tripartite division of the world system at the time – the West, the Communist bloc, and the Third World" (Wallerstein 2006: 6). The Southern moment of this global revolt was profoundly complex, as subaltern groups and popular classes joined together in movements that confronted *both* the contradictions of the postcolonial development project *and* the continued subordination of Third World countries in the capitalist world system (Watts 2001; Berger 2004; Prashad 2007).

A very important aspect of the 1968 revolt in the global South was the emergence of movements from below that targeted "the nationalism and institutionalized elite politics … of the first generation of independent third-world states" (Watts 2001: 172). For example, in India – one of the leading "first-generation Bandung regimes" (Berger 2004: 11) – the late 1960s saw the outbreak of guerilla warfare against the state as the Naxalite movement emerged in West Bengal to mobilize landless peasants against the semi-feudal rule of landed elites and the power of a state that was deemed to be a bridgehead of neo-imperial power in the country (see Banerjee 1984, Roy 2012).

In spite of brutal repression, the Naxalites marked a political watershed in postcolonial India: in its aftermath followed a wide range of new social movements that mobilized groups such as *Adivasis*, women, *Dalits*, and informal sector workers that had often been at the very margins of the postcolonial development project. This mobilization happened outside the domain of electoral politics, and challenged the ways in which this project centralized political power in an elite-dominated state apparatus, advanced a form of development that had dispossessed marginal peasants and subsistence producers, and failed to curtail the gendered and caste-based violence to which women and Dalits were still subjected (see Omvedt 1993).

The Indian trajectory is only one of many examples from across the global South of how the late 1960s and the decade of the 1970s was an era in which subaltern groups struggled to develop new forms of collective action that could enable them to challenge their adverse position in the postcolonial development project. Despite the fact that these movements were often met with coercion from above – most egregiously in the form of the state terrorism unleashed by Latin American dictatorships with U.S. backing during the 1970s – their critiques of dispossession and disenfranchisement still resonate in the politics of more recent popular mobilizations across the three regions of the South (see Nilsen 2010).

Another key facet of the Southern revolt of 1968 is the emergence of what Mark Berger (2004: 19) has called "second-generation Bandung regimes" and the radicalization of Third Worldism that resulted from this development. The term itself refers to an arc of regimes that tretches from Ahmed Ben Bella's Algeria (1962-65) to Sandinista rule in Nicaragua (1979-90). Other significant examples of this new generation of Third World regimes would be Chile under Salvador Allende (1970-73), Samora Machel's Mozambique (1975-86), and Jamaica under Michael Manley (1972-80). What these regimes shared was "a more radical, more unambiguously socialist, Third Worldism" than the first-generation Bandung regimes (Berger 2004: 19-23). Many of these regimes had emerged through protracted and particularly violent struggles against colonial domination – Algeria and Mozambique being cases in point in this regard.

The emergence of these regimes was closely related to the radicalization of the Third World project that had first crystallized at the Afro-Asian people's conference in Bandung in 1955. The first expression of this was the Tricontinental Conference that brought together national leaders and the representatives of liberation movements from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (see Prashad 2007: chapter 8).

The conference was characterized by the militancy of the second-generation regimes, something that became clear not only in the increased support for armed struggle as an anti-imperialist strategy against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Vietnam, but also in the various ways that these regimes "attempted to radicalize state-mediated national development efforts in various ways in the name of socialism and national liberation" (Berger 2004: 21). Resurgent Third Worldism was also evident on the global arena in the form of the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that was put before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, in which the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for a fundamental restructuring of the international economy in order to make it possible for the countries of the global South to break free from their subordinate position in the world system (see Prashad 2012: 24-34).

The resurgence of a radicalized Third Worldism eventually foundered – partly because of the intransigence of the global North, partly because of the erosion of internal solidarity among the states of the global South, and partly due to the onset of the international debt crisis in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the indictment that the second-generation Bandung regimes raised against persistent unequal power relations in the global political economy in many important ways foreshadowed the critiques of neoliberal inequality that has been articulated more recently by social movements across the global South.

Neoliberalism and resistance

During the 1970s, regimes all over the global South attempted to ward off economic stagnation by borrowing large sums of money from an international banking system that was flooded with excess dollars. Whereas these loans allowed Southern states to offset stagnation in the short term, this was nevertheless a strategy that created significant long-term vulnerabilities. This became obvious when the U.S. Federal Reserve implemented a significant hike in interest rates in 1979 as part of a strategy to lift the country out of recession. The combination of higher interest rates and a downturn in demand and terms of trade for products from the global South in world markets made debt-servicing impossible. And as credit in global financial markets dried up, further borrowing was out of the question (see McMichael 2004).

The response to the international debt crisis came in the form of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) administered by the IMF and the World Bank. In exchange for fresh loans and debt rescheduling, countries in the global South had to implement a number of reforms geared towards a profound alteration of their political economies: currencies were devaluated; public expenditure was downsized; prices and commodity markets were deregulated; public sector companies and utilities were privatized and sold off, often to foreign investors (Walton and Seddon 1995). In short, the outbreak of the international debt crisis opened the doors to neoliberal restructuring in the global South and with it, the unraveling of the postcolonial development project (Kiely 2007).

Neoliberal restructuring through SAPs "eroded national economic management, and, by extension, the social contract that development states had with their citizens" (McMichael 2004: 140). The postcolonial development project had been based on an alliance of social forces where the consent of subaltern groups was secured by granting access to public sector employment and various forms of subsidized consumption that came to constitute a social wage guarantee for these groups. With the neoliberal turn, states in the global South withdrew from these arrangements, and – as is evidenced by the escalation of poverty and declining trends in social development that plagued Latin America and Africa in particular in the 1980s and early 1990s – this withdrawal had a deeply adverse impact on subaltern livelihoods and living standards (see George 1991).

The response from below came in the form of a popular resistance that has been called "IMF riots" or "austerity protests" – that is, "large-scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization implemented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies" (Walton and Seddon 1995: 39). Almost 150 cases of austerity protests occurred across the global South from the middle of the 1970s to the early 1990s. These protests brought together the urban poor, the working classes, and sometimes also parts of the middle classes in opposition to the distributional consequences of SAPs (Walton and Seddon 1995: 39-44).

At the heart of popular resistance to neoliberalism was a "moral economy of the urban poor" that had crystallized in and through the postcolonial development project (Walton and Seddon 1994: 48). Subaltern groups had come to see the social wage guarantees that postcolonial states had provided as a legitimate right that was owed to them in return for their active or passive consent to the elite-led postcolonial development project (Walton and Seddon 1994: 48). As a result, when states, as part of the implementation of SAPs, phased out price subsidies and public services and cut back on public sector employment, the urban poor perceived this as a violation of their rightful expectations:

"Protestors demanded that the state meet its responsibilities to the people who, during the decades of patron-client politics, had upheld their end of the bargain." (Walton and Seddon 1994: 50)

The politics of the IMF riots were essentially defensive. In contrast to the new social movements of the 1970s, which took aim at the centralization of political power in the developmental state, austerity protests attempted to uphold some aspects of the state-society relations of the postcolonial development project that accommodated the needs and interests of subaltern groups (Motta and Nilsen 2011b: 14). However, we should not conclude that popular resistance to neoliberal restructuring was simply a backward-looking form of protest. Rather, what austerity protests in fact articulated was an embryonic opposition to the forms of "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2005) that have been at the heart of the neoliberal project and central to the systematic transfer of social wealth "from the mass of the population towards the upper classes [and] from vulnerable to richer countries" (Harvey 2007: 34). In doing this, austerity protests came to play a vital role in giving shape to the counterhegemonic projects of the social movements that are currently asserting radical claims from below in the global South.

Social movements in the contemporary global South

If the unraveling of the postcolonial development project from the late 1960s onwards opened up a space in which novel resistances could be articulated, the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 2000s witnessed the consolidation across much of the global South of social movements that fuse and develop key aspects of these resistances in new oppositional projects. One of the most significant examples of this development was the outbreak of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico in 1994. The political project of the *Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional* was multi-layered in that it fused a rejection of the political economy of developmentalism – a political economy in which indigenous peoples in Mexico had been dispossessed in the name of national progress – with opposition to the structural inequalities – both national and global – that are intrinsic to neoliberal globalization (see Harvey 1998; Collier 2005; Morton 2011: Chapter 7). Such twin indictments of both developmentalism and neoliberalism are not unique to the Zapatistas – they have figured centrally, for example, in resistance to dispossession in India's Narmada Valley (Nilsen 2010) and in the popular protests that have recently shaken the Arab world (Dabashi 2012; Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). There are three particularly important manifestations of this tendency in contemporary social movements in the global South.

First of all, current mobilization from below in the global South have continued to criticize the exclusionary and centralizing tendencies of political decision-making in postcolonial states. Furthermore, many movements have worked consistently to develop strategies that can give rise to more participatory forms of politics – for example, by enabling subaltern communities to take control of local political arenas, whether through urban neighborhood assemblies or by participating in local electoral processes – or by championing for various forms of devolution of political power. Beyond the national level, social movements from the global South have been extremely vocal in articulating a critique of the plutocracy that reigns in transnational institutions like the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the G8.

Secondly, resistance to dispossession has increasingly emerged as a key issue in the politics of social movements in the global South, both in rural contexts where natural resources are increasingly subject to commodification and in urban locales where financial crises have wreaked havoc on industrial manufacturing. However, rather than mobilizing for a return of the developmental state, social movements have begun to develop alternative forms of community-based collective ownership – for example, when the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra* in Brazil organize agricultural production through democratic cooperatives or the *Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados* in Argentina occupy disbanded factories and operate them through systems of workers' management.

Thirdly, the hierarchies of political and economic power that structure the capitalist world system are still a target of critique in and through the collective agency of Southern social movements. This is particularly manifest in the way that the politics of these social movements link the exigencies of localized struggles to the dynamics of global power structures and mobilize to achieve progressive changes across spatial scales. For example, the emergence of networks of transnational agrarian movements have been integral in linking the disparate struggles of rural communities across the South in opposition to a global "corporate food regime" and in defense of the notion of "food sovereignty" as an alternative to neoliberal agricultural policies.

Rethinking social movement studies

This lively reality is often sold rather short by the often rather circumscribed concerns of mainstream "social movement studies". That research on movements is strongly grounded in one's own particular local reality is entirely appropriate and healthy; what is problematic is when the wider world, beyond that reality, is understood only through the terms offered by a provincialism which is not recognised as such. "Science" is not defined by conformity to the concerns of one's disciplinary colleagues locally, let alone by imagining that they constitute the totality of the relevant conversation. Whether from an activist or academic perspective, taking the pursuit of understanding and transformation seriously means thinking on a wider scale as a matter of course.

As our involvement in editing this issue testifies, attention to the epistemologies of the South is not an issue limited to intellectuals from the global South but a general proposal to rethink emancipation, social movements and social sciences. It deeply challenges the dominant theories and perspectives that have been built by scholars and case studies in the Global North. Critical sociologists may, for example, question the very concept of social movements (Garza 2016, Holloway 2015) as based on a Western concept and analyses, proposing instead analyses in terms of "resistance" or "rebels". The challenge is then not to replace one set of words by another – after all, "resistance" is best known in the social sciences through Foucault, and "rebels" are only such from the viewpoint of an empire – but to use this to draw attention to how we think, from what standpoint and for what purposes.

For researchers from the North, the colonial/postcolonal perspective is an invitation to acknowledge our "positionality" (Dussel 1996) as researchers situated and trained in dominant countries and to more modesty when it comes to universalize one's research results and concepts of emancipation. This requires acknowledging the limitation of one's own knowledge and forms of knowing and to open oneself to the encounter with different forms of knowledge. An "intercultural exchange" (Fornet Betancourt 1994) requires a personal attitude and a will to expose oneself to the risk (and the hope) "of losing some of one's certainty and to learning from the other" (Mbembe 2017b).

This is made harder by the constraints imposed on everyone by language: not only the limited number of languages which any individual can effectively learn (although social scientists who are only able to work in one language are particularly restricted – a problem most common in core states), but also the politics and economics of translation, and of globally dominant languages, meaning that it is a particular challenge to develop communication which is *not* shaped by the particular prestige of English and the question of which theorists and researchers are translated, and distributed, via English (Cox 2017).

All of these questions are central to *Interface's* original mission of supporting and encouraging dialogue between reflection on social movements from different parts of the world and the different languages (theoretical, political, disciplinary, intellectual, cultural) in which movements think about themselves and research is framed, something embodied in our unique organisational structure. We are happy to see that MacSheoin's (2016) article shows that our approach bears some fruit, in terms of a wider global focus than other social movement journals – while recognising that there is still a huge way to go. If rough parity between articles on movements in core societies and those on movements in the global South probably mirrors to some extent the global distribution of academic researchers and resources, it does not in any way mirror the far greater strengths of *movement* theorists in the global South, and we need to find more effective ways of including these in our dialogue.

One key reason why *Interface* equally encourages dialogue between different intellectual and political traditions as well as between different disciplines is similarly the very different significance of these different ways of thinking in different national and regional contexts. This is of course also true for thinking *from and for* movements, which arguably plays out very differently in countries where empires have been overthrown within living memory, or for that matter those which are experiencing a reaction either against the socialist experience or against the hopes raised by the movements of 1989.

In this issue

This special issue brings together contributions which articulate particular approaches to social movement research, movement-based theories and histories of thinking about these subjects which are rooted in the post-colonial and post-Soviet experiences, in the context and cultures of the global South and that in other ways decentre taken-for-granted assumptions and institutional power relationships about the production of social movement theory.

In writing the call for this issue, we had broad ambitions: we were interested in everything from indigenous thought via religious forms of mobilisation to the particularities of movement theorising in China or in East and Central Europe. Intellectually we were aware of discussions ranging from Indian subaltern studies, research on the Black Atlantic, Latin American feminisms to South African radical thought and more.

We were hoping for papers which challenge mainstream forms of social movement theory (whether resource mobilisation, political opportunity structure, new social movements, frame theory, dynamics of contention, strategy-framework etc.) from the perspective of movement experiences in the global South. We also sought papers highlighting types of struggle which go beyond the themes of nationally- or core-defined politics, such as work on anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles, indigenous and peasant movements, mass-based left and ethnic movements, campaigns against free trade deals etc.

We were particularly interested in theoretical discussions (eg around sociologies from the global South, Michel Wieviorka's *Penser global* project etc.) and social movement thinking processes (e.g. the World Social Forum discussion processes; Sen and Waterman 2008, Sen and Saini 2005) expressing a consciously global aspiration based in the global South. We wondered how far it might be possible to invite or include existing political and academic debates and discussions which are primarily focussed within a single country or region of the world into a wider debate, in *Interface* or elsewhere.

Finally, at the broadest level, we felt it important that the call did not require authors to subscribe to a particular analysis but instead invited conscious reflection on how far terms and distinctions like global South / global North, postcolonial, core / periphery etc. are helpful in understanding the movements they are studying.

The right to housing beyond the West

This issue's themed articles were preceded, in our last issue (vol 9 no 1), by a special section on "The right to housing in theory and practice: going beyond the West". Guest-edited by Katia Valenzuela-Fuentes, Dominika Polanska and Anne Kaun and coming out of an activist-academic conference, this section included Joanna Kostka and Katarzyna Czarnota's "Modes of knowledge production in the study of radical urban movements" (on Poland); Bálint Misetics' "Homelessness, citizenship and need interpretation: reflections on organising with homeless people in Hungary"; Ana Vilenica's "Contemporary housing activism in Serbia: provisional mapping" (with Ana Džokić and Marc Neelan / Who Builds the City); Marta Solanas Domínguez' "FUCVAM: cooperativismo de vivienda, de los barrios in Montevideo a una alternativa contrahegemónica en otros Sures"; Klemen Ploštajner's "Society of homeowners and possible cooperative future: case of Slovenia"; Andrea Aureli and Pierpaolo Mudu's "Squatting: reappropriating democracy from the state" (on Italy); and an activist panel discussion "Housing activism: beyond the West" with the Committee of Defence of Tenants' Rights (Poland), The City is for All (Hungary), Office of Housing Rights in Dikmen Vadisi (Turkey) and the Popular Organisation of Independent Left "Francisco Villa" (Mexico).

This issue's themed articles

The thematic section of this issue begins with a contribution from Simin Fadaee. Departing from Northern social movements, she takes a systematic approach to study social movements in the Global South. She meticulously articulates Southern movements around four themes starting with the evolution of anti-colonial and post-colonial resistance, to movements that originated from a variety of political structures/regimes, to political action responding to state-civilsociety relations and finally to multiple forms of interactions through democratization, identity and difference, and material informal and formal structures of politics.

In her article, Agnes Gagyi maintains a dialogue between core and non-core conceptualizations and perspectives of movements. The author suggests that political actions burgeoned historically and through the contemporary neo-liberalization of "democratic capitalism" in Eastern Europe. Pepijn van Eeden offers a comparative study of Romanian and Polish politicization of ecological issues under state socialism and during the early revolutionary transformations to post-socialism. Covering different time periods, van Eeden raises key questions as to how we theorize political ecology.

Dina Kiwan's article offers an empirical analysis of people's protests, popularly *thrash protests*, in Beirut, Lebonon in 2015/6. She expands on a range of protest mechanisms to capture the dichotomous relationships between rationality of protests and emotionality of protestors, while challenging the West's universalized constructions of citizenship and knowledge production on movements. In her contribution, Erin Fitz-Henry analyzes the neglected potential of transnational philosophical thought, political possibilities and contemporary colonialisms, drawing from her field surveys with Peruvian and Ecuadorian activists at an environmental rights tribunal.

Tanja D. Hendriks explores Makola Market, Accra (Ghana) which has been historically significant for the development of trade and commerce since pre-colonial times. Hendriks conducts a detailed ethnography of informal workers' approaches to collective action, often overlooked by (inter)national trade union interventions. Lastly, Tomás MacSheoin's piece notes how agrarian movements around land issues contradict conventional nationalist accounts of Irish resistance to English imperialism. His article offers the first systematic overview of such movements, both historically and thematically, from the mid-eighteenth century to the twentieth and a remarkable way of reading Irish history.

Taken together, these pieces represent significant alternatives to conventional approaches which read social movements in the global South, the post-socialist world and other non-core contexts in the light of theories developed in and for the core.

General articles

In this issue's general section, Leah M. Fusco and Angela V. Carter document the practices of a successful anti-fracking campaign in the western regions of Newfoundland and Labrador and identify lessons for organizers in rural locations facing similar challenges around oil and gas expansion. Sophia L.Borgias and Yvonne A.Braun explore the transformation of a local anti-dam protest into a national and global social justice movement. They show how resistance to the *HidroAysén* mega dam project evolved from a small community-oriented struggle against development in a remote part of Patagonia to a largest nation-wide movement which has received considerable international attention.

In their article, Signe Thydal and Christian Franklin Svensson talk about the challenges and possibilities of Firefund.net, a crowdfunding Danish organization that provides resources for direct action movements. They explore the difficulties of an effective self-organising initiative and of operating in a juridical grey zone. Iván Carretero-Navarro and Eva Espinar-Ruiz's Catalan-language article stands at the conjuncture between capital and labor. The authors draw on a sample from three leading Spanish newspapers to analyze media coverage of labour strikes, showing how the media often negatively represents the impacts of strikes on consumers, strikers and the general population as negative. The article identifies important practical lessons of strikes and strategies of labor/social movements.

Drawing on participant observations and in-depth interviews, John Foran, Summer Gray and Corrie Grosse's article analyzes the orientation, discourse, vision and political action of climate activists around the UN climate summit in Warsaw, using the concept of "political cultures of opposition and creation". Drawing on Charles Dickens' *A Christmas Carol*, Bert Lewis's seasonal piece takes a distinctive approach to ghost stories as images and inspiration for acts of labour protests, which can influence tactics of *becoming-ghost* and suggest mechanisms to deal with existing workplace struggles.

Reviews

This issue includes a bumper crop of reviews. We start with Donna Haraway's *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulhucene* (by Carolyn Elerding); Chris Robé's *Breaking the Spell: a History of Anarchist Filmmakers, Videotape Guerrillas, and Digital Ninjas* (by Beth Geglia); Christina Sharpe's *In the Wake: on Blackness and Being* (by Shannon Walsh); Robbie Shilliam's *The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections* (by Lewis B.H. Eliot); Ingeborg Gaarde's *Peasants Negotiating a Global Policy Space: La Via Campesina in the Committee on World Food Security* (by Maria Vasile).

We then have two review essays, one by Andrew Kettler on Wesley Lowery's *They Can't Kill us All: the Story of Black Lives Matter*, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor's *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation* and Christopher J. Lebron's *The Making of Black Lives Matter: a Brief History of an Idea*; followed by Andy Mather's review essay on Jodi Dean's *Crowds and Party,* Donatella della Porta et al.'s *Movement Parties against Austerity* and Richard Seymour's *Corbyn: the Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics*.

Finally we have reviews of Dylan Taylor's *Social Movements and Democracy in the 21st Century* (by Laurence Cox), Harald Bauder's *Migration Borders Freedom* (by Sutapa Chattopadhyay), Nandini Sundar's *The Burning Forest: India's War on Bastar* (also by Sutapa Chattopadhyay), Kristian Laslett's *State Crime on the Margins of Empire: Rio Tinto, the War on Bougainville and Resistance to Mining* (by Alexander Dunlap) and Adam Greenfield's *Radical Technologies: the Design of Everyday Life* (by Harry Warne).

Welcoming new editors

Finally, in this issue we are delighted to welcome a number of new editors to *Interface*, extraordinary researchers and activists who have already brought a lot to the journal. Sutapa Chattopadhyay joins the editorial group for international / transnationally organised / migrant movements. Elisabet Rasch joins the Spanish-speaking Latin American group. Brecht de Smet, Helge Hiram Jensen and Melanie Kryst join the west European group. We are very grateful for their energy and enthusiasm for the project.

Future issues and calls for papers

Our next issue (vol. 10 no. 1, May/June 2018, submissions closed) is an open (unthemed) issue. The following issue (vol. 10 no. 2, Nov / Dec 2018, deadline May 1 2018) is on "Political parties, trade unions and social movements: emancipatory reconfigurations of popular organisation." This is an extension for the call originally given for vol. 10 no. 1, due to the death of Peter Waterman, who was collaborating with us on that issue. Both themed and unthemed articles should go to the relevant regional editors: see http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/editorial-contact/

About the authors

Laurence Cox is a long-time critic of the “terra nullius” approach of US-centric social movement studies, and co-founded *Interface* in part to develop a broader and more serious approach grounded in dialogue between the world’s different intellectual traditions of theorising social movements. His own work attempts to understand Ireland’s peculiar postcolonial movement situation; Europe’s complex, diverse and often revolutionary movements; global traditions of Marxist thought about social movements; and anti-colonial religious movements in Buddhist Asia. His next books are *Why Social Movements Matter* (Rowman and Littlefield 2018) and *Revolution in the Air* (Pluto 2018, with Salar Mohandesi and Bjarke Risager).

Alf Nilsen is associate professor at the Department of Global Development and Planning at the University of Agder and Research Associate at the Society, Work and Development Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand. His books include *Social Movements and the State in India, New Subaltern Politics* and *Social Movements in the Global South.*

Geoffrey Pleyers is a FNRS researcher and professor of sociology at the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium and the current president of the Research Committee 47 “Social movements” of the International Sociological Association. He coordinates the program “Social movements in the global age” at the Collège d’Etudes Mondiales, in Paris, and regularly teaches in universities in Latin America. He is the author of *Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age* (Cambridge, Polity, 2010),the editor of *México en movimientos* (with M. Garza, Porrúa, Mexico City, 2017), *Protestas e indignación global* (with B. Bringel, CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 2017) and of the platform “Open Movements: for a global and public sociology” (www.opendemocracy.net/openmovements).

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Call for papers volume 10 issue 2 (Nov-Dec 2018)

Political parties, trade unions and social movements: emancipatory reconfigurations of popular organisation

Heike Schaumberg and Laurence Cox with Peter Waterman

The November-December 2018 issue of the open-access, online, copy left academic/activist journal *Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements* (http://www.interfacejournal.net/) will focus on the theme of organisational re-configurations between political parties, labour and social movements. Contributions on other themes, as always, are also welcome.

Preparation for this themed issue, originally scheduled for the May 2018 issue (Vol. 10, Issue 1), was interrupted due to the passing of our long time international/transnational editor, Peter Waterman. The next *Interface* will be an open issue while contributions for the emancipatory reconfigurations issue are now due by May 1, 2018.

Organisational reconfigurations in the neoliberal crisis: political parties, labour and social movements

As is widely recognised, uprisings and social movements during the crisis of neoliberal capitalism have tended to articulate rejections of almost all that was before: the art of domination and representation by the powers that be, their economic and political practices, and the organisational configurations associated with existing structures. Yet despite this initial 'anti-politics' (Dinerstein, 2002), what has received less attention is that these movements and uprisings subsequently generated a frenzy of new organisations, new kinds of organisation and coordination platforms, while traditional left-wing parties and trade unions also experienced some membership growth and diversification. To a greater or lesser extent, this dynamic can be observed in many countries throughout this century so far, from Argentina and Bolivia to Egypt and even the UK.

This re-organisation, ignited by massive mobilisations and other impulses 'from below', occurred following the widespread neoliberal dismantling of working-class social, political and trade union organisations (Gambina, 2013; Schaumberg, 2013). The savagery of neoliberal disorganisation, however, did not stop short of affecting even the state and the political establishment. The same appears to be true for the processes of re-organisation, in some countries and maybe generally, whether they follow eruptive uprisings or express general globalisation trends. If these processes do express the deeper historical dynamics of a system in long-term crisis, they represent something more than political interventions by individuals or small groups.

Processes of such large-scale re-organisation entwine with local history. In some countries, they have benefitted the Far Right. A widely shared concern on parts of the academic left is that an earlier wave or cycle of contention against neoliberal capitalism has given way to the rise of the Right: from the growing electoral importance of the Front National in France, Temer's constitutional coup in Brazil early this year, Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution plunging into violent chaos, the electoral success of the neoliberal business elite lead by Mauricio Macri in Argentina late 2015, or Donald Trump's electoral victory in the US.

Often such analyses tend to identify the weaknesses or strategies, and ideological and/or organisational principles of the parties of the left and/or the revolutionary left as the main problem. But if we understand this party-political left to be a part of, rather than external to, the historical processes then arguably it only reflects the weaknesses of the class(es) and social groups it claims to organise and represent.

More broadly still, if we understand parties, trade unions and social movement organisations as so many different ways in which popular struggle articulates itself (Cox and Nilsen 2014), we can reasonably ask whether and how non-party forms of social movement have learned from the difficulties of the party form, if they have advanced on its successes and avoided its failures. We can also see long-standing debates about the organisation of labour – the limitations and weaknesses of trade unions, the relationship with "labour's others[1]" (Waterman 2014), the possibilities of wider emancipatory labour struggles and "social movement unionism" – in terms of this shared question of how popular struggles organise themselves in the 21st century.

This call for papers invites contributions that explore empirically how in this crisis these various tools of struggle are re-arranged and re-configured by impulses 'from below'. Beyond the rhetoric which treats "the Left" as a single homogenous actor uniquely responsible for the future of popular struggle, we want to capture what we suggest are more complex processes of political re-configurations at this moment in time, and thus help generate constructive analyses of the contemporary political condition of working-class and other movements of oppressed groups and the quality of the tools at their disposal.

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[1] Including casual/ised workers, urban residential communities, child workers, rural labour/communities, indigenous peoples, women workers, homeworkers, domestic workers, im/migrant workers, petty-producers/traders/service-providers, sex workers, the un/under-employed and the high- and low-tech precariat – in other words the groups which conventional union organising has often struggled with when it has not simply ignored or excluded them.

Understanding the new struggles

In this regard, we can see that the turn from neoliberal "business as usual" to a more aggressive right-wing assault is sparking new forms of popular opposition, perhaps distinct from those of recent waves of resistance. The Temer government is in turmoil, partly paying the price of the anti-corruption charges it used to attack its opposition, awakening a labour-backed response linked with local social movements. In Argentina, the Macri government has been facing growing challenges from organised, as well as informal, labour, social movements and a far left web of traditional and 'independent' parties that keeps adjusting its internal patterns and relations. Many of these social movements have persisted since the late 1990s, and have spurred other smaller or temporary interest groups into action.

In the US, Trump's electoral success has produced sustained opposition across a wide spectrum of civil society as well as intensifying the conflict between different party-political strategies for opposition. In the UK, the rise of Corbyn and Momentum defies political common sense by showing the revitalisation of an established centre-left party through popular mobilisation. Elsewhere in western Europe the last few years have seen the reconfiguration of pre-existing forces on the further left, building on movement links to achieve unusual levels of electoral success; new electoral and extra-electoral formations with often startlingly innovative forms drawing on social movement ways of operating; pre-existing parties and trade unions reorienting themselves towards popular struggles; and so on. The relationship between social movements and political parties in Europe has clearly become a live and interesting question in the context of more recent waves of movements, with a range of outcomes.

This follows earlier trends in South America where insurgent movements early this century had bargained to defend gained space and restored left reformism to government power as an implicit compromise, hoping to defend the space gained for collective action. In South America as in western Europe, left parties' relationship to movements and states has taken a great variety of forms, and the "party turn" itself has been contested strongly in several countries.

This is a space of experimentation and conflict, and it is not obviously the case that what works (for a given value of "works") in one country or continent will work well elsewhere. As the examples above also indicate, how established institutions (party systems, labour and civil society organisations, even states) work vary hugely across the world, and it is not self-evident that the same forms or relationships will work elsewhere. These trends do not prescribe future developments that might take place at a different moment of the global crisis and in places with distinct economic and geo-political realities. It is certainly too soon to judge the long-term outcomes of these re-organisational efforts, but we can attempt to identify and analyse the processes currently happening and discuss their transformative potential.

Our assumption is that current oppositional movements are to a greater or lesser degree imbued with the collective aspirations that were initially formulated by uprisings and mass movements earlier this century; but they are doing so under new circumstances, not least the background of earlier victories and defeats, and in a situation of a now deepening global economic and hegemonic crisis. The new organisational questions thus express the longer-term question in popular movements of "What should we do?" What lessons can be learned from the struggles so far? How can we intervene to make them more effective? How can we win on shorter-term struggles? And so on.

From Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil to Egypt, Tunisia and southern Europe, movements in this century have reclaimed public spaces, housing, education, health and what they termed dignity through real work and efforts at workers' control over the means of production. These movements prioritised collective interests over personal gain and in so doing, have questioned, for example, traditional forms of leadership and made efforts to generate new organisational and relational forms and methods. As social and historical formations, they have taken issue with the dominant capitalist notions of "politics", "leaders", "democracy", and "work". The ways in which these ideas and collective practices have matured would be an important concern for this Interface issue.

This call for papers thus proposes to look with fresh eyes at the contemporary world of collective struggle in the aftermath of the uprisings of the early 21st century, exploring the resulting connections and re-configurations of social movement organisations and 'events' or 'processes' by taking on board the broader historical forces at work, as well as their impacts on global processes of political re-configuration. By social movements we refer to all forms of social movement organising including, not least, the labour movement (Barker et al. 2013). Indeed, various scholars have identified the role of labour in uprisings for example in Argentina (Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo, 2003; Palomino, 2005; Rauber, 2005; Marshall and Perelman, 2008; Manzano, 2013; Schaumberg, 2014 ; Schaumberg, 2015), Spain (Narotzky, 2016), and Egypt (Alexander, 2014), while its central role in the protest movements is well-known in countries such as Bolivia (Webber, 2011) and Greece (Schaumberg, 2015). They interact in complex and energetic ways with non-labour based social movements. However, studies that have dedicated their attention to this issue are still very marginal and almost appear anecdotal rather than empirically and theoretically grounded.

If, as is widely accepted, neoliberalism targeted the organisations of labour, then its crisis has propelled the working class (in the broadest sense of this term) to restore, reclaim or remake its organisations in order to defend itself in this context. This often obscured working class activity, and the actions by individuals sustained within this class often over prolonged periods of time, that gave rise to many of the social movements we see today around the world. How these movements now interact with and transform its 'traditional' organisations and vice versa, is the main concern of this issue.

But these processes are highly uneven across the world as they are combined, coloured by local historical developments that have shaped political cultures and configurations, and continue to impress upon global movements with their own particular trajectories. Different left traditions and imaginaries have played a powerful role in the revolts, but there is no monolithic development, as the rise of right-wing movements in some parts of the world, that of the left in others, and other, less easily categorised situations, such as Venezuela, testify.

We are interested in contributions to this issue that tackle this more complex picture of re-organisation from below; the emerging organisational solidarities, alliances, merges, and fragmentations between different types of working class and other subaltern organisations such as social movements, civil associations, coordinating platforms, political parties and trade unions. We are especially interested in contributions that are carefully researched and/or speak from an active engagement with these processes of re-organisation and will help raise the level of debate, both empirically and/ or theoretically, about the contemporary challenges for the working class, social movements and the left locally and globally. Given the exploratory nature of this focus, raising deeper questions is just as important as formulating coherent answers.

Proposed themes for contributions to the special issue

Possible themes for contributions might include, but are not limited to:

1) Relationships between labour movements, political parties, and other social movements: a) solidarities and alliances, b) fragmentation and competition;
2) Are trade unions still important? Challenges for rank and file democracy, the emergence of alternative trade unions, other forms of labour organising: pros and cons, interactions between trade unions and other social movements;
3) Appropriation of methods as between different social and labour movements and political parties;
4) Ideological legacies and conflicts that influence contemporary movement thinking, strategies and tactics;
5) Nature of the capital - labour relation and implications for working class organisation (in the broad sense, including all types of social movements);
6) Theories of class and their relevance for today’s re-organisation;
7) Alternative conceptualisations of labour, economics, reproduction etc.;
8) New debates around power and the subject and nature of politics;
9) The role of riots and uprisings in working-class re-organisation;

10) Negotiating the state: social movements and workfare programmes, the defence of welfare, etc;
11) Alternative social movement practices and ideas today;
12) Shared organisational trends and challenges.

Principles for contributions

Interface is a journal of practitioner research, meaning that we welcome work by movement activists as well as activist scholars, and work in a variety of formats which suit these different kinds of writing as well as our very varied readership – which includes activists and researchers across the world, connected to many different movements and working within very different intellectual, theoretical and political traditions.

We are interested in pieces in many formats – peer-reviewed articles and interviews with movement activists, research and teaching notes, book reviews and key documents and other formats that work well for their purposes – that tackle some of the questions raised above.

All contributions (including those for the special issue and the special section) should go to the appropriate regional editors by the deadline of May 1, 2018. Please see the editorial contacts page (http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/editorial-contact/) – and use the appropriate template. Please see the guidelines for contributors (http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/guidelines-for-contributors/) for more indications on content and style.

General contributions

As always, this issue will also include non-theme related pieces. We are happy to consider submissions on any aspect of social movement research and practice that fit within the journal's mission statement (http://www.interfacejournal.net/who-we-are/mission-statement/). Pieces for *Interface* should contribute to the journal's mission as a tool to help our movements learn from each other's struggles, by developing analyses from specific movement processes and experiences that can be translated into a form useful for other movements.

In this context, we welcome contributions by movement participants and academics who are developing movement-relevant theory and research. In addition to studies of contemporary experiences and practices, we encourage analysis of historical social movements as a means of learning from the past and better understanding contemporary struggles.

Our goal is to include material that can be used in a range of ways by movements — in terms of its content, its language, its purpose and its form. We thus seek work in a range of different formats, such as conventional (refereed) articles, review essays, facilitated discussions and interviews, action notes, teaching notes, key documents and analysis, book reviews — and beyond. Both activist and academic peers review research contributions, and other material is sympathetically edited by peers. The editorial process generally is geared towards assisting authors to find ways of expressing their understanding, so that we all can be heard across geographical, social and political distances.

We can accept material in Bengali, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Mandarin Chinese, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Slovak, Spanish and Swedish. Please see our editorial contacts page (http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/editorial-contact/) for details of who to send submissions to.

Deadline and contact details

The deadline for initial submissions to this issue, to be published in late 2018, is 1 May 2018. For details of how to submit pieces to *Interface*, please see the "Guidelines for contributors" on our website. All manuscripts should be sent to the appropriate regional editor, listed on our contacts page.

Submission templates are available online via the guidelines page (http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/guidelines-for-contributors/) and should be used to ensure correct formatting. *Interface* is a completely voluntary effort, without the resources of commercial journals, so we have to do all the layout and typesetting ourselves. The only way we can manage this is to ask authors to use these templates when preparing submissions. Thanks!

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Bringing in the South: towards a global paradigm for social movement studies

Simin Fadaee

Abstract

In this paper I argue for the systematic inclusion of Southern social movements in social movement theory, and I provide a framework comprised of four characteristics. This framework could serve as a starting point for research that accounts for the specificities of social movements in the global South while at the same time acknowledging their heterogeneity in diverse local contexts. The characteristics are not exhaustive, but most Southern movements exhibit one or a number of these characteristics and when taken together they could serve as the basis for decentring Northern movements and establishing a paradigm of social movements that is truly global. First, many Southern movements have emerged in the context of colonialism and post-colonialism which influenced the emergence, and continuity of particular forms of mobilizations. Second, social movements in the South emerge in contexts characterized by a variety of political structures and regime types. Third, in many mobilizations of the South, the continuous redefinition of the state-civil society relations influences the potentials for emergence and expansion of social movements. Finally, social movements in the South can be understood with regard to multiple forms of intersection in that there is usually an implicit connection between most social movements and democratisation processes (e.g. women's right movement, labour movement, environmental movement), between identity and material issues and formal and informal forms of politics.

Introduction

The Northern-centric spirit of social sciences and the existing hierarchies in the global division of knowledge production have triggered immense criticism over the past two decades (Wallerstein 1997; Mignolo 2002; Alatas 2003; Burawoy 2005; Connell 2007; de Sousa Santos 2007; Chakrabarty 2009; Comaroff & Comaroff 2012; Mentan 2015). This critical scholarship has opened discussions surrounding the possibilities of restructuring the social sciences. While some of the critics have dealt with the issue on a more theoretical and abstract level, others have suggested concrete ways to diversify the origin of social science scholarship. For example, Connell (2007) suggests increasing mutual regard and interaction between the dominant social theory in the North with the social theory and experience that has emerged in the South. She believes that Southern theories can offer valuable perspectives in understanding the contemporary world and transcending the existing hegemony in social sciences. Burawoy (2005:509) has proposed to

> bring the social sciences down to earth by provincializing their universalism, their disciplinary divisions, and their methodology, that is grounding them in their particularity, their specific context of production, and exposing their contradictory participation in the social, economic and political worlds they seek to comprehend.

Burawoy's later writings on public sociology (Burawoy 2005b) explicitly seek to provincialize the social sciences. Similarly, Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) have called for "inverting the order of things" by developing theory based on empirical studies of the global South. They believe that currently the global South provides a much more useful context for analysis of the world as pervasive transformations and dynamics are by far more present in the South in comparison to the North.

Since its emergence as a subfield of sociology, social movement studies has gone through different paradigmatic shifts between North American and European approaches. Thus, it has not remained exempt from the above-mentioned critiques and in recent years scholars have addressed the problematic in various ways. Some scholars have criticized the Northern centric nature of major social movement journals (Poulson, Caswell & Gray 2014; Mac Sheoin 2016), while others have raised concerns about the inability of dominant social movement theory to explain social movements in specific regions in Latin America (Eckstein 1989; Foweraker & Craig 1990; Escobar & Alvarez 1992; Alvarez et al. 1998; Escobar 2008), Africa (Mamdani & Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995; Ellis & van Kessel 2009; Pilati 2011), South and Southeast Asia (Omvedt 1993; Oommen 2004; Scott 1985; Ford 2013), the Middle East (Bayat 2010; Beinin & Vairel 2013) or even Eastern Europe (Gyagi 2015; Pitrowski 2015). Finally, a number of scholars have explored the idea of overcoming the hegemonic trends in the field by emphasizing the value and significance of Southern social movements for development of a more inclusive paradigm for social movement studies (Thompson & Tapscott 2010; Motta & Nilsen 2011; Bringel & Dominguez 2015; Fadaee 2016a).

The existence of such extensive scholarship recognizing a problem in the dominant social movement paradigm in one way or another, has led to a number of proposals as remedies to the problem, such as: a more active engagement with scholarship and scholars from the South (Poulson, Caswell & Gray 2014); recognition of social movement scholarship produced in languages other than English (Cox & Flesher Fominaya 2013); focusing on emergent shared social meanings; strategies and articulations of demands across the North-South divide (Pleyers 2010) and the creation of platforms such as *openMovements* (see Bringel & Pleyers 2015) which provide an accessible space for the promotion of a global and public sociology of social movements. This transformative project for social movement studies must combine all of these strategies and should incorporate these diverse world views. However, I argue that recognising the prevalent characteristics of Southern social movements is a pre-requisite for a more radical break with the Northern-centric nature of social movement studies, and a move towards a global social movement paradigm. Hence, in this article I provide a framework which could serve as a starting point for a systematic inclusion of Southern social movements in social movement theory. Therefore, I am not only arguing that social movement studies needs to be expanded by using Southern movements as empirical case studies that inform novel theory, but by developing a framework which identifies their prevailing characteristics I aim to provide a guideline for concrete theoretical and critical engagement necessary for our move towards de-provincializing canonical social movement theory. In the following section I introduce this framework comprised of four components, which highlights the uniqueness of Southern movements from social movements in Europe and North America. However, my objective is not to offer a comprehensive framework or epistemology of the movements in the South but to highlight four characteristics that prevail in many social movements of the global South. I do not argue that these characteristics are exclusive to Southern social movements – in fact they are occasionally exhibited by movements in the North – or that all four characteristics are apparent in every Southern movement. However, these are defining features of many Southern movements and they need to be taken seriously. Finally, I do not claim there is some archetypal Southern movement. On the contrary, these characteristics cohere in different places and times in a variety of ways and the particular manifestation of these characteristics must be established in the course of in-depth research.

Four characteristics of social movements in the global South: a framework for research

A systematic engagement with the existing literature on Southern social movements shows that social movement scholarship in different regions of the global South emphasises different issues and provides different perspectives (Fadaee 2016a). Therefore, it becomes clear that "there is no *one* social movement studies of the global South" (Cox 2017). Moreover, within the past years there has been a rise in literature which disapproves the existence of a distinction between the global North and the global South in the contemporary world. If it is not easy to identify a particular trend in all Southern social movements and we are even not sure of which societies belong to the global South anymore, can we then say that we should not think about the global South and its movements as a coherent category? de Sousa Santos (2007) and Bayat's (2016) engagement with these questions seems very convincing because they suggest that global South should not be understood as a geographical entity but rather as an analytical category in the sense that most Southern societies have experienced colonial and post-colonial and/or imperial epochs in their histories. This unique mode of encounter with the West, has given rise to various structures and multiple enunciation of modernity in these regions which in many occasions are different from the countries without colonial/imperial experiences and encounter similar structures and settings. This is the case even in countries such as Iran or Thailand which were never directly colonized. With this conceptualization, it is plausible to argue that the social mobilizations articulating change in these regions are to a large extent different from their counter parts. However, because of the historical and structural differences between settler's politics in the North Atlantic and Europe's inner colonies such as Ireland this definition does not refer to these countries. In other words, this analytical category is relevant to the African, Latin American and some of the Asian countries which to some extent share a *similar* history of colonial and post-colonial development. Some critics might still remain unconvinced by my definition of the global South and point out the fact that the experience of colonialism/post-colonialism has been different in the above-mentioned countries and regions. I am sympathetic to these criticisms. The global South is in fact a construct and its definition is constantly changing. Nevertheless, the following features define characteristics of the movements that have emerged in most of Africa, Latin America as well as some of the Asian countries which have in one way or another have been under colonial or imperial rule and were until recently referred to as the 'Third World.'

First, many Southern movements have emerged in the context of colonialism and post-colonialism which influenced the emergence, and continuity of particular forms of mobilizations. Second, social movements in the South emerge in contexts characterized by a variety of political structures and regime types. Third, in many mobilizations of the South the continuous redefinition of the state-civil society relations influences the potentials for emergence and expansion of social movements. Finally, social movements in the South can be understood with regard to multiple forms of intersection in that there is usually an implicit connection between most social movements and democratisation processes (e.g. women's right movement, labour movement, environmental movement), between identity and material issues, and formal and informal forms of politics.

1. Many Southern social movements have emerged in the context of colonialism and post-colonialism.

From the late eighteenth century, the anti-colonial movements were at work in constructing a counter-hegemonic discourse that undermined the legitimacy of the colonial powers (Anderson 2007) and for a long period the most significant uprisings and social movements in most parts of the global South were anti-colonial in one way or another. Even the armed guerrilla movements of the 1970s were inspired by anti-colonial writers such as Frantz Fanon as much as Marxist writers and many had their roots in older traditions of anti-colonial resistance. Similarly, imperialism has to a large extent affected social movements and contentious politics in regions such as Latin America and the Middle East. In her analysis of social movements in Egypt and Iran, Povey (2015: 10) has shown that the impact of imperialism "is not uniform or predictable but multifaceted and complex" as imperialism has on the one hand "undermined the authoritarian states and provided an incentive for people in the region to join movements" and on the other hand it "has served to strengthen authoritarian states and allowed them to crack down on dissent". Similarly, Fadaee (2012) has demonstrated how the three major social movements of Iran in the twentieth century, i.e. the constitutional movement (1905-1907), the national oil movement (1951-1953) and the revolutionary movement of 1979 all had strong anti-imperialist sentiments.

After the period characterised by anti-colonial/anti imperial national struggles, the spirit of Bandung and the shared experience of exploitation gave rise to an international solidarity and a call for justice and a new global economic order in the years that followed (Escobar 2004: 207). In fact, "the postcolonial was shaped by social movements that challenged the hegemony of dominant social groups and states across the world" (Motta & Nilsen 2011: 3). For example the uprisings of the 1960s which provided a cornerstone for emergence of the New Social Movement Theory in Europe and Resource Mobilization Theory in North America were fundamentally different in the global South in that in the South these social movements "created a new discourse of entitlement cantered on subaltern groups and popular classes within the independent states of the Third World who posited themselves as being entitled both to dignified livelihoods and political recognition and participation" (Nilsen 2006: 277). In *Reinventing Revolution* Omvedt (1993) demonstrates how in India, women, *Adivasis*[1]*,Dalits*[2] and workers in the informal sector shaped the cornerstone of the so-called new social movements in the post-independence era. She emphasizes the fact that these social groups which were historically dispossessed and marginalised mobilized outside the sphere of formal politics and confronted the developmental state which was dominated by the elite. Similarly, Oommen (2004) traces the mobilizations and movements of India and South Asia to what he calls an *Indian Modernity*. He shows that unlike the industrial societies of the North, the working class has never constituted a revolutionary class in India and in fact the so called "old" movements of India were anti-colonial movements with no clear class character. Accordingly, the new movements of India challenge the failure of the post-colonial state to redistribute wealth, opportunity and power and hence, are concerned with equality and social justice.

The post-Bandung period generated a strong movement for non-alignment which remained highly critical of the economic order of the new empire (Escobar 1992). Beginning in the early 1980s different experiences of developmental states and their encounter with structural adjustment shaped a new wave of resistance in the post-colony. The anti-IMF mobilizations of the 1980s and 1990s were carried on by a variety of social groups who expressed discontent with the policies of the post-colonial states on a domestic level as well as their new political and economic role in the new global configuration of power after the collapse of the colonial powers (Motta & Nilsen 2011). In this period the oppositional movements played a significant role in reconceptualising development, and instead of state-led development they asserted that popular movements could be agents for meaningful transformation (Mamdani et al. 1988). Their proposals for alternative ways of organising societies in many instances led to the emergence of "alternatives to development" and anti-development discourses (Escobar 1992). In addition to criticising the policies of developmental states on a national level, these movements also challenged the legacy of development programmes and policies which had started during the colonial time as well as the transnational development regimes (Sinha 2008). However, since the 1990s NGOs and funding agencies from the global North have played an important role in undermining popular struggles against developmental and neoliberal policies.

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[1] Adivasis are the tribal population of South Asia.

[2] Dalit is the political name of the ex-untouchables in India.

Finally, in the post colony the legacy of colonialism has been prevalent in the so-called identity based movements such as women rights movements. Postcolonial feminism, although closely entangled with the rise of Third World feminism in the US, emerged as a response to the feminism based on experience of Western cultures and is concerned with understanding the ways long-lasting social, cultural, political and economic influences of colonialism has impacted the women in the postcolonial world and the trajectories that have led to emergence of distinguished forms of feminism from the so called "Western feminism" (see Mohanty 2003; Ali 2007).

2. Social movements in the South emerge in contexts characterised by a variety of political structures and regime types.

The political system in most advanced capitalist countries in the global North is a variant of liberal democracy. Consequently, the social movement theories and analytical tools developed in the global North are also useful in these political contexts. Although there are indeed varieties of liberal democracy, they have in common respect for certain rights and freedoms such as the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and a large spectrum of rights usually referred to as human rights. On the contrary, countries in the global South exhibit a very broad range of regime types from liberal democratic to semi-democratic, and from authoritarian to semi-authoritarian regimes. As the regime type defines who can become active, how and to what extent, this diversity has led to the emergence of a multiplicity of opportunities and cultures of activism in the South (Bourdrea 2004; Caraway 2006). For example, in his analysis of social movements in Latin America, Foweraker (1995) refers to the relationship between social movements and the newly established post-military democracies of Latin America as the relationship between the "elite" and the "people" because the newly established democracies remained exclusionary and dominated by the elite. He refers to these regimes as "democracy by default" and defines them as political systems which "will not conform neatly to any of our theoretical or practical models of authoritarian and democratic regimes" (Malloy 1987: 252 cf Foweraker 2016: 113). Kim (2016) has presented a detailed description of the role of social movements in transition to democracy in South

Korea and shows how the complex political reality that emerged after democratization influenced social movements and their relations with institutionalised political actors.

After the independence from colonialism, most of the post-colonial states have suffered (or are still suffering) from authoritarianism or military rules. On the one hand, most of these undemocratic regimes have been the main target of mobilization. On the other hand, under these repressive regimes dissent and contentious politics become a serious challenge (Bayat 2016). For example, in Latin America, after independence Mexico and Venezuela established "personalistic dictatorships" and Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia and Brazil founded "oligarchic, low-intensity democracies" (Ortiz 2015: 44). At the same time, emergence of the labour movement in the late nineteenth century and the Russian Revolution of 1917, led to an outbreak of labour and peasant movements that, in most cases, faced by serious state repression (Ortiz 2015).

Moreover, in an authoritarian regime, open opposition does not always remain an option and this leads to the emergence of secretive and underground movements which are inherently different from organized and open forms of mobilizations. As the underground movements and organisations cope with a high level of risk, this influences the internal dynamics of these movements such as the identity of activists, their mobilization strategies and their connections with other similar movements and organisations (Thomas 2001).

Furthermore, in a liberal democracy such as India, democratic practices have remained fragile and exclusive leading to emergence of a non-responsive and at time a repressive state where many subaltern groups remain marginalised (Chatterjee 2004), civil liberties are commonly suspended, and the press is routinely censored. For example, Nilsen's account of Adivasi mobilizations in India shows how they are forced to circumnavigate their position as subaltern subjects (Nilsen 2012b) within the "everyday tyranny" of state officials such as forest guards or police constables (Nilsen 2012a).

Finally, in recent years activists in the global South have increasingly used the Internet and new social media and in response repressive regimes have sought to develop ways to systematically control this new space. There has been a lot of coverage of internet shutdowns in various countries, or persecution of individuals for writing critical comments on Facebook or Twitter. In *Revolution in the Age of Social Media* Herrera (2014) illustrates the role social media has played in Egypt's January 25 Revolution of 2011. She demonstrates the dynamics of power struggle that took place in social media and shows how powerful forces such as the Egyptian military took over the control of the digital revolutionary platforms. Elsewhere Herrera (2015) shows how the Internet has become one of the most important tools in facilitating repression against activists and citizenship claims in the Middle East.

3. In many societies in the South the continuous redefinition of state-civil society relations influences the potential for the emergence and expansion of social movements.

Civil society has been repeatedly defined as an arena which is "outside the state in an increasingly independent social sphere" (Arato 1981: 23). Yet, writing from a Fascist jail in late 1920s and early 1930s, Antonio Gramsci (1995) remained sceptical of the independence of civil society from the state apparatus. He emphasized the difference between the civil society (educational system, family, unions, etc) and political society (legal system, police, army, etc), and argued that the capitalist state rules in both spheres albeit through different mechanisms: political society is the realm of force whereas hegemony serves to establish consent in civil society. According to Habermas (1991) this version of a tightly controlled civil society was transformed in Europe by the emergence of a relatively open and less regulated public sphere, characterised by democratic and rational communication. He argues that the proliferation of print media contributed to the transformation of civil society, and it became "network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres" (Habermas 1996: 367). Thus, although states were increasingly committed to capitalism, civil society remained a relatively autonomous social space wherein the power of the state was limited (Cohen & Arato 1992).

However, in much of the global South the notion of civil society remains a foreign concept that does not resonate with actually existing political cultures and institutions. This leads to a continuous and vivid definition and redefinition of state-civil society relations to the extent that the change of one government to another can lead to a dramatic shift in the relations between the state and civil society and can to a large extent influence the likelihood of emerging autonomous social mobilizations. For example, in Iran, the rise and expansion of the Reform Movement in the 1990s consolidated the troubled state-society relations that dominated the post 1979 revolutionary era and led to the emergence of a strong civil society. Consequently, a number of social movements such as the women's movement, the student movement and an environmental movement emerged. These movements were enabled by the particular state-society relationship that obtained during the reform era, and in the aftermath of the crackdown on the Reformists they disappeared, were weakened or were fundamentally transformed (Fadaee 2011; 2016b).

Similarly, in Southeast Asia the scope and nature of political space in which activism can take place has continuously been a matter of contention. Despite these challenges in some countries such as in the Philippines in 1986, Thailand in 1992 and Indonesia in 1998, social movements have facilitated the overthrow of authoritarian governments. However, in most Southeast Asian countries the state still remains pervasive in all forms of institutions through which activists can potentially mobilize. Therefore, the scope and essence of activism within the political space remains contentious and undefined. Hence, in some parts of Southeast Asia we have witnessed emergence of different forms of "individualized political expression" which are to some extent autonomous from the state or relatively autonomous "civil society expression" (Rodan 2013). Butenhoff (1999) has demonstrated that as a result of the specific relations between the state and civil society in Hong Kong, many of the social movement organizations that emerged in the 1980s were incorporated into the political system and were transformed to political parties. According to Habib (2005) in post-apartheid South Africa an adversarial-collaborative divide dominates the civil society. While under Apartheid this divide was racial, the post-apartheid state has extended its adversarial or collaborate relations to the entire civil society.

In *Beyond Civil Society,* Alvarez and her colleagues (2017) illustrate that the conventional distinctions between activism on the streets and through formal institutions, as well as between civic and un-civic protest, does not explain the complexity of activism in contemporary Latin America. In fact, as activists in Latin America operate within a fluid and dynamic sphere of civil society contestation and through different forms and moments of activism, they open up new democratic spaces and extend existing ones. Chaterjee's recognition of a civil and a political society in India hints at similar dynamics. He argues that political society is the sphere of actually existing politics where subaltern groups can advance claims, engage the state and render outcomes contingent. Meanwhile, civil society complements formal electoral politics and provides space for middle classes to participate in politics by forming associations and engaging elected representatives and appointed bureaucrats (Chatterjee 2004). Finally, Mamdani (1995) challenges the notion of modern civil society in the context of post-colonial states of Africa because only the bureaucratic and Westernized elite and professional civil servants supporting the state were represented as fitting in the modern civil society while the traditional civil society i.e. ordinary citizens and people from rural areas were not conceived as part of the civil society.

4. Social movements in the South should be understood with regard to multiple forms of intersections in that there is usually an implicit connection between most social movements and democratisation processes, between identity and material issues and formal and informal forms of politics.

In most social movements in the global South there is usually an implicit connection to democratisation processes. This means that even social movements which might explicitly be understood as labour, identity based and/or quality of life movements remain engaged with the struggle for democratisation. For example, the emergence and development of the Iranian environmental movement has clear linkages with processes of democratisation and the rise and fall of the reform movement which emerged as a pro-democracy movement, opposing the hegemony of the conservatives in post-revolutionary Iran (Fadaee, 2012; 2016c). The women's movement in South

Korea participated in the transition to democracy in the 1990s and the movement has continued to demand democratic rights (Hur 2011).

Second, in the global South material issues remain a central subject in many mobilizations. Hence, there is usually a significant inter-class dimension in Southern movements in the sense that they represent the interests of middle classes as well as the lower classes. Moreover, occasionally and/or temporarily middle class movements are joined by lower classes or vice versa. For example, Ford (2009) has shown that in Indonesia a group of middle-class activists have been engaged in middle-class as well as lower class problems and even one group of activists has moved from an environmental NGO to a labour NGO. In the Korean women's movement working class women and their middle-class counter parts work hand in hand on cultural as well as economic matters, especially after the economic crisis (Hur 2011). Similarly, the Green Movement of Iran which was a pro-democracy political movement that emerged after the presidential election of 2009 managed to bring large segments of the middle classes together with the lower classes despite its middle-class origins (Fadaee 2013).

Finally, as informality is a prominent feature of most societies in the global South, this has significantly impacted dynamics of mobilizations in these societies and in many instances, it has created intersections between formal and informal forms of struggle in the sense that there is usually an informal component to the formal modes of mobilization. Bayat (2010) refers to these informal forms of collective action which are mostly popular in the global South as "non- movements" which he defines as

> the collective actions of non-collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognisable leaderships and organizations. (Bayat 2010: 14).

In the first instance non-movements may bear some resemblance to lifestyle politics and everyday politics of consumption, yet the point Bayat makes is that due to repression, the impossibility of organised activism or its ineffectiveness, ordinary people respond to their grievances through social non-movements. In other words, in contrast to lifestyle politics (e.g. shopping for organic produce from a local market), it is a direct-action strategy that reduces the cost of mobilization in the context of high-stakes street politics. Non-movement mobilizations can gain momentum and become overt if the political opportunity structure is altered and an opportunity arises. For example, Bayat (2017) shows that the genesis of the Arab Spring was a plethora of non-movements, many of which had a long history, but to observers unfamiliar with such everyday politics the eruption of popular street politics appeared spontaneous.

Chaterjee (2004) reflecting on the struggles of the poor in India, refers to these forms of mobilizations as "popular politics in most of the world" and articulates them as politics of the poor in contrast to the middle-class politics which is organised and deliberative. However, unlike Chatterjee, Bayat does not limit these forms of mobilizations to the poor and the impoverished. For example, in his analysis of women's struggle in post-revolutionary Iran, he shows that as in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution, women faced systematic oppression and resisted through daily practices in public domains by pushing the boundaries of tolerated Islamic dress code, by participating in sports and by asserting their right to study in universities (Bayat 2007). However, in periods of more political freedom this women's non-movement was complemented by a deliberate organised women organisations and campaigns.

Conclusions

Scholars of social movements have increasingly acknowledged the need for a more global understanding of social movements, yet actually achieving this remains challenging. In this article I have argued for the necessity of globalising or de-provincializing canonical social movement theory by using Southern movements as empirical case studies that inform theory. I presented a framework which draws our attention to the significance of historical contexts and the structural transformation of Southern societies, as well as their complex social, political, cultural and institutional intermingling. This framework is not meant to be exhaustive, but it can serve as a starting point for a transformative social movement research situated within debates that have enriched sociology over the course of the past two decades surrounding (1) the Northern-centric essence of sociology and the extent to which theories, concepts and practices can travel across the North-South divide, (2) knowledge that has been developed around social movements of the global South and the broader project of a Southern theory (e.g. subaltern studies), and (3) its relationship to scholarship in and about places and populations which have traditionally been ignored by Northern academia (e.g. indigenous knowledge).

Moreover, I hope this framework can provide a guidance for finding appropriate theoretical channels and innovative empirical starting points, foster situated understandings of Southern movements across space and time and provide a driving force for understanding the interaction between local, regional and global processes and their dialectics. In *Global Modernity and Social Contestation* Bringel and Domingues (2015) have shown how Southern societies and their struggles have historically been part of global modernity. Through multiple examples the book historicizes social contestation and their linkages to multiple trajectories of modernity. Key concepts are discussed in order to make sense of the distinctiveness of social contestations and modernity in different parts of the world and their significance for our understanding of current global developments. Social movement studies is in urgent need of more similar work to foster a better underrating of long term historical developments and local, social and political structures and economic disparities as well as how certain social groups such as working classes, middle classes, the elite as well as groups based on certain forms of identity such as women groups have evolved in a particular context and if and/or how they have been connected to the local and/or contentious politics.

Despite these necessities in my opinion we still need to critically engage with one fundamental question: what should our ultimate objective be for a transformative social movement research? Is it essential to articulate a distinct social movement study of the global South? Or shall we think of globalising social movement theory? Cox (2017) recounts different traditions of social movement research and underlines the significance of connection between social movement studies and multiple epistemologies of knowledge and theory in general. Accordingly, he encourages movement researchers to move towards a more reflective and reflexive understanding of multiple traditions of social movement research. He warns us of “the *a priori* dismissal of others” when their ways of thinking do not resemble ours and encourages social movement researchers to “live with diversity”. In a *Foreword* to the recent volume *Understanding Southern Social Movements* (Fadaee 2016a), Bayat raises similar concerns and asserts that “it is neither wise nor necessary to build another orthodoxy [i.e. a paradigm for the South]; rather one needs to break and amend the existing orthodoxies by developing critical and productive conversation with the Northern perspective” (Bayat 2016: xxiv). Similarly, I maintain that we should not abandon the concepts and theories of mainstream social movement scholarship that have shaped the field over the years, but we need a critical engagement and provocative starting points for such conversation. In his account of the global justice movement, Pleyers (2010) suggests such a conversation becomes possible if we start developing multi-site and multi-scalar research influenced by fieldwork in the global South and North where actors, movements and debates from the South and North are combined. Although this proposal provides a constructive ground to move forward I believe that a “productive conversation with Northern perspective” first and foremost should challenge the universal claims of mainstream social movement theory by emphasizing the dominant characteristics of the movements in the South. This could serve as a preliminary step for moving towards developing multi-site and multi-scalar research projects and eventually globally relevant theoretical frameworks.

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About the author

Simin Fadaee is a Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Manchester. She received her PhD from Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg in Germany and held academic positions at Humboldt University in Berlin and the University of Sheffield before joining the University of Manchester in January 2018. Simin’s research focuses broadly on issues of political sociology, social movements and activism, environmentalism and environmental politics. She is the author of *Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society* (Routledge 2012) and the editor of *Understanding Southern Social Movements* (Routledge 2016). She serves as a board member of the Research Committee on Social Classes and Social Movements (RC47) of the International Sociological Association (ISA). She can be contacted at simin.fadaee AT manchester.ac.uk

What it takes to compare non-core movements: a world-systems perspective. Two cases from contemporary East Central European movements

Agnes Gagyi

Abstract

The paper joins the discussion initiated by Interface editors on the relationship between core and non-core movement knowledges, from the perspective of one of the research traditions on social dynamics in different global locations: that of world-systems analysis. From this perspective, the paper points out that since capitalism as a global system has no political unit corresponding to its scale, the local politicization of global processes tends to translate long-term systemic effects into short-term, local political concepts. Due to this translation, local political concepts, core or non-core, do not tend to contain the full systemic analysis of their context, a situation leading to parallels and contradictions between critiques born at different points of the global process. The paper maintains that the "dialogue" between such different conceptualizations often happens via concepts that are generalized from specific locations, reflecting power relations encoded in global hierarchies. Regarding contemporary mobilizations, the paper contrasts the narrative on democratic anti-austerity movements challenging the neoliberalization of "democratic capitalism" with the historical context and present forms of East Central European movements. The paper argues that new movements in ECE integrate in long-term historical patterns of global integration characteristic to the region. Comparing Hungarian and Romanian cases, it demonstrates how an analysis that follows local constellations of systemic integration can situate differences of present movement claims amongst trajectories of systemic integration. For a discussion on non-core perspectives, this perspective's contribution emphasizes that beyond differences of context, or epistemic domination, the question of global comparison between movements is also the question of conceptualizing global interaction, which may point to an analytical task additional to a dialogue between core and non-core perspectives.

In a period of economic crisis, and a consequent global volatility of socio-political structures, to reconsider the relationship between social movements (and their theories) across various global locations seems to be a timely and relevant effort. As editors of the present issue note, a new attention towards SMS theory beyond the dominantly US background of the sub-discipline recently appeared within SMS (Cox and Fominaya 2013, Poulson et al. 2014, Hayes 2014, Gagyi 2015, MacSheoin 2016). Authors of new calls for broadening the perspective of SMS theory point out a structurally based "institutional parochialism" within SMS (Poulson et al. 2014), which obstructs the understanding of movement types that have not stood at the center of paradigm formation in the history of SMS theory (MacSheoin 2016), and excludes from view the existing historical body of their theorization.

Non-core perspectives on movements: a question of history

While new calls for bringing back a global perspective to SMS are necessary, as proved by the evidence authors bring for parochialism, the understanding of social movements from the perspective of global social dynamics is not without its own (global) history. Traditions of thought on imperialism (Luxemburg and Bukharin [1924]1972, Lenin [1917] 1963), uneven and combined development (Trotsky [1930] 2010), anti-colonialism (Fanon 1963), post-colonialism (Chakrabarty 2009), decolonialism (Grosfoguel 2007), articulation of modes of production (Rey 1973), dependency theory (Frank 1979), world systems analysis (Wallerstein 1986), global anthropology (Wolf [1982] 2010), Gramscian international political economy (Cox 1983) or recent discussions on global history (van der Linden 2008) all include theoretical frameworks for thinking social movements from the perspective of global dynamics. In all these examples, the perspective and stakes of asking the question of global connections are embedded in moments of social, intellectual and institutional struggles.

How previous waves of knowledge production on movements are incorporated in (or excluded from) canons of SMS across time is a contextual question, not unrelated to what Hayes (2014) or MacSheoin (2016) call the interaction between global structure and SMS theorization. The result is a system of boundaries within existing knowledge that changes through time. Also, as SMS is organized around a thematic focus, rather than a specific social theoretical approach, its divisions and continuities with other branches of social thought are not necessarily argued on the theoretical level. The recent acknowledgement of structural-economic factors, i.e. capitalism, in movement formation (della Porta 2015, Hetland and Goodwin 2013, cf. Barker 2013), is one such instance. There has been a rather swift shift away from the previously widely accepted idea that movements are not conditioned by external circumstances (McCarthy and Zald 1977). This happened not through a revolution in how movements are theorized, but rather thanks to the empirical push of economic claims being raised, once again, by mass movements in the West. The global proliferation of movements with similar claims also spurred a debate about how to conceptualize the relationship between different contexts of new movement waves.

Earlier concepts of movement waves (Shihade et al. 2012, Della Porta and Mattoni 2014) cycles (Tejerina et al. 2013), continuities (Juris 2012, Castaneda 2012, Polletta 2012) or diffusion of movement repertoires and frames (Della Porta 2012) have been employed together with reevaluations of what a wave, cycle or ”family of movements” (Ancelovici et al. 2016) may mean in a wider conceptualization of connections between social structures across the globe. The framework of Varieties of Capitalism has been used to make sense of social conditions for the emergence of movements (Biekart and Fowler 2013, Beissinger and Sasse 2014, Bohle and Greskovits 2012), while the return of material claims in the new anti-austerity movements encouraged researchers to experiment with ”bringing back” class analysis in the understanding of movements (Barker 2013, Della Porta 2015). Contributions of the research tradition that conceives of movements as elements emerging from a long-term, structured interaction within the history of the capitalist world-system (eg. Hopkins et al. 1989, Silver 2003) have been also gaining attention within these debates (eg. Silver and Karatasli 2015, Smith and Wiest 2012), due to the renewed interest in structural connections among different movement locations.

As various existing paradigms of thinking social movements in relation to capitalist social structures are invited into discussions within SMS simultaneously, some parts of existing traditions are emphasized, while others necessarily are object to simplification, selective attention, or oblivion. In the long term, this selectivity seems to be less an exception than a recurrent characteristic in the global dynamics of social movements and social movement theory. Editors of Interface have intensively reflected on the position and responsibility of SMS in relation to the social relations and collective efforts it engages with. Relations between academic and movement-based theorizing, as well as between different usages of knowledge produced in various socio-historical moments, have been addressed in a contextual approach on movements' intellectual history (Barker and Cox 2002, Cox and Nilsen 2007, Cox and Fominaya 2009, Cox 2014). Interface, a journal connecting academic and movement knowledge-making, was born from that approach (Wood et al. 2012). It is a perspective that acknowledges and emphasizes the shifting positions and registers intellectuals' talk on social movement takes. This issue's call returns to Bonaventura de Sousa Santos' concept rooted in the alterglobalization movement, “ecology of knowledge” (Santos 2009, cf. Pleyers 2004), to initiate a field of discussion across social movement knowledges. Lately, Laurence Cox (2017) drafted an agenda for empirical research as a contribution to the creation of such a field: a mapping of the intellectual diversity in social movement studies, to broaden the empirical base for an institutional and intellectual self-reflection and dialogue between movement-related knowledges.

Responding to a call for dialogue between core and non-core perspectives, I will make an argument based on one of the traditions which have dealt with social movements' global embeddedness. It is the tradition of world-systems analysis, spanning from Wallerstein's seminal books (Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1980) through decades of debates and further research that followed them (e.g. Lee 2010). What this tradition makes visible in social processes is defined by the historical constellation of knowledge and politics it was born from. It was an international moment when the academic left turned towards the integration of anti-colonial and dependentista thought, to produce a global understanding of capitalism for a globally relevant left, an ambition propelled by the Stalinist disillusionment and the global mobilizations of 1968. While the institutional and political outreach of the approach grew smaller with time, its potential for understanding of social processes as processes of global capitalism produced a considerable body of research. Today, as questions of social structure and global capitalism come to the center of attention again in discussions about social movements, this body of knowledge can be a valuable intellectual resource.

Core and non-core politics in world-systems perspective

The main heuristic principle of the world-system approach is to take the whole scope of social interactions as the basic unit of social analysis. For the modern period of global history that basic unit of social analysis is defined as the historical development of the capitalist world system. This is a dynamic, interconnected process, in which various regimes of economic, social and political organization are connected on a global scale of accumulation. Within the system-wide accumulation, positions of center, semi-periphery and periphery are differentiated, according to typical constellations of functions within the accumulation hierarchy. These positions do not denote geographical regions, and may shift, through time, from one region to another. Such shifts have been analyzed, for example, in terms of shifts of hegemonic positions across hegemonic cycles of historical capitalism (Arrighi 1994) or the dynamics of semi-peripheries raising to new core positions (Chase-Dunn 1988). While they are conceived as systemic positions that can be characterized by the systemic functions concentrated there, ’core’, ’semi-periphery’ or ’periphery’ do not denote closed social systems that would contain their own characteristics. On the contrary, the meaning of these notions is given by the way they denote functions fulfilled in system-wide processes in different positions. Since these functions move together with the dynamics of the whole system, they cannot be understood through generalizing descriptions for ’core’, ’semi-peripheral’ and ’peripheral’ societies. The practical task of analyzing social processes in these positions requires tracing local dynamics of systemic integration through history.

In a similar manner, nation-states and institutionalized interstate relations are conceived as historically changing political infrastructures of systemic interactions that happen across nation-state territories. Consequently, state politics are not conceived as following from intra-state social relations, as in approaches which compare state politics and state societies on a one-to-one basis. In the process of capitalist integration, local positions become positions occupied within the capitalist world-system, and systemic relations are performed within local societies. As Cardoso and Faletto (1979) formulate it: the penetration of external forces reappears as internal force. In their struggles, local actors act according to interests and conditions that are defined by positions relative not only to each other, but also relative to their world-systems context. From this perspective, the task of analyzing social positions, alliances and political projects within one polity becomes the task of articulating their wider relations along the lines of world-systemic integration. This is a historically substantive analysis, taking into consideration specific local constellations of systemic integration and their recurrent transformations across the cyclical reorganizations of the global economy.

A specific point the world-system tradition makes is that the capitalist world-system does not have a political unit that would correspond to the whole range of systemic interactions (Wallerstein 1986, Arrighi 1997). Instead, through its historical development, political relations came to be formalized in political units of nation-states, smaller than the range of interactions that define their internal processes. Peter J. Taylor (1982), in an attempt to draw the lines of a political science based on a world-systems background, differentiated between "real" relations that bind processes within political units to world-systemic dynamics, and the "ideological" sphere of state politics. This sphere is ideological in the sense that it politicizes local tensions born from system-wide processes by translating them into political concepts limited to the spatio-temporal range of state politics. Thus, momentary local constellations in long-term systemic processes are typically conceptualized in terms of local causes and solutions, and short-term frameworks of ongoing political struggles. Political ideologies do not reflect the full scope of the processes they react to, but rather project momentary ideological visions that universalize particular perspectives of interest coalitions within the given situation. They present effects of long-term processes as short-term political stakes, tuned to the form of temporary coalitions they are tied to.

In line with the above considerations, world-systems scholars do not conceive of social movements as arising from social relations within state units which could be compared to each other on a one-to-one basis. Instead, when looking at waves of mobilizations, they consider the position of movement actors within cyclical dynamics of the whole system (e.g. Wallerstein, 1976; Hopkins et al., 1989; Arrighi et al., 1990; Smith and Wiest, 2012; Chase-Dunn and Kwon 2011, Silver 2003, Silver and Karatasli 2015). Silver's (2003) demonstration of how transformations in global production are followed by transformations of labor organization throughout modern history is one illustrative example. As she points out, struggles for labor's social rights appear wherever capital builds out major industrial structures, yet their lasting success depends on the point of the product cycle they appear in. In core positions, where new and profitable technologies appear at the beginning of the cycle, industries are able to accommodate labor's demands and keep their profit margins for longer periods. In more peripheral positions where the same technologies arrive in a later point of the product cycle (moving away from labor pressure in core locations), the same type of movements can be less successful, due to the lower profitability of their later position in the system-wide product cycle. According to changing relations between labor mobilizations and movements of capital, this line of analysis differentiates between three types of movements. The first are struggling for gaining labor rights in new industrial surroundings (where capital moves into). The second are movements that seek to maintain rights that were once gained but are newly withdrawn due to a fall in profitability (where capital moves out from). The third is a growing scope of movements that evolve in environments where a large pool of active labor meets a constant scarcity of employment possibilities (where capital bypasses) (Silver and Karatasli 2015, Karatasli et al 2011).

Silver and her colleagues' analysis illustrate the limitations of understandings of labor movements based on short-term periods and local effects of systemic processes. The conclusion that 'old' labor movements are a thing of the past (an idea that deeply influenced the conceptualization of movement research after 1968) was generalized from the globally singular situation of the stabilization of the postwar Fordist pact in core regions. Today, as labor movements and other types of economic claims appear in the Western world again, earlier conceptualizations of relations between socio-economic structures and movements are brought back in their understanding. This move often duplicates the localized, short-term bias of the previous period, as it proposes solutions for present problems based on previous movement agendas formulated in a previous systemic moment. Ideas for industrialization and unionization in the US, expecting similar results at the end of the US global hegemonic cycle as at its beginning, are one such example (e.g. Sanders 2015, Corbyn 2017). Another effect of the same time-space bias is that labor movements across the globe are compared to the paradigmatic success story of the core Fordist experience within the US hegemonic cycle. The irony of this comparison is that this success has been made possible by, and is limited to core positions within the boom period of the hegemonic cycle.

There is a larger genre of comparisons that contrasts paradigmatic core successes to a row of non-core 'failures' that lead to local societies not achieving levels of welfare and democracy similar to core societies. This genre compares different local elements of a global process while masking their interconnection through the universalization of one local experience over the other. This type of epistemic dominance (or Eurocentrism) of social knowledge produced in the core, serves to legitimate hierarchies within the global system, and has been widely criticized by postcolonial and decolonial approaches. When comparing contemporary movements, to go beyond the dominance of core paradigms in comparative approaches, basic notions of conceptualizing political movements – such as state, social classes, or sovereignty – need to be reformulated in order to be suited for the analysis of systemic interactions. The role of state infrastructures in global accumulation, the extent of sovereignty experienced by local citizens, or the class constituency of local polities varies largely across global positions. Concepts and narratives, that theorize relations between such elements according to the Western experience, are permanently used to describe non-core situations. However, this usage reflects historical structures of epistemic and real domination (as well as local struggles using resources crystallized within those structures), rather than transparent descriptions of the global processes that constitute them.

The ambition to establish a dialogue between social movement theories based on different global experiences runs against this deeper problem of epistemic dominance within global hierarchies. What are constituted as political values on one end of global processes, are conditioned by material processes that produce situations contradicting those values at the other end of the same process. For example, in the present opening towards structural factors in SMS, which aims to interpret anti-austerity movements and new populisms in a globally comparative manner, the Western experience of postwar “democratic capitalism” (Streeck 2014, Fraser 2014) has been used as a reference point that can set the stage for a debate on why and how it is being dismantled. However, from a systemic perspective, the possibility of democracy within post-war global capitalism has been necessarily limited to specific segments of the whole system. As Samir Amin (1991) notes, the idea of democracy in fact denoted the accommodation of social and political rights within Western democracies. On the peripheries, where global capital’s reserve army was concentrated, the same system engendered dictatorships that executed the demands of the world market, and were occasionally shaken by social explosions against them (Amin 1991, 87). If democracy has been historically limited to the core of the global economy, while the same systemic processes that made it possible engendered repression and violence in peripheries, can it be introduced as a universal political value into a global discussion? Undoubtedly, it is introduced in ongoing struggles by varying structures and interests. However, in such situations concepts are universalized based on globally specific conditions. This practice reflects not the systemic meaning of these terms, but rather applications of conceptual resources born under unequal epistemic conditions. This understanding shapes the way the world-systems tradition reads debates between social movement theories coming from different global contexts.

An example for comparison: the fracturing of anti-systemic movements

Beyond movement actors’ positions within systemic cycles, the world-systems perspective emphasizes the position movements’ strategic contexts occupy within the politically fractured scene of the state system globally. From the perspective of movement history, one main aspect highlighted by this focus is the fracturing of anti-systemic movements across global positions. In the world-systems tradition, anti-systemic movements are defined as arising from and going against pressures generated by the functioning of the capitalist world-system (Arrighi 1990). In the history of the capitalist world-system, movements that addressed such pressures in a secular and political manner arose together with the formation of modern states and modern secular state politics. Addressing state power, they contested two aspects of systemic pressures: of capital on labor (socialism and communism) and of the interstate hierarchy in the world economy (national liberation movements). Politically, these movements formulated different vocabularies and narratives, which clashed in ideological debates. While they appeared as mutually exclusive on the ideological level, their differences were based in the different strategic environments provided by different systemic positions within the same global process (Arrighi et al. 1990).

In core states, workers' movements could rely on the social power of industrial labor and the institutions of political democracy, and followed a social-democratic strategy. In semi-peripheral locations, characterized by the lack of democratic institutions, as well as unemployment and social misery instead of a strong industrial labor base, it was the communist strategy of a vanguard party that prevailed. Finally, national liberation movements mobilized colonial populations in alliance with local elites against colonial domination. After more than a century of political institutionalization of anti-systemic movements since 1848, all three types of anti-systemic movements achieved state power, yet the same motion put them in the position where they needed to fulfill requirements of the world economy in order to maintain state power. Social-democratic, communist and national-liberationist governments followed development agendas that internalized the contradictions of unequal development within their own societies, and collided with each other within the global system. Mutual criticisms of the three anti-systemic streams pointed at the coercive nature of communism, the capitalist compromise of social democracy, the ineffective and compromising nature of national liberation governments, and (from the national liberation perspective) the Eurocentric and colonialist nature of both social democracy and communism.

From the end of the 1960's, as the overaccumulation crisis of the post-1945 economic boom began to be felt globally, all three types of governments that arose from anti-systemic movements lost their hegemony, and were challenged by new counter-movements. The state power structures of old anti-systemic movements, once objects of struggle and criteria of victory, themselves became targets of criticism by new movements.

The criticism of old movements and state power was amplified by the 1968 movement cycle globally. Later, much of this criticism was reincorporated into the new ideologies and governance techniques of neoliberalism in the eve of full-fledged financialization of the post-war hegemonic cycle. Transnational movements which aimed to forge an anti-systemic position vis-a-vis this stage of global capitalism, such as the alterglobalization movement in the 2000's, built on that criticism, as well as on non-core criticisms of the Eurocentrism of Marxism. It proposed a constant, horizontal dialogue between experiences born in various points of the global system, instead of universal strategizing for power (Day 2005). However, this type of organizing could not produce an organizational power that could pose significant challenge to global power structures.

The model of the Occupy movement, applied widely in anti-austerity movements after 2008, relied on the tradition of the alterglobalization movement in its horizontal ideologies and networked organization, further enhanced by new communication technologies. In the past few years, many new anti-austerity movements developed formal political organizations (Gerbaudo 2017, Fominaya 2017). These movements operate in the context of a more evolved hegemonic crisis, systemic reorganization, increased misery, and social upheaval. In the process of their formation, elements of repertoires and infrastructures of earlier movement forms, as well as reactualizations of earlier anti-systemic ideologies, coexist with present systemic pressures and strategic constellations.

That today's movements tend to seek influence over state power in order to further their aims is similar to previous hegemonic crises (Silver and Slater 1999). Meanwhile, social trajectories across the present crisis vary widely across systemic positions. As Milanovic (2011) illustratively pointed out, the winners of income redistribution between 1988 and 2011 can be found within the emerging middle class of China, India, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia, and the global top 1%, situated in North America, Western Europe, Japan and Oceania. Those who lost the most relative to their earlier positions are working-class and lower-middle-class populations of core economies (groups still richer than the emerging non-core middle class). As several studies pointed out (Guzman-Concha 2012, Anderson 2011, Biekart and Fowler 2013, Gagyi 2015, Poenaru 2017), new anti-austerity movements, dominantly thematized by a globally networked middle class, feature similar repertoires and slogans, but fit into different social currents, alliances and interests within the same systemic reorganization. Within those trajectories, the narrative that explains new movements by the neoliberal rolling back of the welfare state, and consequent downward mobility/precarization of middle class constituencies (e.g. Fominaya 2017) applies predominantly to Western contexts, and leaves other global contexts unreflected. To address the issue of a potential dialogue between different gobal cases, in the following section I raise several points regarding how dynamics of new mobilizations in ECE can be included in a comparative framework within a systemic approach – and what that would imply for theoretical frameworks built on Western cases

New movements in ECE: some tools for systemic comparison

In left conceptualizations of the post-2008 movement wave, the narrative of a decline of "democratic capitalism" (Streeck 2014, Della Porta 2013, Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2013, Fraser 2014, Mouffe 2014) has become a consensual point of reference within SMS. This narrative, inspired by the historical experience of Western postwar welfare societies, does not describe non-core experience throughout the same global capitalist cycle, where postwar capitalist regimes have not included social and political rights. In the case of new movements in post-socialist countries, the same framework is applied as a universal reference. However, the story of democratic welfare disrupted by neoliberalization does not apply to post-socialist situations where political democratization arrived together with neoliberal measures. In post-socialist countries, the "decline of democratic capitalism" narrative is combined with the earlier post-Cold War narrative of democratization as catching up. The latter narrative poses "democratic capitalism" as a developmental aim that has not (yet) been reached, which is constantly in danger of a "democratic backslide" (e.g. Swinko 2016). The conceptual tools provided by these two narratives, coming from core-dominated discourses born in different historical constellations, have been combined in various ways to understand present processes in ECE (Pleyers and Sava, 2015), as well as to express movement claims. In a global comparative perspective however, local variations of these political frameworks need to be analyzed in their interconnections with trajectories of social mobilities and political alliances within systemic integration.

For such an analysis of movements within ECE, some analytical foci would be the following. One characteristic of semi-peripheral positions is that of political coalitions around development ambitions for a global mobility from semi-peripheral to core positions. Contrary to the normal story of everyone catching up with the core of the global economy through time, implied by modernization theory (Rostow, 1960), the world-systems tradition demonstrates that in a global economy built on mechanisms of hierarchical polarization, semi-peripheral development meets the limits of an adding-up problem. Set against that background, permanent semi-peripheral efforts towards global upward mobility appear less to be flowing from the objective possibility of catching-up, but rather to be born from, and locked into, the polarization inherent to the global economy. What Arrighi (1990) calls "developmentalist illusion" refers to such development ambitions following from structural positions and interests of their proponents within the global competition. The "developmentalist illusion", in this sense, does not refer to "illusion" as a mistake in cognition, but as a real structural and ideological effect, a fact of internal-external relations at work in semi-peripheral elites and their coalitions, tied into pressing relations of global competition.

A structural analysis of political programs within such situations would start from assuming that the process of capitalist integration, in its various historical phases, produces social groups with interests for and against the given historical form of integration, and that those groups' efforts have their repercussions on the process, both through political and non-political means. Political ideologies, understood as negotiated projections produced within temporary inter-group coalitions within and outside the nation-state, would be expected to change together with the dynamics of systemic integration, while expressing long-term effects of integration in short-term terms of momentary political conflicts.

In terms of politicization of structural processes, a major determinant factor in ECE has been that its economic dependence from the cores of the global economy has been accompanied (and often articulated) by more immediate hierarchical relations to neighboring powers. Along the lines of economic dependence, political dependence announced itself in the form of hegemonic spaces of maneuver for the various horizontal and vertical alliances of local groups. As Andrew C. Janos (2000) demonstrated, throughout the modern period, ECE politics followed the political lines inscribed by global and regional hegemons, with deviations following from local conditions. To what Janos calls the "feigned compliance" of elites (Janos 2000: 411), we can add the positions of contender or anti-systemic interests, also conditioned by configurations of economic and political dependencies. Within this dependent space of maneuver for local politics, external dependencies can work both as constraints and resources along the lines of vertical alliances.

How to place middle class movements within that context? A typical historical feature of middle class formation in East Central Europe, similar to other semi-peripheries (Arrighi 1990) is the relative scarcity of middle class positions available through economic activities, compared to core societies. A related characteristic is the state-bound nature of middle class formation – both in the sense of middle class interests in state policies, and in the more direct sense of middle-class positions available within the state administration (Stokes 1986). Another characteristic is that middle-class positions available locally do not provide life standards equivalent to those of central middle classes. As Janos (2000) notes, frustration under the double conditions of limited and state-bound middle class formation historically had the effect of recursive efforts to translate middle class economic ambitions into political entrepreneurship. The alliance and conflict structures in which this structurally conditioned developmentalist illusion of middle classes is formulated into political projects vary according to dynamics of social reorganizations across phases of integration.

Cycles of revolt followed by alliances with power structures have been described as a recurrent characteristic of ECE middle classes throughout modern history (Szelényi and King, 2004). Mobilizations of 1848 were fuelled by middle estates squeezed out by large estates in a competition for grain export markets – a social group that later got integrated in state bureaucracies. Early 20th century mobilizations on right and left were connected to surging unemployment among intellectuals and bureaucrats. After the consolidation of socialist regimes, middle class dominance in socialist power structures has been a classic point raised by critics of socialist ideology (e.g. Konrád and Szelényi 1979). By the end of the 1960's, a new wave of discontent and criticism began, as the new socialist middle class met its mobility limits within the system. This criticism, formulated from first Marxist, then third-way, and finally liberal terms at the moment of the regime change, was followed by a new phase of middle-class formation within post-socialist structures (vis-a-vis a downwardly mobile socialist working class). By the end of the 2000's, middle class mobilizations started to raise political claims again, and seek state protection from what they see as a loss of social position and security. Throughout these cycles, a long-term structural tendency towards emulating middle class life standards of core countries seems to manifest itself in phases of political struggle in times of crisis, and in phases of coalition-making with elites in times of conjucture. In both phases, the possibilities to achieve core life standards remain limited, a limitation that leads to further cycles of mobilization.

How exactly the developmentalist illusion inscribed in the status of non-core middle classes is activated within the alliance and conflict structures of local integration, is a question of actual historical constellations. In the following, I provide a brief overview of integration contexts in the case of new middle class movements in Hungary and Romania, in order to show how the analytical perspective presented here can connect long-term tendencies of local middle class politics to changes in local social-economic regimes of global integration within the global crisis, and to the local political-ideological vocabularies that provide politicized conceptualizations of crisis effects.

Within the various trajectories of East Central European countries across the socialist and post-socialist eras, Hungary and Romania seem to have repeatedly given contradictory answers to similar world-economic and geopolitical pressures. Hungarian and Romanian socialist regimes reacted differently to the global crisis of the 1970's, and the specific challenges it posed for catch-up industrialization projects of the region (raising energy prices, increasing need for hard currency and export pressure, declining terms of trade with developed countries, and finally, raising debt). In Hungary, the socialist government put in place after the 1956 revolution substituted forced industrialization and ideological control with material legitimation and market reforms. Its reaction to the 1970's crisis was driven by liberal measures, unsuccessfully challenged by the orthodox branch of the party, a path that laid the base to the fastest market liberalization in the region after 1989. In Romania, centralization and forced industrialization survived destalinization, and were coupled with partial independence from the Soviet Union and an early opening towards Western economic partnerships. When the effects of the crisis began to be felt in the form of external debt, the Romanian regime chose to pay back debt with extremely severe conditions of austerity, in order to avoid liberal reforms proposed by lenders, and to maintain the centralized industrial model its power was based on. While in Hungary market reforms within socialism produced a large technocratic middle class with considerable power and material benefits, the Romanian regime coupled extreme centralization of power and symbolic popular outreach with the marginalization (and often, stigmatization and harrassment) of intellectuals. In Hungary, the regime change provided opportunities for former technocrats to rearticulate their positions within market liberalization. This dominant line of post-socialist politics was represented politically by the alliance of Socialist and Liberal parties proposing neoliberal reforms, opposed by a dominated fraction of competing elites proposing protected and state-aided development of national capital. In Romania, the first post-socialist government, set up by second-tier party members, continued previous policies of protectionist industrialization, serving as a program of state-aided national capitalism in the new context of a market economy (Ban 2014). Intellectual opponents saw this new line as the continuation of communism, interpreted as a political alliance of dictatorial power and lower classes against educated strata striving for occidental development. This symbolic continuity was marked in 1990 by clashes between miners brought to Bucharest by the socialist government, and intellectual demonstrators who questioned the legitimacy of elections.

In Hungary, the liberal development model (based on FDI in the 1990's, and credits in the 2000's), was exhausted by the mid-2000's. Problems of debt service were coupled with a political crisis by 2006, when violent street protests broke out in response to a leaked speech of Socialist prime minister Ferenc

Gyurcsány, in which he admitted having lied to the people about economic opportunities. Protests staged people's disillusionment with the promises of liberal development after 1989 in the vocabulary of the nationalist opposition. The two-thirds super-majority gained by nationalist party Fidesz in 2010 was built on this interpretation of the crisis. However, as Fidesz engaged in a politics of power centralization and state-aided development of national capital, waves of protests followed, dominated by local middle class actors connected to previous liberal cultural and technocratic infrastructures. Thus, since the austerity wave following the 2008 crisis arrived to Hungary in the form of Fidesz policies for national capitalist development, post-2008 protests took the form of anti-Fidesz demonstrations. Their main political line followed agendas of liberal middle class actors, yet it also contained elements of opposition to Fidesz's anti-poor policies. While street demonstrations dominated by middle-class liberals dominate the foreground of oppositional publicity, far-right opposition party Jobbik and neo-nationalist movements like that of forex mortgage debtors constitute a significant segment of political opposition.

In Romania, post-socialist national protectionism lost hegemony by the mid-2000's, a process aided by NATO and EU accession. In 2006, as part of preparations for the EU accession, president Traian Băsescu made a symbolic alliance with anti-communist intellectuals, setting up a commission to produce a report based on which he would officially condemn the communist system. Intellectuals' anti-communism became part of the legitimating ideology of the upcoming era of liberalization. Liberalization started a major inflow of FDI, credits, and infrastructural takeover by Western companies. Management positions established by new investments, as well as corporate outsourcing in the ICT industry engendered a growth in middle-class technocratic positions in big cities. This drove a class-based urban transformation which went together with squeezing out former urban worker constituencies (Petrovici 2012, Petrovici and Poenaru 2017) . The waning of FDI inflow and the austerity wave that followed after 2008 activated demonstration waves dominated by this new post-socialist middle class. As Petrovici and Poenaru (2017) point out, this wave gained a political edge after 2013, integrating in a sharpening conflict between Socialists' national protectionism losing ground, and technocratic liberalism gaining power. Within this conflict, new middle class demonstrations allied with the liberal narrative that opposed Western-oriented, enlightened, educated strata to the political alliance of Socialists (remnants of communism) and their uneducated, poor electorate. Regarding the direct interests of the new urban middle class, this narrative condemned Socialists' protectionist and redistributive policies, which favored national capital, rural administrative technocracies and the poor instead of urban professional middle classes directly benefiting from corporate FDI. In contrast to the Hungarian case, in Romanian mobilizations, liberal values were coupled with explicit anti-poor statements.

This very short overview of the two cases shows that although new mobilizations in both countries used slogans and repertoires of Occupy-type movements, their integration into social and political transformations engendered by the global crisis was different from what has been described as democratic anti-austerity movements reacting to the neoliberalization of “democratic capitalism”. In both cases, a long-term tendency of regional middle classes to politicize status claims during crisis periods was expressed in political mobilizations that interpreted the effects of the 2008 crisis as a developmentalist backslide. Due to differences in the paths of integration constellations in the two cases, new middle class movements reacted to different structural opportunities and political vocabularies. Political concepts like “left” and “right”, “Socialist” and “Liberal”, “European” and “national” bore different meanings in the two cases, to the extent that comparing attitutes towards notions like “Socialism” or “Europe” in the two cases on a one-to-one basis would miss the main stakes of middle class actors’ integration within crisis processes. In Hungary, demonstrations were positioned on the “left” of the local political spectrum, expressing commitment to “European democracy”, and opposed the nationalist government who performed the cuts after the crisis. In Romania, demonstrations’ momentum benefited the liberal faction of political elites, a position that opposed the Socialist party and its voters (depicted as the barriers to European development), yet was identical to the governments who did most of the post-2008 cuts. While Hungarian movements criticize current anti-poor policies, in Romania new demonstrations express anti-poor stances. In terms of political reactions to position shifts, middle class constituencies of the new mobilization wave are differently embedded in current transformations of integration constellations. In Hungary, they protest position losses following from politically motivated changes in state-based infrastructures. In Romania, the urban professional middle class, benefiting from FDI inflows, requests state policies that continue to benefit their positions, maintaining a liberalization scheme that, at the same time, disfavors poorer and rural strata.

Conclusion

Regarding the question of a dialogue between movements in various global positions, this article emphasized that local effects of global systemic interactions tend to become politicized through ideological projections of temporary alliances, which translate systemic processes to short-term and localized political causes. Through the example of the fracturing of anti-systemic movements of the 20th century, it illustrated how differences of positions within world economic cycles lead to differences and conflicts in the conceptualization of revolutionary causes.

Turning to the question of contemporary movements in ECE, the paper emphasized that beyond similarities to what has been conceived as the post-2008 wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements, differences of integration into crisis processes also need to be taken into account. It specified several aspects of the region’s world-economic and geopolitical integration, including renewing programs for global mobility to core positions, and the “developmentalist illusion” encoded in the structual position of local middle classes. The paper suggested that present mobilizations dominated by middle-class constituencies integrate in long-term patterns of local middle-class politics, producing politicized status claims in times of crisis. However, through the example of new mobilizations in Hungary and Romania, the paper also demonstrated that the way such long-term ambitions are activated today depends from specific local constellations of global integration. The paper showed that while movements in both countries interpret effects of the 2008 crisis in terms of a developmentalist backslide, the specific trajectories of socialist and post-socialist regimes throughout the same phase of global “downturn” after the 1970’s (Brenner 2003) engendered different structural and political contexts for the expression of middle class claims in contemporary mobilizations. It also pointed out that, according to movements’ local embeddedness, political concepts of “democracy”, “left”, “right”, or “neoliberal” are linked to different structural-political nodes in the two situations, with contradicting conclusions regarding relations to the poor.

While, on the one hand, this points at the limitations of a comparison of the two cases on a common ground established by the narrative of democratic decline through neoliberalization, on the other hand it illustrates a potential for understanding relations between locally embedded struggles as relations between local constellations of systemic processes. In terms of analytical method, this type of approach emphasizes the relevance of historical detail in the analysis of systemic interactions, as opposed to ideal types or narratives that pose certain constellations (e.g. of modernization, democracy, or anti-austerity movements) as universal models.

What follows from this perspective to the question of comparison and dialogue between movements in different global locations is that the politics and knowledge expressed by movements is not necessarily informative in terms of how they are related within global social processes. On the one hand, political conceptualizations of local constellations tend to differ or exclude each other across global positions, due to differences of position, experience and interests, as well as of local opportunities for coalition-making. On the other hand, since political conceptualizations of local constellations conceive of systemic processes in short-term and localized idioms tailored to temporary political alliances, their understanding of global processes does not constitute, or add up into, a general framework on the scale of the systemic interactions they are structurally connected by.

In practice, the latter problem is typically “solved” through political frameworks overlapping along relations of dominance or coalition-making. Santos’ concept of “knowledge ecology”, proposed in line with the principle of “no global justice without cognitive justice”, proposes to solve that problem through giving voice of the whole diversity of social experience across the globe. Regarding that question, the contribution of the world-systems perspective is that adding non-core perspectives to core perspectives, or criticizing the latter by the former may not be enough to solve the problem of dialogue across global positions. If political conceptualizations born from localized constellations of systemic integration do not contain the systemic scale of their interconnectedness, a debate between them can hardly produce an understanding of that broader systemic aspect.

In this sense, the answer provided from a world-systems perspective to this issue's question may seem to downplay the potential of global dialogue. However, its contribution is also motivated by the aim to understand movements in relation to global interconnections without generalizing one movement context over the other. The difference from a perspective focused on dialogue – or, hopefully, the contribution to it – rather consists in the classic gesture of materialist analysis to use impersonal, methodical analysis of structures to circumvent limitations of phenomenological experience.

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About the author

Agnes Gagyi specializes in social movements, focusing on connections between politics and social movements in Central and Eastern Europe, and the social, economic and geopolitical aspects of the region's long-term world market integration. She is researcher at the Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg, and member of the Budapest-based Working Group for Public Sociology "Helyzet". agnes.gagyi AT gu.se

Interface: *a journal for and about social movements* *Article*
Volume 9 (2): 83 - 113 (Nov/Dec 2017) *van Eeden, Politicization and depoliticization*

Politicization and depoliticization of ecology: Polish and Romanian perspectives

Pepijn van Eeden

Abstract

In this article, I comparatively assess the heyday of political ecology in Romania and Poland during the revolutionary and the early transformation years. From the pathways of two key political ecologists, Marcian Bleahu and Radosław Gawlik, I first explore the place of scientific ecology under 'real existing socialism', then its politicisation when state socialism crumbled, and finally the de- politicisation of ecological issues when a liberal environmental policy framework was adopted, as part of 'transition to the free market' in the early 1990s. In an ensuing section, I provide a short literature review dealing with political ecology and environmentalism in the region, pointing out that the short period of momentum for political ecology has been grossly misunderstood. On the one hand, the dominant perspective of the transition, that of liberal modernization, considers political ecology as postmaterialist, thus impossible under state socialism. On the other hand, their adversaries rooted in critical or postcolonial studies, view political ecology as allied to the left, thus difficult to comprehend in opposition to state socialism. Without denying the relevance of both perspectives, this contribution shows how the period substantiates a pragmatist take. The distinctive cases of Gawlik and Bleahu illustrate that a crucial constraint for politicization of ecology is the degree to which ideo-theoretical perspectives overall, and especially on catch-up modernization, whether Marxian or liberal, can colonize and neutralize environmental controversy. The conclusion suggests how this new approach could launch a differentiated yet symmetric approach to the history of political ecology in both Eastern and Western Europe.

Keywords: political ecology, politicisation, environmentalism, Poland, Romania, post-socialism, transition, transformation.

1. Introduction

This article touches on an almost forgotten history: the history of political ecology movements in Central and Eastern Europe during the revolutionary and early transformation period. It reviews how ecology in CEE started gaining political traction during the last years of state socialism, how this wave had its heyday during the revolutionary years, and then gradually broke in the early transformation period. Importantly, the historical distance that has meanwhile arisen, which now includes to the period of 'transition', permits a fresh analysis. Now we can consider this entire trajectory without concern over our positions in it influencing it somehow. From this distance, we zoom in on two key actors in these movements from sharply contrasting backgrounds. They are from geographically close but otherwise very different countries: Marcian Bleahu, from Romania, and Radosław Gawlik, from Poland.

The picture that emerges, from the viewpoints of Bleahu and Gawlik, are then confronted by two opposite ideo-theoretical perspectives that have dominated both general conversation and academic literature on the topic of political ecology in CEE. The first informs the concept of 'transition' itself, and can be called liberal modernist or liberal evolutionist. This position typically recognizes the politicisation of ecology as 'postmaterialist': as a product of rising welfare standards in liberal capitalist 'advanced industrial society' (Inglehart, 1997) – or in a more recent variation: as a formative part of the emergence of a 'risk society' and its 'reflexive modernization' in late-capitalism (Beck et al., 2003; Giddens, 1996). Countering these optimistic approaches, a second perspective draws its inspiration from a broad range of theories that profess a critical stance to liberal capitalism, often with a Marxian touch. Those influenced by postcolonial theory, for example, typically point out that an 'imagined West' after 1989 legitimized international funding schemes, that patronized and depoliticized social movements. This 'NGO-ization' and 'professionalization' of movements in the 1990s meant their disciplining by a Western-imposed liberal state order through rendering them 'fundable causes' and framing them as 'a backward other in need of Western advice' (cit. Böröcz 2006; cit. Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013; cit. Jehlička et al., 2015; cf. Lang, 1997; Gille, 2007).

This article has emerged from the pragmatic remark that, while there are undoubtedly important appreciable elements in both perspectives, they also both push an understanding of the intense wave of political ecology during the revolutionary period as a 'surrogate': as an unreal proxy for nationalist, neoliberal or otherwise anti-communist ideologies, repressed during state socialism (cf. Dawson, 1996). This is however, and understandably so, at odds with both Gawlik's and Bleahu's own takes on the matter. Rather than choosing or disqualifying the one perspective in favour of the other, then, or attempting to integrate them in a new all-encompassing synthesis, this contribution shows that while both were and may remain useful for providing direction and inspiration to policymakers, activists, intellectuals, scientists, or politicians, they tend to obscure political reality. Or in more abstract terms, by taking the Romanian and Polish trajectories of political ecology as focal point, this article substantiates the thesis that the degree of politicisation of the environment can be construed as the degree to which ideo-theoretical perspectives *in general* are unsuccessful in neutralizing experiential and environmental controversy.

The core of the empirical corpus consists of biographical research and two in-depth interviews with the said actors, but is complemented by a wide range of interviews with other actors and analysis of historical works. Before moving to the descriptive part in section 3 below, section 2 below lays out the hypothesis in more detail, and includes comments on periodisation, and on the selection of Bleahu and Gawlik – and Romania and Poland – as case studies. Perhaps somewhat out of the ordinary, the review of the literature and the above discussion over the said theoretical perspectives will take place only afterwards, in a section 4.

2. Approach and preliminary remarks

Theoretically this article follows the pragmatist tradition in sociology. Under its 'abductive principle', a is inferred as the most plausible way to account for b, in view of orienting ourselves in our surroundings, and to disregard some other possibilities, which nevertheless remain possible. As noted by the French pragmatist Francis Chateauraynaud, pragmatism fits naturally onto research to political ecological controversy: both have the experienced environment as their point of departure (cf. Chateauraynaud, 2015; 2016, *Table 1* and *Fig. 4*, pp. 1-2).[1]

Hypothesis

The syllogism below, which outlines the reasoning of this article, varies on one of the founders of pragmatism, the American philosopher and semiotician Charles Peirce (1931, Ch. 7, par. 2). The hypothesis is underlined:

> After adopting a liberal evolutionist (postmaterialist) perspective on the politicization of ecology, it becomes harder to take it into account outside of affluent socio-economic standards and stable liberal democracy.
>
> After adopting a critical (Marxian) perspective on the politicization of ecology, it becomes harder to take it into account in state socialist societies.
>
> If *the degree of politicization of ecology is* recognized as *inversely related to the degree to which any perspective is successful in fixing, colonizing and finally neutralizing attention for environmental controversy*, its heyday after the disintegration of state socialism but before neoclassical economic theory came to dominate in Poland and Romania, would be a matter of course.

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[1] For an extended discussion on abductivism and pragmatism in political research in general: e.g. the work of Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, Ch. 2).

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>
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that the hypothesis is true, and that the precise composition of an ideo-theoretical perspective is only of secondary and contingent importance.

Choice of actors

It can of course be argued that it is impossible to substantiate the above broad hypothetical claim with only two in-depth interviews. However, note that, although it is certainly true that additional research on this topic would be of great added value, the hypothesis does not depend on the interviews directly, but rather on demonstrating the politicisation of ecology during the disintegration of the state socialist authority, and its depoliticisation when new perspectives over 'transition to market economy' provided a new direction and framework for placing and framing environmental concern as well as for environmental policy making. This is itself hardly in question, as we will see below more in detail, confirmed not only by Gawlik and Bleahu but by a wide range of additional sources and existing literature.

The reason of taking Gawlik and Bleahu into account, then, is not primarily to substantiate the hypothesis, but first negative in character: both provide powerful counter-narratives which destabilize both the above mentioned theoretical perspectives in favour of on the ground realities. For such destabilisation to be sufficiently convincing, it is first important to remark that both Gawlik and Bleahu were key leaders of political ecology movements in their countries for a substantial period of time. Their leading role was recognized, for example, by the European Federation of Green Parties, the precursor of the contemporary European Green Party (EGP), which attempted to strike links in the former Warsaw pact in the early 1990s, and identified Bleahu and Gawlik as the pivotal figures in green politics in Poland and Romania respectively. Most importantly, also the domestic political elites considered them key figures: Gawlik and Bleahu served respectively as Minister and State Secretary of Environment, between 1993 and 1994 and between 1997 and 2001.

Gawlik's Poland and Bleahu's Romania: 1960-2004

The focus of this contribution rests on the revolutionary and early transformation years: in Poland from the foundation of *Wolność i Pokój* (WiP, Freedom and Peace) in 1985 to the first free elections of 1991; in Romania from the murder on Ceaușescu 1989 to the transfer of power to the *Convenţia Democrată Română* (Romanian Democratic Convention, CDR) in 1996. The overall scope is larger however: the description below starts in the 1960s, when Bleahu's career took off, and ends in 2004, when Gawlik helped to found *Zieloni 2004*. This long-term view is informed by the above hypothesis, which depends on mapping a longer-term trajectory of politicisation and depoliticisation under respectively expiring or newly emergent perspectives for grasping the environment, and only then on demonstrating the special status in this regard of the revolutionary and early transformation years, when such perspectives were entirely absent.

The choice for Gawlik's Poland and Bleahu's Romania is first and foremost informed by their contrast within formerly Soviet-dominated Europe. Besides a long list of other notable differences, the most telling difference between Romania and Poland is perhaps the above-mentioned caesurae of revolutionary and early transformation period: the disintegration of the state socialist regime in Poland started the earliest, and in Romania the very latest. On top of that: from the early 1960s onward, Bleahu was a member of the communist scientific establishment, and recognized as leading geologist, while Gawlik, on the other hand, politicized ecology as a member of the radical Polish underground in the 1980s, enthralled by environmental sciences, but mostly as an amateur. Precisely due to this poignant difference in national environment and personal background, then, found similarities in the processes of politicisation are likely of wider relevance, certainly if they also fit with known trajectories of political ecologists elsewhere, notably in Western Europe, for example.[2]

Tracing eco-politicisation in Romania and Poland

A communist environment: Romania and Bleahu

Marcian Bleahu was born in Brașov, in Transylvania, in 1924. After having served in the army during the Second World War, he graduated in 1949 from a study in Geology at the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Bucharest. Bleahu claims to have been a silent supporter of the outlawed *Partidul Național Liberal* (PNL) at the time, but refrained from active engagement.[3] Instead he started an academic career at the Geology department, and from this position was affected by political developments: Bleahu's familial background was partly in Romanian aristocracy and partly bourgeois, and per consequence he was banned from teaching in 1961.[4] Strikingly, only four years later, he joined the *Partidul Comunist Român* (PCR):

> Why? That is funny again… the reason why I became member of the party. (…) We had a huge car crash. Our driver was dead immediately. Our director had several fractures, and died the second day. And me, I escaped. (…) Then the Minister responsible for geology came to the hospital. 'It is all very tragic etcetera, etcetera.' And when I left the hospital he said to me: 'Listen, the rector is dead.

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[2] The comparative strategy obviously resonates with Mill's direct method of agreement and is further informed by the work of Sheila Jasanoff in science and technology studies, notably in her book *Designs on Nature* (2005, Ch. 1), and historical comparative theory as laid out by Ludolf Herbst (2004).[2]

[3] There was also the option of more active resistance at the time. Armed resurgent groups had a significant presence in Romania until the late 1950s.

[4] His father was a notary and on his maternal line, Bleahu claims descendance from Constantin Brâncoveanu, Prince of Wallachia between 1688 and 1714.

> You have to become the new rector of the Geological Institute.' As rector I was obliged to enter the Communist Party. I never had any political taste for it or things like that. There was the political charge, and I had to accept it.

It is telling that Bleahu carefully separates the formal political act of becoming a PCR-member from his convictions or engagement. Of course, Bleahu is doing so in part to dissociate himself, ex post-facto, from his communist past. However his stance also confirms a well-known general trait within 'real existing socialism': a radical disjuncture between the national public sphere and the private sphere (Betts, 2010; Wolle, 1998). Shortly after Stalin's death, Chroesjtov signalled that, in the SU sphere of influence, fear for assassination was to change into fear for exclusion from public life. Under these new circumstances, a disengaged, humorous, or along the years almost openly cynical lip service to communism became a possibility for many, certainly for those, like Bleahu, whose family history was a difficult fit for the communist narrative.[5]

Even so, communists could still maintain their control over the public sphere with this narrative, in large part due its promise to 'catch-up' and then overrun the liberal West. Marxist-Leninism offered an internally highly coherent theoretical panorama along these lines, idealist and far removed from the actual environment, but precisely for this reason very successful in providing hope and a progressive vision to those facing the desperate social situations and economic catastrophes in the region after World War II. In the slipstream of Kautsky and then Lenin, Marxist-Leninist theory managed to do so by proclaiming 'hard' sociological-scientific laws on how the downfall of bourgeois capitalism was unavoidable, thus, the communist party ahead of its time, and opposition to its leadership both reactionary and in vain. This stance, of course, suffocated socio-political debate and the possibility for internal differentiation – and meant that communists were per definition out of touch with their environment (cf. the critique of Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, pp. 12-23). Leninism effectively annihilated attentiveness to the environmental in its broadest, literal sense by claiming that 'there is no alternative', to use its later Thatcherian modification – or *alternativlos*, in Merkel's contemporary ordo-liberal version.

Typically, when the Marxist-Leninist rationale installed itself, it did so under violent Stalinist totalitarian attempts. It was during such a period in Romania, under the militant Stalinist Gheorghiu-Dej, that Bleahu was banned from teaching, as Marxist-Leninist sociological theory also invaded natural science. In Russia such attempts had already resulted in huge disasters, most infamously Lysenko's 'proletarian' experiments in agricultural genetics, causing mass starvation in the Russian countryside (Joravsky, 1970; Suny, 1998, pp. 283,

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[5] Noted, of course, that 'totalitarianism' was never that total as theorists like Hannah Arendt claimed it to be. Rather, Lenin's famous dictum 'under communism nothing is private' paradoxically produced its own radically secluded private sphere, to the degree that the things associated with it (holiday houses, family life, hobby's, etc.) have nowadays grown into the most cherished of memories of state socialist times (Betts, 2010, p. 2).

371).[6] After Stalin's death and Chroesjtov's change of course the Warsaw Pact communist parties gradually retreated into accepting 'international standards' in the natural sciences. This entailed that formerly externalised elements could be readmitted in the sciences – provided that the party's position in power was firmly established, and issues such as party membership were formally 'in order'. This is precisely what happened to Bleahu; tellingly, his readmission to the academic geological sciences in 1965 coincided with the replacement of Gheorghiu-Dej by Nicolae Ceaușescu, then still a moderate reformer. Under Ceaușescu's rule, Bleahu was to have a proficient career as a geologist, mountaineer, and internationally acclaimed specialist in tectonics, publishing multiple internationally acclaimed works, and gaining a degree of public visibility after a national television appearance on the 1977 Vrancea earthquake, and a range of popular introductions to geology in Romanian.

Under these 'normalized' circumstances the developments in ecology in Anglo-Saxon scientific communities from the late 1950s onward also permeated Romania – and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe – with relative ease. The term "ecology", having its origin in the German biological sciences, was already well-known.[7] Its classic positivist-objectivist but simultaneously holist orientation, its emphasis on networks of interlinked relations, and on mutual dependence, all seemed a perfect fit to the socialist worldview. Left-leaning ecological works, such as Barry Commoner's *The Closing Circle* (1971) for example, became available in Russian and were extensively commented in the Soviet press, and of Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962) lengthy excerpts also became available.[8] World-system theory was also carefully followed, most notably, of course, the Club of Rome and its ground-breaking *Limits to Growth* (1972) (cf. Cholakov, 1994, p. 38; Komarov, 1980).[9] The first spheres in which these works circulated were, of course, those of Bleahu and his colleagues: working within natural sciences and the substantial state socialist managerial classes trained in forestry and agriculture. Unsurprisingly, then, and further pushed by Cold War competition over moral superiority, Romania and most other socialist states in the region were quick to enact large and highly ambitious packages of environmental legislation from the 1960s onwards. Checks on industrial pollution were introduced, conservation measures were increased, and national parks, of which the first dated back to the pre-communist period, were extended and increased in number.

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[6] In his 'proletarian' agricultural theories, Trofin Lysenko claimed that food crops could survive the Siberian winter, on the environmental influence on heredity in genetics, preferring the idea of mutual aid in this regard over Darwinian competition, favoured by Stalin in part as a result of Lysenko's simple peasant family background, but leading millions to starve in the countryside after its forced implementation.

[7] The term 'ecology' was coined by the German philosopher and naturalist Ernst Haeckel in 1866 (Haeckel, 1866).

[8] This with a note of thanks to Laurent Courmel, whom has made an important correction from a previous version of this article: *Silent Spring* did circulate but was not fully translated and commented on in Russian.

[9] The developments in world system modelling which lead to *Limits to Growth* were closely monitored by some of the highest Soviet authorities even before the report was published (Rindzevičiūtė, 2015). The influence of *The Limits* and the other mentioned translations is clear in Komarov's samizdat publication *The Destructions of Nature in the Soviet Union*, 1980 (cf. p. 138). On the intriguing story of Komarov himself: Altshuler, Golubchikov and Mnatsakanyan, 1992.

An anti-communist environment: Poland and Gawlik

Gawlik was born in 1957, and grew up under the above-sketched conditions of 'real existing socialism', in the 1960s and 1970s, in a village not too far from Wrocław, western Poland, in a regular Polish family. In contrast to Bleahu his interest in the environment was unmistakably politically charged when it first developed, and firmly opposed to Marxist-Leninism:

> the Oder was as black as pitch. And the fish that got caught, even when they were still alive, they smelled like phenol. People tried to eat the fish, but even on a plate after frying they still reeked of phenol [...] and I started to read about the subject. I think that at the end of 1970s the *Black Book of the Censorship*[10] came into my hands, through my brother-in-law whom had to do with people from the opposition. From the Black Book I learned that the information about the environment was simply censored, and the communists imposed the barrier.
>
> [My engagement] had to do with a certain place, a matter of some sensitivity to and observing environmental degradation, and also with the knowledge that I possessed after reading the censorship book. Then I began to develop this interest.

It is undeniable that, for Gawlik's ecological engagement, his family acquaintances and his acquisition of the *Black Book of Censorship* were of crucial importance – but of course, it is at least equally inconceivable without the actual environmental degradation. Finally, in Poland in the 1980s, troubled by martial law and heavy economic crisis, it became increasingly problematic to legitimize repressive measures with the communist perspective on catch-up modernization. Overall, biophysical ecological problems turned into major gathering points for oppositional political energy, and powerful indicators for the moral bankruptcy of existing state socialism. The communist establishment, meanwhile, stuck to treating ecology as ideationally inherently connected to their cause:

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[10] In 1977 Tomasz Strzyżewski, an official of the Polish censorship or *Main Office of Control of Press, Publications and Shows* (GUKPPiW), left Poland for Sweden with one of two copies of the guidelines of his office, which were reprinted in 1977 and 1978 in Polish in London by ANEKS publishers, and then spread in Poland as *samizdat* (large samples were published by NOWa, or Independent Publishing House, related to KOR, in 1977). A translation in English also appeared (Curry, 1984). The book contained guidelines for covering up sensitive environmental information. It was forbidden to talk or write about 'anything that gives information on the disaster in X', or 'about any increase in deaths from XY', about the carcinogenicity of asbestos, or even about the noxiousness of the plastics used in artificial Christmas trees.

> They [the communists] kept treating it [the ecological question] as a valve, let people read, learn, and then they wouldn't be political. 'They are into some ecology' [laughing].

In 1985 Gawlik's old activist friend Leszek Budrewicz assisted in organising a hunger strike in support of Marek Adamkiewicz, who had been imprisoned after refusing military service on moral grounds.[11] The ultimately successful action led to the foundation of *Wolność i Pokój* (WiP, Freedom and Peace), which presented the first sign of open oppositional life since the repression of Solidarność and declaration of martial law in 1981. Strengthened by the *glasnost* in Russia, and in contrast to the underground manoeuvring of post-'81 Solidarność, WiP took up a tactics of radical aboveground transparency. Strikingly, it also broke with Solidarność by stripping its oppositional stance of any allusion to any ideological perspective (Kenney, 2002). WiP-members were radically political in the private sphere, of course, but wherever they appeared in public they took a distance from anything that came close to 'politics'. Rather, when in public, they claimed the moral high ground next to a politics of style, surrealistically mimicking rather than criticising state socialist discourse, or provocatively exploiting loopholes within it.

Similar to the 1975 Helsinki Agreements in the case of human rights, then, the communist party's allegiance to ecology and natural science soon provided a WiP with a perfect niche for activism. Within the movement, Gawlik accepted to become responsible for ecology in 1985, and one year later, in April 1986, Reactor 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded, due to a series of unexpected events during a power-failure stress test. The nuclear meltdown caused an acute meltdown of much of what remained of state socialist self-confidence. Its socio-socio-political is still underappreciated – partly, perhaps, because this radical revenge of contingency must also escape classical sociological theory (Kenney, 2001). Over the whole of socialist Europe, however, it did not simply arouse but also legitimized and broadened massive discontent. Especially in Poland and Hungary, from this point onward, a radical shift of perspective was increasingly supported within the communist parties themselves (Ther, 2016, Ch. 2).

On the radical end in Poland, meanwhile, the situation was efficiently exploited by Gawlik and WiP, leading to the largest public demonstrations since Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law in 1981. Gawlik had already been carefully planning monthly marches against metallurgic plant in Siechnice, threatening the water pollution in Wrocław, but Chernobyl propelled these actions onto a whole new level. Heavily policed but provided with the slogan "Police drinks the same water!" the regime was effectively paralyzed, unable to do anything with its now hollow or even counterproductive theoretical premises.[12]

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[11] In Podkowa Leśna, just outside of Warsaw.

> There were ironworks located in aquifers, it was simply ridiculous. This contaminated those aquifers, there were heavy metals in tap water… We had evidence for this and the communists couldn't deal with it. We were capturing those, those blatant nonsenses, right. When Chernobyl exploded and there was no information about it, you know, we started talking about it. I wouldn't say that there was some great ideology behind it.



***Picture 1*: "Close smelter Siechnice!" / "Chrome = cancer thus death" (http://portal.tezeusz.pl)**

The tension between the public sphere and actually experienced biophysical reality grew to enormous proportions, and there were hardly any areas in which the schizophrenia became more physically tangible than in the government's discourse on the environment, still maintaining its ambitious policy designs, but very literally catastrophic in actual practice. As mentioned, under Stalin even hard scientific deviations from the party line could be repressed if needed, as out of line with the assumed objectivity of Marxist-Leninist sociological laws. In real existing socialism such practices had been abolished – but now it was precisely real objectivity that rebelled *against* it. Did Gawlik *use* the ecological hazard for his political agenda? Or was it the other way around, and did he depart from *objective* ecology, and from there to a political stance against the political regime? Even after being asked repeatedly, Gawlik himself cannot give a clear answer to this question; the two appear as inextricably intertwined – and this has clearly little to do with ex-post facto evasion or attempts at self-legitimation. Gawlik does assert that:

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[12] In Polish: *Policja pije tą samą wodę!*

> It was a very powerful thing. One hundred people could make a fuss and it became a subject of discussion, you know. The communists, whether they wanted it or not, right, and maybe they didn't talk about it in public, but for sure, in their circle, they had to talk about what could be done.

Actions followed against plans for a nuclear plant near *Żarnowiec*, intelligently reframed by WiP as 'Zarnobyl'.[13] It strengthened the general perception but also increasing self-perception among communists that their narrative and worldview, which, as mentioned, had always been highly idealist, had now permanently cut all worldly connections, losing touch with reality completely.

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[13] Recently an excellent article on the Polish nuclear protest was published in this journal, by Kacper Szulecki, Tomasz Borewicz and Janusz Waluszko (2015).

NASTĘPNY
BĘDZIE
ZOSTAŃCIE W
CZY ATOMOW
ŚMIERĆ
WSCHODU
JEST
ŻĄDAMY
PEŁNEJ
INFORM
ZABIJA
ZIECI !

Picture 2:* Protests against the nuclear power plant in *Żarnowiec (http://portal.tezeusz.pl)

Together with economic and external political factors – Gorbatsjovism, the heavy financial and socio-economic crisis in Poland, hyperinflation, pressure of international creditors – WiP and the ecological malaise so pushed the regime into accepting a search for a new perspective (cf. Kenney 2001; 2002). The govenrment soon felt forced to give in to some of the demands of WiP – something it had never done to any opposition grouping before, including Solidarność – to close the Siechnice smelter, and abort plans in *Żarnowiec*. About the same time, the government de-criminalised Solidarność, starting talks with it after wild strikes erupted over real wage controversies at the end of the 1980s. The Round Table Agreement was signed in April 1989, and partly free elections followed in June.

Negotiated revolution in Poland

The situation in Poland is most certainly oversimplified if described as a victory for 'the Polish people', as it is often presented, as a unified block led by the heroic opposition of Solidarność.

> RG: Most of WiP's people thought that there was some risk, just as the radical part of Solidarność, called *Solidarność Walcząca* (SW, Fighting Solidarność). Kornel Morawiecki [from SW] said that it was a betrayal and so on, a collusion with the communists, and we had to take a stand. He remained hidden, if I remember well, until 1991 [laughing]. And some of my friends are hiding until today [laughing], just in case.

The negotiations toward the Round Table Agreement were carried by already established elites. Besides the communist establishment, the opposition consisted of known economists and intellectuals, church representatives, and a few trade union leaders. In the radical WiP-affiliated circles this Solidarność-affiliated oppositional establishment was generally seen as the "old opposition", and some dismissed the Agreement altogether, as a communist plotted attempt at normalisation (Kenney, 2002; Kennedy 2002; Ash, 1990; cf. Szulecki et al., 2015, p. 29). In many ways their intuition was quite right. Many of the Solidarność-affiliated invites to the Round Table had a rich past in the communist party and had only dissented from the party line when the crisis of the 1980s had compelled them to do so. Tellingly, the communist constitution was amended, without a general referendum thereafter.[14] Overall, then, the Agreement is not assessed that badly as a first step toward radically updating the narrative on 'catch-up modernization', replacing the outdated Marxist-Leninist version with a neoliberal one.

The violent intra-party coup in Romania

Similar to Poland, Ceaușescu's Romania had to deal with the same difficulties in the 1980s, arising from an ever-widening gap between the state-centralised system and the real ecological economic and ecological situation. Different than Jaruzelski in Poland, however, Ceaușescu had both the possibility and the will to choose for severe repression of the tension that emerged, rather than giving in to reform. Only when the external pressure finally became too high, due to the events in Poland and elsewhere, did internal opposition within the Romanian communist party emerge and succeed. The subsequent execution of the dictator and power grab by Ion Iliescu is hence best described as a well-orchestrated intra-party coup, in response to events in the region. The old party elite managed to hold on to power, changing its name into National Salvation Front (*Frontul Salvării Naționale,* FSN) (on this period: Antohi and Tismăneanu 2000; Deletant, 2001). Like Poland, neither the socialist establishment nor the actual opposition were eager to use word 'revolution' at the time. Quite typically, Bleahu gives only a short comment the collapse of one party rule in Romania, in December 1989*:*

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[14] A replacement for the "post-sovereign" constitution, as Andrew Arato called this type of constitution-making, only came in 1997 when a fully new constitution was drafted. Still, it was only validated by a referendum with insufficient turnout. (Arato, 2016).

> Ok, good, there was a 'revolution' and I participated as well, I went to the demonstrations and all that. And actually, these were led by Iliescu. [...] In my opinion, you know, Iliescu is a criminal.

Elsewhere Bleahu refers to the events as a 'bouleversement' – meaning upheaval, not revolution.

Ecological regime-extension in post-socialist Romania

Under these circumstances, an ecological party was founded by an "old friend" of Iliescu – the poet, apiarist and eco-publicist Toma George Maiorescu – shortly before the first free elections in May 1990. In Bleahu's words, the foundation of the party was a direct attempt of the FSN to anticipate and incorporate the wave of political ecology wave elsewhere in Europe. The new party was called the *Miscarea Ecologista din Romania* (MER, Ecological Movement Romania) and Bleahu, as a prominent Romanian geologist, was asked and accepted to become a leading member. A second ecological party was also founded, called PER. After the first elections, they received respectively 12 and 8 seats – around 5 percent of the total vote (Nohlen and Stöver, 2010, pp. 1599-1600).

In June 1990, violent anti-government riots in Budapest led Iliescu to call on groups of rural miner communities to defend the government, secretly joined by one of the successors of the *Securitate*, the SRI (Deletant, 2001, pp. 218-19).[15] Iliescu remained seated as President, but the government fell, and then fell again. In October 1991, finally, Bleahu's MER was asked to form a government with the FSN – in an obvious gesture toward multi-party democracy. Shortly after the coup on *Ceaușescu* the first Environmental Ministry had already been erected, over which Bleahu now came to be in charge.

> *MB*: Ecologism was something new and politically appealing at the moment. It was already known by biologists, naturally, as it is originally a biological term that talks about biotopes, biodiversity, and so on. And so, partly because it was a notion so new in politics, the world came for it. It connected a very good sort of people: the Ecologists.

After Bleahu's term as Minister, however, the MER disintegrated alongside the existing regime and its certainties. Bleahu had nevertheless become enthusiastic for ecological politics, partly due to attendance to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit during his term as minister, and co-founded yet another party, the FER

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[15] Violent repression led to several deaths and thousands of wounded among the protesters Bleahu's remark on Iliescu's criminality links to the court case running against Iliescu, reopened at the time of the interview, on charges of crimes against humanity in relation to these events.

(*Federacia Ecologista din Romania*). FER now turned *against* Iliescu's FSN by becoming a member of the unified opposition assembled under the Romanian Democratic Convention (*Convenţia Democrată Română*, CDR). In May 1996, the Convention managed to replace the FSN. After five years of absence, Bleahu entered parliament once again, as FER's only senator.

The Ecological Forum within the Freedom Union in Poland

Back in Poland, the new catch-up modernization narrative, largely agreed upon at the Round Table, quickly enabled intra-elite consensus to return, as the historian Philip Ther has recently suggested (Ther, 2016). As one of the very few invites from WiP and the 'new generation', Gawlik finally chose to join the deliberations, in one of the sub-tables on environment, and therewith inserted himself into the new order. For the first partly free elections he ran on the list of Solidarność. He was elected to the *Sejm* and, after some reshuffling, became part of the liberal democratic *Unia Wolności* (UW, Freedom Union) in 1994 – led by Balcerowicz, one of the crucial post-'89 figures with a strong background in the communist party who, faced by martial law and the Polish financial and economic crisis in the 1980s, turned to Solidarność and then the Chicago School for solving Poland's deep financial and socio-economic problems (Ther, 2016). As such Balcerowicz grew into one of the main architects of neoliberal 'shock therapy' privatisation and deregulation, for having Poland 'catch-up with the West' once again – a crucial inventor and translator of the new perspective of liberal modernization that soon caught on in the entire region. Within the UW, so at least formally in agreement with this perspective, Gawlik now co-founded the Ecological Forum (FE, *Forum Ekologiczne*). The UW became one of the winners of the 1997 elections, and Balcerowicz forged a coalition with the conservative *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* (AWS), led by Buzek.

> *RG*: I think that he [Balcerowicz] didn't want to appoint me to this post. According to him I was a green fundamentalist, and actually he was right [laughing].

Gawlik's positioning here must perhaps be taken with ex-post facto grain of salt: today, the neoliberal framework is far less popular, certainly in the green circles Gawlik is still part of. Gawlik's self-depiction here has partly been confirmed by other sources, however: within the framework of the UW, *Forum Ekologiczne* was not simply a UW-loyalist green-washing machine. Rather it politically monopolised the ecological theme to such an extent that it became almost impossible for Balcerowicz and Buzek to ignore Gawlik for the post on environment (De Boer, 2015).[16] Competition with the post-communist SLD, into which a post-Solidarnosc ecological group had just entered, might also have played a role in this regard (cf. Frankland, 2004, p. 138). In any way, Gawlik was appointed Secretary of State and Vice-Minister for the Environment – remarking on a 'green moment' within the political establishment.

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[16] Anne de Boer, personal interview, 1 May 2015. Anne de Boer was a co-founder of Groenlinks in 1989, the green party in the Netherlands, and co-founding member of the Green East-West Dialogue not long thereafter: the informal body of the European Federation of Green Parties facilitating contact and a forum for exchange on aid programs between Eastern and Western

> *RG*: It was the perception and opinion of politicians at that time... A lot of things could be done because everyone accepted it. There was greater attention for ecological issues. We entered the new political system with the awareness of terribly polluted environment. The feeling that it is devastated. The recognition of green issues was much bigger at that time, in the early 1990s, than today.

The transition to liberal environmentalism: pushing a new perspective

The period during which Bleahu and Gawlik became active as professional politicians for ecology parties or factions was a time in which the post-revolutionary slogan 'transition to a multi-party system and market economy' was introduced in Poland and, eventually, Romania. A new governmentality based on Smith's 'invisible hand' of the free market came to be accepted by virtually the entire post-revolutionary political class, whether affiliated with the former establishment (Bleahu) or the radical opposition (Gawlik).

> *RG*: I understand it like this. First of all, transformation was connected with some basic economic regulations and the economy: the value of money, the currency convertibility, economic freedom.

Within the new framework, Gawlik was quick to adopt a policy position which the political scientist Steven Bernstein coined as liberal environmentalist. Based on the premise that environmental aims could be fully reconciled with neoclassical liberal economic theory, if only its principles on autoregulative supply and demand were properly applied, liberal environmentalists aimed to eliminate top-down state control, and to internalise or included environmental 'externalities', such as identified and represented by Gawlik in the UW, into a market-based system. For doing so, a range of policies came to be advocated: 'polluter pay principles', environmental tax measures, requirements for environmental impact research, 'precautionary principles' in case of 'environmental risk', and so on, which altogether replaced the ideal of top-down state control (Bernstein, 2001; Neale 1997; Hobson 2013).

After state socialism had imploded, and the free market framework constructed, liberal environmentalism naturally made a victory lap in what now became known as the Viségrad region. Far before Western Europe, its policy proposals

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European greens. In his words, he "discovered" Gawlik for the European greens, which afterwards built up relations with Gawlik's Ecological Forum.

were adopted in Czechoslowakia, Hungary, and Poland already in 1990 and 1991 (Vargha, 1992), as well as in Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltics some years later. With the full disappearance of state socialism as a major counterpoint, also globally nothing held back its proponents any longer, and during the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 liberal environmentalism made its global breakthrough, naturally under vocal support from Central and Eastern European participants (Bernstein 2001).

> *RG*: From an ecological perspective, it [transformation] was connected to the fact that we introduced this whole body of environmental legislation which didn't exist during communism. There were some interesting elements that we managed to continue quite well, for example the *Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska* [NFOS, National Fund for Environmental Protection, founded by the socialist government in 1989]. But in these cases there was the area of various practices, and the money that was involved in it, that we had to find out about, and somehow include in the new economic system. And then there was the construction of ecological infrastructure: during communism, there were basically no sewage works, for example.

Bleahu was one of the attendees in Rio, in his position as Minister of Environment. He came to accept the change of regime as necessary, but unsurprisingly, Bleahu warned against all too dramatic change. Romania, during Bleahu's time in office, had started large-scale land reform, and became the defining feature during these years. The large Romanian agricultural sector, which had been completely nationalised under Gheorghiu-Dej, was reprivatized to meet the free market standards, resulting in a chaotic situation around property rights.

> *MB*: The process of giving back all the domains had started, all the agricultural farms, to the old owners expropriated by the communist party. For the new agricultural laws introduced at this moment, it was impossible to find fitting jurisprudence and legal precedent.

The economic reorganisation, which reinstalled the property of formerly disowned large landowners, threatened the existing state-centred environmental policy framework. Bleahu considered himself its protector – carefully accepting elements of liberal environmentalism, but trying to maintain the much older policy ideals of state conservationism, often of German origin, with forestry regulation, natural monuments and national parks as its main focal points.

> *MB*: I managed to successfully push for the condition that no terrain was given back that had become part of the national parks. There were not a lot of them at the time, three, or four, but anyway. And then the protection of natural

> monuments. This was important: one of the biggest successes from my side.

The difference between Gawlik and Bleahu roughly reflects the most important dividing line in established politics at the time, between proponents of 'shock-therapy' or 'big bang' privatisation (Gawlik) and proponents 'gradualism', adopting a defensive line (Bleahu).[17] It should be noted that, when compared to their position prior to 1989, differentiation between Bleahu and Gawlik after 1989 clearly became more difficult, now that they were both engaged in eco-political currents within established politics.

Depoliticisation of ecology

Altogether, the Polish and Romanian situations are very different, as well as Bleahu's and Gawlik's initial positions in these countries. In both cases however the disintegration of 'real existing socialist' perspectives coincided with the emergence of political ecology. Or to put it differently: both Bleahu and Gawlik found themselves at the centre of a wave of environmentalism that was particular to the revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary period in which the Marxist-Leninist modernization paradigm collapsed. Gawlik's case embodies the opening of hitherto hermetically closed ranks of the governing elite for radical environmental opposition during these years. Similarly, although part of the scientific establishment, Bleahu's story is also marked by a perceived need and pro-active attempt of the government to incorporate ecology and the environment. Politicisation of ecological issues elsewhere in the region during the 1980s further confirm this general pattern: Hungary (*Duna Kör*), East-Germany (*Bündnis 90, Grün-Ökologische Netzwerk Arche* and then the Green Party of the DDR), Czechoslovakia (*Dìti zemì*, *Hnutí Duha*, *Brontosaurus* and finally the green party, *Strana zelených*) the Baltics (the human chain, the Phosporite wars, the tree-protection movement), and Bulgaria (*Ekoglasnost*).[18] So altogether, nothing really new is postulated when remarking that: the crisis of state-centrist perspectives regulating public life, the disintegration of hitherto well-established views upon society and how it should be organized, and above all the demise of doctrinal Marxist socio-political theory on catch-up modernization, coincided with the politicization of ecology.

This uplifting of political ecology was then followed by a presentation of a new framework and successful effort to integrate the environment and answer its questions afresh. There was an integration of environmental 'externalities' according to the neoclassical economic language, then much in vogue, or the 'colonization' of the environment by neoliberalism, in the less friendly terms of the eco-political theorist Eric Swyngedouw – by effectively extending the bureaucratic regulatory machinery of the government, now guided by free market principles instead of state socialism (Swyngedouw, 2007). In both Bleahu's and Gawlik's case, the ruling political class simultaneously integrated much of the former opposition too: the environment in its broadest literal sense, then, was re-inscribed into a new politico-economic theory after 1989. This ended with a tragic note for both FER and Ecological Forum, as well as for virtually all other political ecology movements, parties and groups in Central and Eastern Europe. To most observers at the time this came as surprise. The glorious role of political ecology during the revolutionary years and its prominence in the early 1990s seemed altogether to promise a bright future. Most governments in the region took up rather pro-active positions with regards to ecological questions – most notably during the said Rio Summit, as mentioned. After the implosion of state socialism, however, many former activists started careers as consultants, business leaders, politicians, lawyers, or civil servants within the new administrations. If not entirely abolished, the movements themselves gradually professionalised, became grant-dependent, and depoliticised – or "NGO-ized" (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013; Lang, 2000).

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[17] A distinction that was partly the result of successful framing by the former: gradualism was not a self-articulated position, while favouring a big-bang was (cf. Balcerowicz, 1995, pp. 158-159).

[18] On these movements, e.g. French 1990; Jancar 1992; Jancar-Webster 1993; Kenney 2001; 2002; Pavlínek and Pickles, 2000, Ch. 7; Rupnik 1990; Szulecki et al., 2015.

Of the many ecological (initially no 'green') party political enterprises founded in 1989 and 1990, very few acquired parliamentary seats like Gawlik and Bleahu. By the end of the decade, all 'greens' had disappeared from the political radar.[19] Bleahu's FER did not manage to cross the threshold in 2000. It finally morphed into the *Partidul Verde* (Green Party), which exists until today as an official member of the EGP, but as an extra-parliamentary party in the very margins of the Romanian political landscape. In Poland, the Ecological Forum ceased to exist after the UW collapsed in the elections in 2001. Four years later Gawlik and his friends founded *Zieloni 2004* (Greens 2004), which also became a member of the EGP, but has so far not managed to acquire parliamentary seats – and recently saw plenty of its younger members leave to found, ironically, a new socialist party: Razem, currently one of the few viable oppositional forces left in Poland. As we know all too well, Central European political elites, generally became disinterested and then outright hostile to eco-political ideas after the turn of the millennium.

Theoretical perspectives versus realities?

One of the main dividing lines in the literature on political ecology, greens, and environmental movements in general, has been between those following an optimistic liberal evolutionist perspective, and those adopting a critical perspective, often with a Marxian touch. This theoretical opposition is easily construed as a continuation of the old Cold War dichotomies, of course, and also overlaps with the post-1989 differences between Bleahu and Gawlik. Interestingly, then, in light of the assertions in the above Chapter, there are several compelling and thought-provoking turns to be traced here, with much wider implications than one might initially assume.

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[19] With the notable exception of Latvia, where the Green Party (*Latvijas Zaļā partija*), strikingly, developed a nationalist-conservative green discourse, and has without interruption been represented in parliament after 1989.

The evolutionary perspective

The evolutionary perspective on political ecology and environmentalism, closely linked to liberal environmentalism and the concept of transition, builds on liberal modernization theory, and was dominant until quite recently. It typically considers political environmentalism as the product of a 'postmaterialist' value package emerging due to socio-economic standards of 'late-capitalism' or 'advanced industrial society'. As such it associates them with stable parliamentary democratic institutions and a high degree of socio-economic welfare (Inglehart 1971; 1977; 1997). Strikingly, Ronald Inglehart, who first coined the term 'postmaterialism', developed his projections under strong influence from classic Marxist socio-economic reductionism and its conceptions of socio-economically determined historical stages, but applied to the American situation of the 1960s and 1970. Rather than predicting a communist future, he conceived the emergence of environmental and other 'new social movements' on this basis as the latest step in a linear and necessary process toward a more enlightened, more 'green' and less 'materialistic' politics. Inglehart's optimistic liberal evolutionism was repeated in an updated form by the pivotal Western European sociologists Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck from the late 1980s onward, and with an even stronger focus on the environmental aspect, with their theories on the rise of a 'risk society' and 'reflexive modernity' (Beck et al., 2003; Giddens, 1996). In their slipstream, measuring 'postmaterialist values' (and 'materialist values') proved a perfect fit for many large-*n* quantitative researchers, most notably in political science. When the emergence of green parties in Western Europe had to be accounted for somehow, the postmaterialist-evolutionist perspective became almost naturally accepted as the explanatory scheme (e.g. Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990; Müller-Rommel, 1990; cf. Van Haute, 2016). Still today, its categories guide many influential political value surveys and quantitative value research, such as the Chapel Hill Survey, the Eurobarometer, and Inglehart's World Value Survey, either in the form of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage or a modification of it.[20]

Also on ecological topics in Central and Eastern Europe, after 1989, the liberal evolutionary perspective has provided much orientation. As we have seen, in the 1990s, Gawlik adhered to its premises, and its overall approach has dominated general conversation, directed policymaking, and inspired academic literature on environmental policymaking and green politics in the region (for green parties, e.g. in Frankland 2014, 2016; Rüdig 2006). From the assumed lack of attention over waste problems, to the underdevelopment of green parties, or lack of enthusiasm for environmental NGOs in the region, to Central Europe's deplorable reputation in climate negotiations, or problems with implementing EU environmental policy: they have predominantly been described, understood and analysed as indicators that CEE societies have not yet reached the right 'stage' for ecological values to flower. Normatively this implicitly entails, of course, that the region should advance further along the path of free market-steered modernization, to 'catch-up' with the assumedly more developed, efficient, and 'green' liberal capitalist economies *elsewhere*, in the *future*.

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[20] The Chapel Hill Survey promotes using the VAR-TAN cleavage as more relevant party-political cleavage today: Green-Alternative-Liberal vs. Tradition-Authoritarian-Nationalist. This does hardly break radically with the postmaterialist/materialist scheme however – nor with its problems. Instead of preventing the observation of, for example, materialist-green positions, it instead obstructs the very relevant observations of a Tradition-Green-Alternative, or Liberal-Authoritarian-Nationalist position.

Such approaches went largely uncontested for most of the post-socialist period, but have started to lose much of their credibility since the financial crisis of 2008, the series of governmental debt crises in 2009, and the "crisis of liberalism" that ensued, not least in Central Europe. Today, when the topic of political attention for ecology and environment is discussed for the region, the liberal evolutionist scheme still tends to be taken for granted by many, but an insurmountable problem is that the future projected by this perspective, looking so inescapable and promising in 1989, never came true. Moreover, when multi-party democracy did seem to consolidate institutionally, and socio-economic conditions did improve in the later 1990s, at least in terms of GDP (ppp), political ecology groups and parties were *not* gradually receiving more backing but instead disintegrated. Even if there indeed appeared a Westernized, globalist, and postmaterialist hipster-class in the urban centres of Central and Eastern Europe, it can hardly be denied that ecological problems did not politicize, but rather de-politicized between their political heyday in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the 2008 financial crisis.

Although rarely discussed, an even more profound empirical problem is that *when* ecology in CEE politicized this did *not* happen, as is clear from the above section 3, under conditions of abundant consumerism and growing material welfare and stable liberal democratic institutions, like in Western Europe and the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As outlined above, ecology flowered politically in Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when socio-economic *in*security was at peak levels, whether in terms of GDP, state finance, or public confidence in the ruling political class (Ther, 2016, Ch. 2, Ch. 3, fig. 4.2, p. 101). It thus becomes difficult, if not simply impossible, to depict the depoliticisation and politicisation of ecology in accordance with liberal evolutionist theories, perspectives and categories.

When the story of WiP is recalled the problem becomes even clearer. Embracing Inglehart's postmaterialist scheme makes it impossible to appreciate the Polish wave of ecological activism during state socialism on its own terms. Giddens and Beck offer some more possibilities, but essentially their theories stumble upon similar problems. By far the most popular solution to the problem has been to side-line environmental activism during this period as somehow 'fake', like a 'surrogate nationalism' for example, in the words of Jane Dawson over the Lithuanian environmental movements (Dawson, 1996). However, after closer inspection and actual dialogue with the actors, proper empirical substantiation for such judgement can only be fabricated with great difficulty, if at all. Within WiP's ranks, like in Lithuania, nationalist sentiments were certainly very present, but so were leanings toward liberalism, reform communism, and anarchism. While asking activists like Gawlik during this period, or even state-leaning geologists like Bleahu, it appears that their environmental engagement was overall marked by a *lack* of a clearly delineated ideological perspective, or an active denial of ideological perspective, with perhaps shared anti-establishment sensibility. Most importantly, it certainly comes across as rather authentic.

Even when pointing out the political opportunity provided by the environmental niche (cf. Oberschall, 1996), which was of course very real, and which Gawlik fully confirms for his own case, it makes little sense to dismiss 'proper' engagement with ecological questions on this basis, and call it a surrogate instead. One may recall how green politics in Western Europe emerged out of political opportunity too, most obviously in Germany (cf. Bütikofer, 2009, pp. 84-85; Probst, 2007). Perhaps most instructive: one should always remind oneself that practically no one was expecting the Iron Curtain to come down before it did, as the American historian Padraic Kenney has remarked (Kenney 2002, p. 145): even if environmental activism was somehow 'fake' before 1989, activists apparently preferred their 'masks', not thinking they could ever be removed. What are the fundamental differences in this regard, precisely, with those that identified with Paris '68 in the West? Both in East and West, young people with a leftist political education felt alienated from their official representatives in increasingly dogmatic and state-centred organizations, but were unable to find any common ground internally, before a gathering point was found when the ecological crisis came along (cf. Stavrakakis, 2000).

The alternative: critical and postcolonial theory

Since 2008, political ecology is being understood in a range of different ways, in which the pivotal references are drawn from a wide range of different critical traditions: the Frankfurt School, critical realism, post- or neo-Marxist theory, discourse analysis in its different forms, or postcolonial theory.

Although this brings a much-needed improvement, if only because of the need for discussion, there too tend to emerge empirical problems from these perspectives. Let us take one of the most relevant and apt: the postcolonial paradigm. This perspective developed firstly in cultural historical and literary studies, strongly influenced by Foucaultian explorations of the culture-power nexus, and Edward Said's monumental *Orientalism* (1978). For Central and Eastern Europe this new approach was first taken up by cultural historians that, in Said's slipstream, focused on how the region had been semi-orientalised in and by 'the West' as part of its continuous invention of itself since

Enlightenment (Todorova, 1997; Wolff, 1994). Until today, scholars influenced by postcolonial theory typically formulate what can be called an *externalisation-thesis,* pointing to a postcolonial problematic within Eastern Europe to 'locate goodness elsewhere', to use a phrasing of József Böröcz (2006).

> An 'imagined West' is invoked both as 'sovereign and as sovereign measure' in moral geopolitics, but also from a frustrated location of the inadequate ('eastern' etc.) Europe. Goodness, just like 'life' in the title of Milan Kundera's novel, is imagined in Eastern Europe as being 'elsewhere' (pp. 133-34).

From the postcolonial point of view, such a tendency to externalise 'good things' from to the local here and now are linked to centuries of Ottoman, Russian, or German imperial domination, followed by Soviet repression, producing a political culture of popular disengagement, and a submissive ruling class accepting whichever regime manages to present itself as hegemonic. Often, as in Böröcz case, this is followed-up by drawing the local political class as alienated, anti-democratic and patronizing, and therefore after 1989 submissive to the Western-centrist 'moral geopolitics' of a quasi-colonialist ensemble of EU, IMF, large financial donors, and international NGOs. Such theories, then, resonate well with the leftist radical voices in Western Europe – Mouffe, Žižek, Rancière – pointing out that the post-communist political consensus, marked by the cross-party agreement on liberal modernization and 'transition' as described above, produced an undifferentiated political elite, and so worked to undermine real democracy with different and conflicting interests and viewpoints, even if it formally put multi-party systems in place. The strength of such perspectives derive in part from their lucid explanation of the rise of right-wing populism *within* the local here and now: 'good things' like environmental care, but also women's rights, LGBTQ+ equality, asylum policies, the Roma question, or, in Böröcz case, anti-racism, are not entirely without reason identified with an well-educated, liberal and upper-class elite that is democratic and participatory only in name. We barely must remark on the Fidesz government in Hungary or the PiS in Poland – or Trump and Brexit – to agree that we are trapped in an endless vicious circle.

As is clear from the Polish and Hungarian situation, the postcolonial point of view is ever more easily empirically substantiated nowadays relative to Inglehart, Beck or Giddens. Also with regards to political ecology it is not hard to find evidence on the flipside of the large sums from US and international donors becoming available for local 'civil society building' after 1989, later replaced by EU, Norwegian, and Swiss grants. Many of those around Gawlik and Bleahu started seeking "fundable causes", complying with lists of externally fixed requirements, and either losing or never developing incentives for involving with their everyday local human or non-human environment (cf. Fagan, 2006; Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013; Jancar-Webster, 1998; Lang, 2000). It stimulated processes of 'professionalization' and 'NGO-ization', i.e., a de facto political neutralization of civic environmental activism after 1989.

Scholars like Petr Jehlička or Zsuzsa Gille, meanwhile, have been influenced by postcolonial theory more explicitly in their attempts to destabilise what is generally assumed from the perspective of liberal modernisation and transition: the Western-oriented narrative on the 'grey Eastern bloc' and 'Cold War myths of ecocide, toxic nightmare and ecological disaster' (Jehlička, 2009, p. 102). They point out that nowadays trendy 'Western' and 'postmaterialist' local ecological practices, like city gardening or collectivist forestry for example, have in fact deeply rooted local anchors in Central and Eastern Europe, including in the socialist period, and have simply never disappeared, even while the region is still paradoxically overlooked 'a backward other in need of Western advice' (cit. Jehlička et al., 2015; Gille, 2007).

This, as mentioned, is in a marked improvement over the naive liberal transitology of the recent past. In view of the Chapter 3, however, there are several important remarks and side-notes to be made. First, it should be very clear that neither Gawlik nor Bleahu described their own (partial) adoption of the liberal environmentalist policy paradigm as taking place under a financial incentive, direct political pressure, or an articulated wish to become like 'the West'. Rather, when probed, they strongly protested such assumptions, and pointed instead to the moral, social, ecological and economic tensions in Romania and Poland in the 1980s. It is of course still possible to claim that they succumbed to Western neo-imperialist pressure, but simply not admit having done so. Some might claim that Bleahu and Gawlik have unconsciously been 'mimicking the West', to use Bhabha's postcolonial parlance (Bhabha, 1994). Such arguments can always be made, and provide for a comfortable and perhaps tempting critical superiority over actual actors, like Gawlik and Bleahu. The problem is that this comes at a heavy price: it grossly oversimplifies the complexity of their actual reality and daily decision-making, and runs the danger of cutting off levelled dialogue, if not grave insult, by literally subjecting them to a social theory. Note that, once more, actual environmental engagement is not an option here.

The attempt to take Bleahu and Gawlik seriously into account, pragmatically and radically empirically, also unveils a larger and partly political problem with the postcolonial perspective circling around, notably, Spivak's 'strategic essentialism', as a tool in the battle against Western hegemony (Spivak, 1988).[21] Cultural historians like Stanley Bill (2014) and Jan Sowa (2014) have drawn attention to a creative work-around of such postcolonial theoretical notions by radically conservative writers and intellectuals – they name the Polish-American scholar Ewa Thompson, the academic Dariusz Skórczewski, the author Rafał Ziemkiewicz, the poet Jarosław Rymkiewicz. Bill remarks that they use postcolonial theory not simply to identify and analyse but to pro-actively defend and construct nationalist 'necessary fictions' against 'neo-colonial oppression'– in the Polish case for example an historically entirely ridiculous glorifying narrative on the Sarmatian nobility, as the essence of Polish identity. Kaczyński's government in Poland, as well as movements further right such as Kukiz '15, are currently using such mythology to promote an agenda in favour of curbing parliament, undermining an independent judiciary, solidifying social inequalities, menacing the press, and limiting freedoms.

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[21] One of the most clear and well-known examples of such 'strategic essentialism' as a way to resist ruling hegemonies is the adoption of an Islamic heritage by Afro-Americans in the US: see Malcolm X and the history of the Nation of Islam in the US. In 2006 Spivak came to question Central European literary theorists: "Are you also postcolonial?" (Spivak et al. 2006).

Of course, the engaged empirical work of Petr Jehlička, for one, is very far from proposing strategic essentialism along such lines. Nonetheless the warning of Bill and Chibber against abuse of the postcolonial perspective is a rather powerful one, and must be taken utterly seriously. Indeed, overly enthusiastic adoption of postcolonial theory may lead to empirical fallacies, such as blindness over honestly progressive attitudes and intentions of Gawlik and Bleahu, but is also politically problematic, as it tends to play an outright reactionary agenda, or because it for example obstructs collaboration with all those working in 'collaborative' NGOs, for example. Finally, there also is an obvious historical argument against all too direct translation of the postcolonial perspective to Central and Eastern Europe: it was never really colonized! As the Czech cultural critic Slačálek correctly remarked recently, the fundamental anxiety in Central Europe has never been to be dominated by enlightenment culture and the West but rather, and on the contrary, to be 'forgotten' by it:

> The basic barrier [for transposing the postcolonial framework] is that the fundamental anxiety of Central European countries is not being colonized but fear of being expelled from the West and put on the same level as colonised countries. (Slačálek, 2016, p. 40)

Conclusion: post-Cold War political ecology

To finally come to terms with the observed heyday of political ecology, then, this article proposes to appreciate the actual actors. It is not the time, as some say, to move toward a new Cold War between liberal modernization and postcolonial criticalism, almost 30 years after the former Cold War was overcome (cf. Latour, 2004a; 2011). What first must be done to evade this is to give up on platonic thinking on political ecology (or anything else for that matter) as something that must be grasped through one or the other singular ideo-theoretical perspective, historical scheme or pseudo-eternal Form, whether it be the liberal evolutionist 'Advanced Industrial Society' or a quasi-postcolonial celebration of 'ancient national culture'. The encounter with Gawlik and Bleahu makes precisely very clear how *any* theoretical vision acts itself, and does so to *obstruct* environmentalism: dogmatic adherence to any theory informs a high degree of closure for the actual environment in the broadest literal sense, with increasing tension with it as a result.

This is far removed from denying or disqualifying the usefulness ideational schemes or theoretical perspectives altogether, of course. Rather, with this approach, they sink 'deeper into the abstraction', as Latour has called it: they become appreciated as the products of place-bound efforts to view and draw different things together, which then however start acting themselves. Once composed and drawn out, they provide for shared concepts and values, a degree of order, direction in view of chaos and catastrophe, and the very possibility of understanding the environment. In exchange they demand collective compliance, discipline and enforcement, an end to doubting and debating everything for its own sake, and thus a degree of neutralisation or depoliticisation, whether in the case of Marxist-Leninism, liberal modernist transitology, or postcolonial theory. Most dangerously, they tend to draw attention away from the directly experienced surroundings, and tend to being misunderstood as static or fixed blueprints for everyone and all situations.

Interestingly, the politicisation of ecology and environment becomes very well graspable from such an approach, with Central and Eastern Europe as a major case in point. Its history of political ecology, if taken seriously, first shows us the limitations of the liberal evolutionist and postcolonial perspectives. It requires us to face the radical place- and time-bound character of its theorization, and so forces a return to the daily experiences and an attention for the biophysical surroundings instead, of which theoretical schemes are attempting to make sense (Stengers, 2010, p. 32). Finally, and especially after considering its heyday in the absence of any dominant perspective for government, we cannot but admit that these schemes are themselves the political neutraliser, and vice versa, that the politicization of the environment is inversely related to the degree to which any theoretical perspective is successful in fixing, colonizing and finally neutralizing attention for environmental controversy.

One of the major advantages of this pragmatist approach is that, precisely because of its relativist, ‘radically empirical’ approach of ideo-theoretical perspectives as actors themselves, it enables a coherent and unifying narrative on political environmentalism that applies equally to Western and Eastern Europe. As this article shows, it was when the tension between actual reality and the theoretical schemes of Marxist-Leninism became untenable that the environment politicized – indeed as a tautology. In Western Europe, also, scientific ecology first politicised during high tension between the ruling ideological perspectives and actual reality at the end of the 1960s onwards into the 1970s. Like in Central Europe, it was first picked up by groups outside of the ruling political classes, after which the scientific necessity associated with biophysical materiality assisted in catapulting them into the parliamentary political establishment, as the seated establishment perceived a growing need to take its environment into account.

Like in Eastern Europe, neoclassical free market economic theory then became a dominant template for refreshing intra-elite consensus, and provided a new perspective and direction to policymakers, after state-centred governmentality had disintegrated. Like in Central and Eastern Europe, this resulted in the development of an interconnected package of liberal environmental policy. Swayed by the promise of incorporating environmental ‘externalities’ into a rational market-ruled system, the administrative managerial systems that started putting it into practice effectively managed to 'colonize' and depoliticize the environment in the 1990s and 2000s (cf. Swyngedouw, 2007). Along the way, movements 'NGO-ized' while Western European green parties, in this case unlike their Central and Eastern European counterparts, continued to have parliamentary presence, but distanced themselves from their radical past. The most influential and telling was undoubtedly the defeat of the *Fundis* in the West-German *Die Grünen*, followed by a wave of 'professionalisation' in the party (Klein and Alzheimer, 1997).

Finally, it is only since the 2008 financial crisis hit and former securities are again in question that ecological issues have started to regain their former political urgency. Once again 'the environment' is less and less understood as a manageable biophysical niche, and more and more like a difficult intertwined socio-political matter. Movements take other forms than in the 1980s – and are strikingly often at odds with, independent from, or active 'below' or 'aside' established environmental NGOs or green political parties (cf. Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013). Along these lines, even some good old-fashioned predictions about the future can be made. The new heyday for political ecology in Central Eastern Europe, as much as anywhere else, will not come about semi-automatically after arriving at a more 'developed stage' along the lines of liberal modernization theory. Neither will it be part of recovering some imagined lost purity as a 'necessarily fiction', along the lines of postcolonial theory. First, properly political environmentalism worthy of the name will only come to pass when it manages to cast such theoretical perspectives in doubt. Second, it will only maintain its "politicality" if it manages to prevent such doubt becoming as total as in 1989, only to then adhere to yet another set of ideo-theoretic resolutions…

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About the author

Pepijn van Eeden is a PhD researcher at *Centre d'étude de la vie politique* (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles. You can contact him at pveeden AT ulb.ac.be.

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Emotive acts of citizenship, social change and knowledge production in Lebanon

Dina Kiwan

Abstract

This article examines the ways in which people protest and who protests in Beirut, Lebanon through the study of the 'trash protests' in 2015. It aims to problematize the assumed universalism of the West's theories of citizenship, personhood and social movements, through contextualized critical reflections of experiences beyond the familiar cases in North America and Western Europe that dominate knowledge production. In addition, it critiques the politically orientalist assumptions of the citizen in the Global South as incapable of constituting themselves politically and transcending primordial ties. It notes that this conception is predicated on notions that citizenship is a rational contractual relationship with the state, as opposed to an emotive one. Whilst there is a developing literature that recognizes the role of emotions in social movements (Jasper, 2011), this has largely focused on the role of emotion in political mobilization. Rather, I use interviews collected in 2016 with a range of protesters (members of NGOs, trash protest movements, artists, film-makers and other 'activist' members of the public to study knowledge production, via the performative and emotive acts in Beirut's trash protests. These show that the dichotomies of rationality and emotionality collapse when there is a recognition that emotions are social, political and cultural practices (Ahmed, 2014).

Keywords

citizenship, emotion, protest, knowledge production, Lebanon, social change

Introduction

This article draws on research conducted in 2015/6, which aimed to examine the ways in which people protest, who is protesting, and their views on social change and knowledge production in Lebanon. At the time of starting my research, the so-called 'trash protests' were underway, having started in July 2015, which provided an ideal opportunity to explore these themes. In brief, the trash crisis and ensuing protests began when a landfill just south of the capital Beirut - the Naameh landfill, was closed as it had reached its capacity, and the government did not extend the contract of the private company, Sukleen, in charge of trash collection. No alternative landfill or trash collection company had been found. Trash soon started to pile up on the streets in Beirut and surrounding areas. The protests that followed were not only about a problem of waste management, but were an expression of people's despair with political corruption, business interests and sectarianism. Individual activists, NGOs, artists, and ordinary members from all social classes of the general public protested in a variety of creative and emotive ways, including cultural production, the use of social media, as well as hunger strikes, artistic interventions, political cartoons and political songs.

Through this research, I examine the inter-relationships between such 'acts' and the construction of alternative discourses and knowledge, where I propose that emotion plays an important role. In Western discourses, there is a history of ascribing negative characteristics to 'emotion', set up in contrast to 'rationality'. Indeed, Enlightenment theories of natural rights constructed a logic of denying women human rights based on the premise that women lacked rationality, and similarly colonial and orientalist discourses have typically constructed their colonial subjects as lacking rationality and by extension – conceived to be less human (Said, 1978). Jasper (2011) has referred to this dualism between emotion and rationality in his critical review of the role of emotions in social movements over the last twenty years. Ahmed (2014) has also discussed how there is a dominant Western conception that emotions are 'primitive', with an implied hierarchy between cognition and emotion. She argues that it is critical to recognize that emotions are social, political and cultural practices, rather than thinking primarily in terms of an individual's psychological state; as such it necessitates recognition of relations and dynamics of power, and the 'public nature of emotion and the emotive nature of publics' (Ahmed, 2014, p.14). Anthropology has contributed to conceiving of emotions as a public performance, and exploring how discourses of class, gender and race intersect with the politics of emotion (Athanasiou et al., 2008). Not only are emotions feminized and othered, but also are often presented as something undesirable to be controlled, with the expression or 'leakage' of emotion constructed as unintended consequences of this lack of control.

There has been over the last few decades what has been termed an 'affective' turn in theorizing in the social sciences and humanities. According to Massumi (1987), 'affect' refers to a state of being or an intense non-conscious experience beyond language, whilst their manifestation or interpretation corresponds to 'emotion'. In human geography, Anderson and Smith (2001) refer to the 'intractable silencing of emotions in social research and public life' and hence the need for 'recovery work that embraces embodied experience' (Davidson and Bondi 2004). In her article, 'Invoking affect', Hemmings (2005) argues that this turn to affect enables an emphasis on the unexpected and places the body in theory. The focus on the body understands the body not as single or bounded, but as open to being affected and affecting others. Bodies are also seen therefore, in a relational sense, and also in terms of what they can do, and their intersectionalities, as gendered, racialised or classed bodies (Blackman et al., 2008). Hemmings (2005) proposes that the affective turn reflects a response to dissatisfaction with poststructuralists' accounts of power as negatively hegemonic, and in contrast, illustrates a focus on interpersonal dynamics as constitutive of the subject (as opposed to social and institutional structures). In addition, the heightened focus on emotion and affect offers possibilities for increased engagement with memory, listening, attention and perception

(Blackman and Venn, 2010). In thinking through what is meant by affect, this also invites us to think about affect and the body as a process, rather than reified as a 'thing' (ibid, 2010). Yet Hemmings (2005) warns of too easily embracing a celebratory illusion of 'affective freedom' over 'social determinism' as a means of transformation.

Similarly, over the last two decades, with a shift from structural to cultural theorisations of social movements, there has been an increased focus on emotion in the role of political mobilization (e.g. Galán, 2012; Gravante and Poma, 2016; Jasper, 2011; Van Stekelenburg et al, 2011; Woods et al, 2012). Reflecting on my research, I propose that whilst 'emotion' has been a focus of research in relation to political mobilization, it has not been systematically examined in relation to knowledge production, and in particular knowledge production pertaining to social movements. Boler's 'feminist politics of emotion' has highlighted the importance of emotion in education, learning and knowledge production (Boler & Zembylas, 2016). Boler warns of the apoliticality of the 'affective turn', in contrast to earlier feminist work on emotion, arguing that the 'gendered realities of emotion and the feminist scholarship that put emotion on the map' is at risk of being erased, 'adding another layer of misogyny into the histories of emotion' (Boler & Zembylas, 2016). The empirical study of the lived realities of those 'othered' in the Global South is an important resource to theorizing on the role of emotions in knowledge production, further contributing to postcolonial critiques of social science knowledge, production and circulation (Appadurai, 2000; Bhambra, 2007; Connell, 2007; Santos, 2014).

The metaphor of knowledge as energy allows the conceptualization of knowledge as dynamic, whereby one form may be transformed into another (Bratianu and Orzea, 2009). Furthermore, the mind-body dualism dominant in Western intellectual thought is challenged in Eastern cultures, and relates to conceptualisations of knowledge as located within the individual, as opposed to external and separate (ibid, 2009). As such the affective turn is not only a response to poststructuralist social determinism but a postcolonial critique of Western constructions of knowledge and knowledge production, as well as a political feminist response, drawing from the political slogan 'the personal is the political', where for example, expressing anger is defined as a public political practice rather than an individual psychological response (Boler & Zembylas, 2016). Gregg and Seigworth (2010) similarly conceive of theorization of affect as the 'politically engaged work' of such groups marginalized in terms of gender, sexuality, disability, and those in the Global South. In the following section, I will contextualize this study with a brief historical background to Lebanon's contemporary context, before outlining the methodology of the study and theoretical frameworks for the reflection on the findings.

Brief historical contextualization

To give a brief historical background to Lebanon's modern sectarian context, Lebanon was under Ottoman rule until 1918, consisting of differentiated and independent religious communities. Under the Ottoman 'millet' system, these different 'communities' or sects did not constitute a nation, yet conducted affairs with one another through a form of a 'social contract.' It has been argued that these political identities should be understood not only in terms of a localized form of identification, nor solely in terms of foreign manipulation (Makdisi, 2000); rather, sectarianism must be contextualized as arising out of nineteenth-century Ottoman reform, and that it emerged as a practice where the various groups – Maronites, Druze, Europeans and Ottomans struggled to achieve the equality of the Druze and Maronite tribes in a modernizing Ottoman state. The French subsequently took control, establishing the 'State of Greater Lebanon', with the first modern Arab constitution drafted in 1926. In the 1930s, the Lebanese Syrian Unionists and also the Arab nationalist parties illustrated a change in attitudes towards the idea of a Greater Lebanon (Solh, 1988). After defeat by the Nazi forces in 1940, the Free French and British troops overthrew the pro-Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007). Lebanon achieved independence from the French in 1943 and joined the League of Arab States and United Nations as a founding member in 1945.

The post World War II period, however, also witnessed heightened regional and national tensions. On April 9, 1948 Palestinian refugees entered the cities in the South of Lebanon with the establishment of the State of Israel. In Lebanon, the 450,000 registered Palestinian refugees (around ten percent of the Lebanese population) are distributed among twelve camps run by 'The United Nations Relief and Works Agency' (UNRWA) with now third generation Palestinians having no foreseeable route to legal citizenship, and living in violation of their civic, political, social and economic rights. The influx of mainly Sunni Palestinians has contributed to the changing demographics in Lebanon and perceived imbalances in power-sharing.

Lebanon entered a period of 16 years of civil war between 1975 and 1991, with the start being pinpointed to April 13, 1975, when Phalangists (right-wing Maronite Christians) attacked a bus carrying Palestinians through a Christian neighbourhood. The next day fighting erupted and spread, initially between Maronite and Palestinian forces (mainly from the Palestine Liberation Organization), then Leftist, pan-Arabist and Muslim Lebanese groups formed an alliance with the Palestinians, although alliances shifted over time. Foreign powers, such as Israel and Syria, also became involved in the war and fought alongside different factions. The Ta'if agreement (signed on 22 October, 1989 in Saudi Arabia by Lebanese parliamentarians) ultimately put an end to the civil war. While its vision to realize a 'Third Republic' in which political sectarianism would be renounced failed to gain approval, the agreement contributed towards modifying the balance of powers between the different sects (Traboulsi, 2007).

Contemporary Lebanon's religious diversity is a defining characteristic in relation to its politics – what Faour (2007) describes as 'a unique illustration of the intimate connection between religion, demography, and politics' (p.909). There are 18 recognized religious sects; in terms of political representation, this is organized broadly in relation to the three major sects of Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shiite Muslims. Maronite Christians constitute the largest Christian sect in Lebanon. It is also pertinent to highlight the emergence and role of Hezbollah as a powerful and significant non-state actor in Lebanon, and the development of its regional relationships with Syria and Iran. The assassination of former prime minister and businessman Rafic al-Hariri in 2005 led to large street protests against the Syrian regime and demands for the resignation of Prime Minister Karami who conceded. In response, a Shia-led demonstration took place on March 8, expressing solidarity with the Syrian regime. A larger crowd flooded the streets on March 14, including Sunnis, Christians and Druze, appealing for justice, independence and the ousting of Syria from Lebanon (Harris, 2012). The UN Security Council authorized an inquiry into the assassination of Hariri. On 26 April 2005, all Syrian forces and intelligence left Lebanon, and more murders and attempted assassinations followed. On June 29, 2011 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon officially indicted Hezbollah members for the murder of Hariri (ibid, 2012). The two political camps that emerged after the assassination of Hariri and the ousting of the Syrian army were both cross-sectarian: "March 14 allies looked to the West and conservative Arabs", whilst "March 8 looked to the Syrian ruling clique and Iran and acquiesced in Hezbollah's agenda"(Harris, 2012, p.275).

Since December 2010, there have been widespread revolts across the Arab world. The ongoing crisis in Syria, resulting in 'one of the largest refugee exoduses in recent history with no end yet in sight' (UNHCR, 2014, p.4), has had a significant impact on Lebanon, with estimates of over 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, highly significant given Lebanon has a population of 4 million. Lebanon, thought to have evaded the 'Arab Spring' has witnessed its own protests starting in July 2015, as a result of the 'trash crisis'.

Methodological approach

As noted in the introduction, I aim to explore *who* protests and *how* people protest, and the alternative knowledges and discourses produced in challenging dominant discourses. 30 individuals were interviewed in English or Arabic at the preference of the interviewees, ranging from members of established NGOs working in the fields of refugee rights and humanitarian assistance, women's rights, LGBTQ rights, migrant worker rights, youth and political participation, members of the trash protests movements, as well as artists, film makers, and other 'activist' members of the public. Sampling was theoretically driven, with individuals identified through internet searches and networks of established NGOs working in the above-mentioned fields, whilst 'activist' members of the public, artists and film makers were identified through social media. Interview participants were contacted by email, and interviewed at a place of convenience to participants – either a public meeting place such as a coffee shop, the participants' workplace or at my office at the American University of Beirut.

Interviews typically lasted from 45 minutes – 1 hour, and were recorded with participants' consent. Recordings were transcribed, and all data held securely. Interview data was anonymised for all participants. The data was analysed drawing on principles of constructivist grounded theory (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007) in order to inductively develop theory, through the application of codes and categories to the data. Constructivist approaches to grounded theory recognise multiple perspectives and forms of knowledge, and challenges more positivist elements that lack reflexivity and researcher positionality (Charmas, 2011). In addition to the inductive and explorative nature of this research, collecting original empirical data, grounded theory has been advocated in particular as an approach in social justice research; there is also an iterative nature to the process where the data collection and analysis mutually inform one another (Charmaz, 2011).

I examine three inter-related themes emerging from the interview data in contributing to understandings of changing conceptions of citizenship. These include firstly exploring what is understood by the term, 'social change', interrogated in relation to Isin's (2008, 2012) conception of 'acts of citizenship' whereby citizenship is understood not merely in terms of legal status or identity, but in relational terms where those who are socially and legally excluded, nevertheless constitute themselves politically through various 'acts'. He describes these actors as enacting 'political subjectivities', where a whole range of types of rights (e.g. civil, economic, political, social, sexual, cultural) are claimed at different levels (eg. community, regional, national, transnational, international), at different 'sites' (e.g. 'bodies, courts, streets, media, networks, borders') and through different forms or 'acts' (e.g. blogging, organizing, protesting, resisting) (p.368). He argues that contemporary debates that conceptualize citizenship either in terms of a focus on 'status' (i.e. focus on immigration, naturalization, residence) or 'practice' (i.e. focus on education, integration, multiculturalism) do not sufficiently account for the new emerging 'actors, sites and scales of citizenship…that complicate the ways in which citizenship is enacted' (p.369). These 'acts' differ from the notion of 'active citizenship' common in the development and democracy promotion literature where international and/or national NGOs equip groups (typically youth, women or other marginalized groups) with skills for constructive participation in their communities and civil society. This conceptualization of citizenship recognizes the fluidity and relational nature of 'power', where power relations unfold in all social relations, rather than solely being conceived in terms of a finite resource from above (Foucault, 1991). Not only do these acts of citizenship 'interrupt' more routine forms of civic participation, but they also qualitatively differ in terms of their heightened affect and emotional import. Isin's work on acts of citizenship therefore resonates with the 'affective turn', emphasizing the possibilities of social transformation through a focus on interpersonal dynamics.

A second theme examines ways of 'acting' by exploring discourses of 'antisectarianism' and 'secularism', and 'politics', 'antipolitics', and 'counterpolitics' which emerged in the interviews. This theme also includes the use of violence by both protestors and the authorities; in addition, other acts include cultural production, the use of social media, as well as hunger strikes, artistic interventions, political cartoons and political songs. I explore the idea that learning or constructing new forms of 'citizenship', especially through 'performed' acts, are 'emotional', heightening alternative knowledges of 'citizenship'. Learning and the production of knowledge through such performative and emotive acts are transformative and disrupt dominant pedagogies of citizenship.

The final theme, building on the second theme, continues to explore how learning and 'knowledge' is produced through 'acts of citizenship', and considers who is producing the knowledge, the relationships between the different 'knowledge producers', and the role of the university, research and academia in social change. The link between knowledge and power – the political theory of knowledge and its production, constructions of knowledge, and the marginalization of alternative knowledges are interrogated. This raises the question of how vulnerability relates to agency. From a Butlerian perspective, performativity is an account of agency. Linking the notion of 'precarity' – the political conditions whereby certain populations are at heightened risk of violence, injury or death – with performativity, she asks: 'How does the unspeakable population speak and make its claims? What kind of disruption is this within the field of power? And how can such populations lay claim to what they require?' (Butler, 2009, p.xiii).

Problematising and contextualising theory

It has been argued that the 'Orient' has been constructed as 'those times and places where peoples have been unable to constitute themselves as political precisely because they have been unable to invent that identity the occident named as citizen' (Isin, 2005, p.31). Isin refers to this as 'political orientalism', whereby in the West, the (male) citizen was constructed as rational, and capable of transcending primordial loyalties, in contrast to in the East. In 'translating citizenship', it is not only a question of examining the contextualisation of such theories and concepts in the Arab world; what is at stake is the process of constructing knowledge itself, and being aware of the power dynamics involved and the inequalities evident in ongoing processes of knowledge production. Carens (2004), a political philosopher, critically reflects on the relationship between theory and practice and its sociopolitical contextualization, where he makes a plea to his fellow (Western) political theorists, advocating for the use of actual 'cases' or examples in developing theory. He argues that whilst theories aim to provide an explanatory or clarifying role of a phenomenon, it is at a level of abstraction that can be disconnected from reality and 'underspecified', leading to interpretative disputes. Furthermore theories and concepts can ignore that moral reasoning can serve particular interests, for example, class, ethnicity or gender interests. In addition, it should be remembered that such theorising takes place in particular institutional contexts that privileges some over others. Moreover, ways of theorizing and constructing knowledge are rooted in particular historical and sociopolitical traditions that may not be shared with others. His characterization of a contextual approach to theory is an attempt to address these concerns. As real cases are 'messy', they allow what he calls a 'reflective disequilibrium' between theory and practice – which he characterizes as 'mutual unsettling' in theory and practice by juxtaposing the two in an 'ongoing dialectic' (p.123). As such, any dissonance has the potential to challenge how we conceptualize a phenomenon, rather than merely illustrating that practice is not following theory. Carens' approach also advocates a search for 'cases' that potentially challenge the theoretical position, as well as the consideration of a wide range of cases, especially 'unfamiliar' cases (Carens, 2004).

Carens' recognition of the need to scrutinise concepts with assumed universality in more 'challenging' cases, or cases that are unfamiliar, implies a methodological stance of considering the 'translatability' of concepts and theories of citizenship typically developed from a Western frame of reference and socio-political context with its concomitant implicit assumptions – to other regional contexts. This enables a more explicit scrutiny of these concepts and theories. Indeed, public discourses on the applicability of 'democracy', 'human rights', and 'citizenship' are illustrative of these methodological debates.

Yet Carens could be critiqued in that, although representing progress, such a paradigm nevertheless operates with concepts and methods from Western academic discourses, and data from the Global South. Indeed, Connell (2014) argues that there is still the 'fundamental problem' that the Global South provides the data, but does not set the theoretical or research agendas, which is central in the larger social process of knowledge production. Within Western academic discourses – there is often an unquestioned assumption that theories, conceptions and debates are universal, both at the level of language, and at the level of concepts. Postcolonial critiques of citizenship have argued that the language and constructions of citizenship in Western academic discourses do no more than present particularist understandings of citizenship that masquerade as universal theories of citizenship. This would possibly suggest a project whereby there are separate knowledges – what Connell has called a 'mosaic epistomology'. Yet she acknowledges the problem in such a position, and speaks of the 'dilemma' of two approaches to knowledge – mosaic epistemology or Northern ethnocentrism.

However, it could be argued that this is something of a false dichotomy. Some of the more radical theories of 'colonising the mind' (Dascal, 2007) pre-close the notion of an exchange of ideas, and tend to construct power as a finite resource positioned from above between the 'powerful' and the 'powerless'. Such approaches do not recognize more Foucauldian understandings of power as relational, contested and contextualised, nor do they recognise different forms of agency in how knowledge is used, produced and reconstructed. Indeed, Connell (2014) notes, that in the field of gender, some of the most creative work in the South arises from the 'critical appropriation of Northern ideas, in combination with ideas that come from radically different experiences' (p.527).

In addition, it assumes a regionally if not methodologically nationalist approach to knowledge production; implicit in such theorisations is a notion of the 'purity' of a culture and its ideas, which does not account for the complexities of knowledge production, transfer and legitimisation.

Whilst these different forms of knowledge are inevitably 'partial' and are socially constructed, some forms of knowledge are perceived to hold more 'power' than others, and knowledge necessarily entails emotional content. Knowledge is, "never neutral, it never exists in an empiricist, objective relationship to the real. Knowledge is power…" (Fiske, 1989, p.149-50), embedded in social, cultural and political practices. Indeed, Apple (2000) asserts that what is perceived to be 'legitimate' knowledge corresponds to the views of the powerful in communities, with the most powerful tending to determine the nature and content of that knowledge. There is a marginalisation of the views and knowledge produced by the marginalised in society, what Spivak (1988) has called an 'epistemic violence' where the subaltern is silenced by both the colonial and indigenous patriarchal powers. As such, both feminist and postcolonial pedagogies are concerned with power relations in learning contexts, and attending to personal and emotional experiences that inform knowledge and learning (Boler & Zembylas, 2016; Giroux, 1983). In any particular national or regional context, we may witness competing forms of 'knowledge'. Such knowledge may take the form of art, film, performance, graffiti, cartoons, blogs, social media, 'acts of citizenship' (such as protesting, hunger strikes etc), or in terms of alternative intellectual ideas or research. These emotive knowledge forms redefine issues creating alternative discourses and forms of public knowledge; this is an organic, and often unpredictable process of unfolding dynamics.

What is "social change"?

There is a substantial literature on social change from a range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives (e.g. Bayat, 1997; 2013; Coleman, 1990; Della Porta, 2005; 2009; Spivak, 1988; Sztompka, 1994; Tilly 1986). 'Social change' is a contested concept with many different definitions, phenomena, levels of analysis and contexts, beyond the scope of this article to review. Broadly speaking, functionalist approaches see change as necessary and desirable as long as it is gradual over time, largely in order to preserve the status quo. In contrast, conflict theory conceives of social change as arising from social inequality and that protest is desirable and necessary in order to achieve social change. Social change can be broadly conceived in terms of both the notion of structure – including social, legal and political institutions, and also ways of living and thinking as reflected in language, beliefs, values, customs and lived practices. As such, social change deals with both the macro levels and micro levels, and the interaction between these levels. Non-governmental organisations can be categorized in terms of their approaches to social change at various levels of intervention: at the level of the individual, where programmes typically provide pastoral, psychosocial, or empowerment support for individuals; at the level of the living conditions of the targeted group, for example, providing social, medical, humanitarian or legal assistance; at the level of institutional structures – advocating for policy change, and building the institutional capacity of the media, lawyers, or human rights advocates; or at the level of culture, raising public awareness of the issues relating to the group or issue at hand (Tayah, 2012). However, certain forms of civil society have been criticized as an extension of government, providing governmental services – thereby supplying rather than demanding change (Jeffrey & Staeheli, 2014).

On asking interviewees of their understandings of 'social change', there was a significant emphasis on the idea of social change as a *process*: "Change is a very slow process. In poetry or in descriptions of revolutions, they like to tell us that things happened in a day, but in a day a distinct moment occurs, but in reality many things have been built over the years, and several attempts made" (BB).

This was contrasted with a focus on 'outcome', which linked to participants' perceptions of whether the trash protests, or indeed any protest, campaign or social movement has been deemed to succeed or fail. According to another participant, a feminist activist and researcher:

> The world wants to understand change as either black or white. There are moments, and it's a non-ending process. Some people feel frustration since they want to reach the end-product…we can't appreciate the process, while the process is what matters really. Even in Egypt people are wondering whether the revolution won or not, while it is not an exam but a life change process (NI).

This focus on the temporal aspects of social change is also emphasised in understandings of social change as 'a way of living', that what was important was the 'activity of activism', and the importance of conceiving of social change 'not as a vocation but a way of life'. Social change and learning are mutually constitutive of one another, where learning is also a socio-temporal process, extending the conception beyond a construct of learning as an outcome of formal or non-formal education. New experiences and knowledge intertwine with already held understandings and perspectives, producing new transitional and transformative knowledges (Jeffrey & Staeheli, 2014).

We have witnessed something akin to a democracy promotion industry in the Arab world, where international and regional organisations, such as the UN and the EU, and foreign national governments of Europe and the United States have provided substantial amounts of funding to local and national NGOs working to promote particular democracy-related agendas, including promoting women's rights, and youth civic participation for example. Whilst these may be construed as 'top-down' initiatives, these targeted groups are not merely passive recipients, but have their own agency and political subjectivities. Some critics have characterized such initiatives as reflecting the 'pedagogical state' (or NGO or international organizations) promoting a 'pedagogy of citizenship', reflecting a 'neoliberal political rationality' (Pykett, 2010, p.621). Such education or initiatives premised on the idea of imparting knowledge and skills to its recipients - who are presumed to 'lack knowledge', are typically constructed as a form of 'governmentality' where the state or other governing institutions use pedagogical strategies to 'govern' citizens.

In contrast, these arguments have been critiqued in that they do not take account of the 'distinctive nature of pedagogical power' which enables critical debate (Pykett, 2010, p.623). Furthermore such constructions do not account for how knowledge is constructed, given affective meaning and acted upon. Jeffrey & Staeheli (2014) importantly note the embodied, felt, practised and relational nature of learning, and assert that learning is mediated through geographical place, other individuals and groups and everyday experiences. As such, the 'outcomes' of such learning cannot be predicted, as knowledge is not static but changes over place and time. Staeheli et al. (2014) have shown, for example, that youth participants of democracy promotion initiatives in Lebanon used their skills to promote a movement calling for civil marriage, a non-intended outcome of these initiatives. Such examples illustrate that power is always relational as opposed to something fixed that an institution holds from above. Relatedly, Hanafi (2012) talks of 'reflexive individualism', distinct from neoliberal conceptualizations of individualism 'predicated on anti-patriarchal, anti-tribe, anti-community or anti-party sentiments' (p.198). Hanafi (2012) explains that this is a form of political subjectivity different from that promoted by non-governmental organizations, where it is constructed through individual actions constantly negotiating with "the existing social structures in order to realize a (partial) emancipation from it" (p.203).

Interviewee participants' characterizations articulate a construction of social change through learning and production of alternative knowledges as something ongoing rather than well-orchestrated time-delineated activities or outputs. Indeed, one participant compared Egypt's Tahrir Square protests with the trash protests in Lebanon, noting that: "One particular difference (with Egypt): is the idea that the protest has a beginning and an end. Tol3et-Ri7etkon (You Stink) calling people to leave at a certain time...In Egypt, people were going in and out, no one asked them to leave and they stayed for long time" (BT). As such, these characterisations represent a critique of neoliberal, technicist and neutralised forms of 'participation' (Battacharya, 2012), where there is an emphasis on correct process, and 'civility'. In addition, waste management approaches to the trash problem have also been critiqued as a more neutral, sanitizing and depoliticizing approach. For example, at the AUB, a group of professors set up a task force focusing on the 'waste management problem', which recommended such interventions as training municipalities in effective waste management techniques (AUB, 2015), avoiding engagement in the wider politics of the trash problem. 'Practical knowledge' – rational as opposed to emotive and political, is presented as the solution to the trash crisis, in contrast to activists' characterizations of the trash crisis where trash became an emotionally-laden metaphor for all that is rotten in the relationship between citizens and the state.

In addition, social change is conceived as constitutive of the person in their totality – their daily lives, rather than circumscribed as an activity carried out at a certain time. This holistic conception of social change relates further to the idea of social change as addressing a number of interlinked social justice issues, a point expressed by many of the participants. For many participants involved in the trash protests, the issue of concern is one of social justice, rather than a more narrowly defined technicist concern of waste management. As such, protesting a wide range of concerns follows logically from this:

> As a youth organization and as an individual, we find ourselves concerned with most subjects: social causes related to the different domains of women's right (domestic violence, right to pass on citizenship, civil marriage), or related to economics: those of limited income, increased cost of living, wages, social security etc, or political: media freedom or freedom of thought, or matters that are (procedurally) political.. like the electoral law, general movements, movement to overthrow the sectarian regime, the trash crisis movement, or movements against the extension of term in face of the different factions of the regime – 8th and 14th, or movement emphasizing the necessity of learning from the (civil) war, or the subject of the disappeared or kidnapped, issues relating to the struggle with Israel etc, to causes related to youth, like decreasing the age for elections…(BB).

Participants also gave a particular emphasis to the importance of changing attitudes and behaviours at the individual level, although at the same time acknowledging the integrated nature of social change with changes at the macro-level, such as changes in the law, and changes in political processes and institutions. According to one campaigner of LGBTQ issues, "social change is apparent when it occurs …on the level of the individuals and that is seen in their attitudes and behaviour, things that affect social and individuals…the first thing that must occur is to have people understand.."(HT). She highlights as an example, the difficulty of LGBTQ individuals gaining employment, advocating that, "a first step in social change is the pattern of thought that translates into certain behaviour. Then this translates in institutional spaces. This should work in parallel with laws, and this work has to be as powerful as work on civil society" (HT).

In this example, the participant is highlighting the importance of changing how people think at the individual level. This model of social change is a dominant model in civil society NGOs, whereby there is a primary emphasis on changing attitudes and behaviours. This illustrates an implicit recognition of the importance of affect both in terms of its often negative role in the social reproduction of the patriarchal order, as well as its potential for challenging dominant discourses. For example, a recent Oxfam project on women's participation and leadership in Lebanon, Jordan, and Erbil (Kurdistan) was premised on a model of social change whereby changes in individuals' attitudes and behaviours leads to societal change (Kiwan et. al, 2016). Oxfam's project 'LANA' aims to promote gender equality and women's political participation by changing men's and women's attitudes with regards to gender roles and understandings of citizenship. It is based on the 'We Can' approach, where recruited individuals act as 'changemakers' in their communities (Oxfam, 2014). The emphasis is thus on micro-level change, whilst acknowledging macro-level constraints such as religious discourses and practices, family and tribal constructions of gender roles, and political and legal institutions. What has been relatively less theorized is the link between changes at the level of individuals' attitudes and behaviours and societal change; it is proposed that education or more broadly, the production of alternative knowledges - recognizing the role of emotion as social, cultural and political practices in this knowledge construction (Ahmed, 2014), is critically important in understanding social change, transforming change occurring at the level of the individual to wider societal change (Kiwan et al., 2016).

Indeed, participants discussed the role of knowledge in social change, whether in the form of art, film and other cultural productions, or in terms of intellectual ideas or research. 'Representation connects meaning and language to culture' (Hall, 1997), therefore artistic and other cultural representations help link certain issues to symbols, or give certain knowledge power or legitimacy over others in a certain historical, cultural context. This helps define issues, alternatives and how they are discussed. For example, one participant, a director of an NGO with a mission for promoting authentic music of the region, is also involved in promoting cultural activities at T-Marbouta – a café / restaurant in Hamra, which was opened in 2006, which frequently holds talks and other cultural / political activities. T-Marbouta also:

> accommodated several groups' meetings during the Summer protests, for instance, like 'tol3et rihetkon' twice, or 'min haki; that held awareness campaigns on the 'hirak' and on civil rights and the swindling of public money. The 22 August movement also had meetings here several times. Besides unofficial meetings… we posted flyers in T-Marbouta (BB).

According to BB, there were also calls for people to demand their social, political and economic rights and participate in the protests, which led to some concern regarding T-Marbouta becoming politicised as opposed to more neutrally perceived cultural activities. However, "since T-Marbouta does cultural activities, it is concerned with everything, you cannot work on culture or art and be far from reality" (BB).

Participants also conceived of social change as redefining issues, in contrast to making explicit demands on the state. For one participant, she describes "engaging the public through live performances in urban issues", given her interest in how "research is translated into public knowledge and becomes part of mainstream thinking". She advocates "changing minds to realize change on the ground", but ponders the issue of the "great disconnect between people who are active and those directly impacted" (BT). She further reflects that "we are part of the problem obviously, we are really segregated in terms of activist circles, artists, lawyers… and there is the rest of the people…We are always trying, and I feel we failed so far, working with people who are affected and having the change from within and it has been very difficult" (BT). Yet DN conceives of marginality somewhat differently saying: "I say marginalized, but this is where we are living. This is not the minority… When you see them (Syrian refugee women) on the streets you don't realize that they have a life, they have fun, they go to the hairdresser, nothing has changed except that things have crumbled around them." This conception of marginalization does not separate the so-called middle-class or elite activists from the socially excluded, focusing rather on the ordinary lives that the legally excluded can live. For DN, her work in making documentaries contributes to social change through sensitizing the public to issues:

> I am not going to say that (my films) have made a change, but I feel that something does happen after the Lebanese watch a film. (Name of film), for example, people went out, even my friends for example, 'ohh its beautiful in Sri Lanka' and I ask them you never ask her (the person who works at your house) …so people start to think that yeah, you can have a relationship with someone who is living in your house, who is taking care of your children, so I do feel that you can slowly change… (DN).

"Acts" of citizenship: who, where and how?

The constructions of social change described above attest not only to a process over time, but also an organic, fluid and unpredictable unfolding of dynamics through 'acts'. By 'acts', this refers to things that people do that constitute them politically as 'citizens', drawing on Isin's (2008, 2012) 'acts of citizenship' where he has challenged traditional constructions of citizenship in terms of legal status or in terms of routine participation (e.g. voting or volunteering), arguing that this does not reflect the reality of the world we live in with so many people excluded from legal citizenship. To the contrary, those who are deemed to be socially and legally excluded, such as refugees and illegal immigrants can and do 'act politically', paradoxically constituting themselves as citizens (Kiwan, 2016). This 'rupture' from the routine is often emotive, demanding a form of 'recognition', rendering the silent and invisible by contrast, audible and visible. This forefronting of the 'body', performance, as well as interpersonal dynamics in Isin's 'acts of citizenship' reflects such similar preoccupations in theorizing of emotion in the affective turn (Hemmings, 2005), with implicit optimism for transformative change and individual agency. Theorisations of citizenship have tended to neglect a consideration of the 'emotional' nature of citizenship and protest, which is clearly evident in participants' understandings of social change and their activist commitments, where the 'lived experience' leads to affective learning, knowledge production and transformation.

In this section, I examine participants' framings of their acts, which includes the constructs of sectarianism, secularism and inclusivity, and debates about politics, 'anti-politics' and 'counter-politics'. In addition, I explore some of the types of 'acts' enacted by different actors, who these actors are, and the reactions to them.

With the unfolding of the trash crisis in July 2015, there was a prompt civil society response, with the establishment of the first group, 'You Stink' which started to mobilise through social media and then street protests, including hunger strikes and storming the Ministry of the Environment. They called for government to hand over responsibility to local municipalities for waste management, for the resignation of the Environment Minister, Machnouk, and for parliamentary elections. The group, 'We Want Accountability", also established in July 2015, had as its long-term aim the removal of Lebanon's sectarian political system. Other movements included 'Akkar is not a Dumpster' in response to the proposal to create a dump in the town of Akkar, and 'People's Court' – made up of university students and professionals who used legal action to meet their aims of calling government to account (Daily Star, 2015a). You Stink illustrates a dominant approach of making demands on government, in contrast to We Want Accountability's more holistic negation of the political status quo, and the People's Court's legalistic approach. On interviewing participants, what emerges is the anti-sectarian framing of the protest movement's discourse dominant also in other protests and campaigns:

> ...the biggest concern ... is the issue of sectarianism. If one wants to fight corruption, it turns out its sectarian, if one wants to create a civil status law, you are faced with the sectarian barrier, if one want to give rights to women, you are faced with the barrier of sectarianism. So sectarianism is being a tool for security against all the great numbers of demands and reforms one pushes for. So as an organization, we try to work on the issue of sectarianism. Now sectarianism we seek it through spreading awareness and try to work with youth in order not to let them develop any differentiation in their culture between a citizen and another according to their sect, religion (BB).

This is not to say that participants ascribe to a belief in sectarian identities per se, but rather conceive of sectarianism as a way of acting:

> The biggest obstacle in the face of most of these campaigns is sectarianism...there is a clientalism that ties people tricking them and placing them in the illusion that they are beneficiaries from rulers. This distribution of privileges places people in the illusion that they are beneficiaries or prospect(ive) beneficiaries of this cliental relation, without realizing their inherent rights....The problem...is not only sectarian...sectarianism for them is a tool for investment (NB).

The importance of inclusivity was discussed by participants. For example, one participant explains why she was drawn to the group 'Al Shaab Youreed' (the People Want), which she describes as:

> …a coalition between student groups, Socialist Forum, feminist groups and independent people. This group didn't have internal contradictions, and was clear on refusing either 14 or 8 March [political camps], truly adopting 'kilon ya3ne kilon' (all of them means all of them). Moreover, it was the only party that involved students as well as non-Lebanese actors (Syrians and Palestinian) and even once took with them foreign workers. Of the Syrians who feared going down, were even helping behind the scenes and carried out debates (OB).

Yet the emotive divisiveness evident in discourse used to undermine and exclude those from lower socioeconomic classes was also discussed by interviewee participants: "The language used: the calling of some protestors 'infiltrators' by the You Stink movement. There was a rejection of an economic class of individuals that looked a particular way, that made people feel uncomfortable" (SN). This illustrates Hemmings' (2005) caution of how emotion - rather than necessarily challenging the dominant social order - in fact works to reify the status quo. In contrast to some participants ascribing to the 'kilon ya3ne kilon' dismissal of all sectarian groups ('all of them means all of them'), others found this to be divisive and exclusive, denying people the right to various (sectarian) affiliations. Whilst inclusivity as a principle was generally lauded, the question of activists connecting to those not actively participating was considered: "we failed to reach out to the class that is more affected and poor" (PE), as well as concerns expressed of (activists')"arrogant righteousness" (SN).

Furthermore, the exclusion of Palestinian and Syrian refugees from protests was an issue discussed by some interviewee participants. This exclusion occurs given these communities' fear of being arrested and mistreated by the authorities, so involvement tended to be behind the scenes, in organizational or administrative roles. Yet in certain circumstances these excluded communities do make their presence known: "The domestic workers, migrant workers, even Syrians and Paelstinians…they came and declared that they have been excluded, and in declaring so they have created a space for them. It is a problem of discourse, of imagery presented" (SN).

A number of the participants raised the issue of the interlinked nature of agendas: "…the individual doesn't limit himself in a certain space. A person working on women empowerment can work on sexual rights, a person working on changing law related to domestic workers can work on changing laws on other issues" (HT). Many of those interviewed had a history of activism across different domains, working for various NGOs with different agendas, often campaigning under a banner of "holistic justice and against compartmenting issues" (SN) for a wide range of marginalized groups.

The concept of what counts as 'politics', versus a notion of 'anti-politics' often emerged in discussion, where an anti-politics stance was equated with being against sectarianism and corruption. Individualism as opposed to being an NGO or political party was also a part of this conception. For example, Beirut Madiniti (Beirut My City), a highly educated group of declared non-sectarian urban planners, lawyers, economists, professors, architects, and doctors ran in the municipal elections in May 2016. They drew up a programme to improve practical aspects of the city, such as traffic congestion and public transport, introducing green spaces, protecting Beirut's heritage, and implementing a waste management solutions. Whilst they did not win in the elections, they made significant gains, and gained widespread support for their programme. However, a number of interviewee participants critiqued the approach of this group as 'apolitical', perceiving the acts of some groups to be too narrow, sanitized, non-confrontational and technicist, and aiming to successfully achieve a tangible outcome:

> The approach of Beirut Madinati is only to speak of Municipal Beirut…it will not address Solidere, Hariri, politics or anything, all it wants to speak of are small issues related to Beirut, like I want a better public garden, better public transport, better public space…etc. only this, other than this I won't achieve a result. If I want to achieve a result, I have to speak only of this subject and nothing else. And while speaking on this subject, I have no problem meeting with anyone, I therefore consider that you, as a Beiruti voter, can belong to your political leader in the Parliamentary elections and all, but now I am speaking of Beirut, and I limit my problem with the present Municipal council, that is not doing its job, my problem is with it and not with the Zu'ama (leaders) and the regime. I want to fix and do good work for Municipal Beirut, and I can't handle more than this (BB).

The role of NGOs in relation to politics was also considered, where there was a common view expressed that NGOs play an important role in working on single issues: "So now we have a civil society that is capable of taking one single issue and hitting hard with it and getting kind of a result" (NE).

Yet concerns about the technicist and 'apolitical' nature of NGOs was also considered to be a problem, as compartmentalizing issues was perceived to lead to a depoliticized and fragmented view, rather than a more holistic perspective. However, during the trash protests, some of the groups illustrated a move away from the more traditional single issues agenda, exhibiting features of traditional political groups: "That is the challenge and I think what happened last summer is exactly a step in that direction since for the first time you have activists who mostly have met through NGOs, suddenly met and formed political groups, Tol3et Rihetkon, Badna Nhaseb, Min ajl al jomhouriya…etc. all of those were youthful political groups, no one was interested in forming an NGO to find a solution for the garbage, they were all competing for political power"(NE).

Whilst apoliticality has generally been negatively framed in the literature, there are some more positive accounts of civil society 'apoliticality' in the Asian context, where it is seen as a response – usually under repressive regimes to addressing social problems and bringing about social change under these conditions (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari, 2010). Here ethics is given primacy over politics, not merely that 'apoliticality' is avoiding the real issues.

This necessarily raises the question of what counts as 'political' – whether it refers to political in the narrow sense of activities and institutions, or more broadly to power dynamics in society. Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari (2010) use the terms 'antipolitical' and 'counterpolitical' to nuance their analysis of civil society actions in the Nepalese context, where 'antipolitics' refers to economic and social life denying politics – or rather "a political project of rejecting politics" (ibid, 2010). They contrast this with 'counterpolitics' as resisting the logic of division and divisiveness, and it involves the engaging in relationships, dialogue and cooperation with the other. Politics on the other hand, is the "social divisive activity of formal political institutions in the pursuit of power' (ibid, 2010). If we now turn to the Lebanese context, this definition of politics is the common sense understanding typically held by many of the interviewee participants. Beirut Madiniti as such can be seen to be 'counterpolitical' with its relatively nonconfrontational and more dialogic approach or working with others regardless of their political positions. As such, it denies the possibility of opposition to its agenda, removing an 'us' and 'them' – through following a logically ethical agenda - doing 'what is right'. The political and the counterpolitical are brought together through "acting in the sphere of formal politics while trying to performatively transform the public domain by banishing 'politicality' from it" (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari, 2010, p.312). Those critiquing Beirut Madiniti instead take a position that what is needed over and above this is to explicitly reject the political status quo – an 'antipolitical' stance is a more antagonistic and holistic stance involving a 'cleansing' of politics (ibid, 2010).

The various performative acts enacted throughout the trash protests illustrate Isin's 'acts' of citizenship. These emotive performances not only heighten the public's attention to such acts – sometimes pejoratively referred to as 'media stunts', but also result in learning new ways of being a 'citizen' through creating alternative discourses and knowledge and rendering the previously invisible subject visible through this political constitution. For example, the highly publicized and emotionally divisive comments of Nicolas Chammas, head of Beirut's commerce syndicate, that protestors were turning the up-market Downtown area in Beirut into an 'Abu Rakussa' (flea market held in the area historically), triggered an immediate response where Lebanese reclaimed the capital's central district as an area for all citizens and not just the wealthy through the holding of street markets (Daily Star, 2015b). Drawing on both Isin's acts of citizenship, and affective theories emphasising the importance of the body, this is an example of how ordinary people create a new knowledge of Downtown Beirut as an inclusive area for all, through the embodied performance of the formerly denigrated 'Abu Rakussa' market.

Other examples of emotive acts included the group, We Want Accountability disabling parking meters along the Corniche and demonstrating in and 'occupying' Zeitouney Bay, both perceived to be middle-upper class spaces in Beirut. Protesters also dumped trash outside the home of the Environment Minister on August 13th 2015 and went on hunger strike for two weeks in September 2015, setting up tents downtown in front of the Environment Ministry. The You Stink Campaign also organized a cleaning campaign where volunteers bagged trash in October 2015. All these examples illustrate the central importance of the body performing emotive acts transforming dominant narratives.

Other acts included a range of artistic interventions, for example, the 'Beirut Wall', so dubbed in reference to the Berlin Wall which was erected on 24th August after the street protests of the 23rd August. This was mocked across social media, and in addition, the artist Philippe Farhat responded by painting pictures of people with their mouths taped shut with the names of the political parties on the tape (International Business Times, 2015). The slogan 'your wall is low' (connoting a double meaning of also 'ethically' low and questionable) was written on the concrete block. Cartoonists also expressed their anger, where one cartoon illustrates three different waste bins ('political waste', 'terrorist waste' and 'sectarian waste') (BBC News, 2015). Another act was the Lebanese singer Alla Zalzali writing and releasing a new song called 'You Stink' supporting anti-government protestors (Daily Star, 2015c), and another song entitled 'All of them means all of them' to refer to all the political parties being corrupt.

Violence, both physical and psychological, has marked the responses of the state to the protests, which have included arrests, political statements, and other containment techniques. In addition, governmental discourses to discredit the protests have included shaming and criminalizing protestors with drugs tests, or alleging that they are 'foreign' elements or 'infiltrators', including allegations of terrorism. The filing of lawsuits against defamation of character has also been a tactic. Discourses also represent protestors as violent and irresponsible, to which state responses have included police brutality and detainment. One protestor who was shot suffered full body paralysis, with many wounded and hospitalized. At least 250 people were arrested, with 54 referred to military court for trial - 10 of these being underage protestors. The protests subsequently lost momentum somewhat after the initial phase in the summer of 2015, with a relative shift to focusing on the technicalities of waste management. Discourses also illustrated exclusion by class, where discourses of violence were linked to those from lower socio-economic classes. Paradoxically, 'the dysfunctional Lebanese state that was being condemned …turned into a highly functional and efficient repressive machine', illustrating features of authoritarian state resilience (Nayel & Moghnieh, 2015), coupled with the construction of emotionally loaded discourses aimed to trigger shame and fear in the protestors.

These examples illustrates the role of emotion being used by the state in social reproduction, as opposed to the transformatory 'promise' of the affective turn challenging the status quo (Hemmings, 2005). Similarly, we see the violence of the patriarchal order within society maintaining the social reproduction of oppressive gender relations. This can be illustrated in the following example, where a feminist activist from Sowt el Niswa, a group of writers, artists and feminists, describes the approach of their group as creating new knowledge opening discussion "inviting people to think about the links between the violence of a patriarchal order and the violence we see currently in the absence of electricity, water and minimal rights" (MN). Violence takes a variety of forms, not only repression on the streets against protestors, but also "confrontation of masculine practices within group organisations that attempt to violate, silence, marginalize and exclude women within the meetings that prepare for demonstrations" (MI). She provides various examples of microaggressions in speech exchanges at these meetings, where microaggressions are dismissed with retorts of getting priorities straight: "it's okay now, let it pass, are we going to overthrow the regime or monitor our tone?" (MI). Violence also is evident in the state's accusations of indecency and immorality directed towards protestors, taking various forms, such as use of drugs, different forms of sexual practices, homosexuality and "thuggish" behaviour. A strategy of blaming the 'violence' of the movement, yet limiting this to certain categories of people is evident: "we see the intersection of the patriarchal regime's masculinities, racism and classism" (SN), reflecting the intersectional nature of people's lived exclusions: "Blaming the 'moudaseen' or 'zu'ran' (lower class thugs), members of the lower classes, or Syrians, Iraqi's, Palestinians and Egyptians for riots, whilst speaking of other people as well-behaved, decent and respectful" (SN) illustrates a discourse of the national middle class citizen as morally upright and in control of their emotions, in contrast to the lower class emotionally volatile 'sub-citizens' and the 'non-citizen', outside of morality and citizenship.

Production of knowledge and pedagogy of social change and citizenship

In this final section, I explore the production of knowledge through 'acts of citizenship'. I have proposed the important role that emotion plays in the power of alternative discourses produced through public 'performative' acts, and indeed, emotion itself can be conceptualised as knowledge (Bratianu & Orzea, 2009). A number of the interviewee participants talked about the importance of optimism and hope in their understandings of social change:

> Pessimism is a luxury of the rich...we have to find a hope (SN).

> I am not a pessimist, not because there is anything that leads me to be hopeful, but because if we are not optimistic we die. But there is nothing for us to be optimistic about. The situation in Lebanon is as it has always been, a pending situation, waiting (BB).

> A lot of us felt a huge optimism after the trash crises, even when it began to die out. We felt the generational difference, up to the age of 25 I met some of the most inspirational people, especially outside Beirut. I am totally convinced that probably change will not come out of Beirut. I believe there is a very big hope for social change (BT).

What can be seen from these quotes is that these participants involved in their various ways contributing to social change, either as independent activists, NGO members, artists or other members of the public, share an affective positive attitude of hopefulness, described by one interviewee as the importance of "the activity of activism" (SN). As such, it is the *act* of doing, its performativity, which creates hope through possibility. This does not mean that they envision that change is imminent, but rather, it reflects an individual commitment to an ongoing process, rather than expecting a 'result' or arriving at a particular moment in time. These conceptualisations resonate with the preoccupations of the affective – namely 'affective freedom' as opposed 'social determinism' (Hemming, 2005), and a concomitant understanding of social change as affected by individual and interpersonal agency, and the role of the embodied experience, the body as process in such anticipated social change within this understanding. This also relates to interviewees' discussions of the perceived success or failure of the trash movement, and social movements in general, whereby interviewees tended to judge 'success' not in terms of particular outcomes, but in terms of process. In addition, through acting, it was recognized that this opened up possibilities of creating new discourses and knowledge: "The power we have in framing the narrative will determine our view of whether there has been a shift" (SN).

Perceptions of who the knowledge producers are in relation to social change and protest movements, and the nature of these new forms of knowledge were contested amongst interviewee participants. The question of the role of the university and research in social change was perceived to be important although the question of translatability is raised:

> I always sensed that there is a huge value in knowledge produced in universities… I am someone who believes in change. And I always had this question, as a researcher interested in urban issues: How can I translate this research into public knowledge and become a part of mainstream thinking …change minds in order to realize change on ground"(BT).

The recognition of alternative producers of knowledge is also articulated: "In the past few years it (knowledge) has been taking place sometimes through architecture and sometimes through activism" (BT).

Others were more directly critical and sceptical of traditional academic knowledge arguing: "I believe those capable of change are not the intellectuals and those living in castles, but those of the suburbs and those marginalized since they are the most vulnerable and harmed from the regional and local systems and regime, that prevents them any chance of advancing. The hirak (movement) is a number of people and is very alive and diverse. So I believe a communication was realized. I personally developed a connection with the suburbs, a new knowledge and even commutes to the suburbs, friends, acquaintances" (BB). The university itself as an institution was critiqued as part of the problem of academic knowledge: "intellectuals do not have proposals.

Later we discovered that this is because the university does not prepare someone to make a proposal, it directs them to make a problematic" (NG). In contrast, this activist journalist and researcher argues for approaching the problem with a 'proposal' – a problem-solving approach and also expresses the "right of the normal citizen to philosophize", asking why should this be restricted to academics, further arguing that "in liberating the black or women the university didn't have any role, this used to come from society" (NG). Formal education was also critiqued as didactic and inhibiting people's critical abilities: "The problem with our education system is that it is based on memorizing, which means that the mind is excluded"(XO). A call for a holisitic approach to learning, invoking the importance of the social and emotional learning is reflected here: "More than that, is giving people back humanity, which we are losing bit by bit. The human cannot be human without feeling and having compassion with the other"; in addition, the idea of knowledge constructed from below – by ordinary people is referred to: "Education is built from below, with respect for every difference among us, and its necessity" (XO), resonating with the idea of inclusive knowledge construction through the individual and performative acts people engage in, recognizing that social movements themselves produce knowledge. These conceptions reflect the partial nature of knowledge, and knowledge as emanating through acting and reflecting, and arguing for the importance of marginalized knowledges previously silenced. Some interviewees expressed concern with those who are silent advocating methodologically for listening to those who abstained from acting, and understanding what it means also to decide not to act:

> There is a huge issue we face in Beirut, and that is that there is a great disconnect between people who are active and those directly impacted. We are part of the problem obviously, we are really segregated in terms of activist circles, artists, lawyers… and there is the rest of the people…We are always trying, and I feel we failed so far, working with people who are affected and having the change from within and it has been very difficult (BT).

Concluding thoughts

In this article, I have aimed to explore social change through a focus on the things that people do – 'performative acts', and a consideration of who the actors are in Lebanon. As I have reflected on in the introduction, it is important to problematize the assumed universalism of the West's theories of citizenship, personhood and social movements, through contextualized critical reflections of experiences beyond the familiar cases in North America and Western Europe that dominate knowledge production. In addition, the politically orientalist assumptions of the citizen in the Global South as incapable of constituting themselves politically and transcending primordial ties - predicated on notions that citizenship is a rational contractual relationship with the state, is challenged. By focusing on the performative and emotive acts in the context of Beirut's trash protests, I challenge, through original empirical evidence, dichotomies of rationality and emotionality. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that emotions are social, political and cultural practices, rather than understanding emotion primarily in terms of an individual's psychological state (Ahmed, 2014).

The protests engaged an extremely wide range of actors – from NGO representatives and unions, to individual activists, artists, and first time demonstrators – the 'ordinary' man and woman on the street. Whilst inclusive in the sense of drawing people from across all socioeconomic classes, both men and women, Lebanese nationals, Syrians, Palestinians and migrant workers, there was a public emotive discourse of socioeconomic, gendered and legal exclusivity. Drawing on the notion of Isin's (2008; 2012) 'acts' of citizenship, I argue that through such performative emotive acts as have been witnessed - such as hunger strikes, holding flea markets in exclusive downtown Beirut ('Abu Rakhussa'), street art, slogans, cartoons, music, occupying Zeitouney Bay, storming the Environment Ministry and blogs, these actors constitute themselves politically, rendering themselves visible and heard. These are necessarily embodied emotive performed acts, constructing new narratives and new knowledge. Interviewee participants emphasized a particular sociotemporal understanding of social change emphasizing process as opposed to outcome, and a holistic embodied lived experience of acting. These constructions of social change articulate a framing of learning and production of knowledge where through such performative acts, there is an enabling of often silenced voices, and the vocalization and raising awareness of issues. Challenges to sectarianism, 'politics', and 'violence', emerged through performative and emotive 'acts'.

This highlights an important area for further work in understanding how emotion as a set of practices constitutes the production of new knowledges. The relationships between different producers of knowledge – intellectuals and researchers, public discourses of policymakers and the media, and civil society actors illustrate the partial nature of these different forms and content of knowledge. In addition, the role of powerful knowledge producers is interrogated – not only in terms of their contributions to social change, but in terms of considering the political theory of knowledge, as can be evidenced through the silencing of those voices being studied, where "the contestation over what counts as knowledge is just as implicated in the marginalization" (Ormond et al., 2006) – an epistemic violence of the marginalized (Spivak, 1988) - as wider sociopolitical processes and actors, such as the state, unjust laws or corrupt institutions. These acts of citizenship illustrate a response and a reclaiming of these actors' political subjectivities and the production of new knowledges.

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About the author

Dina Kiwan is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Media Studies, American University of Beirut, Lebanon; in 2015/6, she was the Centre for Lebanese Studies Fellow at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. Her research programme focuses on citizenship and inclusion, and is interdisciplinary and comparative in scope. Her interests centre around sociological and politico-philosophical examinations of inclusive citizenship through the lens of education policy, naturalization policy and migration policy, in particular in the context of pluralist / multicultural societies, and also societies in conflict. Her work engages with the inter-relationships between theory, research, policy and practice. Her interests in critical policy analysis are complemented by an interest in how those deemed to be 'marginalised' and vulnerable' constitute themselves as political actors. Publications include Kiwan (2008). *Education for Inclusive Citizenship* (Routledge), and Kiwan, D. (ed). (2013) *Naturalization Policies, Education and Citizenship: Multicultural and Multination Societies in International Perspective* (Palgrave Macmillan). She has extensive and long-standing experience and networks in the UK and internationally, in the field of citizenship. Policy and consulting experience includes co-authoring the UNESCO curriculum framework for global citizenship education (2015), appointment to the UK's Home Office 'Life in the UK' Advisory Group by Home Secretary, David Blunkett (2002); commissioned to co-author Diversity and Citizenship review for UK government's Department of Education (2007); a member of experts' advisory board for Carnegie Middle East Center 'Education for Citizenship in Arab Countries' research project, consulting the Lebanese government on teacher-training for religious diversity management, (2013) and regional manager for the Middle East for a large-scale research project on Democracy (Varieties of Democracy – V-Dem; 2013-ongoing).

Grief and the inter-cultural public sphere: "rights of nature" and the contestation of "global coloniality"

Erin Fitz-Henry

Abstract

In 2008, Ecuador became the first country in the world to write a national constitution enshrining 'rights' for nature. In the years since, a burgeoning transnational movement for these rights has established itself in countries as otherwise diverse as Bolivia, Mexico, India, South Africa, and the United States. Although they have thus far had limited impact at the national level, this article argues that one of the principal, if neglected, novelties of the transnational movement is its creation of "People's Tribunals" for the articulation of emotions rarely afforded a public hearing in other international fora. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork with Peruvian and Ecuadorian activists at the second international 'Rights of Nature' tribunal in Lima, Peru in 2014, I bring together recent work on the role of affect in new social movements, philosophical reflections on the political possibilities of mourning, and arguments among Latin American social movement scholars about "global coloniality." Specifically, I argue that despite the conceptual challenges and practical limitations of granting rights to nature, this movement is facilitating highly-charged cross-cultural performances of "disenfranchised grief" for the natural world that may become increasingly central to the contestation of what Ghassan Hage has called "mono-cultural intolerance."

Keywords

Environmental rights, grief, affect theory, global post-coloniality, Latin America

Introduction

In early December 2014, the 2nd international "Rights of Nature" Tribunal convened in downtown Lima, Peru, just a few kilometres from where the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP 20 meeting was being held in the lead-up to the Paris talks of 2015. While state delegations from 195 countries participated in the formal UN talks, thousands of environmental activists from across the hemisphere converged on city squares and parks across Lima to demand a significantly more vigorous response to climate change than was eventually to be arrived at by the parties to the UNFCCC. Fresh from struggles against mining operations in Cajamarca (Peru), Mirador (Ecuador), and Oklahoma (USA), they had come to participate in the

Cumbre de los Pueblos Frente al Cambio Climatico, or the “People’s Climate Change Conference” – a grassroots conference that brought together indigenous elders, labour organizers, seed guardians, advocates of food sovereignty, and others concerned with the intensification of neo-extractivism throughout Latin America. A particularly novel part of this alternative people’s climate convention was the “Rights of Nature” tribunal.

The tribunal is a little known civil society-led forum that convenes once a year in parallel with the UNFCCC meetings on climate change. The inaugural session was held in January 2014 in Quito, Ecuador; the second was held in Lima, Peru, in December of the same year; and the third took place in Paris in December 2015. Initiated primarily by Latin American environmental and indigenous rights activists affiliated with the transnational “Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature,” the tribunals are the first people’s tribunals anywhere in the world to hear cases brought on behalf of the natural world – cases alleging that the “rights” of rivers, corals, mountains and underground aquifers have been systematically infringed by both governments and corporations in ways that the annual COP meetings seem unable or unwilling to address. Overseen by a multi-cultural panel of 10-12 judges – including sociologists, theologians, former Ministers of Energy and Non-Renewable Resources, environmental lawyers, and indigenous elders – the tribunals are modeled explicitly on the people’s tribunals that have been held all over the world since the 1960s and on the “Permanent People’s Tribunal” currently based in Bologna, Italy. Since 2014, the tribunals have heard the cases of mountains threatened by Canadian and Chinese mining interests in Peru and Ecuador (the Conga-Cajamarca mines and the Mirador project), of parts of the Ecuadorian Amazon that are still home to lingering damage from oil extraction (Chevron-Texaco), of oceans afflicted by the ongoing devastation of oil spills (British Petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico), and of rivers likely to be dammed for the large-scale generation of hydroelectricity in Brazil (Belo Monte).

The rights of nature are a widely remarked-upon legal innovation that made their first appearance at the national level in Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution following years of transnational civil society organizing that brought together lawyers and activists from Ecuador, Bolivia, and the United States (Acosta and Martinez, 2010; Gudnyas, 2010; Fitz-Henry, 2014; Tanasescu, 2015). After many months of heated debate at the Constituent Assembly, Ecuador became the first country in the world to grant legally enforceable rights to the natural world, recognizing in four constitutional articles that ecosystems have the right to “exist, persist, maintain and regenerate [their] vital cycles, structure, [and] functions;” that nature has the “right to restoration” independent of what is owed to affected individuals and communities; and that the state “will apply precaution and restriction measures in all the activities that can lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems or the permanent alteration of natural cycles” (Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2008).

Although rights discourses are foreign to indigenous languages throughout the

Andes (and beyond), the rights of nature in Ecuador are widely seen as part of a broader turn toward a recognition of indigenous-led alternatives to both neoliberal globalization and the colonial underpinnings of post-neoliberal development models (Escobar, 2010). As Argentine semiotician and decolonial theorist Walter Mignolo has recently noted, these rights are embedded in much broader movements for *sumak kawsay* (in Quechua), sumak kamaña (in Aymara), or *buen vivir* (in Spanish), all of which translate loosely as "living in plenitude," living in "harmony with all living organisms," or good living. Rooted in Andean philosophies – albeit somewhat more tenuously than is often recognized by mestizo scholars and activists of the left –, these alter-development visions are animated by forms of "horizontal solidarity that extend not only to all humans but also to non-humans in the natural and cosmological world" (Mignolo, 2011: 308-310).

Particularly important for the discussion that follows is the fact that these visions reject what Colombian-American anthropologist Arturo Escobar calls "mono-ontological" understandings of the world – that is, understandings that refuse a multiplicity (or, in his terms, "pluriversality") of ways of both articulating and coming into relation with diverse socio-natures. "[These rights]," Escobar continues, "have re-opened the crucial debate on how Latin Americans want to go on living... the movement is at the same time a movement for the right to exist differently [and] to construct worlds and knowledges otherwise" (Escobar, 2016: 26). At their broadest, then, the rights of nature aim to destabilize and provincialize dominant Euro-American understandings of "Nature" as a "natural resource" by initiating a series of "integrative decolonial projects" that nurture epistemological plurality, and that push against the relentless marketization of what the minority world increasingly calls, "ecosystem services" (Mignolo, 2011: 308, 310; Sullivan, 2008).

In the years since the passage of Ecuador's radically biocentric constitution, cultural anthropologists, human geographers, and environmental lawyers have raised important questions about the philosophical coherence and practical feasibility of these rights. Perhaps most frequently, scholars working in Latin America have pointed to the ways that they have been selectively embraced by governments of the region to mystify or manufacture consent for state policies that remain highly centralized, non-participatory, and only superficially inter-cultural or "pluri-national." As Catherine Walsh has observed, "the Constitution provoke[s] an 'inter-culturalizing' unprecedented in the country as well as the Latin-American region" (Walsh, 2010: 19).

However, this inter-culturalizing moment and its requirement that we "think and act 'with' ancestral principles, knowledges, and communities," is one that is already being displaced by other State-led development imperatives. "The crucial question," Walsh continues, "is whether *buen vivir* [and the rights of nature are] becoming another discursive tool and co-opted term, functional to the State and its structures and with little significance for real *intercultural, interepistemic, and plurinational transformation*" (Walsh, 2010: 20). Most of the scholars working in this area have similarly emphasized the fact that these ostensibly indigenous-led (or at least indigenously-resonant) rights claims are increasingly being used by leftist-populist administrations throughout the region as a kind of ideological icing on a cake that remains highly centralized, inattentive to the ontological commitments of ancestral communities, and fundamentally extractive (Acosta and Martinez, 2010; Gudnyas, 2010; Walsh, 2010; Radcliffe, 2012).

While I share many of these critiques and have engaged them at length in my previous work (Fitz-Henry 2014, 2015), in this article I want to redirect the conversation about the "invented" origins and political-economic hypocrisies that have thus far characterized this legal framework by dwelling more specifically – and in significantly greater ethnographic depth – on the *affective dimensions* of the international tribunals in which they are becoming manifest as part of a burgeoning transnational movement. At a time when growing numbers of environmental activists continue to raise questions about the limitations of dominant (which is to say, "mono-ontological") understandings of the environmental crisis – understandings that focus overwhelmingly on cost-benefit analyses and other instrumentalist approaches to environmental remediation – these tribunals are performing crucial labour by making *affective* space for the preservation, nurturing, and exchange of subaltern sentiments (Sullivan, 2017). By exploring a number of key moments of activist speech during the 2014 Rights of Nature tribunal in Lima, Peru, supplemented by interviews with both activists and audience members, I develop two central points that seem to me increasingly relevant for expanding social movement theorizing about the emotional, ethical, and political possibilities of inter-cultural engagement.

First, although Western court rooms are often imagined to be rational-bureaucratic spaces par excellence (Mills 1948), defined primarily by logical argumentation and other highly cognitive forms of persuasion, the Rights of Nature tribunals, on the contrary, are juridical spaces explicitly constructed to make possible the emergence of registers of feeling that rarely find expression in mainstream environmental policy forums. Activists from the Global South have been particularly insistent that the defining quality of these tribunals is their openness to forms of argumentation that both invite and amplify emotions *vis a vis* the loss of particular ecosystems – emotions that are routinely denied public expression elsewhere and that are too often cast aside in the instrumentalist rush of UN policy experts to work toward biodiversity offsets, species banking schemes, projects of carbon sequestration, and other fundamentally market-oriented efforts to remedy environmental damage.

Second, contrary to what many radical left critics have suggested over the past decade or so, this grief is not a form of narcissistic melancholy in the Freudian sense – the kind that keeps participants and audience members returning impotently to scenes of collective environmental trauma – but is instead affectively transformative in ways that remain insufficiently explored by scholars of transnational social movements. While political theorists like Wendy Brown have raised questions about the demobilizing effects of a politics focused on wounds, and others have worried that mourning may serve to simply reinforce an unproductive narrative of victimization (Brown, 1995), the experience of shared environmental grief made possible at these tribunals suggests the need to significantly expand current approaches to the power and potentiality of grief.

Bringing together predominantly Euro-American political theorists influenced by affect theory, sociologists of new social movements, and Latin American scholars committed to projects of radical epistemic decolonization (Escobar, 2004; de Sousa Santos 2003, 2014), my argument is that there is an important link between 1) genuinely inter-cultural engagement that allows for the experience of ontological multiplicity related to the environmental crisis; and 2) the creation of spaces that nurture affects too often disavowed or downplayed by Western juridical systems. I pursue this argument in three parts – First, after a brief overview of contemporary affect theory, I provide a series of short ethnographic vignettes taken from my fieldnotes of December 2014. Drawing methodological inspiration from Henri Lefebvre's call for a "theory of moments," I describe those moments at which tribunal presenters expressed emotions that significantly destabilized the energy in the room, allowing activists – myself included – to experience the losses of particular ecosystems in novel ways. I then use the vignettes to think with, alongside, and against, political theorists concerned with the ethical potentialities of grief. My primary interlocutors here are Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida. Finally, returning to the work of decolonial theorists of Latin American social movements, I show how a focus on grief opens us to more expansive understandings of explicitly inter-cultural social movements – understandings that would be missed if we were to focus only on the substance of the specific claims being advanced, the opportunity structures to which they are responding, or the (implicitly cognitive) framing devices used to mobilize support. For scholars of Latin American social movements who have arguably done the most to advance recent discussions about collective responses to "global coloniality" and ways of challenging the "mono-cultural intolerance" of much of the non-indigenous left, these insights about the power of grief may prove particularly fruitful as part of efforts to re-think and solidify connections across diverse "transnational third worlds of peoples and knowledges" (de Sousa Santos 2002: 234).

The return of the repressed: toward a theory of "moments"

In a 2011 essay, Arturo Escobar notes that we are witnessing a "return of the repressed" all across the humanities and social sciences, as the subordinated sides of long-familiar Western dualisms – nature/culture, female/male, emotion/rationality, body/mind – begin to re-emerge as both potent forces of social mobilization and ethnographic objects of considerable analytic importance. This perception is borne out with particular intensity when we look at the meteoric rise of affect theory across the social sciences and humanities over the past decade or so. While this is not the place for an extended examination of the emergence of “affect” as a key focus of attention in fields as otherwise diverse as anthropology, gender studies, and philosophy, important for my purposes here is that it is increasingly seen by political theorists as one of the primary means by which to move away from thinking about politics primarily in terms of cognition, representation, reductionist models of rational choice, or even “ideology” and “false consciousness” in the tradition of structural Marxism.

Inspired by Deleuzian models of non-linear becoming, theorists working in this tradition have seen in affect – whether in the form of pre-linguistic “intensities” or more culturally elaborated “emotions” – a space of emergence that is pregnant with radically non-teleological political possibilities. Borrowing from Raymond William’s notion of “structures of feeling” that exist along the “cusp of semantic availability,” political theorists from Sara Ahmed and J.K. Gibson-Graham to William Connolly and Jane Bennett have argued for the political relevance of that which is pre-discursive or sub-discursive in human experience (Connolly 2002; Bennett 2010; Ahmed 2014; Gibson-Graham 2006). By paying attention to the “layered ‘inter- and intra-corporeality’ of thinking,” J.K. Gibson-Graham suggest, we can learn to focus not just on the “intellectual arguments offered in response to… politics, but to the “visceral intensities and emotive narratives that accompany their expression” (Gibson-Graham 2006: 2). Likewise, political theorist William Connolly insists that analyses of socio-political transformation need to pay significantly more attention to “the critical role that *cultivation of the visceral register of being* plays in ethical [and political] life” (Connolly 2013: 400). And Brian Massumi has similarly argued that this “visceral register of being” plays a central role in “pull[ing] thinking beyond the steady control of intellectual governance” toward unimagined political alternatives (Massumi 2002: 76).

In pursuit of these fleeting “moments” that might “form the basis for entirely new demands on the social order,” particularly as that social order relates to, imagines, and searches for new ways of caring for the natural world, let us now turn back to the 2014 “Rights of Nature” tribunal. In the following sections, I analyse these moments by way of a close reading of one activist’s testimony about environmental losses in the state of Oklahoma (USA) associated with hydraulic fracturing. I focus at length on her testimony because it not only set the stage for the proceedings that followed, but elicited some of the most palpable expressions of grief from audience members and fellow activists at the tribunal. These experiences were widely noted in follow-up interviews with both. While this close-up focus on a number of particularly affect-laden “moments” does not allow me to generalize about the long-term political effects or mobilizing potential of grief, what it does allow is a fine-grained analysis of the centrality of emotions to the internal dynamics of these explicitly inter-cultural tribunals. What is lost in breadth is, I hope, more than made up for in depth.

Testimonies of loss

I arrived at the *Gran Hotel Bolivar* early on the morning of December 5, 2014. The hotel is an imposing neocolonial building located in the heart of Lima's historic center where it faces one of the most iconic public spaces in the city – the famous Plaza San Martín. By mid-day, the plaza would be filled with the rainbow colors of the indigenous *wiphala*, bright banners with slogans such as "We are a River, Not just Drops," and the lively sounds of music, bullhorns, and sporadic drumming, as activists from across the hemisphere congregated around a statue of Peru's independence hero. Inside the hotel, the 2nd international Rights of Nature tribunal was just beginning in one of the conference rooms far removed from the festival atmosphere of the surrounding streets. As I arrived, navigating my way between images of poisoned fish, posters calling for the cessation of REDD+ programs, and pamphlets with detailed information about each of the twelve cases scheduled to be heard over the following two days, indigenous elders from the Amazon, representatives from rights of nature NGOs in Ecuador and Mexico, and anti-mining activists from Peru were setting up microphones and talking quietly. Beneath a large screen on which the iconic image of the "Rights of Nature" tree was projected in bright blue and green, the expert judges were already assembled along two long tables.

The day began under a shadow that was only to intensify in the hours to come. One of the largest contingents to make the journey to the Plaza San Martin was a group of Shuar activists from the southern Ecuadorian province of Zamora Chinchipe – a province that is currently engaged in a David and Goliath battle against a Chinese mining company that has been granted the right to establish the country's first mega-mining project. The activists had travelled by bus, having survived a harrowing journey during which they were repeatedly harassed by security forces in Ecuador who had attempted to prevent their attendance at the tribunal. However, what made their arrival all the more painful was that just two days before their departure, they had learned of the death of one of the most vocal opponents of mega-mining in the region: a young Shuar man by the name of Jose Tendentza. Tendentza – a fierce opponent of the mining project who was widely known at the time to be preparing his testimony against the mining company for the tribunal in Lima – had disappeared from the community of Yanua at the end of November. His body was subsequently found decomposing and stripped of all identity papers in the Chuchumbletza River, having sustained injuries to his upper body consistent with strangulation. While both the Ecuadorian government and the company admitted no wrongdoing, activists and community members remain certain that his death was a politically motivated homicide in which both state and company are implicated. The palpable grief of the Shuar activists arguably set the emotional tone for the proceedings that followed, with the death of Tendentza serving as a reminder of the increasingly high stakes involved in defending the rights to which we had all assembled to bear witness.

After a series of quiet lamentations shared among close friends, the morning began with an invocation of "the spirits," framed explicitly by ceremonial invitations from indigenous elders from both "the North" and "the South." The representative from "the North" was Casey Camp-Horinek, a well-known indigenous activist from the Ponca Nation in Oklahoma. She immediately began the work of geographical and emotional reorientation that is such a central part of these tribunals, thanking the indigenous communities of the Amazon and the Andes for allowing her to be present at the tribunal and identifying herself as native to "Turtle Island… [the land that] the occupiers call North America." This juxtaposition of the language of "the occupiers" with the native languages of communities throughout the hemisphere was a strategy that would be used repeatedly used throughout the day to displace the centrality of the markers too often used by the representatives of what Arturo Escobar, Annibal Quijano, and Walter Mignolo have called, "imperial globality" – that is, an "economic-military-ideological order that subordinates regions, peoples, and economies worldwide" and that is defined by both a "hyper-technification of rationality and a hyper-marketization of social life" (Escobar 2004: 3). For most of the activists present at the tribunal, the UNFCCC COP 20 conference being held just down the street was dominated precisely by such representatives of this "imperial globality," whose hyper-technical and hyper-marketized responses to climate change have thus far led to the "heightened marginalization and suppression of the knowledge and culture of subaltern groups" (Escobar, 2004: 1).

This juxtaposition of "occupied" Turtle Island and the "imperial" United States was not just, however, a conceptual one intended to reorient us geographically. Indeed, a central part of its novelty was that it was accompanied by a series of *affective* juxtapositions that were similarly intended to displace the centrality of the kind of "pure reason" that is at least normatively characteristic of Western legal proceedings. The sense of displacement deepened and became more emotionally charged as Camp-Horinek continued the opening invocation by lighting a series of candles, burning sage (as is customary as part of Sun Dance festivals in the American Plains), and inviting another indigenous activist from North America to perform the opening drum circle. Such practices – perhaps overly stylized for those familiar with critiques of "strategically essentialist" performances of indigeneity (Tanasescu, 2013) or jarring to those more familiar with the highly cognitive formalism of Western tribunals – are, it should be noted, an integral part of every tribunal explicitly formulated to initiate a passage from the dominant frames of the "minority world" of "imperial globality" toward more expansive, embodied, and emotional experiences of the "rights" of the natural world.

Following this ceremonial invocation, Camp-Horinek began her opening argument. Continuing in the same affective register, she continued:

> This relationship [with the natural world] is cellular, it is spiritual, it is… so deep. And it is body reflecting…What is the flesh made up of? Science tells us that it is one cell developing over and over again. Where did it come from? The food that our mothers eat… That food is of the four-legs, the food is of the wings, the food is of the ones that have their roots deep inside the earth…[And it comes from the] fire that comes from the Father that's called lightning in the white world… [This is] what they call the 'biosphere,' what we call an extension of ourselves…"

The energy of the room began to change, as the definitions and exclusions of the "white world" continued to fall away. The other activists became noticeably quiet, and an atmosphere of subdued concentration settled across the room. In place of the biosphere, there were extensions. In place of lightning, the Fire of the Father. In place of 'natural resources,' cells dividing. In place of the United States, Turtle Island. In place of "climate change," southern birds in Oklahoma that have never before been in Oklahoma.

Building on these displacements by way of a conclusion, Casey-Horinek further destabilized the anaemic conceptions of environmental responsibility that are so familiar to Western environmental policy-makers. More specifically, she expanded the temporal frameworks necessary for thinking about the "rights of nature" by tracing these "extensions" not just across different kinds of bodies, but across significantly extended temporal spans. With visible emotion, looking earnestly at the faces of the activists assembled across the room, she intoned: "I honor the blood lines all the way back as far as they go, and as far forward as our Mother Earth allows us to go. We must remember that she is in stress and in pain… [She is not sick], but she has areas that are hurt, bruised, and in pain…" This vision of a woman being beaten and bruised by extraction, poisoning and neglect provided a powerful counterpart to the image of Jose Tendentza's strangled body that hung uneasily over the tribunal, allowing participants to understand in particularly vivid terms the rights-violations of bodies both human and other-than-human.

It was the particularity of this pain that, later in the tribunal when Camp-Horinek testified in opposition to hydraulic fracturing in Oklahoma, became even more powerfully amplified. Numerous speakers throughout the day had gone on to note the unusual emotional atmosphere of the tribunal and the welcome departure that the heartfelt testimonies signalled from the constricted forms of argumentation more usually characteristic of Western courts and environmental policy forums. However, it was not until Camp-Horinek re-took the stand that the pain first articulated in the opening invocation reached a pinnacle. It was at this point that something like "environmental grief" reverberated most visibly through the audience, with many wiping tears from their eyes – a sight that is not at all unusual at these tribunals and that is even sometimes apparent among judges after hours of testimonies about environmental rights violations.

With some notable exceptions, political theorists concerned with affect have tended to not want to dwell on "negative emotions" such as grief. And for good reason. As J.K. Gibson-Graham have pointed out, given the particularly depressing times in which we find ourselves in many parts of the world, there is a tendency among "critical, radical, left-oriented thinkers and activists" to engage in a "deep-seated negativity" that involves endlessly rehearsing the "politically correct emotions" of paranoia, cynicism, and melancholia (Gibson-Graham, 2006: 3) Following Wendy Brown, who has forcefully argued against the "fetishization of the wound in subaltern politics," Gibson-Graham, Connolly, and others working in this tradition have attempted to move away from what Peter Benson and Stuart Kirsch have called, in another context, the "politics of resignation" (Benson and Kirsch, 2010; Gibson-Graham, 2006: xxix). A notable exception to this trend is the work of Sara Ahmed, who, in her 2004 *The Cultural Politics of Emotion,* and specifically in relation to a government report entitled "Bringing Them Home" on the Stolen Generation in Australia, has argued that "bringing pain into politics requires we give up the fetish of the wound through different kinds of remembrance" (Ahmed, 2004: 35). Many who focus on pain – Ahmed included – focus primarily (and importantly) on the pain of colonial exploitation and its legacies, or on forms of human suffering that are neglected or disavowed through processes of intensely gendered and colonial othering. However, there is more to be said about the kinds of pain that can be expressed and mobilized through "different kinds of remembrance" – in this case, at a tribunal overtly constructed as a forum in which to mourn other-than-human lives which have also been colonized, but which are often "disenfranchised" in so far as they are prevented expression in mainstream policy forums associated with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. I will return to this point in greater detail shortly.

After re-introducing herself as a member of the Ponca Nation living "in the occupied territory of Oklahoma" and holding up a paper map of the state that demonstrated in bright blue and red the hundreds of oil and gas concessions across the state, she explained: "The deaths have begun to multiply." Noting the dramatic increase in earthquakes which the American Geological Society has now linked definitively to hydraulic fracturing, the growing number of "deer with boils" and fish whose "flesh is falling off of them," she then took a long pause during which she had to visibly stifle the tears. After a deep breath, and still choking back angry tears, she continued:

> And we know…in a community of 6-800…We're having a funeral a week where we live. We have four-day ceremonies to take our people back to the earth. For the first time in our history, we're having to resort to cremation and no

> ceremonies because our people can't afford the feasts and the give-aways. ..I am here to tell you [as someone who lives in the midst of the fracking territories up there] that people are dying…

As she listed off all the people who have been diagnosed with either cancer or auto-immune diseases in her territory, including babies, small children, her husband, and her sister-in-law, she continued to have to visibly restrain the emotion. As I looked around at other activists across the room, many were nodding silently in recognition, shaking their heads, and wiping tears from their eyes. "We can't hunt, we can't fish," she concluded, "The Ponca people are an endangered species. We are suffering from a genocidal process…"

Using the language of "endangered species" usually reserved for non-human species to refer to the cultural genocide that the Ponca Nation is currently undergoing, she continued the affectively charged work of displacing the centrality of the human by locating it directly alongside those who have already appeared on the infamous Endangered Species lists. Just as she had opened the tribunal by displacing the centrality of both the geographical referents most familiar to the West and the foundational separation between reason and emotion long characteristic of that "minority culture," she continued to further erode modernity's long-standing distinction between nature and culture. We are an endangered species, she insisted. This is a genocide that affects all beings, both human and other-than-human. Clearly overwhelmed with sadness, she concluded:

> What about those that we love? Those that grow from the earth? What about the earth herself as her bones are broken and she's sucked dry? What about those innocent ones that walk on four legs? Those with wings flying through the poisoned air?... Who speaks for the water?... We're this close to being fracked to death!

After expert testimony that had relied primarily on Western scientific indicators to advance the case that hydraulic fracturing is causing significant water contamination and air pollution across the state, Camp-Horinek's emotional presentation allowed participants to feel – from the perspective of both the "bones of the earth" and the bones of First Nations peoples who are no longer able to be properly buried – the visceral reality of the ongoing violation of nature's "rights." In the place of cost-benefit analyses that highlight the relative clean-ness of natural gas *vis a vis* oil, the injured voices of the "bones of the earth" began to make themselves heard. In the place of industry-sponsored denial about the increase of cancer diagnoses in extraction zones, the interlinked deaths of fish, deer, and humans became audible. And in the place of ecologically modernist solutions of precisely the sort being devised by state representatives at the COP 20 just down the street, living experiences of connection to all those affected by extraction, strangulation, poisoning, and neglect. “The grief was just overwhelming,” one Peruvian activist told me later. “It was like I couldn’t breathe. I could hear those rivers so loudly…” And again, from a North American activist affiliated with a California-based global justice NGO: “The really remarkable thing about [the tribunal] is that we can express what we all know is true. The only way to do that is to be able to feel sad together.” And again, from a long-time rights of nature activist from an Ecuadorian NGO: “It’s just not possible to talk about these rights violations without talking about loss…”

As powerful as these “moments of grief” clearly were for the rights of nature activists assembled at the Lima tribunal, and as powerful as they are for many others associated with the transnational movement more broadly, we still might want to ask: What, if anything, might this grief do politically? What do these performances of public lamentation for dying communities – both human and non-human – make possible not just emotionally, but ethically and politically? Or, as David McIvor has recently wondered in the context of an exegesis of Judith Butler’s shifting approach to mourning, “Is [mourning] a means of cultivating ethical dispositions toward human vulnerability that would make possible a less-violent politics? Or is it a public process of working through in which the meaning and significance of traumatic events or lamentable outcomes are contested and revised? What, in short, are the potential politics of mourning?” (McIvor 2012). It is toward this question that I now turn.

On “environmental grief” and cross-cultural exchange

While emotions have begun to receive their due in recent work on new social movements, grief has continued to be theoretically sidelined in favour of emotions like anger, shame, or “moral shock,” which are more often seen as essential to the articulation of effective “injustice frames” (Goodwin, Polletta, and Jasper, 2000; Goodwin, Polletta, and Jasper 2001). Indeed, the vast majority of studies included in a recent review essay on the role of emotions in social movements focus on the power of anger, outrage, and indignation (Goodwin and Jasper, 2006). The primary exceptions to this trend are studies that explore the mobilizing power of maternal grief in contexts of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence, particularly in Latin America. As is by now well-known, mothers have taken the lead on social movement organizing in opposition to militarized violence and the disappearances of their children in countries as otherwise diverse as Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. As Lorraine Bayard de Volo has recently pointed out, “these studies suggest that grief, particularly when framed as maternal grief, can carry a high emotional resonance and thus can become a powerful frame used against the state” (Bayard de Volo, 2011: 463). While grief may, as Bayard de Volo rightly suggests, serve as a potent framing device in struggles against highly militarized states and contribute to the solidification of experiences of collective identity ("we are all grieving mothers"), it seems to me that environmental grief of the sort explored in this paper has much wider political possibilities.

It is perhaps Judith Butler who, since the turn of the millennium, has done the most to bring the experience of mourning to political centre stage. As McIvor points out, in her later work Butler focuses more and more on mourning as a form of "identification with suffering itself" that "cultivates ethical dispositions such as humility and generosity" (McIvor 2012: 411). More specifically, she recognizes the importance of the "disorientation" or "dispossession" of grief which "puts the individual in a salutary 'mode of unknowingness' that might make for a more welcoming form of life," allowing him or her to come to an awareness of shared vulnerabilities, frailties, and limitations with other human beings, particularly those publicly constructed as not worthy of grief – most paradigmatically, homosexuals, detainees, or refugees (McIvor 2012: 411). While some critics have faulted Butler for this sharp "ethical turn" in her later writings, her approach to mourning encourages us to see how the articulation of grief for the natural world might function to open rights of nature activists to experiences of shared vulnerability, though in this case with disavowed others who are not exclusively human.

This recognition of shared vulnerability and violation across species was also accompanied, as we have seen, by a recognition of the extended temporalities necessary to more fully reckoning with the environmental crisis. It is this second dimension of mourning that has been emphasized by Jacques Derrida, who is perhaps the political philosopher after Butler who has written most extensively about the political potential of grief. His explicit linking of mourning with the possibility of inter-generational justice is instructive. As he explains in his 1993 *Specters of Marx*:

> If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice... No ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle *the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born.*" (Derrida, 1993: xviii)

While Derrida, like Butler, is not particularly concerned with mourning the lives of non-human beings, his insistence that justice can only be possible when it makes space for beings "already dead or not yet born" is an insistence implicitly echoed in Camp-Horinek's invocation of "the bloodlines that stretch all the way back and as far forward as Mother Earth will allow us to go." Central to the kind of radical environmental justice called for by the broader movement for the rights of nature is precisely this sort of commitment to extending the "principle of respect for those others who are no longer" to other-than-human beings. This is a call that is increasingly being voiced by other parts of the environmental movement who seem to be arriving at similar recognitions. As ecofeminist Lori Gruen has recently put it, drawing comparisons with the models of public grieving characteristic of ACT UP in the 1990s and the anti-war protests of the 1960s, "Creating communal possibilities for mourning [other-than-human beings] whom we have loved and lost as well as all of the other animals for whom we grieve can take grief out of the closet... and make the lives and deaths of [other-than-human beings] visible and meaningful." And again: "Collectively grieving provides a way to honour the precariousness and fragility of our entangled lives" (Adams and Gruen, 2014: 139).

While these understandings of the social and political productivity of grief demonstrate how it shifts ethical sensibilities (for example, toward openness to disavowed 'others' and inter-generational forms of justice), I want to further suggest that in the context of the Rights of Nature Tribunal it served an additional purpose that is never explicitly mentioned by these Euro-American theorists, and one that may be worth attending to in somewhat greater detail. Not only did it register a more temporally expansive form of inter-generational justice (a la Derrida) and move participants into a "mode of unknowingness" in which they could experience their shared vulnerability with both human and other-than-human beings (a la Butler and Gruen). In addition, in facilitating a series of visceral experiences of "dispossession" and "disorientation" *vis a vis* currently hegemonic understandings of environmental collapse, it initiated a series of critical openings whereby activists from both the South and the North could together affirm "what they always knew to be true" – that is, those diverse place-based knowledges relentlessly displaced by "global coloniality." As Camp-Horinek concluded at the very end of her opening testimony, when asked about how the knowledge of indigenous peoples could be translated in defence of "Mother Earth": "I believe that *all of you have your own understandings of this time of change*... so the inter-cultural dialogue has begun."

Grief in this context, then, not only reoriented activists in ways that made them acutely aware of the conceptual, spiritual, and emotional limitations of some of the core divisions at the heart of Western modernity. In addition, it began to clear space for a diversity of ways of relating to both other-than human beings and other-than-Western cultures. Radically reoriented, participants not only grieved that which had previously been un-grievable, but experienced a cultural multiplicity of ways of relating to those dead and dying "extensions of ourselves" that are too often neglected by mainstream environmental policy-makers. This recognition of the death that both surrounds and implicates us is a recognition that is perhaps most painfully familiar to indigenous communities. As Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Deborah Danowski have recently suggested – rightly and respectfully – indigenous communities have long experienced the "deaths of their worlds" at the hands of the forces of "global coloniality." They are, in a sense, "experts" at how to navigate the "ends of the world" (Viveiros de Castro and Danowski, 2017). As I have argued, it is from the affect-laden sharing of these experiences of ongoing eco-genocide – and the multiple languages in which those genocides are articulated – that we might begin to think beyond deeply Eurocentric, enduringly colonial, and intensely market-led approaches to addressing socio-environmental collapse.

Conclusion

Latin American social movement scholars Arturo Escobar, Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos have rightly emphasized the organizational novelty of the new transnational movements working to contest global coloniality. One of the many forms taken by that coloniality is the single-minded commitment to reductive, one-dimensional, pseudo-universalistic, and hyper-marketized understandings of 'Nature' that attempt to capture and contain its unruly multiplicity (Sullivan, 2008; Fitz-Henry, 2017). Drawing on complexity theory, these scholars have highlighted the conceptual novelty of the focus of these movements on the defence of particular place-based "practices of world-making" – a focus which represents a significant departure from the totalizing, modernist projects of the traditional revolutionary left. However, they have not been consistently attentive to the affective undercurrents of the politics advanced by transnational groups like the Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature. While Escobar, for example, rightly recognizes the "return of the repressed" across the social sciences and the humanities, he does not fully engage the emotional landscapes which these groups are creating in their efforts to make palpable alternative understandings of worlds marginalized by global coloniality. Similarly, de Sousa Santos has argued for a "theory of translation" – "one that propitiates mutual understanding and intelligibility among movements brought together into networks but with worldviews, life worlds, and conceptions that are often different and at odds with each other (Escobar 2004, 17). The point, he continues, "is to create, in every movement or NGO, in every practice or strategy, in every discourse or knowledge, a contact zone that may render it porous and hence permeable to other NGOs, practices, strategies, discourses, or knowledges" (Escobar, 2004: 18). However, de Sousa Santos, too, does not explore the possibility that these "contact zones" may perhaps be most effectively carved out, strengthened, or rendered porous through precisely the sorts of affectively-charged experiences facilitated by the Rights of Nature tribunal. "Another knowledge is possible," he tells us. The response that I have tried to develop in this article is, in short: "Only if another register of *feeling* is made possible."

I have tried to suggest that one of the key strategies of inter-cultural translation used by the movement for the rights of nature is the creation of tribunals that explicitly invite experiences of "disenfranchised" forms of environmental grief. While political theorists have recognized in practices of mourning possibilities for significant ethical transformation and inter-generational justice, scholars of transnational social movements have by and large neglected the political possibilities of grief, preferring instead to focus on the mobilizing power of anger, outrage, or indignation. While Latin American social movement scholars in particular have gone a significant distance in deconstructing the hierarchical binaries that remain foundational to much of Western colonial thought, and have argued passionately for increased attention to "pluriversal" movements that resist "cognitive injustice," there remains much more to be said about the social and political productivity of affect in relation to transnational movements across the Global South (Boaventura de Sousa Santos 2014).

Thom van Dooren has recently argued that mourning species extinction "may be essential to our and many other species' long-term survival" (van Dooren, 2014). Similarly, Anna Tsing has observed that "to track the histories that make multispecies livability possible, it is not enough to watch lively bodies. Instead, *we must wander through landscapes where assemblages of the dead gather together with the living*" (Tsing at all, 2017: 65). The movement for the rights of nature aims explicitly to create emotional space for the experiences of mourning that necessarily accompany these "assemblages of the dead." As I have shown, these tribunals are facilitating critical conceptual and emotional ruptures in the hegemonic discourses used by the United Nations that overwhelmingly insist on "mono-ontological" understandings of the natural world – understandings that continue to reduce living systems and communities to "natural resources" or "ecosystem service providers." An integral part of the value of these tribunals is that they serve as rare spaces in which to nourish experiences of inter-cultural exchange that may prove particularly enduring as we continue to build South-South alliances to resist the ontological narrowness that too often accompanies even projects of the traditional left. In the fight against global coloniality, there is, it seems to me, an urgent need to listen more attentively – and along thicker emotional registers – to the experiential and epistemological multiplicities of communities who are grappling with socio-environmental losses poorly acknowledged by the policymakers at UN environmental forums. As more and more nation-states – from Bolivia to New Zealand and India – pass ground-breaking new laws that protect the "rights" of rivers, glaciers, and other natural formations, it is perhaps time to take even more seriously the affective power of these tribunals.

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About the author

Erin Fitz-Henry is a Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Development Studies at the University of Melbourne. She can be reached at erinfh AT unimelb.edu.au

Collaboration and competition: market queens, trade unions and collective action of informal workers in Ghana's Makola Market[1]

Tanja D. Hendriks

Abstract

This paper focuses on informal workers in Makola Market, Accra (Ghana), and the ways in which they organize for collective action. Ghana has a long history of trade and this makes for well-developed and culturally embedded local institutions that have organized and represented the (informal) workers active in markets. A prominent example is the market queens, who (cl)aim to oversee, protect and promote markets vis-a-vis the public and the (municipal) government. Yet, these social structures are not easily recognized as a kind of social movement by (inter)national trade unions. Hence trade union interventions and outreaches aimed at ameliorating the plight of informal workers tend to bypass and antagonize these existing formations, fuelling competition and division in the already fragmented and inherently competitive market space. Based on 2.5 year-long ethnographic research on strategic actors in inclusive development with a focus on informal workers, this article draws attention to empirical realities in Ghana. It demonstrates that bypassing culturally embedded groups is problematic because it feeds fragmentation and thus limits the possibilities for collective action.

Keywords: informal workers, collective action, market queens, trade unions, Ghana, social movements, Makola market, ethnography

Introduction

> *I am in Accra, Ghana's bustling and bubbling capital city. It is very hot and I am sweating because I am trying to make my way through the crowds to reach the centre of 31st December Market in Makola, one of Ghana's oldest and biggest markets. Chaos and capitalism celebrate a happy marriage here, I remember thinking while I move through the narrow alleys, trying not to bump into other people and the neatly piled up goods. I am on my way to an interview with Makola's market queen and I don't want to be late. The queen holds office outside of a primary school that was built inside the market for the traders' children to attend. When I arrive she is sitting on the veranda in a sparkly white dress, and she gestures to me that I should join her in the shade. I am really missing my research assistant, with whom I normally visit the market, but she*

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[1] I would like to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their valuable comments to an earlier version of this paper.

> *is delayed as her* trotro *(minibus) broke down. Yet I do not want to cancel the interview, because it has taken me almost six weeks to get it organized: the queen was busy, it was election time, and – as she reveals during the interview – she was hesitant to speak to me. Makola being the biggest market in Accra, many* obruni *(whites) visit and many (international) organisations (aim to) become active in the market. Not all of these recognize 'procedure' and 'custom', the queen tells me, which means that some of them evade or undermine her authority – much to her dismay. When I bring up the Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC) and its attempts at organizing informal workers in the market, the queen quickly responds: 'Without doing on the grassroot, you can't work at the top. Nobody can jump from outside'.*

This interview took place in October 2016 when I was doing fieldwork in Accra for a research project that focuses on increasing political leverage for informal workers and the organisations that (cl)aim to represent them.[2] In the project, trade unions and informal workers' organisations are conceptualized as 'strategic actors' for inclusive development that can assist informal workers to promote and obtain decent work conditions as described by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).[3] The informal economy is very diverse, but informal workers have one thing in common: many of them labour under precarious conditions and have no, or limited, access to social security (Chen 2012, Lindell 2010a). In Ghana, informal workers make up more than 85% of the workforce and the economic developments of the past decades – not least the Structural Adjustment Programs enforced by the IMF and World Bank – seem to have only increased their numbers (Boampong in Lindell 2010a, GTUC 2009). Or, as the market queen put it: 'when the formal market stopped employing, we employ. When government deploys, we employ'.

A large number of informal workers are women and this is especially visible in market places in Ghana, where women traders have traditionally dominated the scene (Britwum 2013, Clark 1994, 1997, 2010, Greenstreet 1972). The earliest travel accounts of the West African region describe female traders and the importance of (inter)regional trade networks – including the role of the market queens (Clark 2010, Awuah 1997). Market queens are female traders who rule a market and represent its traders to the outside world, even though they do not occupy a formally recognized administrative position (Thiel 2015, 60). In contemporary Ghanaian society, market queens still have great moral authority, both inside and outside of markets (Britwum 2013, Clark 1997, 2010). They are part of powerful social networks that connect them to all layers of society and they are able to mobilize large numbers of market traders for issues of shared concern. Yet, these market queens are not often recognized as leaders of social movements, by other social movements. This is evident from the remarks of Makola's market queen in the excerpt above: she accuses the trade union, that has stepped up to organize market traders, of 'jumping' in from 'outside' while she is already there. Both the queens and the labour movement ultimately aspire to the same goal: collective action by informal workers to safeguard their interests. So why do these two groups appear to be competing, instead of collaborating?

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[2] This project is part of the research agenda of the Knowledge Platform on Inclusive Development Policies and funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through NWO-WOTRO. http://includeplatform.net/research-group/increasing-political-leverage-for-informal-and-formal-workers-organizations-for-inclusive-development/ (last accessed 24-04-2017)

[3] http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm (last accessed 24-04-2017)

As was highlighted in the call for papers for this special issue on 'social movement thinking beyond "the core"', social movement studies have tended to focus on the Global North; Europe and North America. Creating space for new ways of looking at and seeing social movements (in the Global South) is therefore urgently needed (Sutcliffe 2012). This article aims to contribute to this by presenting an empirical case, situated in Ghana, elucidating the intricacies of collaboration and competition for social movements – in the broadest sense of the term – on the ground. In what follows I first situate this paper in relevant theoretical discussions on the informal sector, trade unions, informal workers' organisations and collective action. Thereafter I delve deeper into Makola market, the market queens and the labour movements' activities in it, zooming in on their competition and potential for collaboration. This paper aims to show that although locally developed forms of organizing, like the market queens, do not necessarily correspond to pre-conceived notions of what social movements (should) look like, bypassing them is problematic because it feeds fragmentation, hence impacting negatively on the possibilities for collective action.

Informality, workers' organisations and collective action

In the early 1970s anthropologist Keith Hart coined the term 'informal economy' when he studied income opportunities in urban Ghana (Hart 1973). His aim was to illustrate the diverse range of activities that people who are not formally employed engage in while attempting to take care of themselves and their families. The term became widely used by a multitude of actors – governments, not in the least – who tended to focus on the fact that workers and companies active in the informal sector are not paying tax and potentially engage in illegal activities (Hart 2009, Lindell 2010a). Consequently more often than not, informal workers have to deal with a 'bad image' and actively need to claim their right to work and live in the city (Magure 2015, Jimu in Lindell 2010a). The informal economy is extremely diverse and the boundary between the formal and the informal is not as clear as the terms suggest: in praxis, many workers engage in activities in both sectors (Lindell 2010a). This makes it difficult to define the archetypal informal worker and the challenges s/he faces (Chen 2012). Broadly speaking however, informal workers engage in 'economic activities that lie beyond or circumvent state regulation' (Lindell 2010a, 5). This holds true for many of the workers we find in Makola market. Some of them are barely managing to get by, selling one piece of cloth every few days. Others rent several big stores and casually employ other traders to work for them. In this sense, the informal economy shows us the resourcefulness of people who manage to create their own income under precarious conditions (Sindzingre 2006).

Over time, many different schools of thought have emerged that attempt to interpret the (existence of the) informal economy. In the early 1960s most thinkers assumed that it was a temporary phenomenon, linked to developing economies, and that the formal economy would eventually absorb the informal one (Lindell 2010a, Munck 2010, 2013, Sindzingre 2006). The ILO (1972) classified venturing into the informal economy as a 'survival strategy' and urged more formal job creation. As time progressed, scholars increasingly came to see the informal economy as part and parcel of the capitalist economic system (Castells and Portes 1989), or as an entrepreneurial strategy to avoid the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures that are present in the formal economy (De Soto 1989). The notion that many activities in the informal economy would not be allowed or possible in the formal economy, led to the assumption, noted above, that informal economic activities are illegal and dangerous. This link between informality and illegality is regularly used by politicians aiming to prosecute those who (attempt to) circumvent their regulations – rather than offering a useful description (Brown and Lyons in Lindell 2010a, Mitullah in Lindell 2010a, Lindell and Utas 2012, 410).[4]

In Ghana, more than 85% of the workforce, roughly 11 million people, is active in the informal economy (GTUC 2009).[5] Taking into account the current state of the world economy, this number is not expected to drop any time soon. The informal economy is here to stay (Magure 2015, Munck 2013). Yet this does not mean that the majority of informal workers do not wish to become active in the formal economy: most of the workers I spoke to argued that they would if they could, but that there are no formal jobs available to them. The discussion on whether and how to formalize the informal economy is thus a complex and vibrant one, in which informal workers' representatives mainly argue that 'it is important to ensure that formalization offers the benefits and protections that come with being formal and does not simply impose the costs of becoming formal' (Chen 2012, 14). Moreover, because of the diversity of the informal economy, formalization – if attempted – should be 'comprehensive in approach but context-specific in design and practice' (Chen 2012, 14). This is easier said than done. Attempts by the Ghanaian government to transform the informal sector into a sector for 'gainful employment', have so far not been very successful. In addition to the profound structural problem of unemployment due to Ghana's rapid population growth, many informal workers do not possess marketable skills or educational attainments that would render them suitable for formal jobs. In addition, gaining access to credit in order to start a business remains problematic (Debrah 2007).

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[4] McFarlane argues that these kind of (political) interventions often marginalize the already marginalized even further (2012).

[5] http://www.uniwa.org/?page_id=24 (last accessed 27-04-2017)

More recently, the informal sector is increasingly considered as a vibrant and productive part of the economy (cf. Lindell 2010a, Sindzingre 2006). In the case of market women, for example, it is clear that their activities create jobs and provide income not just for the informal workers themselves but also for the Ghanaian government; they pay levies and rent for their market stalls (Awuah 1997, Baah-Ennumh and Adom-Asamoah 2012). Scholars also found that market women who deal in foodstuffs play a vital role in ensuring food security (Baah-Ennumh and Adom-Asamoah 2012, Britwum 2013).

Also, Lindell (2010a) reminds us that 'the fact that informal activities lie outside the state regulatory system does not mean that they are "unregulated"'. The wish to formalize the informal in order to regulate the unregulated is thus to a certain extent misplaced: informal workers have devised ways in which they regulate themselves, their businesses and their colleagues (Britwum 2013, Clark 1997, see also publications by WIEGO). But despite increased recognition of their contribution to society, making their voices heard, defending their rights and gaining access to social security, remain major obstacles to achieving decent work conditions (Lindell and Ampaire 2016, Lindell 2010c). This is where workers' organisations come in.

Workers' organisations

The most well-known workers' organisations are probably trade unions. Trade unions emerged to safeguard workers' rights and protect them against the actions and interests of capital and corporations. This places them squarely in the formal economy, where they work with easily recognizable groups of workers who can be classified according to their position, contract or company and who are entitled to enjoy social security, such as pensions, and protection by law (Lindell 2009, 2010a, Rizzo 2013).[6] By uniting workers and speaking with one voice, trade unions have been able to instigate collective actions, such as strikes and demonstrations, defending the rights of large groups of workers. In Ghana, trade unions also figured prominently during the struggle for independence, fiercely backing Kwame Nkrumah, who became the country's first prime minister in 1957 and later (in 1960) its first president (Britwum 2013, Drah 2014, Fallon 2003).

Out of the two trade union centres currently present in Ghana, the Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC) is the biggest: it has 500,000 members and is active in many of Ghana's geographical regions (Tsikata 2009).[7] Yet, even if GTUC would represent *all* formal workers in Ghana, this would still only translate to 15% (or even less) of the currently active labour force. Clearly, what several union officials referred to as 'the shrinking of the formal economy' has severely impacted on trade unions, the power they wield and the activities that they are able to engage in. Trade unions typically function based on the membership fees that they are able to collect. The decline of the formal economy has therefore meant that GTUC 'lost' members to the informal economy – and therefore also a considerable part of its income. GTUC officials conveyed that the informal economy thus represents a giant pool of new resources: discontent is omnipresent, not in the least because workers often labour under precarious conditions. On a more ideological level, the dedication to the goal of achieving decent work for all, championing the rights of all workers, makes venturing into organizing the informal economy workforce a necessity (Adu-Amankwah 1999, GTUC 2009).

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[6] The fact that formal workers are legally entitled to enjoy social security, does however not mean that all of them actually do so in practice. In fact, the position of formal workers appears to (have) become increasingly precarious (see Standing on the emergence of 'the precariat' (2012, 2014)).

[7] http://www.ghanatuc.org/about.html (last accessed 15-08-2017)

Despite the widely acknowledged fact that informal economy workers could benefit from union-like organisations, fierce disagreements exist on the possibilities for trade union organizing in the informal sector. The immensely diverse work force, as mentioned above, and the fact that there are no clearly defined employer-employee relations, severely complicate trade unions' attempts to orchestrate collective action (Lindell 2010a, Rizzo 2013). In addition, trade unions' keenness to get involved in the informal economy appears to be very much connected to the idea that informal workers are either not yet organized, or not organized 'properly' (Munck 2013, Jimu in Lindell 2010a). Informal workers' associations are often not taken into account because they usually do not organize beyond (immediate) welfare matters: they do not politicize the structural position that their members occupy in the grand economic scheme of things. Or, as one union official put it, 'informal workers are not politically aware enough', 'even though the system evolves, their lives are not changing'. Because of this assumption, informal workers' associations are not always recognized as (potential partner) organisations or movements. In fact, it seems that in order to be recognized, one has to be organized 'properly'. The latter is then interpreted to mean democratic togetherness with internal elections, political neutrality and regular meetings (Pommerolle 2010). In Ghana, many locally emerged informal workers' associations do not meet these criteria. This focus on a particular type of organizing thus sidesteps many existing organisational structures in the process (Pommerolle 2010, Prag in Lindell 2010a).

Despite these 'hurdles', many trade unions around the world have started to organize in the informal economy – a development which is, to a large extent, also donor-driven (Lindell 2009, 2010a, b, c). In Ghana, GTUC made some first attempts in the 1960s, but these were unsuccessful:

> "A woman organizer for the Ghana Trades Union Congress in the 1960s told me that she had tried to recruit market women's groups. They were offered membership in the commercial workers' union, dominated by shop assistants and led by men. They told her that rather than follow a male leader they preferred to join the Ghana Assembly of Women, dominated by church women's groups"

> (Clark 1997, 186).

Clearly, gender dynamics played a big role in the women's decisions (see also Clark 2010) and internal discussion about how to accommodate informal workers, many of whom are women, continued. In 1996 GTUC adopted a resolution to formalize their efforts, seeing that labour casualization was only increasing the number of workers active in the informal economy. In order to attract informal workers, GTUC opted for a dual strategy. On the one hand they continue to encourage workers to form unions or associations and provide assistance to people who express willingness to do so. On the other hand GTUC now also explicitly advocates collaborating with already existing informal workers' organisations and enlisting these under a national umbrella organisation. Through the creation of the overarching Union for Informal Workers' Associations (UNIWA), GTUC is attempting to integrate the championing of informal workers' rights and agenda into the trade union federation.

Established in 2013 and officially founded in 2015, UNIWA has been very vocal and regularly figures prominently in the Ghanaian newspapers.[8] GTUC's organizing efforts include regularly providing trainings for leaders of UNIWA's member associations, for example on union principles, democratic leadership styles, organizing tactics and gender awareness. Most of these trainings are sponsored by international donors or trade unions from the Global North, aiming to sensitize informal workers to the wider political dynamics of which they form an important part. Whether the content of the trainings resonates with the situation on the ground, is however a different matter. As stated earlier, many informal workers' associations do not (aim to) function democratically and leaders frequently voiced their struggle to adhere to the ideals expressed in the trainings during their day to day activities.[9]

Yet apart from 'organisational styles', additional problems have to be reckoned with. Trade unions' interests in organizing in the informal economy are intimately linked to their active search for more dues paying members. Many – but certainly not all – informal workers live hand-to-mouth. This means that they often lack the ability and willingness to pay membership dues. Their willingness is linked to the fact that many informal associations and organisations that (aim to) cover aspects of social security and welfare, such as churches and informal saving groups, already exist (Schindler 2010). In a sense, unions thus compete with the informal structures in which informal workers are already embedded – and indebted to pay dues. Using trade union money to pay for organizing in the informal sector in order to convince informal workers of the additional benefits of becoming a member is a possibility, but is not strongly supported within GTUC. Union officials told me that many dues paying members do not wish to see their fees used for this and argue that informal workers have to pay their own fees if they wish to join. Waiving fees (temporarily), as was done for UNIWA, is another possibility, but also one that is not sustainable in the long run. This, especially when considering that the need for dues paying members is among the prominent reasons why GTUC started organizing in the informal economy in the first place. A third possibility then becomes the use of external funding.

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[8] See also this special report on the informal economy in which they are explicitly mentioned https://www.equaltimes.org/recommendation-204-ending (last accessed 29-04-2017)

[9] During one training on leadership style, a lady expressed her concern that democracy limits her power over her members and thus leads to fragmentation. Her solution was to mix two of the presented leadership styles: 'I blend the two: democracy and autocracy'.

In the case of GTUC, this external funding is being provided by trade unions from the Global North with whom they are linked through their affiliation to ITUC, the International Trade Union Confederation. Examples are the Dutch trade union FNV and the Danish trade unions LO and FTF (LO-FTF). Several German foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation also frequently contribute(d), as does DANIDA, Denmark's development cooperation agency. Transnational organisations such as WIEGO, Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing, and Streetnet International also form part of the partners that GTUC links with when it comes to organizing events and mobilizing informal workers, without incurring substantial costs themselves. But, as I mention later on in this paper, working with donor funding is not a bed of roses; it creates additional challenges of accountability, representation and unity (Lindell 2009, 2010a, b, c).

Informal workers and collective action

According to Lindell, informal workers were long thought of by governments and economic institutions as having no, or only limited agency (2010a, b, c). This misconception has however been refuted by scholarly work that shows that within the turmoil of capitalism, informal workers 'develop their own leverage in the form of enterprise associations, ethnoreligious networks, political connections, and even alliances with labour unions to push their own agenda, with varied implications for governance outcomes' (Meagher and Lindell 2013: 69, cf. Lindell 2010a, 2010c, Lyon 2003, Awuah 1997). The assumption that informal workers have not organized because they are not organized according to trade union principles, is thus problematic and unfounded. Today, organizing in the informal sector is an important topic, not in the least because of the seemingly ever-growing number of workers active in the informal economy and informal workers' prominent place in plans to reduce poverty and (gender) inequalities globally (Chen 2012).

In democracies, collectivities have more voice than individuals do. This is why collective action is considered to be the most beneficial way to create political leverage (Lindell 2010a, Lindell and Utas 2012, Magure 2015). But collective action is not solely instigated or generated by formalized organisations. We need to look for additional ways that informal workers have organized themselves. Bayat, for example, argues that informal workers sustain 'passive networks' which they can "switch on" when their subsistence is being threatened (1997). This renders *ad hoc* collective action possible, without placing organisational burdens on (groups of) individuals. An example of these kind of 'politics of informal people' is 'quiet encroachment': a non-oppositional way of claiming one's space and one's share of the city, for example by continuing to sell one's goods in an area where this is not (or no longer) allowed (Bayat 1997, 2000). Bayat contends that this tactic is often used in societies where 'traditional institutions serve as an alternative to civic associations and social movements' (1997, 68). In this paper, the case of Makola market and its traders provides an empirical example to illustrate this point.

In his working paper '*On the informal economy: the political history of an ethnographic concept*', Hart elaborates on the concept he coined and emphasizes that 'we need to know how formal bureaucracy works in practice and, even more important, what social forms have emerged to organize the informal economy' (2009). It is on this note that I want to take the reader to Makola market and to introduce the social movements and organisational structures that emerged there.

Methodology

This paper is based on information that I gathered during ethnographic fieldwork in Accra, Ghana, from September to November 2016. The fieldwork was conducted in the context of the INCLUDE research project 'Increasing Political Leverage of Informal and Formal workers' Organisations for Inclusive Development: The cases of Ghana and Benin'. The research consortium consisted of several stakeholders including researchers from four different research institutes and universities from four different countries (Belgium, Benin, Ghana and the Netherlands), representatives from trade unions of Ghana, Benin and the Netherlands and informal workers' organisation representatives of Streetnet International and UNIWA among others.

The bulk of the data I collected consists of field notes made during participant observation at the 31st December textile section of Makola market. During these market visits I worked closely with my research assistant, a recently graduated Ghanaian woman. Most of the interactions with the traders, both the informal chats and interviews, were in English but sometimes in *Twi*. We would arrive at the market around 8.00 am, when most traders had opened up shop, and stay until 2.00 pm when traders would eat lunch, take a nap and, around 4.00 pm, start closing up shop. There were three reasons why some traders were unwilling to speak to us. First, the economic situation meant that many were not interested in spending their time chatting to someone who was not going to buy their goods. Second, they seemed wary of foreigners wanting to know how their business was doing. They also often mentioned that many people, including 'other *obruni*' (whites), had come to hear about their challenges, but they never heard from them again, or benefitted in any way. Third, my research took place during an election which meant that questions regarding challenges, organizing and organisational allegiances were highly politicized. Although the traders' suspicions never completely vanished, some did seem to get used to having us around and opened up more during the last weeks of the fieldwork period. Before commencing the research I requested permission from both Makola's market queen and the textile traders' commodity queen.

In total, I spoke to approximately 40 cloth sellers. Half of these chats were brief informal exchanges on how their business was going, whether they were members of an organisation, which challenges they faced and how they would like these to be addressed. Approximately 25 traders allowed us to sit with them for a prolonged period of time and participated in semi-structured interviews that lasted between 1 and 2 hours. During the interviews I brought forward topics that I wanted to discuss, but conversation flowed freely and the interlocutors' interests guided the talk. There was no fixed order in the way I addressed the topics and each interview went differently. We also made clear beforehand that if customers would show up, they could be assisted – which many of our interlocutors took to heart. All traders agreed to let me take notes during the interviews, and some even checked to see whether I wrote down certain details of their stories correctly. No audio recordings were made due to the acoustics in the market and out of respect for the politically sensitive nature of the conversations. Whenever I was in the market, I made a point of passing by those with whom I had already spoken, to greet them. This courtesy appeared to be greatly appreciated and traders often made time for additional conversations on a wide range of topics. Some traders however remained suspicious of our presence, fearing that we were verifying their story with other traders or double-checking because we did not believe what they had told us. I tried as much as possible to address these concerns, but I recognize that I have not been fully able to do so which meant that some traders were not interested in interacting with me.

In addition, I interviewed officials with Ghana's two trade union centres: GFL (Ghana Federation of Labour) and GTUC, and attended meetings. I also interviewed international donors active in the informal sector and visited seminars and workshops organized for market women and informal workers. I also visited a meeting of the Greater Accra Market Association (GAMA), where the market queens and their assistants of all 70-something markets in Greater Accra Region come together. Due to the elections, government officials were often busy campaigning and hesitant to discuss or comment on current matters. In total I interviewed 37 government officials, municipality representatives, NGO-staff members, market leaders and union officials. These interviews were semi-structured and took place in the offices of the respective interlocutors. After receiving permission, some of these interviews were audio recorded.

Being a white, Dutch, unmarried, young woman meant that many traders anticipated that I was working for an NGO or looking for suitable people to enrol in a (profitable) programme, for example for the trade union. I was also often asked about my personal political preferences, because my fieldwork coincided with the election campaigns. By reading the daily newspapers I continuously attempted to transform these 'interrogations' into more informal chats and reflections on Ghana's political landscape. This was difficult at times, but it also generated helpful insights. All participants in this research were aware of the fact that I was conducting research and what the aim and topic of my research were. If needed, I showed a letter of endorsement from my institution, confirming my position as a researcher and the topic of my interest.

Makola market

Ghana, having figured prominently in the Black Atlantic, has a long history of transatlantic and (inter)national trade (Gilroy 1999, Robertson 1983, Clark 2010). Although Ghana's biggest market is located in Kumasi in the centre of the country, much of the trade also took place along the coast. This is where we find one of Ghana's best-known markets: Makola. Located in Accra, Ghana's capital, it is referred to in the literature as 'the queen of Accra Markets' (Robertson 1983, 469). Hundreds of thousands of shops, countless shoppers and thousands of informal workers can be found here every day. In a way, Makola exemplifies the informal economy; harbouring immensely diverse goods, clientele and activities.

During my first visit I was struck by the noise, generated not just by the people present, but also by the cars and busses passing on the nearby road. I was overwhelmed by the chaotic ambiance and the utter explosion of smells, colours and produce; completely lost in this economic focal point. Yet, after several visits, I began to realize that there is more order in this chaos than there seems to be at first glance. At the outer rims of Makola, before entering one of the main gates, ambulant traders walk around while carrying their goods on their heads. Just in front of the gate, a whole square is occupied by the same traders every day: the lady selling pig feet always sits next to the lady who sells fish and the two ladies who sell vegetables and tomatoes. They stick to the same order of shops even though no permanent structures oblige them to do so. This is different inside the market, where small buildings and containers form a maze of roads, fully decorated with everything that is on sale.

When Makola was built, in 1924, many people in Accra relied on it to buy their daily food (Grant and Yankson 2002, Robertson 1983). Most of the vendors and traders were (and are) women, 'as is often common in West African outdoor markets' (Jamison 2003, 10, Clark 2010). Initially, Makola market was intended to be a wholesale market, located just outside of town with ample space to park. However, Ghana's urbanization caught up with (what was mainly colonial) city planning and slowly engulfed Makola and its surrounding areas (Grant and Yankson 2002). When the Ghanaian economy stagnated in the 1970s, the government looked for a scapegoat and blamed the market women for everything that was going wrong: 'the market women, because of their *visible* role, were forced to bear the brunt of the public displeasure provoked by shortages in goods, *invisible* inflation, decline in terms of trade, corruption and incompetence' (Robertson 1983, 469, emphasis in original, Britwum 2013, Clark

2010). This eventually led to Makola's destruction in 1979, as a desperate attempt by the government to "improve" the Ghanaian economy (Grant and Yankson 2002, Robertson 1983, Clark 2010).

After the destruction market women rebuilt as much as they could, but Makola 2 was again destroyed in 1981 (Robertson 1983). Several market leaders I spoke to described this period with tears in their eyes, narrating the fear they felt and the hardships their mothers had had to endure. Luckily, after realizing that the destructions hadn't improved the economy, the government decided to reconstruct Makola (Grant and Yankson 2002). Today, 'Makola as a marketplace consists of four officially recognized parts (31st December Market, Annex II Market, Tema Station Annex and Kwasea Guasu) and many more loosely associated subsections' (Thiel 2015, 11). The 31st December market, where I conducted most of my fieldwork, was officially opened by President Rawlings on the 31st of December in 1986. Nowadays, under the auspices of Chinese developers, a big shopping mall is being constructed right next to it. This is part of a broader development because, as the municipal authorities explained to me, Ghana's markets 'need to be more modern so they fulfil the needs of our times'. According to the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Makola is in urgent need of 'modernisation' and 'renovation' (see also Hobden 2015 on the increase of modern shopping malls in Ghana).

Like most markets in Ghana, Makola is traditionally ruled by a powerful market queen (Asomani-Boateng 2016, Britwum 2013, Clark 1997, 2010). She settles disputes and interacts with the municipality, supposedly always keeping the interests of the market and its vendors at heart. Makola's market queen is also a key figure when it comes to engagements with AMA concerning the potential modernisation of the market. In the next section I describe market queens and their activities in more depth.

Market queens

Ghanaian markets, although seemingly chaotic when visited for the first time, are in practice highly organized. For starters, all traders selling in a market are members of the commodity association of the commodity that they sell (Clark 1997, 2010, Britwum 2013, Fallon 2003). If a trader sells onions, they become a member of the onion association, if they sell textiles they become a member of the textile association etc. And 'although membership in the association is voluntary, in reality one can hardly legitimize his or her place in the market without belonging to an association' (Asomani-Boateng 2016, 186). All of the traders with whom I spoke, were members of a commodity association. They referred to this membership as 'automatic'.

Each of these commodity associations is headed by a 'commodity queen' (Asomani-Boateng 2016, Clark 2010). So there is an onion queen, a textile queen etc. 'To be selected as a commodity queen, one has to command respect from the group; be humble, diligent, and courageous; have foresight and intelligence; and command loyalty' from the members of the association

(Asomani-Boateng 2016, 186). The commodity queens solve disputes that occur between members of the association and they are involved in price setting and bargaining when it comes to tariffs: members of the association can be both wholesalers and retailers. In the case of the textile traders in Makola's 31st December market, wholesalers tend to sell materials to their fellow textile traders as well as engaging in retailing with customers. This has also been extensively documented for the tomato queens who are involved in organizing the ways in which the freshly harvested tomatoes reach the market areas (see Britwum 2013, Lyon 2003 and Clark 2010 among others). Commodity queens also allocate selling spaces to their members, organize market-clean ups when they see fit and, sometimes, assist in revenue collection (Asomani-Boateng 2016, Clark 1997).

Commodity association members pay regular contributions to the association which are used to assist each other in times of sickness or in case one of the members passes away: extra contributions are then collected which are used to pay for the funeral, which is an important cultural event (Clark 1997, Clark 2010). Commodity queens are expected to attend the funerals of their members to signify the importance of the group. Some commodity associations also function as informal credit schemes, referred to as *susu,* by having members contribute a small amount every week or month and distributing this to one selected member (Schindler 2010, Asomani-Boateng 2016). By remaining in the *susu* scheme, debts are automatically paid off over time. Also, traders hardly default on these payments to the association because of the social pressure and importance to maintain a position of credibility vis-à-vis their competition and clients in the market (Schindler 2010). The commodity associations thus 'provide economic and social benefits for their members' (Awuah 1997, 407, Clark 2010). Clark refers to them as 'cohesive collegial sets' which is interesting because apart from being colleagues, traders are also each other's competition (2010). The latter partly explains why, when a commodity queen is chosen by the members of her association, her ability to settle disputes is the most important characteristic that they look for (Clark 1997).

The queens of all commodity associations are, supposedly, in regular contact with each other and together they choose an overall market queen from their midst, with the help of a council of market elders (Clark 1997, 2010). This market queen rules over the overall market, but has no 'jurisdiction' within a particular commodity association other than her own. Traditionally, the market queen often hails from the larger and more important commodity associations, such as the ones selling yam, tomatoes or textile (Clark 1997, Greenstreet 1972). This organisational form can be traced back to the beginning of this century and market queens' positions can be likened to that of chiefs (Clark 1997, Clark 2010, Britwum 2013). Queens 'are elected by their elders for life, and can be destooled by them in case of bad conduct' (Clark 1997, 184). But, unlike chiefs, market queens rule only over market traders, who are mostly women. Their following is thus highly gendered and defined 'by occupation rather than residence or citizenship, as in community leadership, or kinship as in lineage leadership' (Clark 1997, 184). Also, although market queens rule over the market, they do not rule over the land that the market is on, nor are they officially recognized in chieftaincy hierarchies or government bureaucracy (Clark 1997, Britwum 2013, Thiel 2015, 60).

Market traders look for specific qualities in their market queen. First of all she has to have a good track record of functioning as a commodity queen in her own association. She also has to be wealthy: a queen needs to be financially able to regularly attend – expensive – ceremonial gatherings such as funerals and meetings, which means that she will have less time to work as a trader (Clark 1997, Lyon 2003). The market queen is also supposed to have a non-confrontational character and be able to smoothen out conflicts swiftly, or at least before they escalate (Clark 1997). This is in everybody's interest, because traders often work side by side on a daily basis for many decades. Like the commodity queens, the market queen is able to give punishments and fines, which reinforces her authority over market traders. Traders hardly oppose the market queen, not only because she has the power to decide who can and who cannot trade in the market, but also because they rely on her support in case they find themselves in a conflict in the future. Even when they disagree with the queen's judgement, 'the fear of complete ostracism encourages member traders to accept' her ruling (Clark 1997, 195).

Succession of market queens does not necessarily take place in hereditary fashion: the market's council of elders appoint the successor whom they deem to be most suitable (Clark 1997). As Makola's market queen put it: 'we don't vote. We appoint and approve'. It does however often happen that a market queen uses her reign to prepare her daughter for the position, which makes them a strong candidate in the eyes of the council of elders and many market traders.

In 'her' market, the market queen is the leader of the general traders association, which is present in every market in Ghana. In the case of Makola market, this association is called the Makola Market Traders Association (MMTA). It consists of representatives of several commodity associations and they support the queen in executing her tasks. Because of the large number of markets in Ghana, the market queens of all markets have also organized themselves per administrative region. Ghana has ten regions and each hosts a regional chapter of the market queens' associations. In the case of Makola market this is the Greater Accra Market Association (GAMA). The regional associations of all ten regions together form the national chapter of the market queen's network.

The above described archetypal functioning of market queens developed over centuries and has facilitated national, international and transnational trade relations throughout history and the present. However, considering it as the 'traditional' structure of market governance in Ghana, should not lead to assumptions about the ways in which it functioned or will function in the near future: the structure is anything but static (Clark 1997, 2010 Asomani-Boateng 2016). Markets exist in society and therefore shape and are shaped by developments in society at large. This becomes evident when looking at one of the most important roles that a market queen has: she not only represents the market within the structure of market governance, she is also the market's representative to the outside world. Ghana's tumultuous independence struggle, later followed by democratization and the current partisan political system, severely influence both what it means and what it takes to be(come) a market queen (Clark 2010).

In the 1950s and 1960s 'women participated in the anti-colonial struggle and boycotted policies, such as taxation, implemented by the colonial government' (Fallon 2003, 529). They assisted Kwame Nkrumah's movement financially but they also contributed organisational power and encouraged others to 'rally behind the leaders of the independence struggle' (Drah 2014, 15). Of all the 'other social, religious and occupational women's groups, the market women were most influential' (Drah 2014, 15). The market traders, personified by the market queens, were at the forefront of these actions because they were well organized and connected to the wider (urban) governance system and national authorities. The queens' strong personalities, powerful economic positions and effective organizing both within and outside of the markets, contributed greatly to the eventual victory of independence (Fallon 2003, cf. Drah 2014). This glorious position however radically changed once Ghana's economy began to suffer.

At the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, market women came to be 'targeted as enemies of the state', being held accountable for inflation and steep price rises (Fallon 2003, 530, Clark 2010). Market queens came to be seen as corrupt, representing the many market traders who were 'stealing' money from the population by selling commodities at expensive prices. The destruction of markets that subsequently took place throughout the country symbolized the public's feelings of discontent (Clark 1997, Robertson 1983, Clark 2010, Fallon 2003). Rawlings, who was in power at the time, however quickly realized that he needed to maintain a close relationship with the market women in order to prevent them from turning against him, like they had with the colonial rulers. He started a women's organisation in 1982: the 31st December Women's Movement. 'The group's ostensible purpose was to encourage women to become involved economically, socially, and politically in the state; however, it acted as an apparatus to mobilize women under' his political party (Fallon 2003, 530). In 1985, Nana Konadu, Rawlings' wife, became the movement's president (Fallon 2003, Thiel 2015, 13). Makola market's 31st December area is named after this movement and is therefore intimately associated with Rawlings' political party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). This serves Makola's traders well during the times that this party is in power, but it is to their detriment when another political party is in office.

Since the democratic transition in 1992, the two largest political parties (NDC and New Patriot Party) have alternated rule, hence Ghana's political system has become characterized by partisan allegiances (Bob-Milliar 2012, Crawford 2009, Paller 2014). Through their wide network of connections to local and national government agencies, the market queens have become fully implicated in this. By associating themselves with one political party, queens are able to tap into a pool of (political and) financial resources, which they use to obtain infrastructural improvements in their markets, increase the visibility and improve the image of market women in society. Makola's queen, for example, aligned herself with the – now former– NDC government and managed to secure a position within the municipal authority: the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). [10] By having a seat at the table, she frequently used the political stage to argue for a stronger position of market women. She also joined forces with the ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection by assisting in the organisation of the first 'National Market Women Conference' on October 24th and 25th 2016. This conference was aimed at 'empowering market women for economic prosperity' and the (then) first lady was the keynote speaker.[11]

Using her political network, Makola's market queen (among other queens) has become widely known in Ghanaian society, in which informal institutions and personal rule – especially in the urban areas – are very common (Paller 2014). Yet this should not be taken to mean that market queens rule unchallenged or have a monopoly on organizing in the market, as the next section will make clear.

The New Makola Market Traders Union

One market houses many different traders. Although they are all members of commodity association, many of them are also aligned to a wide range of other (informal) organisations and movements – some of them political.[12] Many textile traders told me about their church groups, *susu* circle or the groups of women from their neighbourhood or villages of origin, whom they regularly meet up with. "We are just by ourselves, no protection", one cloth seller told me, so she joined multiple groups and makes use of the complementary services they offer. Another lady explained that she had tried to form an association, but it had failed: 'we are all far and busy with our own stall, there was no time to leave our stores to go for meetings so it failed'. Being too busy with one's business was often mentioned as a reason for not joining additional organisations apart from the commodity association. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana safeguards the women's rights to join organisations: 'all persons shall have the right to (…) freedom of association, which shall include freedom to form or join trade unions or other associations, national or international, for the protection of their interest'.[13] It is this latter right that has enabled the activities of one textile trader in particular: she started a trade union in Makola market.

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[10] NDC lost the elections that were held on December 7th 2016.

[11] http://globalnews60.com/2016/10/maiden-national-market-women-conference-ends-in-high-hopes/ (last accessed 29-04-2017)

[12] Partisan politics play a big role in everyday life in Ghana and also in the emergence of different organisations and social movements that (cl)aim to represent market traders. Discussing the in-depth intricacies of this aspect of social reality goes beyond the scope of this paper. I do refer to the partisan system in cases where political allegiances appear to (have) play(ed) a decisive role.

Her shop is rather small and when I came to talk to her I was impressed by the amount of fierceness that a slender, now elderly lady is able to radiate when speaking on issues that market traders face. Her health no longer allows her to be present in the market every day, but she speaks passionately of having been a textile trader since she was 'old enough to walk'. Her mother had also been a textile trader and she inherited her shop from her. She also vividly remembers the impact of the market destructions of the late 1970s and early 1980s, as she had never seen her mother so upset. According to her, this is partly why she has always been very aware of the struggles of (textile) traders and the hardships that they face. Based on her mother's past experiences, she felt that self-organisation was the only way to defend themselves against 'many market oppressors'. In 1996 she starts to speak to her fellow traders on issues of shared concern ranging from (gaining) access to a proper toilet to fixing a leaking roof. She also discusses the responsibilities of the municipal authorities (AMA) when it comes to maintenance of the market structures: all traders pay daily and yearly fees to AMA but the women are not convinced that their money is being used properly. The dilapidated state of the market infrastructure underlines their point.

After the elections in 2000, the NDC lost power and the market queens' position vis-a-vis the new NPP government became problematic: knowing that she was not 'on their side', the NPP government was reluctant to work with her. In an attempt to obtain resources to improve their working conditions, the textile trader doubled her efforts to organize her colleagues and she found a partner in GTUC. Having established contacts with them since 1999, the textile trader resembled an 'entry point' for GTUC to come into the market. Also, because her brother had become a regional minister for Greater Accra Region in the new NPP government, she had strong linkages to power. Some textile traders in Makola even say that she was officially installed as market queen because she became the government's official spokesperson for Makola's 31st December market. Makola's market queen fiercely disputes this and insists that she did not step down: to be a market queen is a lifelong position (see also Thiel 2015, 16).

Related to this dispute is however the story that the textile trader attempted to change the name of the market: by removing 'December' she hoped that it would be less closely associated with the 31st December Women's Movement, which is linked to the NDC – the opposition party at the time. Regardless of whether these stories are true, it is certainly the case that her brother's position as a minister gave her (access to) a lot of power.

Another example of this is the way in which she was able to facilitate the registration process of the trade union that she founded with the help of GTUC in 2002 or 2003: the New Makola Market Traders Union (NMMTU) (cf. Thiel 2015, 15). Needless to say, this name is very similar to that of the queens' organisation: Makola Market Traders Association (MMTA). The adjective 'new' hence immediately created animosity, prompting the market queen to state that there was 'nothing new' about the NMMTU and that those whom it claimed to represent, were already being represented by her at all organisational levels. Yet, much to the dismay of the market queen, the NMMTU, through GTUC, subsequently had access to connections and resources which allowed them to be vocal and offer members access to trainings and workshops. When GTUC founded UNIWA, the Union for Informal Workers Associations, NMMTU was one of its founding members and they and their members are frequently offered trainings as well as mentioned in international publications.[14]

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[13] Available here: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/republic/constitution.php?id=Gconst5.html (last accessed 29-04-2017)

With the increasing global interests in organizing in the informal economy, the NMMTU became exposed to international organisations as well, who made good use of their (albeit limited) network on the ground. Streetnet International, an organisation defending the rights of street vendors, enlisted NMMTU's founder to become the President of the Streetnet Ghana Chapter, despite the fact that she had never been a street vendor: she had always had her shop in Makola. WIEGO, Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing, also linked up with them and several of NMMTU's members were subsequently able to participate in international meetings overseas, greatly boosting their status and visibility on the international stage. On the ground in Makola however, this hardly translated into more influence due to the conflict with Makola's market queen. When asked about the NMMTU leader, one commodity queen said: 'she is nobody'. 'All she does is do things with the NGO's and so on'. She continued by arguing that NMMTU is only active internationally and outside of the market, but that they can't do anything inside the market because they are not part of the queen's structure. This conflict between the NMMTU leader and the market queens, fuels the competition between the organisations they represent.

Competition

The labour movement, represented by the New Makola Market Traders Union (NMMTU) and the market queens' network, represented by the Makola Market Traders Association (MMTA), ultimately claim and aim to represent and defend the interests of the same group of informal workers, active in the same locality. Yet, they are often at odds and do not collaborate. How did this competition come about and what are its consequences?

The NMMTU claims to be democratically organized and prides itself on not being politically linked. Both of these claims can however be contested, as Makola's market queen likes to point out. Although NMMTU aims to function democratically and according to trade union principles, its founding member is firmly leading the organisation in practice (see also Thiel 2015). Meetings do not appear to take place regularly and traders (both members and non-members) in the market are not aware of the union's activities: 'they don't tell us'. Also, NMMTU's political neutrality can be questioned based on the fact that its founding member is linked to the now ruling NPP government. This connection might be less explicit than the connection between NDC and Makola's current market queen, but it exists nonetheless. Market queens' political ties traditionally form an important part of the network they use to obtain resources and protect 'their' market and its traders (Clark 2010). Also, the queens are not organized democratically and do not claim to be: once elected and appointed as a market queen, they occupy this position for life.

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[14] See for example https://www.equaltimes.org/recommendation-204-ending

These two organisational differences explain why international organisations interested in organizing in the informal economy tend to collaborate with NMMTU and not with MMTA. They do not recognize the market queens as a potential partner because of their organisational structure. Yet, the majority of traders in Makola's 31st December market are very hesitant to join or associate themselves with the union precisely because of the existing conflict between the two organisations. 'I have no interest in the union. I don't want problems', several traders told me.[15] Other traders mentioned that the commodity associations, which are part of the market queens' structure, already offer them what they need and that they did not wish to pay another membership fee to join yet another group. This sentiment is often reiterated because it is widely known that the union has connections with GTUC and international (donor) organisations: they are 'supposed to assist us, not take our money', one trader stated. Some union members put forward that income is needed in order for the union to become successful, but the market women are not impressed by this: 'don't let somebody tell you today is no good, [but] tomorrow', an older lady said. 'If you want to do me good, do me good now'.

Most of NMMTU's activities consist of trainings and workshops facilitated by GTUC, often paid for with donor assistance. Only a limited number of people can attend these trainings and most of the times, the leaders go themselves. 'It's always the same people' who participate and benefit, several cloth sellers said. Others commented by saying 'the money is only on one side' – meaning, with the leaders. Most of the people I spoke to thus considered the union as an income generating activity for its leaders, rather than an organisation they could join to improve their working conditions. The influence of NMMTU in the market itself, is thus negligible: it mostly exists in name and has not been very successful in expanding its membership. Tsikata argues that this has been the case for many other women's movements in Ghana as well (2009). She refers to this as the ‘NGOization’ of organisation:

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[15] This statement has a double meaning: either they did not want to become involved in the conflict between the NMMTU leader and the market queen, or they did not want to get into trouble because of their presumed political allegiance (NMMTU being associated with NPP, MMTA with NDC). Because my research took place during election time, partisan politics figured prominently in traders' deliberations and explanations.

> *NGOization refers not to the existence of NGOs per se, but more to the growing dominance of a particular organisational form and politics characterized by the lack of a mass base, connection and accountability; donor dependence, the substitution of NGOs for civil society and mass movements; the prioritization of a professional technocratic approach over politics because NGOs cannot be overtly political or partisan; and a short-term project-based approach (…)* (Tsikata 2009, 186).

Due to its organisational structure, NMMTU is preferred as a partner by GTUC and international donors. At the same time, NMMTU does not nearly have as many members or as much influence on the ground as the market queens do. The queens' organisational structure functions more like what Bayat has described as the ‘passive network’ – albeit more structurally organized and culturally embedded – reaching out to many of the traders present in the market (1997, 2000). But not all. Indeed, one could argue that democratic movements are more inclusive than movements that appoint leaders for life. However, both types of organizing create so-called ‘winners’ and ‘losers’: those who benefit and those who do not, or less so. My point here is that even though market queens are not often considered as possible partners by trade unions and international organisations, attempts to bypass their networks have not yielded much success so far. In fact, organizing in the market turns out to be extremely difficult without the queen's support: traders are hesitant to involve themselves with the union and the union's (internal) functioning in practice is hampered by the conflict with the market queen.

If they want to work in the market, ‘they are forced to be close to us’, Makola's market queen said. According to her, the GTUC and the international organisations that collaborate with NMMTU have been ‘deceived’ by the NMMTU leadership in thinking that they represent the market traders. NMMTU leaders of course retaliate by stating that they were chosen to represent their members, whereas the market queen is not. The differences in organisational form, political ties and (international) access to resources has fuelled competition and diminished the possibilities for collective action on a market-wide scale.

Fortunately, most of the actors involved have started to realize this. GTUC and UNIWA are undertaking new attempts to reconcile with Makola's market queen and WIEGO is also increasingly trying to work on both sides of the divide, inviting both NMMTU and MMTA leadership and members to their programs. Although not (yet) always successful, this appears to be the only way to prevent boycotts and low turn-outs. Clearly, competition is less beneficial than collaboration – for all involved.

In this paper, I argue that despite having reservations on the organisational structures and political functioning of the market queens, including them in attempts to organize in the market is beneficial to inclusive collective action. A recent study for example underlines the potential of including market queens' networks when it comes to organic solid waste management. In it, Asomani-Boateng criticizes the fact that the market queens' network has often been misused, instead of collaborated with for improvements: 'Politicians are quick to use these associations as their support base to canvass for votes and financial donations during political elections, but have failed to exploit their immense potential to solve the myriad of problems facing cities in Ghana' (2016, 191). Drah came to a similar conclusion in her work on queen mothers, explicitly addressing academics and the ways in which we produce knowledge: 'unfortunately, women's struggles and the academic frameworks that explain these struggles are skewed towards formal national politics, to the neglect of the traditional political institutions' (2014, 19). This is why this article has attempted to provide an empirical illustration of the need to collaborate with organisational structures on the ground when it comes to organizing for the benefit of market traders in particular, and informal workers in general. Bypassing existing structures leads to conflict and fragmentation.

Conclusions

In this paper I have presented an empirical case that explicates the intricacies of attempts to organize informal workers. I started by discussing the informal economy, emphasizing that most informal workers suffer from decent work deficits, as defined by the ILO. Globally, trade unions have become increasingly involved in combating these deficits, aiming to orchestrate collective action. But, as the case of Makola market shows, this is not without its problems. Not only are informal workers not – as is often assumed – unorganized, they are organized in ways that are not recognized as an organisation or a type of social movement. The example of the market queens signifies one way in which informal market traders have succeeded in organizing and regulating themselves and their work environments.

The market queens' powerful networks function in Ghana's partisan political environment by engaging in alliances with political parties. The labour movement functions in a different way: they aim not to engage in partisan politics and they strive to organize democratically. These ideological differences on how to organize have created a tense situation in Makola market, fuelling competition and fragmentation in an already inherently competitive and fragmented market environment. The market queens are powerful on the ground but are not recognized sufficiently by the union; whereas the union is having difficulties to expand its membership on the ground because it is not recognized by the market queens. This ongoing conflict hampers the union's functioning and the competition has further complicated attempts to come to collective action.

By presenting Makola market as a case study, this paper provides empirical evidence that underlines the importance of moving 'beyond the core' when it comes to researching social movements and working in the field. Taking into account culturally embedded and locally emerged institutions and organisations demonstrates the problems that can arise when approaching 'social movements' by using a blueprint of what they should look like and how they should function. Instead, by keeping an open mind and immersing oneself in the situation, the existing potential of collaborations across difference comes into view. This perhaps makes moving 'beyond the core' analytically challenging, but it enriches our understanding of our shared and diverse world. After all, 'nobody can jump from outside'.

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About the author

Tanja Hendriks holds a bachelor's degree in Cultural Anthropology (2012) and a Master's degree in International Development Studies (2015) from the University of Amsterdam. She also completed the Research Master African Studies at the African Studies Centre, Leiden University (2016). Her thesis was awarded the Africa Thesis Award 2016. Tanja currently works as a junior researcher at the African Studies Centre in Leiden, The Netherlands. Her work on labour relations and informal workers' organisations in Ghana forms part of the research program: 'Increasing Political Leverage of Informal and Formal Workers' organisations for Inclusive Development: The cases of Ghana and Benin'. She can be contacted at t.d.hendriks AT asc.leidenuniv.nl

***Interface:** a journal for and about social movements* *Article*
Volume 9 (2): 188 - 275 (Nov/Dec 2017) *MacSheoin, What happened to the peasants?*

What happened to the peasants?
Material for a history of an alternative tradition of resistance in Ireland[1]

Tomás Mac Sheoin

Abstract

As often in postcolonial contexts, the traditional nationalist account of resistance to English imperialism in Ireland involved repeated armed, national uprisings. However, the record of these risings is not impressive compared to that of resistance by agrarian movements. Such movements were grounded in material concerns: contention over land was equally or more important than contention over "nation". Between at least the 1760s and the 1920s, a fluctuating war over land mobilised a range of classes from landless labourers to large tenant farmers, and continued after independent in the southern 26 counties.

This article offers a historical overview of these agrarian movements in Ireland, providing a skeleton outline of rural unrest over three centuries, as well as a bibliography of recent secondary literature on the subject. It explores the writing of Irish history in the post-colonial period and why discussion of agrarian agitation has been little and late. A chronological section provides short histories of agrarian movements and rural unrest, followed by a section discussing this contention thematically.

I Introduction

The traditional nationalist version of resistance to English imperialism in Ireland involved repeated armed, national uprisings leading up to the 1916 rising and the war of independence yet the record of these risings is not impressive: Emmet's rising of 1803 was dismissed as 'a dispute on Thomas street', 1848 was laughed at as the 'battle of Widow McCormack's potato patch', 'the Fenian rising, like the Young Ireland rising of 1848, was no more than a gesture' (Moody 2001:232), while among the possible descriptions of 1798 advanced by Thomas Bartlett (2000:182) is that of a peasant uprising (see also Rudé 1978:40).

Compared with this, the record of resistance by agrarian movements is impressive. Clarke and Donnelly (p.420) note 'The Rockites and Terry Alts, for example, were vastly larger movements than the rebellion of 1848 or the Fenian rising of 1867, yet are much less well known to students of Irish history'. Earlier

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Donnelly (1977/1978:121) himself noted, while providing a useful foreign comparison: 'Every decade between 1760 and 1840 was punctuated by at least one major outbreak of organised protest. Most of these outbreaks were at least comparable in intensity and duration to the formidable uprising of 'Captain Swing' in England from 1830 to 1832, though most were smaller than Swing in geographical extent'. For eighteenth-century Kilkenny, Cullen (1990:XX) writes 'it is hardly surprising that there should be evidence of a virtual class war in the countryside'. Reflecting on agrarian agitation between 1800 and 1850 Pomfret (1930:25) concluded 'it is clear that in the main there existed a class war'. John Stuart Mill described the agitation as a 'defensive civil war' (ibid). McCarthy (1954-55) described the existence of agrarian warfare in Tipperary. Broeker (1970:6) noted that 'from 1800 to 1823, there were altogether only about five years free from serious agrarian disturbances in various sections of the country.' O'Farrell (quoted in Townshend 1983:5) writes 'in the 1850s Irish agrarian relations were at a level resembling guerrilla warfare. Landlords and tenants carried arms as a matter of course: the peasants killed them when they could'. MacDonagh (2003:30) observes 'in general Irish landlords and agents behaved and were treated as if they were at war with their dependants.' Furthermore, '[d]uring the first half-century of the union, as J.L. Hammond pointed out, Ireland was governed under 'ordinary' English law for only five years.' (Townshend 1983:55). There also occurred what appear to have been examples of dual power over significant areas of the country, even if (admittedly) for short periods only. 'Between 1813 and 1816, and between 1819 and 1823, considerable portions of the south and west were under the domination of peasant 'armies'.' (Broeker 1970:10).

The significance of this is that it supplements, and in some readings supplants, accounts of nationalist opposition to English imperialism as the motor force of resistance during the eighteenth and nineteenth century with class-based resistance. These movements grew in response to material concerns of those active in them i.e. they were class-based. And, in a variety of different ways, and at a variety of different scales, they were successful. On the immediate front they often brought relief to the hard-pressed peasantry. In the case of the Steelboys, Magennis (1998:183) reports 'cess collection slowed down or ceased in the immediate aftermath of the disturbances [of July 1763] ...in the case of Oneillland West...some were reportedly still paying no cess as late as 1769'. A more homely example is evident in Cavan where 'a Mr. Kenny, a Catholic, who refused to reduce his rackrents was riddled with slugs in his own hallway. He pulled through, however, and his first act on returning home was to reduce all rents by 20%' (Barron 1979:37). Similarly, unrest which resulted in the provision of conacre[2] for potato ground for landless labourers and cottiers immediately relieved the fear of starvation. But longer-term effects also resulted. In general, after 1880 'the tenants' psychological, political and other intimidatory weapons induced most of them [landlords] to opt for a quiet life [i.e. not evict tenants en masse]' (MacDonagh 2003: 46). As Terry Dunne has argued these 'peasant movements in the early 19th century had a profound impact on the course of economic development'. 'Emboldened by the myth of Captain Rock relatively powerless groups, with scant resources and little or no formal organisation, wore down attempts to dramatically re-shape Irish agriculture in a long process of 'slow-moving and low-intensity guerrilla warfare.' This is part of the reason why there was, into the twentieth century, a continued prevalence of petty commodity production and a relatively restricted sector of wage-labour-based agrarian capitalism' (Dunne forthcoming). Similar struggles were carried out in such rural industries as mining. (Dunne n.d.)

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[2] Beames (1983:6-7) describes conacre as 'a form of holding, from half a rood to two acres in size, taken from farmer or landlord to grow potatoes, or less commonly oats, for one season...Where a farmer let conacre to one of his own labourers, the rent would generally be paid in labour rather than money. Otherwise, a money rent was the norm except in situations where the labourer was so impoverished that some part of the rent could only be met by labour

This essay then argues that contention over land was as – if not more – important than contention over 'nation'. While the term 'land war' is used in Irish historiography primarily to designate the short and intense period of contention during the existence of the Land League and the Ladies' Land League (i.e. 1879-1882) this essay argues that a land war, varying regionally and in strength, varying also in social composition and repertoire of contention, existed in Ireland from at least the 1760s until the 1920s, mobilising a variety of different classes from landless labourers to large tenant farmers at different stages and over different issues. Contention over land continued after independence for the southern 26 counties, with perhaps the last gasp of traditional agrarian contention occurring in the 1950s. Contention over land continued however with new issues arising following the late industrialisation of Ireland.

This article attempts to set out a historical overview of these agrarian movements in Ireland, providing a skeleton outline of rural unrest over three centuries, as well as bringing together a bibliography of recent secondary literature on the subject. The reader should be aware that this is a report on work in progress and that, in particular, coverage of county studies is unbalanced, and dependant on the availability of local history journals online and the number of county libraries the author has so far visited.

The essay is structured as follows. The next section (Part II) argues for the importance of attending to this contention, both in Ireland and due to its transnational aspects. The following section (Part III) looks at the writing of Irish history in the post-colonial period, noting tensions around 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches to writing history, the rise of various revisionisms in response to both traditional nationalist historiography and the return of the national struggle in the six counties, as well as issues of national versus local approaches. This discussion illuminates why it was so late that historians in Ireland turned to writing about agrarian agitation and why the vanguard in

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services for the landholder. Conacre... ensured a supply of food throughout the year for landless labourers.'

writing about this area consists of historians from outside Ireland. The core of the essay –which provides an introduction to the literature on rural unrest- follows, and is divided in two. The first chronological section (Part IV) provides short histories of the various agrarian movements and incidents of rural unrest and contention in Ireland under British rule and in the post-colonial state. The sections ection (Part V) details work which deals with rural contention from a thematic rather than a chronological approach. This is followed by a short conclusion and a long bibliography.

II Why pay attention to these movements?

One reason to pay attention is summed up in the title of a recent article in the *International New York Times* reporting from Dublin: "Europe's landlord: Wall Street: as many face eviction, U.S. investment firms are the object of anger' (Alderman 2016). Ireland still suffers from absentee landlords and the question of whether people have a home or are thrust out onto the streets still confronts Irish people a century after the land question was supposedly solved. More recently the Jesuit campaigner on homelessness Peter McVerry compared recent evictions with those during the Great Famine: 'It should be made illegal to evict people into homelessness, particularly families. That's what we did during the famine years and we're still doing it today in 2017'. (Fegan 2017).

This resistance represents a different tradition of resistance to English imperialism, the local elite and church authorities, a tradition worth recovering and recounting (for a variety of different reasons).[3] One of these reasons is the class nature of this resistance, especially its ideological underpinnings, the 'unwritten law"that the right to access land for subsistence purposes overrules property rights. It allows examination of the development of the state's machinery of repression and social control (police and courts, but also national schools and newspaper censorship). It provides a number of examples of betrayals of the poorest classes (landless labourers and cottiers) by middle class leadership in cross-class alliances, a lesson/warning that is always worth recounting. Related to this is a critique of national liberation movements, shown by the nationalist movement piggy-backing on land demands, which it then betrayed when it obtained power. There are also a (small) number of interesting transnational manifestations of the tradition, primarily in labour disputes in the US and elsewhere among Irish migrant workers.

A further reason is provided by the role Ireland played as a test-bed for various imperial measures and as a labour provider for English and other imperialisms. Here we must confront the ambivalent role of the Irish under English colonialism: "During the early modern period, segments of the Irish population, especially the disempowered and dispossessed Catholics, can be viewed as victims of English imperialism... Yet, other Irishmen, including Catholics, often proved effective and enterprising colonizers at home and abroad, where they contributed not only to the development of an English empire but to the growth of the Portugese, Spanish, Austrian, and French global empires' (Ohlmeyer 2004:57) In a later period, the same analyst argues 'Ireland was a crucial sub-imperial centre for the British Empire in South Asia that provided a significant amount of the manpower, intellectual and financial capital that fuelled Britain's drive into Asia from the 1750s onwards' (Ohlmeyer 2015:171)

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[3] Credit where credit is due: leaving aside Marx, Connolly and O'Neill (1933) the first recognition of the radical nature of these movements is in Anon. For a more recent anarchist interpretation see Dwyer. For a Marxist perspective see Moraghan.

Just as previously Ireland was a testing ground for British colonial ventures so Ireland after the union with England in 1800 became a place where British administrators experimented with various measures, some of which were later extended to England and English colonies. The result was that government services in Ireland were more centralised, uniform, professional and inspected than the equivalent in England. (MacDonagh 2003). One relevant example is provided by the differences between these two offshore islands in policing. 'Whereas Britain has never achieved a national police force, and did not even possess county forces everywhere before the 1850s, Ireland began the nineteenth century with baronial forces and rapidly built up a national body to keep order and execute state policy uniformly throughout the island. By 1825 a single force for the entire country was well on the way to being realised... Thus Ireland possessed a coherent, stratified, paramilitary police at a time when the lonely, untrained village constable was still the instrument of law enforcement across most of rural England'. (MacDonagh 2003:29).

The rediscovery of this history has some relevance outside the island of Ireland, in particular in relation to other countries whose misfortune it was to be colonised by the English. It is in policing and repression that Ireland's role in the British empire is most obvious. As Broeker (1970:241) notes 'the Irish Constabulary exerted a major influence upon the development of the colonial police forces of the British Empire'. Sinclair (2008:173-174) concurs: 'Colonial policing was Irish in origin, stemming from the Irish Constabulary's original role as an imposer of force on the people, a constant reminder that Ireland could only be governed by force'. Silvestri (2000:477) reports 'the reorganization of the Indian police in the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 replicated the centralized control and semimilitary aspects of the Irish Constabulary'. Its influence on colonial police forces meant it was not only a model: it provided training and personnel for these forces. 'Until the 1930s Ireland (and then Northern Ireland) was *the* official and unofficial training ground for colonial police officers. Similarly, senior-ranking officers with a background in 'Irish' policing were dispatched the length and breadth of the empire to provide advice and assistance to imperial police forces facing bloody challenges during the long era of decolonisation' (Sinclair 2008:174). They provided similar services during the bloody periods of colonisation. 'British rule in Africa in the last quarter of the 19th century was extended in great part through through the establishment of armed police forces' (Palmer 1988:544). Similarly Sinclair notes 'The Indian Police was certainly the first and largest colonial-style police force to be shaped by the RIC [Royal Irish Constabulary]' before quoting Hawkins to the effect that the police system set up by the Indian Police Act of 1861 was 'the dominant influence on police development in the far east and British Africa' (Sinclair 2008:182). The recent struggle in Northern Ireland has reinvigorated the reputation of the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary], ex-officers of which have found a happy hunting ground in working on 'police reform' in 'post-conflict' situations. Sinclair cites the example of assistant chief constable Stephen White, 'dispatched to Basra in 2003 to command a 10,000 strong Iraqi police force, having previously been loaned out to Mongolia, Indonesia, Bulgaria, South Africa and Serbia'. (Sinclair 2008:186).

Nor was the influence confined to policing. Army personnel also brought their Irish experience to India: for example 'Gerard Lake's dubious fame for burning the villages of refractory peasantries followed him from Wexford to Jat north India.' (Bayly 2000:385). Other dubious English exports from Ireland to India include a model of governance, an administrative template, a system of elementary education and an ideology of 'improvement', accompanied by and partly accomplished by, systems of knowledge including land surveying. (Ohlmeyer 2015). Silvestri (2000:476-477), noting Ireland was a fertile source of precedents in land tenure and law and order for the British Empire, details how 'Indian land legislation provided the precedent for the Land Act of 1870 in Ireland, while the Irish Land Act of 1881 in turn provided the basis for the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885.' Howlin (2013) notes that 'legislation passed in India to combat nationalist movements was based on similar measures enacted in Ireland. Rosenkrantz (2005) reports 'Government treatment of the press in India followed a pattern of surveillance, suppression and prosecution previously established in Ireland.'

The history of rural contention in Ireland also discommodes any notion of the peasantry as a unified class (facing a unified class of landlords). Class differences in rural areas were more complicated than that and rural conflicts more complex. The traditional nationalist version of the land war –unified peasants fighting foreign, and often absentee, rack-renting landlords- is a delusion. Often the war was a class war between landless labourers and cottiers and their employers, the farmers, who were mainly of the same nationality and religion, but who did not let that stand in the way of abusing, exploiting and – when it suited- evicting their workers and sub-tenants. Sometimes the rural unrest involved attacks on large farmers and graziers, many of whom were merchants, professionals and other members of the rising indigenous middle class, with the aim being land redistribution.

Without succumbing to Fitzpatrick's (1982) vision of rural Ireland (in the example of Cloon, Co. Leitrim) as a war of all against all, the Irish countryside was the location of a complex class structure –from landless labourers living on a half-acre of potato ground on conacre through a variety of farmers and middlemen to the landlords who owned vast amounts of Irish land. While there are major difficulties over statistics from this period in Ireland, the following table, using figures provided to Donnelly (1985:152) by Cormac Ó Gráda, gives an indication of class structure in rural Ireland in 1841:

Table 1 Class structure of rural Ireland 1841

Class	Landholding	Numbers
Rich farmers	80 acres	50,000
Snug farmers	50 acres	100,000
Family farmers	20 acres	250,000
Cottiers	5 acres	300,000
Labourers	1 acre	1,000.000

Clarke (1982:16) identifies at least five classes in pre-famine rural Ireland, 'landless labourers, labourer-landholders, small independent landholders (small farmers), large independent landholders (large farmers) and landowners'. Of course the class composition varied by region and often by county. For Leinster in 1841 O'Donoghue (1965:18) estimates 37% of farms were 1-5 acres, 34% were 5-15 acres, 16% were 15-30 acres and 13% over 309 acres. For one Leinster county, Edwards (1966:103) reports 'landless people constituted half of the rural population of Louth in the 1830's and 1840's.' This class structure changed over time, with one major influence being the Great Famine, with Joseph Lee commenting 'The small farmers, and especially the labourers –the real rural proletariat- were decimated by the famine. The rural proletariat was not so much transformed as buried' (quoted in Boyle 1983:312). The return of landholders for 1876 reported 110 owners held upwards of 20,000 acres each, with a total of some 4,151,142 acres, out of a total acreage of 20,247,849 in the country. Thus one-fifth of the country's land was held by little over a hundred people. (Collins 1974:2). The situation of desperate inequality continued into the twentieth century: Lee (1973:100) states 'as late as 1911 the 6,000 largest farmers in Connacht held roughly the same amount of land as the 70,000 smallest holders.'

The land struggle that arose from this material reality was complex and uneven, in some cases mobilising only some strata, in other cases (mainly those of widespread economic crisis) mobilising the majority of rural classes. One major and continuing cause of unrest grew from the need of landless labourers (and town labourers as well) for conacre ground on which to sow potatoes, the one guarantee of food for the labourer and his family. Another was the struggle between tenant farmers and their landlords (and sometimes middlemen) over the level of rents extracted. There is reasonably general agreement that these struggles arose from and responded to the economic situation, not just nationally but internationally, as when the market for agricultural products received impetus from imperial wars or when it was depressed by the opening of markets to foreign competition. According to Rude (1978:38) 'the high points in the various phases of this peasant rebellion coincided with economic crises affecting wages, employment, rent, the imposition of tithe, and the rise and fall in the price of potatoes'. Thus the reaction involved was in part to the globalisation of agricultural production, distribution and supply and in part to the development of capitalist agriculture in Ireland, which Vanhaute, Paper and Ó Gráda (2006) characterised as a long-distance food exporter at the time of the Great famine (1845-1852). The struggles varied from local responses to the activities of individual landlords, entrepreneurs and agents (such as the disturbances related to John Marum in Galmoy, Co. Kilkenny from 1819-1824 (Ó Macháin 2004)) to the land war of 1789-81 which was a transnational social movement financed by the Irish diaspora in the USA, and which in Ireland originated with the smallholders of the west before being extended to mobilise the snug and rich farmers of the south and east.

Rural unrest cannot be seen in isolation from the urban. The most obvious example is the Land League whose 'challenging collectivity', according to Clark (1979), included shopkeepers, merchants and others. We need also to consider the material conditions of town labourers. As early as 1822 trade unions in the city of Kilkenny 'used violence in a way that bore a strong resemblance to the tactics of rural agrarian rebels' (Donnelly 2009: 76). Donnelly (1983:214) also reports 'combinations of urban workers, especially those of journeyman weavers in the larger towns, also made use of oaths, regulations, forced contributions, charivaris and carefully directed violence for economic ends, all indicating patterns of thought and behaviour congruent with those of Whiteboys. Since journeymen regularly switched to agricultural work at harvest time, Whiteboys could recruit them easily for attacks on spailpini [migrant workers], who competed with them for the high wages of that season. Town workers also commonly hired gardens for the cultivation of potatoes in outlying fields and thus became liable for the payment of the customary tithe on that crop, a tax which they resented as bitterly as tillage farmers detested the tithes of corn.'

There were also a variety of other causes of agitation, including opposition to the expansion of the state and its extraction of taxes (Dickson 1983, Watt 2015), which included opposition to the activities of revenue officers against illegal distilling and smuggling. Parts of the local elite, at least in the eighteenth century, shared similar suspicions regarding state expansion and centralisation of power.

Another battle between the state and the peasant population occurred over illicit distillation or poitin-making, against which the state mounted raids by the army, private bounty hunters and eventually a specialist police force. (Dawson 1977). In the 1850s some £45,000 a year was spent on the revenue police, a body of one thousand men dedicated to restricting poitin production. In 1833 and 1834 they seized 16,000 stills and until the 1870s seized from two to three thousand stills annually. The peasant producers did not give up their production equipment easily: between 1808 and 1814 for example, the *Londonderry Journal* reported six deaths in encounters between the military and poitin makers. The industry was concentrated in the north and the west, generally in mountainous areas and on islands, in the following counties (in descending order of production in 1823): Donegal, Cavan, Leitrim, Mayo, Clare, Sligo, Monaghan and Tyrone. For many peasants 'poteen-making was the alternative to eviction, a condition of retaining the status of land-holder... On occasions the landlord's demands were met…for some…only if they made poteen'. (Connell 1968:26).

Some of these movements, particularly those waged by cottiers, those subsisting on conacre and landless labourers, also represented a struggle between a vision of the land as providing subsistence and one of untrammelled profit-oriented agriculture. (Struggles waged by larger tenant farmers differed in that they were over the extraction of rent by landlords and tithes by the Anglican clergy from commercially-oriented tenant farmers). As Townsend (1983:2-3) notes 'Irish agrarian society resisted the incursion of laissez-faire economics. Irish violence and disorder were basically a reaction against English law –above all the law of property which governed the holding of land'. Furthermore, he notes 'the resistance was not merely negative. It was rather the upholding of a different system of law or social control' (p.5). Solow, noting on mature reflection that she had actually written 'a case study of Marx's theory of primitive accumulation', states that 'the Irish land question … [was] a struggle between two conceptions of property' (Solow 2013:73,77). Here was one possible difference between protest in Ireland and England: English protest claimed English landlords were resiling from the law, a law accepted and recognised by both sides; Irish protest involved a law held by the peasants, an alternative law. That an alternative law was being proclaimed in agrarian notices was often made explicit as in the following Rockite notice:

> 'We also *enact* that rents in general be reduced so as to render the tenant solvent, and that the tithe system be utterly abolished. We also *enact* that all rackrents and backrents be forgiven, and that any person or persons driving or distraining for any of the aforesaid charges, or processing or executing decrees for tithe or any illegal charge whatsoever within our jurisdiction, shall suffer capital punishment. We also *enact* that any person or persons invited to the standard of liberty and refuising to comply therewith shall suffer such punishment as is attached to that offence. We also *enact* that all bidders at auctions for rent or tithe shall suffer accordingly. We also *enact* that any person or persons proposing or agreeing for any farm or farms of land until the same be three years unoccupied shall suffer death. It is further *enacted* that any individual attempting to take down or in any way disfigure this advertisement or any other [of] the like tendency shall, without regard to age, sex or function, suffer capitally.' (Donnelly 2009: 85, emphasis added).

As can be seen here, Rockite notices also imitated state laws in the number of offences drawing capital punishment. (Analysts commonly noted that such notices often copied and mocked official state vocabulary.) This system was expressed not only in 'midnight legislation' but also in a variety of institutional forms, many of which functioned as courts –'Repeal Association arbitration courts, Ribbon Association courts, Land League courts, National League courts, United Irish League courts and Dail courts' (Laird 2005: 13). [4] As Laird (2005: 13) summarises '[l]aw in Ireland was not only a medium for the implementation of English rule: it was also a fundamental component of anti-colonial resistance, with the concept of an alternative system of control capable of supplanting a despised official law, functioning as one of the most sustained threats to colonial administration'. It may be speculated that this law found part of its material basis in the existence of the rundale system of communal landholding and the associated clustering of dwellings in clachans. Kenny (1998: 34) argues 'the rundale system suggests a fundamentally different conception of property from the rationalized conceptualisation typical of agrarian capitalism'. [5]

More generally an argument has been made that Irish exploitation was essential to the Industrial Revolution in England. Kiernan (1987: 23) suggests 'by the 1830s Ireland was subsidizing the Industrial Revolution by feeding two million of the British population', while also providing a constant supply of cheap labour, which not only provided a major proportion of those who built England's canals and railways, but also undercut wages in England, Scotland and Wales: 'it may be questioned whether the Industrial Revolution would have been possible without this supply of hungry hands' (Kiernan 1987: 23). The constant production of population also provided recruits for the British military: 'it may be questioned whether the empire accumulated by the incessant colonial wars of the nineteenth century would have been attainable without the army's flow of recruits from Ireland' (Kiernan 1987: 23). Irish soldiers, for example, were crucial to the East India Company: '500 Irish recruits were sent to India in 1777 and within a few years a third to a half of the company's European soldiers were Irish by birth or extraction' (Murtagh 1996: 306). Some 50 years later Irish soldiers represented a major portion of the English army: according to Spiers (1996: 337) Irishmen represented 42.2% of the British army in 1830, 37.2% in 1840 and 30.8% in 1868, dropping from the 1870s to some one-fifth of the army, and below that from the late 1880s.

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[4] This was not simply a southern custom and it stretches from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century. In March 1772 the Presbetry in Dromore, Co. Down, protested that the local Hearts of Steel assumed 'to themselves the power of courts of justice, consulting and decreeing in all causes referred to them and putting their determinations in force by the most violent means' (Donnelly 1981:41). Donnelly (2009:51) reports the existence of a Rockite court in County Limerick in 1821. Another southern example can be cited from 1832 during the tithes war: 'In parts of County Cork the Catholic clergy set up minor courts to deal with matters in dispute between the local population and issued summonses to appear before them' (O'Donoghue 1972:94). Bull (2003:420) notes in 1843 'the Repeal Arbitration Court was declared to be for the purpose of Irish people "taking the administration of justice into their own hands" '. Curtis (2014:154, note 68) cites RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) evidence that in 1885 215 land league courts held sessions in eight counties in the midlands and the southeast, while in 1886 221 sessions were held. Campbell (2013:150) reports that United Irish 'League branches constituted themselves as land courts that decided who had the right to occupy land (usually evicted farms and grazing farms).'

[5] For a useful introduction to rundale see Slater and Flaherty (2009).

These rural movements have been condemned as being sectarian and/or reactionary, depending on the ideology of the objector. We need to defang the charge that the impetus for this agitation was essentially sectarian, consisting of Catholic peasants attacking Protestant landowners simply because they were Protestant. For the early period, how could it be anything than that, given that under the penal laws Catholics could not hold land by fee simple, a state sectarianism that worries some analysts much less than a popular sectarianism. The predominantly protestant ownership of land was a structural feature, resulting from British occupation and colonialism. This state-sanctioned, state-supported sectarianism can be clearly seen in the system of tithes, payments extracted by the state Church of Ireland from tillage farmers, while landlords and graziers did not pay tithes as grassland had been exempted from payment in 1735. Thus a large part of the burden of keeping the Anglican clergy in the style to which they were accustomed in Ireland fell, not on those to whom they provided religious services but on Catholics, Prysbeterians and other Protestant farmers and cottiers. (The extraction of tithes from cottiers and those holding conacre land depended on the local or regional situation: in some places the Anglican clergy did not extract a tithe on potatoe ground). Finally, the position of Anglican clerics as landlords, as well as their often acting as magistrates and sometimes as middlemen, left them open to attack for a number of reasons unconnected with religion.[6] Indeed when sectarianism manifested itself in land struggles, it often came from over-zealous Protestant landlords who either attempted to prosleytize their tenants or to replace their Catholic tenants with Protestants.

Aside from this, there were undoubtedly occasions –such as the influence of the Pastorini prophecies in the 1820s – where religious sectarianism and millenarianism mixed with economic and subsistence interest (Donnelly 1983b). Agrarian secret societies were mainly resolutely non-sectarian, being as happy to attack Catholic as Protestant landlords, including members of the catholic clergy. Two examples among many possible will suffice. During the Rightboys disturbances in the 1780s ‘many priests were insulted, reviled and even physically assaulted’ (Donnelly 1977/1978:174). In 1841 Father Francis Clery of Ikerrin, Co. Tipperary was warned, after letting two acres of potatoe ground to speculators rather than to poor people, that ‘Captain Rock thinks as little about a priest when he turns a land jobber as he does of any common man’ (Grace 2009: 53). The campaign against tithes has also been portrayed as sectarian: however, the record shows the agrarians were as happy to attack, limit and regulate the various charges the catholic clergy imposed on their flocks while opposition to tithes was also manifested by Protestants who were not members of the established church and by some who were.

Land reform movements later in the nineteenth century also attempted to be non-sectarian, despite the strong involvement of catholic clergy: as Moffitt (2011b:96) notes ‘nationalist leaders sought (often successfully) to include

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[6] Similarly in 1641 Anglican clergy were attacked because of their money lending activities. (Smyth 2013:79; Walter 2013:139)

Protestant farmers in land agitation movements.' As one example, the Land League was non-sectarian. The first person affected by the revived land war in Mayo was a Catholic clergyman, Canon Bourke. A more entertaining example is provided by the unopposed election (of a candidate who only appeared in the county the week before the election) in Mayo to Parliament in 1880 of the Reverend Isaac Nelson, 'a 71-year-old Belfast Presbyterian minister who had been an outspoken critic of the slave trade and had enthusiastically supported home rule and the Land League' (Moran 1994:199). Moran notes this as evidence of the loss of electoral power by the Catholic church: 'in the pre-1874 period it would have been inconceivable for a non-catholic clergyman to secure a seat in Mayo' (Moran 1994:199)[7]. Furthermore the Catholic church's cadre increasingly also became farmers and landholders and were a significant part of the emerging catholic middle classes; thus they became heavily involved in agrarian activities only after the 1850s and in the Land League. Yet, while the clergy was eventually strongly involved, they did not direct the movement. Moran (1994:193) argues that clerical involvement in the Land League was due to fear 'of the dimunition of their control over the people'.

Indeed these movements were notable for how their aims were primarily material. We also need to remember here that the objectives of many early European rural social movements were expressed in religious terms, at least in part because religion was the dominant understanding of society available to peasants. However, Irish peasants were nothing if not pragmatic and were happy to add to their existing frames 'the rights of man', the liberty tree, and nationalism.

Agrarian unrest has also been commonly described –and in part condemned- as being essentially reactionary and conservative: many analysts believe that these movements did not query the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship, but only wished for this relationship to be 'fair' and just. Revealingly, this reactionary charge is common to both vulgar Marxist and modernization analysts. Leaving aside the question of how many of these analysts would have actually welcomed a full revolutionary programme, we might note three things: first, this conservative peasant position represented a block on the 'progressive' (i.e. capitalist) development of agriculture in Ireland and its place in the British imperialist project, with its demand that local land and food production on it should be devoted first to local subsistence rather than exported to sustain the expansion of British capitalism and economic and political imperialism; second, this position involved an assertion of popular law as against the law of the imperialists; finally that position was one that responded to the immediate economic interests of the peasants and the other wretched of the earth: it was a demand to control everyday life.

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[7] In fairness, the rest of the story needs to be told. Nelson was reported to have made anti-Catholic comments in Belfast, due to which he fell out of favour in Mayo and never again appeared in the county.

We have already mentioned Dunne's argument that these movements impeded capitalist development and proletarianisation. Huggins (2007:124) noted in response to one author's conclusions that Irish agrarian agitation was a reactionary response to changing European capitalism 'to term such demands reactionary is to say no more than they impeded the accumulation of capital and the re-organization of production in non-traditional ways.' The same charge is levelled at the Molly Maguires, who are seen as a primitive, defensive response to capital (and as a stage towards a more organised response through open combinations such as trade unions) but their demands (particularly at the height of their strength) were not far off demands for workers' control. (Bulik 2015)

If left analysts/historians in retrospect dismissed peasant demands as reactionary, the elite at the time recognised they represented a threat to 'the very existence of property' (Beames 1983:210 citing a contribution to the 1836 Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Poorer Classes in Ireland) while as early as 1811 Lord Norbury, Special Commission judge, noted the objectives of the Caravats and Shanavests 'overthrew the principle of laissez-faire economics' (Beames 1983:138).

Ireland is a small country so it is possible to summarise three centuries of rural unrest. Looking at these movements over this long period allows us to see how they differ from each other, grow in complexity and sophistication, change composition, aims, tactics and strategies, operate locally, nationally and transnationally. While episodes of unrest generally began with a specific cause or complaint, they normally grew to add other grievances as the movements sought further support outside their immediate base. If the dominant form of agrarian organisation before the famine was the secret society[8], towards the end of the nineteenth century with the long land war nationally organised combinations were the dominant form, though the repertoire of the secret societies continued to accompany the new repertoire of open defiance and civil disobedience characteristic of the new national organisations. We can also see similarities between recent transnational movements and those of the nineteenth century, with similar problems regarding foreign funding, pressure from foreign funders and use of new communications and transport technologies to facilitate transnational organising. They also allow us to see that land struggles are not simply anti-colonial struggles but continue after the achievement of so-called 'national liberation'.

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[8] Some analysts have problems with the concept of secret societies as a description of Irish agrarian groups. Parts of this problem can perhaps be traced to Williams (1973), an anthology of academic articles on secret societies in Ireland, which includes extremely different groups, from the freemasons and the Orange Order to the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Communist Party of Ireland,l while its first two chapters on the Whiteboys (Wall 1973) and the Ribbon societies (Lee 1973) are seen as seminal contributions to the literature on agrarian agtitation. Williams justifies the wide range of organisations and groups gathered together by using a somewhat maximal definition of secret societies, which term 'here mainly denotes organised groups which have poursued political, ideological or economic objectives by secret means and very often through violent actions' (Williams 1973:1). While there are objections to the analytical validity of such a wide category, nevertheless the ascription of the term secret society to a wide range of agrarian groups can be argued for on the basis that they indeed operated in secrecy and were commonly bound together by an oath. For a critique of this use see Huggins (2017).

Before we can turn to our main subject in detail, we need to make a few comments about the writing of history in a post-colonial society, as the literature this essay brings together was strongly influenced by the post-colonial conditions in which it was produced.

III Who writes what history?
Historiographical and political problems

The writing of history is inherently political, all the more so when history deals with insurgencies, rebellions and unrest. To begin with we need to note that the writing of Irish history is not an activity confined to the island of Ireland: as Boyce (1996:6) notes, the majority of historians of Ireland are located outside Ireland. A further complication is added however with Ireland's position as an ex-colony, whose national revolution/liberation was incomplete and which still operates in the various shadows of its old colonizer. For the former the settler community in the northeast is still integrated with the colonizer, despite recent attempts by parts of the minority community there. For the latter, a significant amount of academic work – both teaching and publication – is undertaken by the academic headquarters of the colonizer, with – in particular – the university presses of Oxford and Cambridge publishing a stream of works on Irish history, while the former publishes the most prestigious and closest thing to an official history of Ireland in multiple volumes. Furthermore the teaching of Irish history has been strongly influenced by the English historical tradition. This may be seen as another example of the global division of knowledge production previously pointed out in this journal. (MacSheoin 2016).

The orientation towards 'high politics' that Irish historians imbibed from their mentors in England may be seen as one of the reasons for the late development of history writing on agrarian agitation in Ireland and why the major contributions to the literature came from writers outside Ireland, initially the US and, more recently, England (from writers who inherited a different orientation in writing history –from Thompson, Hobsbawm and the like; see footnote 8). The same high politics orientation may be seen in the concentration of the literature that did come from Ireland on the Land League and state responses to it. Similarly some basic work remains to be done on agrarian agitation, while Irish historians continue to re-rake the coals on certain areas. Jim Smyth, the historian who both noted the tendency of Irish historians of the 1790s to concentrate on the more patrician United Irishmen and ignore the more agrarian Defenders, noted in 1992 that 'the basic narrative history of the Defenders has still to be written' (Smyth 1992:100). A quarter of a century later, it still remains unwritten.

One problem with treating Irish history as British history is immediately obvious. Townshend (1983:vii) begins his volume by noting he will be dealing with 'a vital element of modern British history': the problem with this is not only political, but also historiographical, as seeing this as a part of British history means a large amount of time is spent on the actions and attitudes of the British elite. This tendency is not confined to English authors. The American Broeker declares that his intention is twofold: 'to investigate organised peasant opposition to the existing economic and religious systems in Ireland between 1812 and 1836, and to examine the methods developed by the authorities to deal with the violence used by the peasants to make this opposition known' (Broeker 1970:vii). However the first of these subjects is treated minimally while most of Broeker's efforts go on his declared second objective. Partly this is due to the availability of material on high politics in both Ireland and England related to this repression, which makes the writing of such history easy. Another part must surely relate to the traditional historian's preference for the powerful over the powerless.[9] This modus operandi continues in use: see Rozman's recent examination of the use of Irish outrages in struggles between English whigs and tories. (Rozman 2017)

Nor is this problem unknown among Irish historians. Because of an orientation that sees history as the record of the activities of the rich and powerful, and because of the availability of state archives, there are a plethora of studies of the English state's deliberations on how to deal with the Irish problem, the various investigatory commissions, the changing land acts introduced at various stages and the parliamentary manoeuvrings by Irish politicians and parties. As Beiner (1999) notes the archival historical sources of Ireland are documented primarily from the view of colonial establishment and hierarchical elites. [10] These state reports need to be approached with caution, if not suspicion. Kiernan (1987:31) is the most outspoken critic, noting of constabulary reports of evictions 'the figures recorded were what the constabulary thought proper to record, taking into account the susceptibilities of the landlords who controlled local affairs, and who were conscious of the obloquy that evictions were bringing on them in England' before widening his attack to suggest 'in general, nineteenth century Irish statistics should probably be treated with much the same caution as Spanish'. Griffin (2005:62-67) also recommends caution in approaching and using official crime statistics.

A further problem, particularly in relation to the eighteenth century, is many historians' failure to use sources in the Irish language. A surprising number of historians –possibly the majority- of eighteenth century Ireland do not have the ability to read Irish, thus cutting themselves off from native sources. Morley is one exception in that he can not only read but also write Irish (see, for example Morley 1994). A further issue arises, of course, due to the nature of these Irish-language sources, most of which were produced by members of the colonized elites, in particular professional poets and historians. (Of course the sources in English also tend to be products of the elite but this does not appear to be considered a problem).

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[9] Needless to say, not all English historians' work on Ireland follows this line: both Gibbons (2004) and Huggins (2007) have made major contributions, while Featherstone (2005) attempted to rescue the Whiteboys from the 'litany of theoretical condescension' they have been subjected to. The most explicitly political interpretation I've seen is provided by the Scot Armstrong (2010) in his analysis of Davitt's 'internationalism from below'.

[10] O'Callaghan (2004:55) notes 'Dublin Castle produced a stunningly vast archive. The structure of the archive bore remarkable similarities to the archives of India and other imperial locations'.

Another important limitation is the professional niches or specialisations of many academic authors. Thus undoubtedly one reason for the lack of a chronological history of agrarian agitation is this division by period – one author does the eighteenth century, another pre-famine Ireland, another the land war and never the twain shall meet. McBride (2009:319) notes the failure to compare Whiteboys in Munster in the 1860s with the Hearts of Oak/Steel in Ulster at the same time. ('No-one has attempted anything like a sustained comparison of these northern and southern protests, despite the fact that they were often linked at the time' (McBride 2009:319)). Indeed, what is noticeable about this literature is the failure in most cases to move beyond case studies of individual movements. Thus comparison of movements within Ireland is minimal, without considering comparisons with English or other European peasant movements. There have been some comparisons between Ireland and Scotland (Devine 1988) and one recent effort (Howell 2013) to compare experiences in 'these Atlantic islands' but otherwise we must be satisfied with the occasional genuflection towards Scott, Thompson or Tilly. Indeed the main comparisons are normally with England, often using Thompson's moral economy frame, which represents a problem given the structural differences between the two countries. More useful comparisons with other European countries are missing.[11] Whelehan's comparative work with Italy is a welcome but lonely exception (Whelehan 2014; 2015).

We also need to consider for a moment the issue of the moral economy and the question of whether this frame – developed for the analysis of movements in England – is fully applicable to movements in Ireland, another variation of the question raised by the export of metropolitan frames for social movements to peripheral nations. (Mac Sheoin 2016) Eighteenth century land agitation was seen as operating within the accepted limits of a moral economy. In Bartlett's formulation ' "Moral economy" as experienced in Ireland had been to a certain extent dependant on easygoing farming practices (long leases, low rents, tolerance of arrears), practices which while productive of a certain amount of harmony were generally not profitable. From the 1760s on, however, these relatively relaxed practices had tended to be displaced by more profit-oriented ones such as short leases, enclosure of commons, and regular "drives" to bring in arrears. In a real sense the precepts of the "moral economy" were yielding to the forces of the "market economy".' (Bartlett 1987:216-217) Bartlett argues that the 1793 militia agitation represented the end of this moral economy. Patterson also makes that point when he notes that after 1798 Munster agrarian movements were more ready to use capitally violent methods than previously. His argument that this change 'can be directly attributed to the government's creation of an environment in which capital force was increasingly the norm'

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[11] I owe this point to Terry Dunne.

(Patterson 2008:190) seems convincing. It is worth noting that this presentation of quiescent peasant-landlord relations is based purely on English-language sources, and a different view is presented by the Irish language sources. Indeed the unquestioned acceptance of the presentation of the peasantry as happily accepting and acknowledging the paternalism of the landlords always seemed to involve a failure to critically assess the sources, particularly in the light of research on peasant silence and cunning in the international literature on peasant-landlord relations. However Wells (1996) applies the moral economy frame to responses to the famine at the turn of the century and at least some events from the nineteenth century, including during the great famine, appear to fit the frame of the moral economy.

Some analysts have characterised the difference between Irish and British rural unrest as the preparedness of Irish peasants to embrace violence as a tactic: Rudé (1978:32), for example, notes ‘a number of violent crimes against property, such as robbery of arms, forcible possession of property, armed assembly and attacks on houses and lands, which play no part in the English records, are conspicuously present in the Irish’.[12] While this is indeed true another major difference needs also to be emphasised which may weaken the case for the use of the moral economy frame in Ireland. While British rural unrest claimed to appeal to a moral economy shared both by the downtrodden and the elite, the law acclaimed by those involved in Irish rural unrest was an alternative rather than a shared law, a law which prioritised landholding over land ownership, as previously noted.

Revisionism

The late development of critical work on Irish rural and peasant unrest may be partly attributable to the dominance of a narrow national history of Ireland which was unsympathetic to issues of class and preferred to present Irish history as a vision of a unified national community opposing foreign occupation and domination. This nationalist mystification was inevitably challenged and the historiography of Ireland almost since the foundation of the 26-county state has been accompanied by controversy regarding revisionism. The first wave of revisionism came with a new wave of historians who wished to establish a more accurate history, partly out of a desire to introduce professional standards into the writing of history in Ireland. Here an English influence was decisive. Many of these scholars were trained in the 1930s in London's Institute of Historical Research, including T.W,Moody and R. Dudley Edwards, who co-founded the dominant journal *Irish Historical Studies* in 1938.[13] A further connection was forged in the 1940s between the chair of modern history at University College, Dublin (UCD), Desmond Williams, and Hubert Butterfield of Peterhouse, Cambridge. 'Williams and Butterfield provided a bridge between a society with scant resources for advanced historical research and the riches Peterhouse offered. A procession of gifted UCD graduates crossed to Peterhouse: Oliver McDonagh, F.X. Martin, K.B. Nowlan, J.J. Lee, Patrick Cosgrove, Dermot Fenlon, Ronan Fanning, Joe Bergin, Denis Smith, Tom Dunne, among others' (Regan 2013:230). Others associated with Peterhouse included Donal Cruise O'Brien, Ian d'Alton, Gearoid Ó Tuathaigh, Gerard O'Brien, Eamonn O'Flaherty, A.T.Q. Stewart and Patrick Lynch. (Regan 2013:250, note 29).

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[12] While these movements have been condemned for their embrace of violent methods, these need to be seen in the context of state violence. Maureen Wall (1973:17) notes ‘the frontier-type law should, perhaps, be viewed against the background of the law of the land, which for countless minor offences decreed the pillory, whipping or transportation and, for more serious offences, hanging, drawing and quartering. Corpses of criminals were left suspended from gibbets and heads were left on spikes for months, even years. Such exhibitions were meant as a deterrent; they can hardly have inspired the Whiteboys to grant humane treatment to those who offended against their code’. Similarly while it must be acknowledged that these movements increasingly utilised serious and often fatal violence against men and beast, this violence pales against the structural violence inherent in the land system and the accompanying colonial governance, most viciously exposed during the Great Famine. (Nally 2011).

A more recent wave of revisionism began with the reconsideration of the nationalist revolutionary tradition, beginning with the commemoration of the 1916 rising in 1966, and involved at least in part a revulsion against the armed struggle which resulted in the six counties (which had remained part of the United Kingdom after the war of independence) when the repression of the civil rights movement of the 1960s exposed that state's failure to reform its gerrymandered and sectarian nature. This struggle raised questions about the nature of the 26 county state and mobilised strong support from large segments of the population of that state with the result that the state found itself under threat both practically and ideologically. [14] Thus the southern state needed to defend itself ideologically against the threat of a resurgent republicanism and the intelligentsia, called to answer the standard, was not slow to respond to its paymasters.

Partly involved here was a revulsion against the reappearance of popular systems of social control and 'justice' in areas of the six counties where the state 'justice' and legal systems were unacceptable (Monaghan 2002). At least some of the rural actions undertaken by the Provisional IRA represented the return of the rural with a vengeance: the assassination of Protestant members of the various 'security forces' at home in front of their families recalled the agrarian assassinations of the nineteenth century, while in some readings the IRA's rural campaign involved a policy of ethnic cleansing intended to drive Protestants off their land, particularly in border areas. The IRA campaign also drew on the long memory of humiliation and injustice suffered under the hands of the various

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[13] A peculiarity of *Irish Historical Studies* that's worth noting was 'the provision in the journal's constitution which provided that no articles could be published which had reference to Irish politics after 1900' (Fanning, quoted in Regan 2013:240).

[14] The standard references for the revisionist controversy are Boyce and O'Day (1996) and Brady (1994). To these I'd add Reagan's unjustly neglected *Myth and the Irish state* (2013), not only for its close engagements with the empirical arguments, but for its intriguing suggestion regarding the formation of a 26 county nationalist ideology.

'security forces' at the foundation of the Orange state and since. [15] The response to these tactics on the part of the southern intellegensia was not a principled, pacifist response to violence per se, but a partisan one: similar disgust was not expressed at the activities of the 'security forces' including the B Specials, UDR (Ulster Defence Regiment) and murder gangs operated by the English counter-insurgency forces. (Punch 2012).

We might also note other ways in which prejudice can appear in even the most sympathetic authors through the use of disease metaphors and animal images to describe these movements. The depiction of the spread of agrarian agitation as a communicable disease is widespread in the literature. An example is provided by Bartlett (1983:374): 'The spread of the Defenders can to some extent be attributed to the 'contagion' effect of popular disturbances. It sometimes happens that areas adjoining the original protest areas become 'infected' with similar-type disturbances even though the objective conditions which gave rise to the original protest are absent from the newly-infected areas'. The differences in tone can be seen in two different versions of an attempted rescue in July 1793 of two men, arrested for oath-taking or threatening notices, from Wexford jail. According to Nelson (2003:379) Colonel 'Valleton tried to reason with the mob, but was attacked and fatally wounded'. According to Bartlett (1987: 204) Valleton was 'mortally wounded while negotiating with (or rather attempting to bully) the rescue party'.[16] HigginsMcHugh (2011:88) describes peasants stoning police and yeomanry at the Newtownbarry tithe affray in June 1831 as a 'menacing mob'; similarly Lucey (2011:56) describes peasants resisting an eviction from the Horenc estate in County Kerry as a 'mob'. Murray (1986:71-72) dismisses Westmeath Ribbonmen as 'rural gangsters' enforcing a 'customary agrarian code', without noting that Ribbonmen might have considered the 'security forces' themselves as state-sanctioned gangsters enforcing a foreign code of justice. Fitzpatrick's lack of sympathy with his subject is bracingly blatant in his description of one James Maguire as "an independent-minded man who had the misfortune to be caught in the treacherous bogs of Leitrim" '(Fitzpatrick 1982:62). This encapsulates the metropolitan's disdain for the rural dweller or bog trotter and also reflects an over-emphasis generally in the historical literature on Ireland on the national at the expense of the local and the metropolitan or urban at the expense of the rural.

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[15] Townshend (1983: 386, n.2) reports 'by 1922 Tallents [government official] reported 'the feeling against the Specials and the "B" in particular is more bitter than against the Black and Tans'; even prominent Unionists were telling him 'that this purely partisan and insufferably disciplined force was sowing feuds in the countryside which would not be eradicated for generations'. The "specials" were the Ulster Special Constabulary, an armed force set up in 1920 to provide support for the security forces. Almost totally Protestant, the specials were renowned for their sectarianism. The Black and Tans were an auxiliary armed force mobilised by the British during the war of independence, who were noted for their cruelty and indiscipline.

[16] Nelson's position can be further seen in his suggestion that the Militia Act provided another excuse to foment trouble: it may be suggested that Nelson is writing from a conservative position on the 1790s where those challenging existing social relations are to be condemned.

Local and citizen historians

One major contribution to the growth of the study of agrarian agitation has been the contribution of amateur, citizen and local historians. Much of the local history material has been published in the various county historical and archaeological journals, at least some of which were founded by members of the landed elite. While originally these were confined to antiquarian pursuits, in more recent times they have shown themselves happier to face at least some of the more controversial aspects of recent Irish history, while newer local history journals –such as those in Clare, Roscommon and Tipperary- have had no problems in embracing, examining and researching the contentious history of their counties. These newer sources have been augmented by the growth in publications of parish and district histories, some of which have been spurred by the growth of heritage and genealogical tourism and others by community development programmes funded by the European Union.

One significant contribution these historians make is that they provide portraits of the actual local campaigns and agitations to balance the volumes that concentrate only on the national level. In the conclusion of his paper on the contribution James Daly made to the development of the Land League in the west, Moran (1994: 206) notes: ‘During this period nearly every part of the country produced its own local leaders whose role and influence was as important as those at a national level. It was this local Land League leadership which taught the tenant farmers that through combinations and agitation they constituted a force which the landlords and the government would have difficulty in controlling’; he further argues ‘a study of other local Land League figures must not be addressed from the confines of the movement at a national level, but rather by their contributions to the locality in which they served. Only then can the significance of the Land League as a truly national organisation can be assessed’ (Moran 1994:207), a strong reassertion of the importance of the local over the national.

The arrival of the local both in local and academic publications can be seen in Tables 2 to 6 below.

Most local and parish histories now include a section on at least the Land League, quite often the tithe war and sometimes the secret societies. This, combined with articles appearing regularly in local history journals, means the local history of at least some of these movements is being slowly written, article by article.

A further welcome development has been the academic training of local historians, whose subsequent publications have enriched the literature on agrarian movements. For local historians the work of those trained at Maynooth, where a MA course in local history began in 1992, can be seen in the publication every year since 1995 of pamphlets in the Maynooth Studies in Local History series. These publications have produced a flowering of case studies relevant to our subject. A congratulary review can be found in James Kelly (2014). Fergus Campbell (2000) has produced an illuminating guide to the available local sources that can be used to investigate the involvement of rank and file members of the Land League, showing their use in the production of such a history for Craughwell, Co. Galway and providing a model for such local investigations of the experience of the movement's rank and file.

We need also to mention the production of historical accounts by citizen historians, which often differed from official productions in their enthusiastic support for the movements they chronicled. These were normally local productions, often printed or published by the local newspaper. A fine example is Ó Gallchobhair (1962)'s history of landlordism in Donegal, while another example would be provided by the fictionalised account of the hanging of John Twiss (Lynch 1982).

Silence of the subaltern?

The old adage no archives, no history seems to imply that the story of agrarian agitation, in particular that of the secret societies, cannot be told or can only be told using the available sources, ie those created by their enemies, the landed elite and their varied police forces, but there are texts aplenty: most well-known are their threatening letters and notices (Gibbons 2004, Grace 2009) but some groups also produced proclamations. Another source of voices from below can be found in the various commissions of inquiry set up by the English state where in some cases the lower orders were allowed to speak[17]. Furthermore the possibilities of utilising oral history to supplement the history of the archives exists, though oral history is not accepted in mainstream Irish historiography. (Beiner 1999; see also Daly 2010). These sources can be very useful for a view from below, though they may suffer from historical inaccuracy and the tendency of a story to grow over many tellings. One example may be cited in relation to public opinion regarding those who facilitated the escape of Pat Dolan, who assassinated the magistrate George Bell Booth in June 1845. According to the account by James Brady of Bailieborough 'For the saving of Dolan the woman was respected in the fairs and markets in all the towns around' while in the case of a servant girl to a man who informed on Dolan, 'the girl was sacked immediately but the people of Laragh treated her like a queen'. Alas, the treatment of the informer was not regal: 'The informer lived only three years after that, dying brokenhearted. On the night of his wake, twenty young men marched into the house took the corpse off the bed and kicked it into the river' (Barron 1979: 41-42).

Sympathy for the landlord

One entertaining strand of the literature –partly impelled by revisionism - has involved a reconsideration of the traditional image of the rack-renting landlord. A nostalgia for the imagined life of the big house and the Ascendancy can be found in certain quarters (and publications). The local history journals are of course replete with (often uncritical) work detailing the experiences of individual landed families and their estates. Even landlords as reviled as Lord Leitrim (Dolan 1978) have been the subject of almost hagiographical volumes. (Malcolmson 2008) [18] One welcome result of revisionism was some work concentrated on non-landlord Protestant experiences of agrarian agitation, mainly relating to the land war. (Moffitt 2011a, 2011b) .

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[17] I owe this point to Terry Dunne.

One of the issues facing analysts here is a political one: whether they approve or not of the existence of landlords and landlordism. In the Irish case the question includes a further political judgement, given that many landlords were landlords because of conquest, colonisation and confiscation. However, given the truism that behind every great fortune is a great crime, the question boils down to whether or not the analyst considers capitalism acceptable: eventually what is left is a moral or political decision. We can see this problem in Moran's work on the Gore-Booth estate in Co Sligo. Gore-Booth was a 'good' landlord, but also one who believed in consolidation and who promoted emigration as a 'solution' to his estate's 'problems'. Within the worldview of landlordism Gore-Booth's actions were both understandable and necessary, even praiseworthy. But the fundamental question here is who was Gore-Booth to be in the position to decide where people should live – in Sligo or North America – on the basis of his estate's economic situation? (Moran 2006).

The tie between the national movement and the land movement

Much of the historical literature on rural unrest shares a major concern with the colonial authorities: what connection, if any, did these movements share with the nationalist movement? While landlords scattered throughout the country reported to Dublin Castle (the colonial headquarters) that these movements had French and other foreign leaders and included wild plans for insurrections that would kill all Protestants in a single night, the Castle authorities were more realistic in their assessments. The importance of agrarian agitation to the nationalist movement is pointed out by a number of historians, many of whom suggest that the land question was more important than the national question to the rural population. Townshend (1983:339) writes 'It may indeed be that the real dynamism that underlay the national movement remained the pressure of population on the land. Land hunger, exacerbated by the cessation of emigration, seems to have remained the only force which generated large-scale popular action.' Fitzpatrick (1987:410) noted 'my own study of the conduct of the revolution in county Clare … suggests that 'IRA [Irish Republican Army] engagements' were in many cases thinly disguised land seizures which Dublin headquarters had neither the ability nor, perhaps, the intention to prevent',[19] while O'Riordan (2015:9) reports 'in many areas the desire for land was stronger than the appeal of an independent nation'; Dooley (2004:177) writes 'it was arguably land issues that had provided the momentum to political movements rather than vice versa. For the majority of people living in rural Ireland, access to land continued to be a possibly more desirable commodity than independence'. It's also worth noting that during the war of independence the nationalists used part of the agrarian repertoire, including boycotting the judicial and courts system, the police and the military, with the boycotts being reinforced by threatening letters, public posters and physical assaults. (Borgonovo 2017).

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[18] Those wanting a more balanced view of Lord Leitrim are directed to Ó Gráda's review of this book, in which the following can be found: 'Leitrim was fond of money... He took over an encumbered estate and debts of about £55,000. At his death his gross rental income was about £30,000, fifty percent higher than when he took over, and he had accumulated capital of £180,000 in bonds and cash. In today's terms that is roughly Euro 20 to Euro 25 million. Most of this fortune he had extracted from an impoverished tenantry.' (Ó Gráda n.d.). Those interested in Leitrim's representation in folklore should consult Wilgus and Long-Wilgus (2005).

Despite the centrality of the land issue to their mobilisation of the population, the leaders of the nationalist movement often expressed disdain for the land movement. Sinn Fein leader Arthur Griffith dismissed the United Irish League (UIL) 'with classical Fenian contempt as 'a squalid class movement'' (Townshend 1983:233). According to Lee (1973:72) the IRB (Irish Republican Brotherhood) supreme council 'feared that a solution to the land problem would divert public opinion from political goals, and were prepared to sacrifice the last Mayo peasant to the separatist ideal'. Foner (1980:163) quotes another Fenian 'It is not a thing to be wished, by those who love Ireland, that class feuds should arise and increase in intensity, so as to dissever those who should be united, and to withdraw to class-disputes the interest which should be concentrated on the National Question'. During the 1920s and early 1930s Peader O'Donnell made heroic efforts to convince the IRA to take up the cause of small farmers (and form an alliance with the urban working class). The failure of the former was shown in the IRA's behaviour in the case of Jimmy Gralton, the only Irish citizen to be deported by a native government (Feely 1986, Guckian 1988, Gibbons 1989, Ryan 2011). (The case has recently become the subject of a rather romanticised film by Ken Loach).

What is interesting is how little nationalistic sentiment can be found in threatening letters and notices. Of Gibbons's collection of 526 notices and letters he observes 'There are 30 or so references to the sovereign, with some protestations of loyalty and, conversely, some protestations in the opposite direction. There is no significant preponderance on either side' (Gibbons 2004:36), while Grace (2009:55) reports 'only eleven of more than a thousand notices posted in County Tipperary between 1836 and 1843 had a political motive, some of which were tinged with a sectarian hue'.

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[19] In this Fitzpatrick's conclusion is wrong. Sinn Fein put serious effort into controlling agrarian movements after its (curiously enough, pre-election) involvement in 1918 in land struggles in the west: agrarian agitation was a cause of major concern to Sinn Fein whose 'underground government was early engaged in attempts to control land disturbance through the Dail courts' (Townshend 1983: 370).

For the late nineteenth century land wars, a change in rhetoric can be seen as a result of both cxonstitutional and some physical force nationalists embracing the land movement as a means of waging the national struggle. Kane (2011) provides an excellent, if excessively jargonised, account of the construction of an Irish national identity through speeches at various land meetings, editorials and letters to the editor and similar texts, which identified the Irish national interest with that of tenant farmers, concluding ‘the emergence of a strong Irish national identity, wrought through the struggle against landlords and the British, must be seen as a major outcome [of the Land War] that would influence the drive for Irish national autonomy achieved in 1922, and the subsequent process of nation building’ (Kane 2011: 2). Leaving aside the question of whether national autonomy was achieved in 1922, Kane shows the construction of this national identity to be the product of action and discourse by tenant farmers, nationalists and the Catholic church.

Donegal
Derry
Antrim
Belfast
Tyrone
Leitrim
Down
Fermanagh
Armagh
Monaghan
Sligo
Cavan
Louth
Mayo
Roscommon
Long-ford
West-meath
Meath
Dublin
Dublin
Galway
Offaly
Kildare
Laois
Wicklow
Clare
Carlow
Tipperary
Kilkenny
Wexford
Limerick
Waterford
Kerry
Cork
Cork

IV Materials towards a history

A full literature review is not possible as it would strain the patience of both editors and readers, so the core of the literature is summarised in Tables 1 to 7. The first table is accompanied by a chronological account of the various agrarian movements. There is only one existing guide to this literature, Cronin (2012), which is very useful, but neglects most of the work of local historians; its main interest is looking at the variety of explanations historians have advanced for these movements, rather than giving details of the movements' activities and results. This introduction tends to the latter trend, with the main section being a chronological narrative of these movements.

The vanguard in the agrarian literature are American. The first thesis I can trace is from an American hand (Jennings 1915). The first academic consideration of Whiteboys is also from an American (Calkin, 1943). The 1930s saw the arrival of no less than three monographs from the US on the land struggle (Hooker 1938, Palmer 1940, Pomfret 1930) no doubt in part due to the then current land struggles in the US (Pratt 1988). Indeed one volume explicitly notes in its preface 'At the Congressional hearings on farm tenancy bills in 1935 and 1937, for example, reference was made to Ireland again and again, and questions were asked regarding tenure experiments there, with the evident hope that light might thus be thrown on pending legislation in this country' (Hooker 1938:v). American academics have continued to contribute to the literature, with Donnelly as the Stakhanovite in the pack, having produced studies of the Carders and Caravats, Hearts of Oak and Hearts of Steel, Rightboys, Rockites and Whiteboys.

The cultural turn has also impacted the literature, with a large amount on the presentation of rural struggles in cultural products, especially that Irish speciality, literature (O'Connell 2000, Hanson and Murphy 2014, which also contains a bibliography of novels from 1879 to 1916). Some attention has also been paid to visual issues (Curtis 2011; O'Sullivan 2004). There has been some work on the commemoration of agrarian struggles, with Owens (2014) providing a superb case study of the remembering of the Carrickshock massacre over the course of a century. Attention to gender issues has focussed almost totally on the land war and the Ladies' Land League.

TABLE 1: Main studies

DATE	**GROUP**	**Geographical Extent**	**Source**
1711-1713	Houghers	Connacht –started Galway, then Mayo, Sligo, Leitrim, Roscommon, Fermanagh	Connolly 1985, 1987
1714-1740	Tax riots		Watt 2015
1761-1765	Whiteboys	Started Tipperary, then Kilkenny, Waterford, Cork	Wall 1973, Bartlett 1991, Donnelly 1978, 1983b
1763	Oakboys (Hearts of Oak)		Donnelly 1981, Magennis 1998b
1770-1773	Hearts of Steel	Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down (Ulster land war of 1770)	Donnelly 1981, Maguire 1979
1785-1788	Rightboys	Started Cork, then all Munster, Kilkenny, Laois, Offaly	Bric 1987, Donnelly 1977/78, Wall 1973
1780s, 1790s	Steelboys, Peep O' Day Boys		Powell 2005
1790s	Defenders	Armagh, Louth, Meath, Cavan. Monaghan	Garvin 1987, Smyth 1992
1793	Anti-militia	Carlow, Kilkenny, Laois, Meath, Wexford, Kerry, Limerick, Sligo, Leitrim, Roscommon, Down, Mayo, Cavan, Fermanagh	Bartlett 1987, Nelson 2003
1798-99	Agrarian agitation	Western Connacht	Patterson 2008
1806-1807	Threshers	Mayo, Sligo, Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon	McCartney 1987
1806-1811	Caravats & Shanavests	Tipperary, Waterford (parts of) Cork	Roberts 1983
1813	Carders		Donnelly 1985

1813-1816	Threshers & Caravats	Clare, Limerick, Tipperary, Kilkenny, Offaly	McCartney 1987
1819-1820	Ribbonmen	Connacht	Lenahan 2003
1821-1824	Rockites	Limerick, Cork, Kerry, Tipperary, (parts of) Clare	McCartney 1987, Donnelly 1983a, 2009; O'Neill 1982
1831	Terry Alts	Clare, Galway, Limerick, Tipperary	McCartney 1987 Enright 2008
1831-1834	Whitefeet	Kilkenny, Laois	McCartney 1987, Dunne n.d. Dunne (forthcoming)
1830s	Anti-tithes		O'Donoghue 1965, 1966, 1972 Higgins-McHugh 2011
1829-1847	Tommy Downshire's Boys	Mid-Ulster (Down, Armagh)	Blackstock 2007
1840s	Molly Maguires	Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Roscommon	Kelly 1998, Bulik 2015
1848-57	Tenants' rights movement	West of Ireland	Shields 2011
1848-87	Agrarian opposition	Ulster	Bew and Wright 1983
1868-1886	Land agitation	Ulster	Thompson 2001
1870s-1903	Land war	Biography	Warwick-Haller 1990
1879-1882	Land War		Palmer (1940); Pomfret 1930; Clark 1971,1979; Bew 1978; Orridge 1981; Kane 1997, 2011 Vaughan
1879-85	Land War	Mid-Ulster	Kirkpatrick 1976, 1980
1879-82	Land War -biography	West of Ireland	Moran 1994
	Ladies Land League		O'Neill 1982, Parnell 1986, TeBrake 1992,

			Hunt 2002, Mulligan 2009, Ward 2000
1881-1882	Stopping the hunt		Curtis 1987
1880-1881	Land League	Ulster	Thompson 1987
1882-1890	Irish National League		Jordan 1998
1886-1891	Plan of Campaign		Geary 1986
1886-1888	Plan of Campaign	Catholic church	Larkin 1978
1890-1910	Land war -graziers		Jones 1983, 1995
1895-1900	Land war -graziers		Higgins& Gibbons 1982
1898-1900	United Irish League		Bull 2003
1898-1912	United Irish League	Nth Galway, west Mayo	Thomas 1999a, Thomas 1999b
1901-1903	Compulsory land purchase campaign	Ulster	Cosgrove 2010
1904-1908	Ranch war		Jones 1995
1918-1923	Labourers/land redistribution campaign		Campbell 2005, O'Connell 1988
1930	Working Farmers' Conference	Clare, Galway, Leitrim, Limerick, Longford, Roscommon, Tirconnaill	O'Neill 1933
1957-1960	Lia Fáil	Offaly, spread to 11 counties	Murphy, Murphy 1998
1960s	Fish-ins, opposition to foreign land ownership		Cullinane 2010, O'Driscoll,2016 Hanley and Millar 2010
1970-date	Locally unwanted land uses –factories, mining, waste dumps, telephone masts		Allen and Jones 1990, Allen 2004 Mac Sheoin 1999
	Turfcutters/contractors	Galway, Roscommon	O'Flynn 2012

A quick history

The following brief history of rural unrest is necessarily incomplete, due to some movements being unresearched in any depth. It's also important to note that, at various stages, agrarian unrest resulted from, and was often highly interconnected with, other political developments in Ireland, which lie beyond the scope of this essay. The most obvious of these is the connection with the nationalist movement. However one particular example needs to be cited, the movements spearheaded by Daniel O'Connell. The early nineteenth century saw a number of campaigns which mobilised vast numbers of rural and urban dwellers nationally, first for Catholic emancipation (by repeal of the Penal laws) in the 1820s and then for repeal (of the Act of Union) in the 1830s and 1840s. These massive popular campaigns were characterised on the one hand by monster meetings and on the other by organisation and fund-raising on a parish basis. While O'Connell consistently denounced violent methods and agrarian outrages the mobilisation of vast numbers undoubtedly represented a threat: failure to negotiate with O'Connell would have consequences. However the middle-class leadership were occasionally worried when these supporters began to mobilise independently from orders from above (Owens 1997). This represented the initial appearance of the cross-class alliance that was basic to the nationalist movement, an alliance which, while it mobilised the lower orders, provided no benefits to them.

As always, problems of nomenclature exist. The Whiteboys were a movement in the 1860s in the counties of Munster, but the designation was widely used for agrarian movements in other areas and at other times. Similarly Ribbonism was a term widely used in the nineteenth century to describe various local groups. Broeker (1970) deals with this problem by using the generic term *banditti*. The problem is inherent in the type of movement we're dealing with and whether the movements involved supralocal organisation or local efforts by different groups, which were conveniently classed together as a movement. Lady Moira is reported to have believed that the Hearts of Steel movement was not a single entity, but consisted of local units often operating under different names, with examples being Hearts of Gold, Hearts of Thunder, Hearts of Flint and Regulators. (Magennis 1998:180). Powell develops this point further when he observes that 'The Oakboy case is useful in looking at the way an umbrella term for a popular protest movement could cover not only different religious affiliations but also aims that would have been anathema to sections of its support. Thus the Oakboys could contain a core leadership of Presbyterians espousing anti-Catholic rhetoric while in, say, Monaghan and Cavan it was highly likely that the Oakboys were predominantly Catholic. Similarly, both Protestant Steelboys in Ulster and Catholic Defenders in Meath chose not to use the generic name for their protest group, but instead called themselves 'Regulators". (Powell 2005:264-265).

Houghers

The first agrarian unrest appeared in Iar Connacht in the west of Co. Galway in October 1711. By January 1712 the unrest reached Co Mayo and by the end of February 1812 Hougher outrages were reported in counties Sligo, Leitrim, Roscommon, Fermanagh and Clare. The cause of the unrest was the removal of small occupiers from lands converted to pasture for sheep and cattle. The outrages consisted of attacks on the livestock that had taken the place of the evicted, either by killing them outright or by cutting their hamstrings (houghing them). These attacks backed up demands by Hougher proclamations which detailed how much land farmers or gentlemen were allowed to hold, as well as permitted stock numbers on these holdings, with the rest of their lands to be let 'to poor people, according to the former rates' (quoted in Connolly 1985:52).

Thus the first example of agrarian unrest showed what was to be a characteristic of most such episodes in being regulatory in nature, specifying acceptable levels of landholdings, etc. Government response in November 1711 proclaimed maiming of sheep, cattle or horses to be a felony punishable by death, with levels of monetary rewards offered for discovery of those responsible increasing as the unrest spread. The disturbances apparently subsided by July 1812 and 'certainly by the end of the year', though Connolly (1985:58) notes 'there is nothing to indicate why this happened'. To back up local elites' attempts at repression, military units were dispatched to Ballintobe, Castlebar, Tuam, Carrick-on-Shannon, Jamestown and two locations in Roscommon. Connolly reports this to be a cross-class movement: 'the involvement of members of the landed class both as protectors of the Houghers and as actual participants in attacks on livestock was one of the most distinctive features of the movement, setting it clearly apart from the later agitations of the Whiteboys and similar groups' (Connolly 1985:60). Four prisoners were tried in Galway in April 1712 and two more in June 1712: the former four were sentenced to hang and one is known to have been hung and quartered, a fate that also befell the latter pair.

Whiteboys

While 18th century agrarian agitation is generally seen as beginning with the isolated case of the Houghers in 1711-1713 and then disappearing until the appearance of the Whiteboys in the 1760s, it seems unlikely that that half-century was bereft of rural unrest and that the Whiteboys emerged fully formed from nothing. For Ulster, for example, Magennis (1998:173) reports the Hearts of Oak were preceded by 'combinations and the intimidation of tithe farners in the 1750s'. Powell (2011) reports on the houghing of soldiers in towns and cities, while Watt (2015) reports on opposition to tax collection, and Dickson reports on opposition to enclosures on the Kildare/Meath border in 1753 (Dickson 2016: 64-65). Whiteboy activity from 1769 to 1776 stretched from Tipperary to Kilkenny, Carlow, Waterford, Wexford, Kildare and Queen's County (Laois).

The Whiteboys first appeared in late 1761 in the area between Clogheen and Ballyporeen in Co Tipperary in response to tithe-farming and the enclosure of commonage, resulting in the levelling of fences and those involved becoming known as Levellers. The movement spread to Co. Limerick early in 1762, when large groups mobilised at night, demolishing fences and administering oaths. The movement then spread to Waterford and Cork; in the latter county groups mobilising in large numbers at night called themselves fairies, 'enclosures were the principal grievance, and again ditches were levelled, walls were knocked down , and some cattle killed' (Donnelly 1978:24). The state's repressive response led to the disturbances abating , with Limerick quiet and only occasional activity in Cork and Waterford. In March 1763 Whiteboys became active in Kilkenny, but were quickly repressed with eighteen being jailed. In late 1764 and 1765 the movement bloomed again in Kilkenny, with the motive being not enclosure but tithes of corn and potatos. Only in Tipperary did the movement maintain its strength between 1763 and 1765, with some 14,000 insurgents estimated to be involved in March 1763.

Donnelly (1978:33) argued that the opposition to enclosure was not related to commonage: 'it was an expression of intense popular resentment against the keeping of land from tillage', with deerparks, orchards and demesnes being the object of attacks due to being 'seen as eminently suitable for the cultivation of potatoes', often after the landlords had either refused to let such lands for conacre or demanded exorbitant rent for them. These lower class demands were a reflection of the composition of the movement, members of which were predominantly cottiers and labourers, though many town labourers and craftsmen were also involved. State repression in March 1762 involved elite troops sweeping through the towns and countryside of the four disturbed counties, with some five hundred suspected Levellers jailed by May 1762. However repression was tempered by acquittals and judicial and jury lenience: over all the period only twenty-six were capitally convicted, twelve by the 1762 special commission, three in Clonmel in 1763 and eleven in Kilkenny in 1765. What ended the first wave of the Whiteboy movement was not repression but a subsistence crisis, with conditions in early 1766 'bordering on mass starvation'. (Donnelly 1978:52).

The second wave of the Whiteboy movement began in 1769, grew slowly in the years to 1771, increasing in intensity to a climax in 1775 before retreating in disarray the following year in response to military repression, formation of vigilante groups (volunteer companies) by local gentry and a large number of executions. The second wave was strongest again in Kilkenny and Tipperary, but its geographical expansion went in a different direction, to Laois, Carlow, Wexford and even Kildare. While this expansion related to economic factors 'the rebels themselves widened the frontiers of revolted. They frequently travelled considerable distances to seize arms and ammunition, to requisition horses, to punish transgressors of their regulations and to extract contributions… the rebels of different areas often collaborated in supralocal operations and their leaders were adept at manipulating extensive networks of mobilisation' (Donnelly 1983a:295-296). Another change was the expansion of grievances to tithes of corn, exorbitant rents and evictions, leading to the addition to their traditional base of cottiers, labourers and tradesmen of farmers and their sons, while labourer grievances included antipathy against migrant workers. Opposition to tithes resulted in assaults on proctors, while opposition to evictions and land-grabbing involved opposition to distraint for non-payment of rent and intimidation and violence against incoming tenants.

The repressive response was unsuccessful, with only thirteen sentenced to death between 1770 and 1774, with many acquitted or found guilty on lesser charges, while charges often failed due to lack of informers and witnesses. This failure of repression changed in 1775, when the arrival of additional military forces encouraged local magistrates and gentry to act, including the recruitment and arming of vigilantes (counter-gangs), while the murder of the well-connected magistrate Ambrose Power near Fethard,. Co. Tipperary in November 1775 galvanised the ruling class into action, with an offer of £4600 for information leading to convictions, which jurypacking assisted. The first four months of 1776 saw thirty condemned to death, six in Tipperary, six in Carlow, six in Kilkenny and twelve in Laois: of these only two were convicted of murder, while up to ten were sentenced to die for robbing arms. Donnelly (1983a: 331) concludes ‘A combination of naked military force and judicial terror thus enabled the governing elite to surmount the crisis of authority produced by the greatly increased scale, scope and violence of the Whiteboys’ challenge in 1775’.

Oakboys

The protests by the Hearts of Oak (or Oakboys) in mid- and south Ulster which resembled a veritable popular uprising in July 1763 began in north Armagh and spread to the counties of Down, Tyrone, Derry, Fermanagh, Monaghan and Cavan. In the words of Donnelly (1981:21) : ‘The Oakboy upheaval was a mass movement drawing support (in varying degrees) from all social groups below the landed, professional and commercial elites’. While some have described it as a Presbyterian movement, it also found support among lower-class Catholics and Protestants. The movement’s tactics involved the assembly of large, intimidating crowds which visited the houses of local landlords and Anglican clergy and demanding that the former lower the county cess (local taxes or rates) while the latter were to abandon their demands for ‘small dues’, and later the calling of these worthies before large crowds in nearby towns. The movement was spread from its original centres by means of marches through the countryside and into the towns, resulting in similar marches in these new counties to swear their gentlemen and clergy in a similar manner. Crowds assembled were reported in some cases to be 8,000, 12,000 and even 20,000 strong. The objections to increased local taxes (cess) for road-building was not unconnected to suspicions the local elite were voting public money to build roads in their estates and demesnes. The small dues –for christenings, marriages and funerals- were collected by Anglican clergy from those to whom they did not provide these services –dissenting Protestants and Catholics.

The popular enthusiasm for these activities dissipated rapidly however when in response the state dispatched military reinforcements to the affected areas.

Generally the appearance of troops led to crowds dispersing, though in an encounter at Watte Bridge in Co. Fermanagh Oakboys retreating from Cavan were involved in a skirmish that left nine dead and many injured. On 25 July when some 5000 Oakboys stoned three military companies near Newtownstewart the troops fired, killing four and taking 77 prisoners. In the trials that followed the state overreached itself by charging Oakboys with treason. 'At Armagh, Omagh and Monaghan not a single capital conviction could be secured by the crown lawyers. In every case juries acquitted the alleged Oakboys brought to trial'. (Donnelly 1981: 20; Magennis 1998).

Steelboys

The Steelboy agitation, which began in 1770, was longer lasting, perhaps because the causes being contested involved access to land and rent and involved a response to 'a general tendency in the 1760s for landowners in Ulster to replace poor tenants by solvent ones and to raise rents by letting to the highest bidder' (Maguire 1979: 356). This pressure was exemplified in the case of Lord Donegall's estate, where a wholesale expiry of leases had given him the opportunity to increase his unsatisfactory return from his rentals, a return now urgently needed to pay for Capability Browne's improvements on the Lord's estate near Lichfield in England. The trouble began in response to the first middlemen on Lord Donegall's estates who pressed for higher rent. In 1769 three farmers' houses were burnt and disturbances spread to neighbouring estates in 1770, with cattle houghed on land held by middlemen ['the nature of the reprisals against them suggests they may have placed their cattle on the lands of tenants whom they had dispossessed' (Donnelly 1981: 37)].

Steelboys now began to operate by day, their greatest manifestation being at Belfast on the 23rd December when 500 to 600 of them marched armed into Belfast to demand the release of a captured comrade, burning down a middleman's house and losing three Steelboys in a fire-fight with soldiers before heading home with the released man. Things went reasonably quiet then, though protests spread to Co. Down in 1771 and later that year reached Armagh, Derry and Tyrone. Great was the alarm among the gentry: 'large bands of Steelboys, occasionally numbering in the thousands, completely overrun the northern tip' (Donnelly 1981:40) of Co. Derry in 1772. Judicious exertions by magistrates and military quietened the area, but renewed protests broke out in Co. Down. In March 1772 after a magistrate took four Steelboy leaders into custody in Gilford, Co. Armagh, his premises was assaulted by a large group of Steelboys – some 2000 – and in the subsequent 'Battle of Gilford' he was forced to flee for his life and swim the river Bann to escape his pursuers.

Donnelly (1981:44) describes the Steelboys' grievances as 'excessive rents, eviction, exorbitant food prices, heavy county cess.' Their rank and file were weavers and small farmers, but some larger farmers became Steelboy captains. The main tactic involved threatening letters, with violence often following if warnings were ignored. The violence was normally against the property of canting[20] or evicting landlords and tenants who collaborated with them, killing or maiming the cattle of the former and burning the sheds and houses of the latter. Maguire (1979:354) reports the movement 'consisted of locally organized groups which, though they proclaimed similar aims and expressed their protest in similar ways- had no common leadership or direction and did not appear to concert their activities'.

The state responded in early 1772 with a special crimes bill rushed through parliament and substantial military numbers sent north. The Steelboys lost four in encounters with troops at Coleraine, nine at Clady and seven at Grange, despite Steelboys vastly outnumbering their military opponents. One result of the government repression was an increase in emigration by those on the run, though in the event the state was unimpressed with the results of its efforts. With failures to convict in the local assizes (court sessions) eleven men were brought from Down and Armagh to Dublin for trial in August: alas for the government, the jury took 'only 17 minutes to find all the charged not guilty'; they were helped in this decision by the state's incompetence, with crown witnesses proferring only circumstantial evidence and failing to positively identify the defendants. The crown was more successful in Antrim in April 1772, when judicious jury packing resulted in nine death sentences, at least seven of which were executed in Carrickfergus in May 1772. Depressed by their failures in court, the government issued a limited pardon in November 1772.

Rightboys

The Rightboy movement first appeared around Mallow, Co. Cork in August 1785 with the appearance of notices opposing the customary system of payment of tithes: from here it spread south and southeast. Later that year and early in the next, disturbances appeared in north Kerry with armed men requisitioning horses, administering oaths and destroying hay and corn such that 'by March 1786 reports circulated of a general rising affecting the whole upper portion of north Kerry' (Donnelly 1977/1978: 130) from where it spread into west Limerick. In December 1785 Laois, Tipperary and Kilkenny saw major mobilisation by Rightboys, with greater violence than in the cases of Cork, Kerry and Limerick. In 1786 a new tactic appeared whereby unarmed crowds marched from parish to parish administering oaths. 'By June the Rightboys were employing [this tactic] systematically throughout Cork and Limerick' (Donnelly 1977/1978: 132). These musters involved significant numbers with some five to six thousand assembling near Killarney, Co. Kerry on July 30th and between six and seven thousand meeting in Milltown, Co. Cork in August. Similar mobilisations occurred in Limerick, Tipperary, Laois and Kilkenny, with some mobilisation occurring in Co. Waterford in September and October 1786. In September the Rightboys appeared in Co. Clare, from where they spread to Co. Galway.

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[20] Canting involved auctioning off a landholding to the highest bidder.

While cottiers and day labourers formed the majority of the Rightboys, there was also involvement by larger farmers and, in Co. Cork, by some anti-clerical gentry; the urban poor, including textile workers and labourers on outlying farms, were heavily involved in some areas and a disproportionate number of Rightboy leaders lived in towns. The success of the Rightboys in expanding their movement beyond the ranks of cottiers and labourer resulted from their target –tithes- which greviously affected their own members: pasture land was exempt from tithes but potato land was not, with the result that in the south the main burden of supporting Protestant ministers fell on the poorest section of society, a burden increased by the exactions of tithe farmers, proctors and cantors. A wholesale change of land use to grain production in the late 1780s brought many larger farmers under the tithe system, which explains the wider support the Rightboys received. The Rightboys used traditional methods to inconvenience tithe collection by large numbers of parishioners setting out their tithes for collection on the same day and added a new method by creating tables of tithe payments acceptable to the Rightboys, backed up by intimidation and violence against both clergy and their agents, including the destruction of their records, valuation books and bonds; this was an attempt to remove all middlemen from the tithes system. The Rightboys also opposed the high exaction of dues by Catholic clergymen, who denounced the movement from the altars but eventually agreed to accept lower payments for their spiritual services.

What was surprising about the Rightboys was the minimal amount of actual violence that accompanied their massive mobilisation. While they occasionally indulged in ‘carefully staged rituals of violence’ (Donnelly 1977/1978: 182) they were few in number and only six murders were attributed to them. The reaction by local magistrates to the movement was minimal though in certain areas the gentry mobilised effectively against the movement. During the autumn of 1786 a show of military power in the disturbed areas led to a decline in Rightboy activity with little conflict, but a revival of Rightboy activity in Cork and Galway in the following winter led to major coercion acts the the following spring, with an increase in convictions and death sentences for Rightboys at the 1787 assizes, though the latter were low, with only nineteen capitally convicted and many others given mild punishment, with intimidation of witnesses strongly evident in many cases. Still increased repression, and the increased resistance of a previously supine gentry, sapped the movement’s vitality and the movement slowly dissipated.

Peep o’ Day Boys

Miller argues ‘that the Peep o’ Day Boys originated before the 1780s, not as a sectarian movement but as a group of insurgents which Arthur Young classified with the Steelboys and Oakboys’ (Powell 2005:264). Powell (2005) has traced the first appearance of the Peep o’ Day Boys to Co. Meath in November 1976 where they consisted of a Catholic faction centred in Athboy and, for the first half of 1777, reports Peep o’ Day Boys in Kerry, Mayo and Roscommon, which he suggests were offshoots of the Whiteboys. The most famous group of Peep o’

Day Boys arose in Co. Armagh in the 1780s in response to a number of grievances, one of which was agrarian: that landlords' changing attitudes to Catholics as tenants meant Protestants –until then favoured as tenants- faced competition from Catholics for land, while another cause was upset caused to the traditional social order by improving landlords. At the same time changes in the linen industry were proletarianising the previously independent rural weavers.

The Armagh Peep o' Day Boys grew from previous factions (for details see McEvoy 1986) which in 1784 began raiding Catholic homes to search for arms, possession of which by Catholics was illegal under the Penal laws. In response Catholic groups calling themselves Defenders arose and after 1788 conflict between these two groups changed from traditional arranged fights at markets and other occasions to confrontations at large demonstrations, while the conflict itself became more deadly: prior to 1788 there were only two deaths and no executions, while 1788 to 1791 saw nine deaths and seven executions. In 1795 the defining fight which explains the long-term importance of the Peep o' Day Boys occurred at the Diamond, a cross-roads at Loughgall, Co. Armagh, with estimates of Defenders' deaths between 16 and 48. 'Protestants followed up their victory with a series of raids on Catholic homes over the next few months, which had the purpose of driving Catholics out of the county. Meanwhile, Protestants who had fought at the Diamond organised the society which came to be known as the Loyal Orange Order' (Miller 1983:180). As Kelly (1986:341) notes, after this '[m]any Catholics fled from Ulster to counties Leitrim, Sligo, Mayo and Roscommon and Defenderism moved south with them'

Defenders/ Anti-militia

Kelly (1986) reports two intense periods of Defenderism in Leitrim, first in opposition to the Militia Act in 1793 and again in the spring of 1795 over agrarian concerns with tithes and rents. While Defenders have been presented as mainly sectarian and political, Defenders in Roscommon also forced graziers to lower rents and raise wages. (Powell 2015:260). Though the Defenders were strongly involved in resistance to the raising of a militia in 1793 the opposition to the militia was not confined to areas where the Defenders were strong. The opposition to the militia, while important in itself[21], is significant also due to Bartlett's interpretation of it as the end of the 'moral economy' in Ireland. In Leinster Bartlett (1987) reports opposition in Carlow, Kilkenny (where the colliers threatened to flood the mines), Laois, Meath (where there had been clashes previously between Defenders and Orangemen) and Wexford. In Carlow in May seven *banditti* were killed when a large group attacked the Sheriff and 22 dragoons; the same month in Athboy, Co. Meath, two soldiers were killed when a crowd they had attacked returned fire; in July in Wexford an attempt to release prisoners led troops to fire on a crowd, killing anything between nine and one hundred, depending on which source you believe. In Munster Kerry and Limerick were strongest in their opposition, with troops shooting twelve among a crowd of some five thousand which attacked a militia ballot session in Dingle, Co. Kerry in June; in July Limerick was reported to be in ‘a state of complete insurrection’ ; later that month troops were fired on in Bruff, houses were burned in Kilfinan, but the county was quietened by the arrival of more troops with a threat to burn and raze to the ground any town from which shots were fired at troops.

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[21] Opposition to conscription was also important in the case of the Molly Maguires in Pennsylvania (Bulik 2015: 172-182. 193-202) while other campaigns against conscription in Ireland were also waged (Drumm n.d.) including, of course, during the war of independence.

In Ulster things were generally quiet but for a riot in Castlereagh. In Connaught it was a different story. In Leitrim, disturbances began with arms raids on big houses; a traditional attempt by a large group of Defenders to free prisoners in Carrick-on-Shannon led to a clash with dragoons in which nine or ten Defenders were killed and the only injury to the dragoons was the death of a horse; in May five or six were killed in Manorhamilton during a clash with troops, following by an over-zealous mopping up operation in which the military brought the death toll to between twenty and thirty. (Kelly 1986). In Boyle, Co Roscommon, nineteen rioters were killed and, in a clash in Erris, Co. Mayo, between badly-armed locals and troops, some thirty-six rioters were killed. Bartlett (1987:212) comments ‘In just over eight weeks, as many as 230 lives had been lost throughout Ireland in violent protests against the embodiment of a militia. This was over five times the number of casualties sustained in the previous thirty years of agrarian disturbances in Ireland’.

Bartlett notes that anti-Militia rioters also raised traditional agrarian slogans related to tithes and rents. In the spring of 1795 it was these complaints that remobilised Defenders in Leitrim, with arms raids on houses, marches at night and attacks on cattle and crops. An encounter in April 1795 near Keshcarrigan when revenue policeman searching for illegal stills shot a man who’d complained of their shooting his dog (which had bitten one of the police) led to the death of eleven police officers when a large crowd of locals burned the house in which the police had taken refuge on Drumcollop hill. Following this troops saturated south Leitrim: ‘Houses were raided in the night and some were set on fire, people were arrested, some tortured, some hanged. This policy of terrorizing the area had the desired effect’ (Kelly 1986:352). In May this quiet was reinforced when the military ‘rounded up a large number of men from Roscommon, Leitrim and Sligo and had them sent to sea to boost the English fleet in their war with France’ (Kelly 1986: 353). After this Defenderism declined in Leitrim and elsewhere and was then subsumed into the revolutionary movement known as the United Irishmen.

Threshers

In 1806-1807 the Threshers were active in five counties in Connacht: Mayo, Sligo, Leitrim, Roscommon and Longford. Originally regulating tithes and priests’ dues, they extended their concern to local wage rates for agricultural and industrial labourers. Beginning in Co. Mayo, groups of Threshers attacked houses for arms and swore rural dwellers to pay only those rates set by Captain Thresher, threatening to card [22] those who ignored instructions. In September, disturbances spread to Sligo and the same month alleged Threshers were arrested on the word of an informer, who was murdered in a public house in November by Threshers, seven of whom were hung after a Special Commission held hearings in the five affected counties. A number of other Threshers were sentenced to death, others to transportation, others to prison and public whippings. (McCartney 1987)

Caravats and Shanavests

According to Roberts (1983:66) 'Between 1806 and 1811 the Caravat-Shanavest conflict seriously disturbed large areas of Tipperary, Waterford, Kilkenny, Limerick and Cork, began to spread into Laois, Carlow and Wexford and briefly touched Clare, Kerry and Kildare –eleven counties in all.' Originally dismissed as another example of faction fighting (a popular type of recreational violence), research has shown this to be an example of rural class struggle. Roberts describes the Caravats as 'a kind of primitive syndicalist movement whose aim was apparently to absorb as many of the poor as possible into a network of autonomous local groups, each exercising thoroughgoing control over its local economy, and the whole adding up to a generalised alternative system' (Roberts 1983:66) while the Shanavests was a middle-class anti-Whiteboy movement formed to respond to the Caravats using vigilantism and informing. The Shanavest and Caravat conflict was an extension of a previous conflict in southeast Tipperary between 1802 and 1805 when a Whiteboy campaign by a group of labourers and small farmers who came to be known as the Moyle Rangers against land-grabbing by comfortable Catholic farmers involved twelve murders and six or seven attempted murders, which came to an end when the Rangers' leaders was hanged in Clonmel, Co. Tipperary in 1805.

The Caravat movement was strongest in Tipperary and Waterford, the area of Munster with the most commercially developed agriculture, with groups based , on the one hand, in towns and villages where they drew on agricultural day labourers and industrial workers, and, on the other hand, on remote hill districts with clachan settlements and widespread collective tenure. The movement appears to have consisted of locally-based groups with no formal organisation but a common oath of solidarity. The main aims were to restrain landgrabbing, reduce rents and regulate wages and the price of food. Their preferred tactic was a night raid in disguise, armed and on 'borrowed' horses: three warnings were given before physical attacks, normally beatings. They also expanded much energy expanding their movement into new districts, with large groups travelling impressive distances before splitting up into smaller raiding parties. They also paraded in large numbers at fairs and markets, where they often fought with Shanavest contingents. The latter was based on middle-class remnants of the United Irishmen, with a nationalist ideology, an oath and elaborate passwords and were mainly drawn from the farming class: their exploits took place during the day, mainly assaults –occasionally fatal- against prominent Caravats, and occurred in the winter of 1808-1809, after which their main activity was informing. By 1810 when the Caravats had spread into Kilkenny, west Tipperary, east Limerick and north Cork the government responded by flooding the Caravat strongholds with soldiers and opening a special commission in February 1811 which sentenced twenty to death and seventeen to be transported, imprisoned or flogged, devastating the movement: the prisoners hailed from Tipperary, Waterford and Kilkenny. Roberts suggests the movements continued at least up to the famine, with groups operating in the 1820s in west Tipperary, east Limerick, east Cork, south Laois, north and west Kilkenny and with some presence in Carlow, Wexford and Offaly. (Roberts 1983)

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[22] According to Huggins (2007:7) 'carding involved the tearing of flesh with a comb used for carding wool'.

Rockites

Donnelly traces the origin of the Rockite movement to the replacement in 1818 of a previously indulgent land agent on the estates of Viscount Courtenay near Newcastle West in Co. Limerick with an oppressive new agent who went about the collection of arrears and the increasing of rents in a manner guaranteed to create resistance. In the ensuing disturbances the agent's son was shot dead and a number of the agent's workers were shot, while some of the agent's informers were murdered. This successful example of resistance –the agent was removed and demanded rent reductions granted- inspired further action, which was also propelled by an economic crisis beginning in 1819. By the end of October 1821 much of west Limerick was in uproar, with arms robberies, swearing of oaths and threatening notices being accompanied by serious violence, including the assassination of Major Richard Going, previously head of the Co. Limerick police. Rockism began to appear in Co. Kerry in October 1821, with one of the estates being affected that of Daniel O'Connell.

The movement in Cork was even more successful with, in January 1822, something close to open insurrection with bands of hundreds of men attacking homes while searching for arms in various parts of the county. Large numbers of men then took to the hills with groups of 5,000 gathering near Millstreet, while clashes with the army took place near Macroom, Newmarket and Kanturk. The large, badly-armed Rockite crowds were no match for the trained and well-armed military and the movement collapsed after they were routed in these encounters. The movement spread to Tipperary in November 1821 with areas around Cashel, Clare and Clonmel demanding reductions in tithes and rents, and then to Kilkenny, with much of south Kilkenny 'almost under the Whiteboy dominion' by April 1822. In its heartland of west Limerick the movement reached new heights in the spring of 1822, with at least ten murders attributed to the Rockites and some thirty to forty houses belonging to land stewards or landgrabbers burned from February to April 1822. By April however the movement was in retreat as the 1822 subsistence crisis ‘by turning human energies to the immediate and urgent task of finding sufficient food to preserve the lives and health of one’s family and kin, dissolved the broader bonds of collective action’ (Donnelly 2009:81).

Terry Alts

The Terry Alts were a movement that grew out of sectarian struggle in Dysart, near Corofin, Co. Clare, where a landlord’s agent, a fundamentalist Christian, introduced bible schools for the children of his tenants. During the winter of 1829 the Terry Alts transformed into an ‘aggressive guarantor of the food supply of the poor… during 1830 the main emphasis was on controlling the price of potatoes and maintaining a supply for the poorest classes’ (Enright 2008: 221). In June 1830 large crowds, estimated at between 500 and 3000, toured the county laying down a price for potatoes. The movement increased and at its peak in 1831 ‘it extended into almost all of Clare’s nine baronies, as well as into south Galway, large parts of Limerick and a much smaller portion of Tipperary’ (Donnelly 1994:34) The Terry Alts used the full gamut of agrarian tactics, levelling ditches and walls at night and driving off cattle, raiding for arms, attacking persons and houses and meeting en masse during the day to dig up pasture land, when crowds of hundreds and sometimes over a thousand marched in military order to musical accompaniment to the fields to be dug up. Some 591 cases of these ‘illegal meetings’ were recorded from January to May in Clare: ‘this mass popular mobilization, the largest of its kind in the pre-famine period, was a giant food-riot Irish style’ (Donnelly 1994:34). In May the authorities counter-attacked, bringing large forces of police and military to confront the crowds, arresting hundreds and committing many for trial; eventually some 18 Terry Alts were hanged, 58 transported and 40 jailed.

Tithe war

While tithes had been a constant complaint among many agrarian movements, the opposition developed during the 1830s into a regional tithe war. This war involved a change in aim as well: Gibbons’ analysis of threatening letters and notices found that while some threatening letters up to 1827 or 1828 seek to regulate rather than abolish tithes ‘by 1831, the letters reflect widespread resistance to any payment’ (Gibbons 2004:30). Beginning in Graiguenamanagh, Co. Kilkenny, in a dispute between a parish priest and the local rector, which led to a request to the rector for a reduction in tithes, which, being refused, led to refusal to pay any tithe at all. In December 1830 a large anti-tithe meeting was held at Bennetsbridge, Co. Kilkenny, and the tithe movement spread to adjoining counties, often under the cover of hurling matches when the tithe meetings were declared illegal. In January 1831 hurling matches were declared illegal, but legally constituted meetings were permitted. ‘As passive resistance spread like wildfire through Munster and South Leinster in 1831-2, tithe collection became “utterly impossible” ’ (HigginsMcHugh 2011: 87).

The resistance did not stay passive for long, with a tithe riot erupting in Newtownbarry (now Bunclody), Co. Wexford, with the yeomanry (a Protestant militia) shooting fourteen people dead after they and the police were stoned. (de Val 1972). Other riots followed at Athboy, Co. Tyrone, Carrigeen in Co. Kilkenny, near Carrickmacross, Co. Cavan, Desert, Co. Cork, Keady, Co. Armagh and elsewhere, which gives some indication of the spread of the movement. 'About eighty country people were killed and nearly two hundred wounded in these affrays' (HigginsMcHugh 2011: 80). In Carrickshock, Co. Kilkenny in December 1831 an affray resulted in twelve police deaths, the death of the process-server and three locals. Following another massacre at Rathcormac, Co. Cork, (HigginsMcHugh 2011: 87) where soldiers killed twelve and wounded forty-two, the new under-secretary restricted the use of security force escorts for tithe collection in October 1835. In 1838 a Tithe Commutation Act was introduced which reduced tithes by a quarter, while transferring payments to rent payments. Tithes were eventually abolished in 1869.

Tommy Downshires

While northeast Ulster is generally seen as barren ground in the nineteenth century for agrarian protest 'between 1829 and 1847 waves of Tommy Downshire protest, sometimes involving both Catholics and Protestants, erupted against landlord and capitalist linen manufacturers' (Blackstock 2007:125). In 1829 these protests opposed the export of potatoes, in 1830 opposed high rents, tithes, cess and evictions, in 1831-35 agrarian issues and in 1842 threats to reduce weavers' wages. The protests drew on local protest traditions from the 18th century and showed great tactical and strategic sophistication, taking advantage of factional differences among the local elite: 'the appropriation of the traditional mobilization rituals of both Oakboys and Orangemen were paralleled by distinctly modern protest methods like the organizational sophistication of committees and using the newspaper press for propaganda. At the same time as bonfires blazed on Shane Hill, threatening letters arrived by penny post and notices calling meetings were professionally printed' (Blackstock 2007:168-169). Through these methods and the judicious use of the threat of violence, these movements succeeded in wresting concessions from the local elite, both landed and manufacturing.

Ribbonism

While Ribbonism has been used as a general designation for agrarian activists in the pre-famine era by both the state and some recent academic historians, the Ribbon Societies seem to have been a lower-class nationalist movement, mainly urban in orientation and membership, which descended from the Defenders and the United Irishmen, with a complicated hierarchy and an extensive use of passwords, a strong tendency to factionalism and a lack of any considerable achievements: as McCartney (1987:87) notes 'no secret society was more ineffective in its practical achievements'. Between 1822 and 1840 two Ribbon networks existed, one centred on Dublin, the other on Ulster: the Dublin one was smashed by the police in 1839 and in 1840 its grand secretary was sentenced to seven years transportation. (Beames 1987a). While in some cases Ribbon Societies undertook agrarian activities, its mainly urban orientation and nationalist nature leaves it outside our scope. In some cases, such as Sligo, it has been interpreted as a variety of protection racket (Kelly 2008) though the same author's presentation of Ribbonism in Co. Leitrim in 1841 has the organisation operating as an agrarian one. (Kelly 2003). Ribbonism also extended to Irish communities in England. (Belchem 1994).

Molly Maguires

The Molly Maguires, seen by some as an outgrowth of Ribbonism, appeared in late 1844 in Leitrim and west Cavan, with the usual night-time arms raids, oath-taking and assaults, resulting in a special magistrate, John MacLeod, being despatched from Fermanagh to deal with the threat, along with police reinforcements and a military detachment. Captain MacLeod was assassinated on January 29, 1845; in May a land agent was assassinated at Ballyconnell, Co. Cavan and in June another magistrate, George Booth Bell, was assassinated at Crossdoney, Co. Cavan. The activities of the Molly Maguires spread into the neighbouring counties of Roscommon, Longford, Sligo and Donegal. As Bulik (2015) notes 'for 1846, the overwhelming majority of Molly Maguire incidents concerned access to land and food'. In Roscommon, for example, the Mollies' activities accompanied a major campaign to force graziers to let conacre, with large groups assembling to dig up some of the county's best grassland, accompanied by the usual intimidation, with occasional murders such as that of Major Mahon (Coleman 1999; Duffy 2007, Vesey 2008). The Mollies campaign continued into the early years of the famine before dying out as the people's capacity for resistance was weakened by hunger, devastation and death. (Food riots and other responses to famine and subsistence srises are dealt with below and summarised in Table 5.) The Molly Maguires reappeared in the 1870s in the mining districts of Pennsylvania in the US. (Broehl 1983, Kenny 1998, Bulik 2015).

Tenants' associations/leagues

The 1850s saw the setting up of various associations to fight for the rights of tenant farmers, with the first such association established in Callan, Co. Kilkenny in October 1849 and some twenty-eight similar societies being established by 1850, mainly in the provinces of Munster and Leinster. These groups, mainly composed of relatively prosperous tenant farmers, called for the lowering of rents and fixity of tenure. At the same time in Ulster, a movement arose to defend the 'Ulster custom' (informal rights of tenants in Ulster, including security of tenure and the right to sell one's interest to a new tenant with landlord's approval). Both these groups came together at a national meeting in May 1850, attended by some 200 delegates, which led to the formation of a national organisation, the Tenant League. The local organisations that formed the base for the League largely disappeared in the mid-1850s due to improvements in agricultural prices. While the period between the famine and the Land War which began in 1879 is generally seen as quiet, Howell (2013:93) notes outrages 'were especially perpetrated during 1849-52, 1862-64 and 1868-70, periods of economic difficulty'.

The Land War

The long land war was a war with three phases which stretched from 1879 to at least 1910; each phase had its own organisation: the land war, which stretched from 1879 to 1882, involved the Land League, originally a local Mayo organisation which was quickly organised nationally and then transnationally; this was followed from 1886 to 1891 by the Plan of Campaign, where the organisation involved was the Irish National League; the third phase, involving the United Irish League (UIL), began in 1898 and continued for most of the first decade of the twentieth century. The origins of the first phase can be found in two sources: on the one hand, in the resurgence of smallholder grievances in the west, impelled by a local subsistence crisis that threatened famine; on the other hand, by a partial and temporary alliance between physical force nationalists (the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), popularly known as the |Fenians) and those following the parliamentary road.

On 16 August 1879 the National Land League of Mayo was formed, followed by the formation of the Irish National Land League in Dublin on October 21st. The deradicalization of the movement can be seen in the change from the Mayo organisation's demand of 'The land for the people' to the more reformist demand for rent reduction prioritised by the national organisation. If the Land League began to answer the grievances of western smallholders, its extension nationwide changed both its base and the demands it advanced. 'By the middle of 1880 the emphasis was geared increasingly towards the graziers of the east and the south in what Matthew Harris described as "the union of the shark with its prey". ' (Moran 1994:200). The policy used to attract support for the Land League from larger farmers, who had both more to gain if their rent was reduced but also more to lose if they were evicted, was called 'rent at the point of a bayonet'. Keyes (2011:131) describes it thus: 'The new policy asked only that tenants delay paying the rent, not refuse to pay it. When the legal process ran its course and eviction loomed, the farmer could then pay the rent 'at the point of a bayonet', and the league would pay the legal costs. It was a win-win situation for the tenant: they could seek a rent reduction, and, if this succeeded, they would be better off; if it did not they still managed to avoid eviction and did not have to pay legal costs. The Land League found it easier to get tenants to support this almost painless form of resistance, and the league itself was seen as the knight in shining armour when it intervened at the last moment to save a man's farm and stock by bidding against the 'emergency men' at sheriffs' sales.' As Keyes point out this policy was only possible as long as money kept flowing from America and the main proceedings of the Land League became the parcelling out of this money. Keyes (2011:132-3) reports ‘the correspondence from 150 branches, mostly from mid-1980 to September 1881, relates invariably to money, and in virtually every case the direction of the flow is from the centre to the branches’. The expense was such that eventually the Land League ended the policy at the end of June 1881.

League tactics included large demonstrations (from October 1879 to December 1880 the RIC reported an average of forty-six land meetings a month (Clark 1979:309)), boycotting and legal and financial assistance to tenants. These legal tactics were backed up by the traditional methods of agrarian agitation, intimidation, threatening notices and violence, with the traditional violence of the secret societies now augmented by Fenian involvement. (Michael Kelly (2014:35) reports: ‘By the end of the year [1880] it was clear that the Land League organisation in the west of Ireland was being directed by Fenians’. Rynne (2009) details Fenian involvement in west Cork). Much of this activity involved public protests against evictions, with large crowds attempting to prevent process serving and evictions. One spectacular instance involved Carraroe in Co. Galway in January 1880 with confrontation between large crowds of locals and the security forces, including the locals digging up the road to make access difficult for the army and the RIC. (Finnegan 2014:31).

The state responded to the League with coercion and concessions, coercion involving the banning of the League, with the concessions involving the Land Act of 1881 granting the three F’s – fixity of tenure, fair rent and free sale – though these concessions excluded freeholders and those in arrears, thus splitting the Land League coalition. The exclusion of those with arrears was significant as ‘in 1881 more than 100,000 tenants, one third of tenants in the country, were in arrears of up to three years’ (Finnegan 2014:104). For the details of coercion, in March 1881 the Protection of Person and Property Act suspended habeas corpus, allowing internment of ‘agitators’ resulting in 568 arrests, with 420 still in jail at the end of 1881, including Parnell and most national leaders. The Land Act allowed tenants to apply to have their rents adjudicated either in the county courts or before the Land Commission. Both measures undermined the League: in response to the Land Act the League proposed test cases should be taken in each area. Parnell was arrested in October, with other prominent national leaders following him into Kilmainham Jail, from which a No Rent manifesto was issued. On October 22nd the state responded by proclaiming the Land League an illegal organisation.

The movement was maintained by the Ladies’ Land League, set up in January 1881. However when the Land Commission began hearings in October there were a large number of applications from tenants for rent adjudication. One sign of the success of the Land Act was shown by how its land court was embraced in its first year of operation by 1130 Mayo tenants who believed themselves abandoned by the League’s national leadership. Moran (1994:202) explains ‘The Act gained acceptance in Mayo because of the small farmers’ deteriorating economic situation and the perception that the league executive was indifferent to their plight.’ Nationally the tenants also embraced the provisions of the Land Act and the No Rent Manifesto was a failure. In a compromise, the Kilmainham Treaty between Parnell and Gladstone involved, on one side, the passing of the Arrears Act of 1882, which allowed the Land Commission to cancel arrears of up to £30, and, on the other, Parnell withdrawing from land agitation, which included withdrawing the No Rent Manifesto and crushing the Ladies' Land League.

Curtis (2003) provides an excellent account of landlord response to the land war, detailing formation of eight national associations between 1879 and 1887, including the Property Defence Association, a physical force organisation. Jones (2008) presents the view of the land war taken by southern unionist newspapers (see also Maume 2011), while Mulvagh (2012) reports on the series of pamphlets published by a landlords' association, the Irish Land Committee.

The Plan of Campaign

In 1882 Parnell set up the Irish National League. While he intended the League to be purely a support organisation for the Irish Parliamentary Party when economic conditions deteriorated again in 1885 tenants began using the local branches of the League as a base for agitation, with boycotting reviving and some organisation of rent strikes and land courts (for the operation of the courts see Jordan 1998: 161-164). In response to these developments, prominent members of the League announced the Plan of Campaign in October 1886. This began the second phase of the land war, which lasted to 1891, and affected 203 estates, mainly in south and west: 75 in Munster, 71 in Connaught, 33 in Leinster and 24 in Ulster. County-wise, 32 estates in Galway, 24 in Cork, 20 in Mayo and 18 in Clare were targeted, with Donegal having nearly half the Ulster total with ten cases. The basic tactic of the Plan was for tenants on targeted estates to offer landlords what they considered a fair rent and, if the landlords refused this, to pool the withheld rents in a fund, generally administered by the Catholic clergy, to support the tenants' struggle. This was intended to ensure the campaign was self-funding as little financial assistance was flowing from the USA at this stage. The Plan was not official National League policy however and Parnell refused to support it as renewed land agitation would detract from his efforts to obtain home rule. However many National League M.P.s supported the Plan and received the attention of the police and criminal charges for doing so.

In April 1888 the Pope condemned the Plan and its associated tactic of boycotting, but his condemnation received a cold welcome, including from the Irish Catholic clergy. Funding the campaign was a consistent problem, along with government repression which saw many of the Plan's advocates jailed on and off. The landlords also organised in response to the Plan, setting up different organisations to support financially imperilled landlords, while other sources of funds were the Orange Order and financial syndicates such as that which bought the Ponsonby estate, a major target of the plan. The financial difficulties involved in supporting those evicted under the Plan weakened the campaign, which collapsed after the Kitty O'Shea divorce case when the

National League split into Parnellite and anti-Parnell factions. (Lee (1973:114) summarises the record of the campaign: 'By 1890 agreement by negotiation had been reached on 60 of the 116 estates affected by the Plan, tenant victory secured through confrontation on 24, defeat suffered on 15 while the struggle continued on 18 others.'

United Irish League (UIL)/Ranch war

In January 1898 the UIL was set up in Co. Mayo and for the first nine months of its existence was confined to the west of that county where it campaigned against both land grabbers and graziers, agitation which had been developing locally since 1895, using the usual methods and assisted in its growth by repression by the RIC. By June the UIL began to expand into south and north Mayo, and during October and November spread into Co. Galway and by early 1900 had expanded its organisation throughout the country. (Bull 2003). The Wyndham land act of 1903 is generally seen as solving the Irish land question yet one of its consequences was increased struggle against graziers and ranchers. Motivated by land hunger and the realisation of tenants that ownership of their holdings would be meaningless unless those holdings were economic, the agitation against large grazing farms and ranches resulted in a ranch war from 1906 to 1908.

The campaign began with a public meeting in October 1906 in Co. Westmeath described as 'a demonstration of all who wished to smash and finish ranching and to recover the land for the people' . The methods used were those of previous campaigns including large public meetings, resolutions at district and county councils, boycotting, some intimidation and violence and the most important tactic –cattle driving, where a grazer's cattle were driven off the grazier's land at night and relocated to other farms or left to wander the long acre, the grass verges of country roads. 'During 1907 and 1908 cattle driving became rampant in numerous parts of north Leinster, north Munster and Connacht... it reached a, peak in the second quarter of 1908, when 297 cattle drives occurred'. (Jones 1983:383). For the whole of 1907 and the first three quarters of 1908 the RIC recorded 897 cattle drives: the counties with the highest number of drives were Galway (234), Meath (137) Clare (104), Westmeath (88) and Roscommon (87). A similar rise occurred in boycotting, jumping from 174 persons boycotted in December 1905 to 889 in February 1909. (Jones 1983:383). These methods were supported by the full repertoire of agrarian agitation, with agrarian crimes increasing from 234 in 1906 to 576 in 1908, leading one official to write: 'Although cattle driving thus became the most fashionable method of operating, it is not to be assumed that other methods of terrorism and destruction were neglected. Arson, the burning of hayricks, firing into dwelling houses, spiking meadows, the mutilation of horses and cows, the destruction of turf, the damaging of machinery and various other forms of lawless violence began to increase and multiply' (Jones 1983:384).

As McNamara (2010:158) notes 'the rural wing [of the UIL] tended to co-operate with violent local secret societies in powerful alliances against large farmers', thus representing 'a clear juncture of the rural tradition of mass agitation and the threat of violence with semi-constitutional campaigns against the dominant land tenure system'. (McNamara 2010:157). The campaign was strongly supported by some elements in the UIL and League policy stressed the importance of grazing in land reform, though others in the League were unhappy with driving. The rural labour movement also supported the campaign, particularly in Meath and Westmeath. In 1909 the campaign gradually ran out of steam.

Agitation during and after the 'Irish revolution'

As noted above, while the 1903 Wyndham Land Act was seen by many as the final solution to the Irish land issue, it was a solution only for certain classes. As Ó Tuathaigh (1982) notes the various land acts which had created a peasant proprietorship 'did nothing to solve the problems of those smallholders and landless men whose main grievance had not been their status as tenants but rather the size of their holding or its poor quality, or both. In the case of landless men it was, of course, their inability to secure a holding at all.' Thus for the landless in 1917 who seized estates in Roscommon 'the old cry of 'land for the people' had the same impetus as those who broke up estates in Roscommon in 1844: 'it meant access to conacre land for survival' (Ó Tuathaigh 1982:169) Similar issues were raised by O'Neill (1933) for the 1930s, who also cited cases of death by starvation.

During the war of independence there was a resurgence in land occupations, mainly in the west. While some have suggested the IRA was strongly involved, in the words of Peader O'Donnell (quoted in Townshend 1983:371, note 1) 'in many cases volunteers were actually used to control the rural masses who would identify the national struggle with their own struggle for land' (see also Varley 1988). The reasons here were clearcut: the urban leaders of SF had no desire to threaten the respectable, middle class support the nationalist movement had received for the sake of landless labourers in the west. Indeed the continued failure of the Dublin government regarding the west was to be a constant cause of complaint and some action during the new state's existence.

There is some disagreement over exactly how revolutionary the period of the "Irish revolution" (1917-1923) actually was. Given the work of O'Connell and Kostick, especially O'Connor's stunning study of the spread of syndicalism, there can be no doubt that it was a period of intense class struggle. Some indication of this can be seen in the Labour Party's congress in 1920 which 'unanimously affirmed workers' rights to control food production, distribution and pricing, and called for the abolition of the wages system' (O'Connor 1988: 49). The most militant direct action was taken in rural areas, especially by farm labourers who combined traditional agrarian methods –threatening letters[23], violent intimidation and boycotting- with sympathetic action by organised dock, transport and other labour. Kostick (2009:221) summarises: 'it was rural Ireland that witnessed some of the most intense examples of class struggle in the period, with labourers forming red armies, taking over landlords' estates and coming into conflict with white guards of farmers.' Rurtal conflict escalated from action at farm or parish level in 1917 to county level by 1919, while county towns saw many strikes, with militancy increasing: 'it was mainly among small town and rural workers that violence took root. Riot, assault, and physical damage were the weapons most frequently employed' (O'Connor 1988: 32). In the Meath agricultural labourers' strike of 1919 pickets patrolled roads and train stations, auctions were disrupted, crops damages and cattle were driven. The sabotage campaign reached its climax on Augsut 16th when a cattle special train to Belfast organised by Meath farmers was derailed and 41 wagons were damage after fifteen feet of track was torn up.

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[23] As one example, when road workers in County Cavan destroyed six culverts to protest against redundancies in April 1923, they accompanied the action with a letter from 'Captain Moonlight" threatening anyone repairing the damage. (O'Connor 1988:113)

This period also saw the introduction of workplace occupations or soviets, mainly in pursuit of wage demands. The post-war slump saw some eighty workplace occupations in 1922, as well as eight farm strikes involving over one thousand labourers each in 1922 and 1923 as workers fought against an employers' campaign to cut wages and jobs. With victory in the civil war, the Free State government organised to regain social control, mobilising the army against labour unrest, the strongest example of which occurred in the Waterford farm labourers' strike: 'By late June, 600 Special Infantrymen were billeted in a chain of posts throughout the affected area. They guarded property, protected scabs, ands conducted arms and ammunition searches. On 4 July, a curfew was imposed in east Waterford and martial law declared. Union officials and pickets were interned, union offices raided and records confiscated.' (O'Connor 1988: 32). State repression was combined with vigilante action by farmers, with farmers' units in Kildare and Waterford styling themselves White Guards.

Agrarian agitation continued to be a problem for the Free State government. In February 1923 a Special Infantry Corps was set up by the Minister for Defence, on advice from the Minister for Agriculture, to deal with agrarian agitation, while in May 1923 a new land bill was introduced into the Dail giving the Land Commission power to compulsorily acquire and redistribute land. Dooley stresses the importance of the Land Commission by providing statistics, while noting the failure of standard Irish history text-books to make more than cursory reference to it: 'By the time it published its final report in 1987 over 1.5 million acres had been acquired and redistributed under the various land acts since 1923, while another 840,000 acres acquired under previous land acts (for which the Land Commission became responsible after 1923) were also divided. This gives a total of 2.34 million acres ... this represents a very significant twenty per cent of farmland affected by acquisition and division' (Dooley 2004: 183). He also makes no bones about political involvement in that redistribution: 'From 1923 to 1948 very few received land unless they were members of Fianna

Fáil[24] cumainn [local branches] or Cumann na nGaedhael/Fine Gael[25] clubs.' (Dooley 2004:185), while also noting that Fianna Fáil acquired and redistributed more land than did Cumann na nGaedhael: indeed he suggests that 'one of the main reasons for the decline of Cumann na nGaedhael in the early 1930s was its commitment to the large farming class in its perceived attempt to maintain Ireland "as an agricultural appendage of the UK economy" ' (Dooley 2004:190). Fianna Fáil's coming to power in the January 1933 election can also be reasonably attributed to the promise of a 'revolutionary programme of land acquisition and division'. (Dooley 2004:191, see also Bew 1988).

Dooley makes an intriguing connection between Fianna Fáil's 1933 Land Act and the growth of the Blueshirts, the Irish fascist movement (Dooley 2004:192), while Cumann na nGaedhael condemned Fianna Fáil's policy as tantamount to 'the purest of communism' (Dooley 2004:193). [26] Dooley's associating the growth of the Blueshirts with agrarian agitation is confirmed by other research (Cronin 1997, Montgomery 2014), with Cronin describing the economic war between Ireland and England as the movement's raison d'etre. The economic war began in June 1932 when the Fianna Fáil government ceased payment of the land annuities, repayments by (mainly larger) tenant purchasers of money advanced under the land Purchase Act to the British, in response to which the British government imposed a 20% levy on Irish agricultural exports to England. The Irish government continued to collect the annuity payments, however, resulting in a major campaign of non-payment, mainly by larger farmers and graziers in the cattle and butter producing counties of Munster, accompanied by a grass-roots direct action campaign to prevent collection of annuities and the sale of cattle distrained by the state when annuities were not paid. The non-payment campaign resulted in 36% of annuities being uncollected by the end of 1933-1934, with 55% uncollected in Tipperary and over 40% uncollected in Carlow, Clare, Limerick, Kilkenny, Waterford, Westmeath and Wexford. (Cronin 1997:143).

The response of the state echoes that of the British government in previous agrarian campaigns: writs were issued, cattle were seized and sold, security forces were mobilised to protect cattle sales, the military tribunal was reconvened in August 1933 specifically to deal with Blueshirt criminality and the Annuities Defence League was proscribed. The campaign saw major increases in criminal incidents, with riots and unlawful assembly rising from six incidents in 1932 to eighteen in 1933 and sixty-five in 1934, while malicious damage to property increased from 424 in 1932 to 538 in 1933 and 903 in 1934, with 76% of the incidents in 1934 occurring in four Munster counties – Cork, Kilkenny, Limerick and Waterford. (Montgomery 2014: 26). Much of the direct action focussed on interfering with telegraph and telephone communications and blocking roads and rail lines to impede police involvement in cattle seizures and sales. Between July 1934 and Januaryu 1935 there were 197 attacks on lines of communication by the League of Youth, the Blueshirts' youth organisation, in Cork, 145 in Waterford-Kilkenny and 109 in Meath. (Cronin 1997:149). The campaign resulted in the only killing of an agrarian protester by Irish state forces, when an attack on the sale of six cows in Marsh's Yard in Cork led to the shooting dead of young Blueshirt Michael Lynch. When the economic war ended in December 1934 with the signing of the Coal-Cattle Pact, Blueshirt activity dissipated.

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[24] Fianna Fáil was the party used by some republicans who lost the civil war as their instrument for electoral politics.

[25] Cumann na nGaedhael was the party of those who were victorious in the civil war; Fine Gael was a later iteration of the same politics.

[26] Fianna Fáil had no qualms when it came to dealing with actual communists: in 1933 it deported Jimmy Gralton to the US.

Fianna Fáil support among western smallholders was affected by the failure of its land redistribution policy as well as by its 1946 Land Act which gave the Land Commission power to take back land from those previously allotted it: 'Fianna Fáil, by threatening to take back forcibly lands that it had allotted, was acting in a way that was tantamount to evicting tenants during the land war of the 1880s' (Dooley 2004: 1925). Jones notes that periodically new associations or movements appeared to raise the issue of land reform, though their support rarely reached beyond three or four counties. 'The main ones were the Back to the Land Association, the rival Evicted Tenants and Land Settlement Association both in the 1920s, the United Farmers Association and the Land Settlement Committee in the 1930s, the Land Division League in the 1940s and early 1950s, Lia Fáil at the end of the 1950s and the National Land League in the 1970s.' (Jones 2013:137).

Lia Fáil

Lia Fáil involved a late revival of smallholder agitation, a last gasp by a class fraction increasingly marginal to the economy, if not yet to the population as 'the balance between small and large holdings decisively shifted against small holdings over the first four decades of independence' (Murphy 1998:198). Founded at a parish meeting in Lusmagh, Co. Offaly in November 1957 by Fr. John Fahy, a radical republican priest who had been involved in agrarian agitation with Peader O'Donnell at the end of the 1920s, it quickly became an umbrella organisation for smallholder groups from 11 other counties, setting up its own newspaper in August 1958, and in May 1959 began agitating in Lusmagh against Land Commission activities. Lia Fáil's aims included preventing foreign ownership of land or other sources of wealth in Ireland and capping land ownership at 100 acres.

While Lia Fáil's ideology embraced xenophobia and extreme conspiracy theories, its grievances were those of the smallholding class that was being abandoned by both the state and Fianna Fáil, whose modernising representatives such as Seán Lemass were abandoning the party's support for smallholders and land division. Lia Fáil's actions, though few in number, lay squarely in the agrarian agitation tradition: cattle driving, reallocation of a field to a landless widow and rescuing from the local barracks three people arrested for the cattle drive. A couple of cattle driving incidents in Co. Galway followed, but then Lia Fáil disintegrated in response to state repression, lack of popular support and ecclesiastical action which resulted in Fr Fahy resigning from both Lia Fáil and Lusmagh parish. While Lia Fáil was the last gasp of the smallholder agrarian agitation tradition, other such small groups continued to appear, with a National Land League formed in Mullingar in 1970, while another group, the Small Farmers' Defence League, operated in Donegal and Mayo.

1960s and after

In the 1960s there was strong involvement by the IRA in social agitation, including fish-ins, strikes, squatting and other direct action, as well as campaigns against ground rent and foreign acquisition of land (Cullinane 2010, Hanley and Miller 2010). This social agitation disappeared with the revival of armed struggle in the six counties.

With the late industrialisation of Ireland, traditional agrarian agitation all but disappeared but that industrialisation resulted in a new upsurge in rural agitation. After the 1960s a change came to rural unrest in the 26 counties with the arrival of environmental and locally unwanted land use (LULU) campaigns, many of which have been framed by some academic analysts as opposition to modernisation. Allan and Jones (1990) present an uncritical account of rural community opposition to chemical and mining developments by transnational corporations during the 1980s, while Allen (2004) has produced an updated version which presents these struggles as anti-globalisation struggles. Mac Sheoin (1999) provides statistical evidence on rural opposition to LULUs from 1990 to 1999, involving 429 local environmental campaigns over the period January 1990 to July 1999, showing the extension of local opposition campaigns to a much wider range of activities, with 176 campaigns against telecommunications facilities (mainly mobile phone masts), 79 campaigns against waste disposal (mainly municipal waste landfills), 52 campaigns against agribusiness and the remaining campaigns involving transport and power, tourism and leisure and extraction (mainly quarrying). Phyne (1999), while concentrating on conflicts involving salmon farming in the period from 1987 to 1995, gives details also of a variety of other conflicts involving fishing resources, including the fish-ins of the 1960s and the rod licence dispute from 1987 to 1990 (subject also to book length treatment by Buckley 1992), and reports that 'conflicts over marine rights and inland water rights date back to the nineteenth century.' (Phyne 1999:6). [27] One particular campaign –that against Shell in Co. Mayo has been the subject of two books, one from a community activist (Corduff 2007) and another from a sympathetic journalist (Siggins 2010). More recently turfcutters and farmers are defending their traditional fuel extraction practices (O'Flynn 2012) while opposition to LULUs continues to be widespread.

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[27] The neglect of marine disputes in this essay is a reflection of the general neglect of the maritime aspect of Irish history by Irish historians (see MacLoughlin 2010).

V: Thematic approaches

County, area and estate studies

For county studies there have been a number of monographs which take a long-term glance at land issues, while many others have produced studies of unrest over short periods in specific counties. The choice of counties for the former indicate major areas of unrest especially in Tipperary, Cork and Mayo. County studies include general studies including but not limited to rural unrest, such as Donnelly (1975) who examines the rural economy in County Cork during the nineteenth century, Power (1993) who examines eighteenth century Tipperary, the same county Marnane (1985) treats of, and Jordan (1994) who considers land issues in Co. Mayo from the plantation to the land war. We also have book-length treatments of shorter periods of intense unrest in Limerick, Kilkenny, including studies of specific areas such as Craughwell, Co. Galway and Galmoy, Co. Kilkenny. There has also been a growth in case studies of particular landed estates. A useful guide to the developing literature on landed estates is available in Dooley (2000).

TABLE 2: County studies

1760-80	Whiteboys	Tipperary	Bric 1997
1790s	Defenders	Leitrim	Kelly 1986
1790-1828	Agrarian violence	Meath	Mooney 1987
1798-99	Tithes	Cork	Patterson 2004
1800-1842	Whiteboyism	Roscommon	Huggins 2007
1815-1831	Ribbonism	Clare	MacMahon 2002
1819-1820	Ribbonmen	Galway	Ryan 2000
1820-1845		Limerick	Curtin 2008
1820s	Rockites	Cork	Katsuta 2003
18XX	Rockites	Laois	Givens 1999
1821	Rockites	Limerick	Feely 1987
1828-1835	Agrarian violence	Meath	Mooney 1988/1989
1830s	Collective biography Connerys	Waterford	Kiely 1994; Reece 1992
1830-1845	Rural conflict	Waterford	Kiely and Nolan 1992
1830-1834	Tithe war	KIlkenny	O'Hanrahan (1990)

1830-1838	Tithe war	Tipperary	Higgins 2002, Farrell 2005
1831-1860		Tipperary	Hurst 1974
1835-1844	Agrarian violence	Meath	Mooney 1990/1991
1840s	Molly Maguires	Roscommon	Coleman 1999
1841	Ribbonism	Leitrim	Kelly 2003
1842	Ribbonism	Sligo	Kelly 2008
1849-1885	Land struggle	Clare	Reid 1976
1850-1882	Land struggle	Kilkenny	Walsh 2008
1870-1871	Ribbonism	Westmeath	Murray 1986
1872-1886	Land struggle	Co Kerry	Lucey 2011
1879-1882	Land War	Laois	Carter 1994, 1999
1879-1882	Land War	Kildare	Nelson 1985
1879-1882	Land War	Waterford	Ó Ceilleachain 1997
1879-1882	Land war	King’s County	Doherty 1997
1879-1882	Land war	Clare	Murphy 1999
1879-1883	Land League	Leitrim	Mac an Ghalloglaigh 1983-1984
1879-1883	Land war	Roscommon	Ganly 2003
1880s	Land war -priests	Clare	Murphy 1979
1880-1881	Land war	Fermanagh	Thompson 2004
1881-1882	Agrarian unrest	Roscommon	Lane (n.d.)
1881-1882	Ladies Land League	Mayo	Quinn 1997
1880-1889	Land agitation	Waterford	Power 1998
1882-1916	Land struggle	Laois	Carter 2013
1903-1907	Ranch war/UIL	Roscommon	Clarke 1994
1911-12	Ranch war	Mayo	Murphy 1995, 1996
1917-1923	Agrarian unrest	Waterford	O’Connor 1980

TABLE 3: Area studies

1800-1903	Land agitation	Tullyhunco, Co. Cavan	O'Raghallaigh 2016
1819-1824	Rural unrest	Galmoy, Co KIlkenny	Ó Macháin 2004
1820-1850	Whiteboys	Limerick liberties	Toomey 2002
1823	Rockite	North Cork	Forde 2001
1831-1838	Tithe war	Northeast Carlow	Shannon 2012
1833-1903	Land struggle	Logboy, Co. Mayo	Kelly 2014
1834-1838	Rockites	Garrycastle, Co. Offaly	Murphy 2007
1835-1839	Land struggles	Ballinamuck, Co. Longford	O'Farrell 1983
1838	Tithes	Clonmany, Co. Donegal	Duffy 2005
1840-1869	Land war	Derryveagh, Co. Donegal	Dolan 1980
Pre-Famine	Agrarian unrest	Cloone, Co. Leitrim	Fitzpatrick 1982
October 1849	Affray at Killoughy barracks	Rahan, Co. Offaly	Smith 2007
1850s	Tenant League	West of Ireland	Shields 2011
1856	Sheep war	Gaoth Dhobhair, Co Donegal	Vaughan 1983
1865-1881, 1900-1903	Land reform, labour	Mid-Cork	Galvin(n.d.), (n.d.)
1876-1880	Tenants defence association	Ballinasloe, Co. Galway	Moran 2011
1876-1882	Land war -biographical	West of Ireland	Casey 2014
1879-1882	Land war	Hackettstown, Co. Carlow	Shannon 2008
1879-1883	Land war	Loughrea, Co. Galway	Manzor 2003a
1879-1883	Land war	West Cork	Rynne 2009
1879-1916	Land War	Belcarra, Co Mayo	O'Connor and O'Connor 2013
1879-1882	Land War	Loughrea, Co. Galway	Finnegan 2012, 2014

1879-1882	Land War	Drumlish, Co. Longford	Dooley 2010
1879-1891	Land War	Tallaroan, Co. Kilkenny	Kennedy 2004
1879-1927	Agrarian agitation	Lugacurran, Co. Laois	Coffey 2006
1881	Land League/Poor law election	Tralee, Co. Kerry	Feingold 1983
April 1881		Ballaghdareen, Co. Roscommon	Ganly 2009
1881-1886	Land war	Knocktartan, Co. Wexford	Urwin 2002
1881-1891	Land war -biography	North Cork	Keane 2012
1885-1886	Land agitation	Termonmagurk. Co. Tyrone	Kerr 1987
1885-1892	Irish National League	Dingle, Co. Kerry	Lucey 2003
1885-1892	Irish National League	Arklow, Co. Wicklow	Rees 2012
1886	Plan of Campaign	Southeast Galway	Shiel and Roche 1986
1886-1916	Land agitation	Galway	Moffitt 2011a
1893-1916	Land war	Loughrea, Co. Galway	Manzor 2003b
1907-1910	UIL & Protestant tenant farmers	Aughavas, Co. Leitrim; Riverstown & Roscrib, Co. Sligo	Moffitt 2011b
1908	Ranch war	Riverstown, Co. Sligo	Cosgrove 2012
June 1916	Cattle drive	Moore, CO. Roscommon	Egan n.d.
1998-date	Shell refinery	Erris, Co. Mayo	Siggins 2010

TABLE 4: Estate studies

1763-1826	Bellew estate	Mount Bellew, Co. Galway	Clarke 2003
1790-1800	Devonshire estate/Defenders	Edenderry, Co. Offaly	Reilly 2007
1820-1870	Gerrard estate	Kilian, Co. Galway	Crehan 2013
1833-1903	Nolan estate	Logboy, Co. Mayo	Kelly 2014
1858-1863	Plunket estate	Partry, CO. Mayo	Lane 1994, Moran 1986
1859-1861	Adair estate	Derryveagh, Co. Donegal	Vaughan 1983
1879-1882	Digby estate	Offaly	Pilkington 2008
1879-1888	Kingston estate	Mitchelstown, Co. Cork	Power
1879-1910	Gardiner/Pringle estate	Belcarra, Co. Mayo	O'Connor and O'Connor 2013
1886-1892	O'Grady estate	Herbertstown, Co. Limerick	Ó hIarlaithe 2013
1888	Drumbanagher estate	Poyntzpass, Co. Armagh	Canning 2012
1899-	Estate of RH Johnstone; UIL	Aughrim, Williamstown, Co. Galway	Keaveney 2007
1922	Land agitation; house burning	Ballydugan, Co. Galway	O'Riordan 2015

Food riots and other responses to famine

There is a misperception that the Irish don't do food riots (Wells 1996: 179) though this is being undermined by recent research. (Kelly, forthcoming). In her work on popular protest in Ireland from 1570 to 1640, Tait reports that from late 1628 to early 1629 serious disturbances over food shortages shook the midlands and the north, while in May 1641 women in Belfast were involved in food riots (Tait 2011: 26, 38).

The majority of publications have been on popular responses to the great famine of the 1840s. Moran (2015) has identified 55 riots and incidents of major subversion in Irish workhouses from 1848 to 1850, some 33 in Munster, ten in Leinster, eight in Connaught and four in Ulster, with the majority occurring in 1848 to 1850, thirteen in 1848, eleven in 1948 and thirteen in 1850. Eiriksson (1997) details food riots and other lower class protests during the 1830s and 1840s in Clare and Limerick. He notes the occurrence of food riots in these two counties and elsewhere in southwest Ireland in 1817, 1822, 1830-1831 and in the late 1830s and early 1840s ‘even if that particular period did not witness anything which could be described as famine or fatal scarcity’ (Eiriksson 1997: 72). (Details of one such riot can be found in Stack 2012). He notes four types of riots during the Great Famine: to secure employment and to protect wages on public works from the summer of 1846 to January 1847; attacks to prevent export of grain from the autumn of 1846 to January 1847; violent resistance in the spring of 1847 to the closure of public works and food riots in May and June 1847 regarding the operations of food kitchens. Ó Súilleabháin (2015) provides detailed descriptions of various agitations during the famine in Limerick. Bohstedt (2015) provides a transnational context to the Famine food riots.

Finally to lay to rest the nationalist notion that the laissez faire attitude of the English elite to the effects of famine was confined to countries like Ireland and India, we should note that the English elite was also happy to sacrifice its own lower orders on the altar of its principles of political economy. During famine in the 1790s Wells (2011) reports ‘a massive sector of the population was unable, unaided, to command the most basic of subsistence levels; wretched faces became a reality; destitution stalked the land; families were unable to clothe themselves; children literally cried for bread; begging assumed unheard of levels. The famines caused serious malnutrition, disease and ultimately demographic distortions with increased death rates, decreased birth rates, and delayed marriages’. This strongly supports the contention that what was involved was a class issue rather than a nationalist/imperialist issue.

Table 5 Food riots

1756-1757	Famine	Food riots	Magennis 2000
1799-1801		Response to famine/Captain Slasher	Wells 1996
1817-1845			Cunningham 2010
1830	Limerick	Food riot	Stack 2012
1845-1847	Famine	Food riots, etc	Lowe 2003
1846-1847	Co. Waterford	Food riots	Cowman 1995
1846-1849	Dungarvan, Co. Waterford	Food and workhouse riots	Fraher 1995
1847-	Famine	Food riots, etc.	KInealy 2002
1848-1854	Workhouses	Riots and other incidents	Moran 2015

Rural labour

Given the previously mentioned elite orientation of Irish historians, it is no surprise to discover that the history of the working class has not been a priority of mainstream historians, with such work as has been done until recently mainly coming from the ideologically committed. I suspect (and hope) that the table below is simply scraping the surface, but am not cheered by the following statement from F. Lane (2005: 113) who complains ‘the dedicated historiography of the rural labourer still comprises a handful of articles, several of which were written over twenty years ago, and, regrettably, not a single book-length study has been published. In recent years Pádraig Lane, in a series of articles based on his 1980 doctoral thesis, has been almost alone in pursuing the subject’. A decent examination must await further work.

Just two further notes will be added, one relating to a transnational organising attempt and the other on the use of the repertoire of agrarian agitation in strikes during the twentieth century by agricultural labourers. Horn details an abortive attempt by the British National Agricultural Labourers’ Union to organise in Ireland in 1873 and the activities of the union thus founded as continued under Irish auspices –and under the name Irish Agricultural Labourers’ Union- until 1879. Details of IALU activities can also be found in Fintan Lane (2002). As Bradley (1986) notes of the north Kildare farm labourers’ strike of 1946 ‘the agrarian crime, threats of eviction and boycotts associated with that dispute were more appropriate to the nineteenth century than the mid-twentieth’. Similarly many of the agricultural workers’ actions on which Kostick (2009) reports made full use of the repertoire of agrarian agitators. Indeed the decisive action of dock and other urban workers in blacking cattle may be seen as an adaptation of the traditional agrarian tactic of boycotting.

TABLE 6: Rural labour

19th century	Ireland	Agricultural labourers	Boyle 1983
19th century	West of Ireland	Agricultural labourers	Lane 2011
1825-1845	Tipperary	Colliers	Cowman 2001
1800-1950	Thomastown, Co. Kilkenny	Rural and urban labour	Silverman 2006
1830s	Castlecomer, Co. Kilkenny	Colliery workers/Whitefeet	Dunne n.d.
1841-1912			Fitzpatrick 1980
Pre-Famine	Clare	Shannon/Newmarket	Enright 1981
1850-1870	Midlands		Whelehan 2012
1850-1910	Mayo		Lane 2011

1850-1914			Lane 1973
1869-1889	Meath/Westmeath		Lane 2015a
1869-1882		P.F.Johnston	Lane 2002
Early 1880s	Offaly		Lane 2015b
1880s	Breifne		Lane 2014
1880s	Mallow, Co. Cork	Agricultural labourers	Lane 2010
1880s	Roscommon, Galway	Herds	Cunningham 2011
1880-1890	Roscommon	Agricultural labourers	Lane 2009
Land war	Roscommon	Shepherds' Association	Lane 2003
1890-1914	West of Ireland	Urban and rural labour	Cunningham 1995
1894-1914		Land and Labour Association	Lane 1993
Late 19th century	Loughrea, Co. Galway	Herdsmen	Cunningham 2003
1900-1976			Bradley 1988
1917-1920	Kildare		Dunne forthcoming
1917-1923	Ireland	Agricultural and rural labour	O'Connell 1988
1921-1923	Waterford	Strike ITGWU agricultural labourers	Symes 2016:31-35
February 1922	Broadford, Co. Limerick	Soviet	McCarthy 1980
1944-1948		Federation of Rural Workers	Bradley 1986
1947	Kilkea, Co. Kildare		O Dubhshlaine 1994
	Castlecomer., Co Kilkenny		Feely 1981a, 1981b, 1981c
	Castlecomer., Co Kilkenny	Biographical	Brennan and Nolan 1990

Assassination/outrage studies

One focus of research has been on spectacular outrages and assassinations.The firing of Wildgoose Lodge in Co Louth has been the subject of a number of articles on local history journals and two recent books. The assassination of Major Mahon in Co Roscommon has produced a book, as well as a number of articles, while another high-level assassination –that of Lord Leitrim- has also produced a number of studies with varied approaches. The Maynooth local history series has also produced a number of pamphlet publications centred on assassinations.

For studies of more than one assassination Beames (1987b) examines 28 assassinations in Co. Tipperary in the decade 1837 to 1847, with eleven landlords, nine landlords' factors and employees and eight farmers the victims. In Beames (1983) he lists assassinations from 1806 to 1847, involving 28 landlords, 36 landlords' factors or employees, 34 farmers, 15 clergy and tithe proctors and 15 miscellaneous persons (such as informers and crown witnesses). Reilly has examined the murder of seven land agents in Co. Cavan over the period 1830 to 1860, while noting 'a further twenty were shot or otherwise injured'. (Reilly 2014: 16). Mulholland gives a grand total of fatalities during the land war (which he defines as 1879 to 1888) of seventy-six, in which he includes the famous Maamtrasna murders of August 1882 (Waldron 1992). He summarises as follows 'Those killed in attacks on direct agents of landlordism amounted to twenty-nine. Those killed as egregious violators of popular discipline in the campaign against landlordism amounted to twenty-one. There were eleven unintended fatalities arising from punishment beatings and shootings. Partisans of the popular movement killed by agents of the state or the landlords, or when out on moonlighting operations, amounted to eight. This comes to a total of sixty-nine. To this should be added legal executions, killing a total of seven (some of whom were clearly innocent).' (Mulholland 2016: 84). For purposes of international comparison, during the twenty years 1834 to 1854 Volin (1943) reports there were 144 cases of murder of landlords and their agents in Russia.

TABLE 7: Assassination/outrage studies

October 1816	Wildgoose Lodge	Louth	Paterson 1950; Casey 1974, 1975; Murray 2005; Dooley 2007
1823	Assassination –Franks family	Cork	Cronin 2009
1832	Assassination tithe proctors	Castlepooke, Doneraile, Co. Cork	Shine 1987
1835	Assassination Rev Charles Dawson	Ballinacarriga, Co. Limerick	Curtis 2012
1835	Assassination William Blood	Corofin, Co. Clare	Harbison 1983
1835-1855	Agrarian assassinations	Crossmaglen	McMahon & McKeown *(various dates)*
1837-1847	Assassinations	Tipperary	Beames 1987
1830-1860	Assassinations (land agents)	Offaly	Reilly 2014
1847	Assassination of Major Mahon	Strokestown, Co. Roscommon	Duffy 2007, Vesey 2008
1847	Rev John Lloyd Assassination	Elphin, CO. Roscommon	Enright 2009
1851	Bateson Assassination	Monaghan	McMahon 2006
1852	Assassination William Ross Manifold	Offaly	Lambe 2015
1855	Assassination Charlotte Hinds	Templeport, Co. Cavan	Gallogly 1979
1864	Assassination Thomas Reynolds	Rathcore, Co. Meath	Griffin 1994
1868	Assassination Policeman and landlord's stewart	Ballycohey, Co. Tipperary	Moran 1992
1878	Assassination Lord Leitrim	Manorvaughan, Co. Donegal	Dolan 1978
1879-1885	Barbavilla Assassination	Westmeath	Murtagh 1999
1879-1882	Land War assassinations		Mulholland 2016

1882	Assassination John Doolaghty	Drumdoolaghty, Co. Clare	Butler 2006
1882	Assassination Michael Moloney	Caraloe, Co. Clare	Houlihan 2007
1894	Assassination James Donovan	Co Cork	O'Riordan n.d.

Repression/law/crime/justice

These works on assassinations and outrages intersect with another developing area of study: writings on crime, violence, the law and the legal system, policing and repression provide another angle on our subject. The two foundational works for this aspect are once again by Americans, with Broeker (1970) dealing with 1812 to 1836 and Palmer's enormous 1988 volume moving to the comparative as he engages with nothing less than policing and protest in England and Ireland over the period 1780 to 1850.

Palmer summarises the differences between Irish and English crime as English crime as being individual and for personal gain, while Irish crime was collective and for the gain of the group; English crime was not particularly violent, while Irish crime more commonly involved violence against persons and animals; finally, Irish violence had widespread support among the population. (Palmer 1988:45). On this last point Palmer writes 'Again and again, Irish authorities trying to track down criminals encountered only the peasantry's sullen consent to the crimes; indeed, daytime assassinations occurred with some frequency before loudly approving crowds' (Palmer 1988:45). Another significant difference was the success Irish movements had: 'Networks of Whiteboy government, though highly localised, crisscrossed southern and central Ireland. "Committees" (note the parliamentary term) arranged outrages; members were sworn to secrecy; "strangers" executed Whiteboy orders both to prevent detection and to ensure anonymity and develop (?) impartiality of punishment; and the neighbouring peasantry was intimidated or sympathetic. The result was a remarkable record of success' (Palmer 1988:53).

Howlin (2013) gives a succinct account of the differences between criminal justice in Ireland and England in the nineteenth century. Haire (1980) details the army's involvement in supporting the police during the land war, while Legg (2013) is a comparative study of the security forces in two counties during the last three decades of the nineteenth century and Malcolm (1998) outlines the military origins of the RIC. Townshend (1983) looks at British policy in response to both agrarian and nationalist violence from 1848 on. Crossman (1991) examines emergency legislation in response to agrarian agitation from 1821 to 1841. Regrettably unpublished is a thesis on policing the land war. (Ball 2000). Rudé (1978) provides statistics and fascinating details of Irish social and political prisoners transported to Australia between 1788 and 1868, providing useful comparison with social and political prisoners from England, Scotland

and Wales: overall figures given are 2,250 from Ireland, 1,2000 from England, Scotland and Wales and 154 from Canada. (Rudé 1978:8).

As previously noted, a careful introduction to the literature on crime, including policing, is provided by Griffin (2005). Work on repression of agrarian unrest, particularly in the nineteenth century has been provided by authors interested in the development of the police and particularly in the model the RIC provided for English colonial policing. As well as legal or military operations, more long-term innovations in repression were also developed by the English. ‘Like so many other experiments in reform during the era, the reformed schoolroom was to be given its first test in Ireland, more or less frankly for the purpose of suppressing subversion and instilling obedience. When the national schools emerged… they immediately began to carry out the same mission by sanitizing and demystifying Irish history, muting the oral tradition, deemphasizing the Irish language, and extolling an extreme puritanical code of deference, obedience and chastity’ (Scally 1995:144).

Howlin (2009) describes the state’s responses to unsatisfactory verdicts in criminal cases by attempting to control the composition of juries, in which activities she unsurprisingly concludes ‘the crown on occasion abused or over-used its power’. The peculiar difficulties involved in obtaining convictions in Ireland meant state protection of witnesses was often essential and they would be removed from the local area to police lodgings elsewhere until the trial took place; often afterwards they would be assisted to relocate to other parts of Ireland or, more frequently, to emigrate. In 1833 some £2,272 17s. 9d. was paid from the treason fund for removal and other expenses of witnesses: ‘in the case of families payments of £250 were common, huge sums in the 1830s’ while use of secret funds for emigration of witnesses to the US was ‘common throughout the nineteenth century’ (McEldowney 1986:133). McEldowney concludes ‘it is *not* proved that the executive were able to purchase convictions; but if the scale of payments shown by the Hatherton papers [which detail expenditure for 1833 from the treason fund] is a fair indication of the payments throughout the century, the use of money is a ground for questioning the reliability of prosecution evidence in many cases’ (McEldowney 1986:136). O’Hanlon notes a steep decrease in expenditure from the secret service vote after the land war, dropping from £18,057 in 1884-85 to £1,240 in 1898-99 (O’Hanlon 1983:350)

Intimidation of jurors occurred in plenty. A spectacular example of this intimidation can be given in the case of a massive assembly in July 1832 near the village of Ballyhale, in Co Kilkenny, reportedly attended by some 200,000 from the four neighbouring counties to commemorate an encounter at Carrickshock some seven months previously in which thirteen RIC, a process server and three protesters were killed. As Owens (2004:43) observes ‘it was obviously timed to influence the impending trial in Kilkenny of eighteen men charged with the killings, and was but one part of a well-organized and determined campaign to sway the opinions of jurors.’ This campaign appeared to succeed: ‘We can never know the extent to which the members of the juries were intimidated by the image of their tenants and neighbours massing in the tens of thousands a stone's throw from Carrickshock on the eve of the trial. We know only that a fortnight later they voted to acquit three of the defendants, before the Crown withdrew its case against them all'.

It's worth noting the lack of success the various security forces had in dealing with agrarian agitation. While police detectives were successful in infiltrating urban nationalist groups like the Fenians they had no such luck with the rural groups. Malcolm (2002) convincingly shows the failure of specialist/undercover detectives (also known as 'disposable men') in solving agrarian crime, compared with their success in infiltrating urban political groups of conspirators: 'There were 40 homicides in Westmeath between January 1848 and March, 1871, but during those 23 years only four persons were convicted of murder in the county.' (Malcolm 2002:89) Grace (2009:65) outlines the failure of the security forces regarding threatening notices: 'during the twelve-year period 1834-45 as few as eighty-five persons were committed to trial for posting threatening notices in Tipperary, notwithstanding the fact that it was the single kmost common crime in the county. [Grace (2009: 48) gives the number of threatening notices over the period 1836 to 1843 as totalling 1075.] The committal rate was even lower at national level because only 321 individuals were committed to trial for the crime during the same period.'. Palmer provides a similar picture of failure: 'Disturbed districts were at time virtually out of control. In Queen's County and Kilkenny in 1831-2, sixty-three murder committals resulted in a lone conviction for manslaughter (a 2 percent rate). In Tipperary over a four-year period, 129 committals for armed assembly at night brought but 21 convictions (a 16 percent rate). The Crown Solicitor for Leinster told Parliament in 1839 that as far as he could recall, some 300 Whiteboy offences in Kilkenny in 1832 had netted only five convictions.' (Palmer 1988:339).

Religious repression

Here we must also attend to the often ambivalent actions and attitudes of the catholic church to popular movements. Catholic bishops denounced the Whiteboys in the 1760s and the Ribbonmen in 1822: 'The Whiteboys were excommunicated in Cloyne in 1762, in Ferns and Cashel in 1775, and in Ossory in 1779' (Connolly 1982: 308-309). Connolly (1982 :236) notes the ways Catholic clergy demonstrated their opposition to agrarian and other disturbances 'through the penalising of offenders, through a close personal supervision of their parishioners, through cooperation with the civil authorities, and through the mobilisation of their parishioners in support of law and order' Indeed, the catholic church and its local cadre was often mobilised to help maintain law and order by local magistrates; in other cases they took action on their own volition. Examples abound of this behaviour by priests: let one example from famine-era Limerick suffice. The quotation is a long one, but the incident is worth retelling not only for its obvious lessons, but also for its author's righteous anger:

> Rockite notices were posted on the chapel gates of Coshma barony and the surrounding districts on Sunday 5 April [1846] calling on 'the labouring classes and starving population to assemble on Tory Hill on Holy Thursday' for the purpose of devising means to provide food and employment for themselves and their families... On Holy Thursday, about 2,000 gathered on the summit, where a large plaid banner was hoisted on a pole as a rallying point. One of these roads passed by Tory Hill House, the residence of Fr. Laurence Hartnett, PP [parish priest] Croom, where his two curates, Fathers O'Shea and Meehan, watched the movements of the people with intense anxiety.
>
> At one o'clock Fr. Meehan ascended the hill and pulled down the flag, which was badly received by the people. He exhorted them to disperse, but in vain. He then retired and the rallying flag was again hoisted. Fr. James O'Shea, who was held in great esteem by the people, then ascended the hill, accompanied by two prosperous farmers. He stood beside the flag and paraphrasing the patriot priest of Boolavogue said: "Boys I suppose this is the banner under which I have to fight". The tumultuous roar from the assembled throng indicated their belief that another Fr.Murphy had come to lead them in their hour of need. But Fr. O'Shea had not come to fight. He had come to break the resolve of those who would take by force of arms the vital necessities of life denied to their starving loved ones. Playing on the great love of the poor for the minor clergy and the promise of government aid in ten or twelve days, he persuaded the assembly to disperse. Amid cries of 'we will be starved before then', the broken poor went back to their impoverished cabins, to the despairing glances of the old and the weak, and the anguished cries of their wives and their children, slowly starving to death. Fr. O'Shea returned to the elegance of the parochial mansion, the bountiful table its sixty-acre farm generously provided, and the gratitude of his pastor, who had ruled the Catholics of Croom for thirty-two years in direct succession to his uncle, who had ruled them for twenty-eight years.' (Ó Súilleabháin 2015:90).

By the time of the Land League the Catholic clergy had overcome its opposition to at least some forms of agrarian agitation and many Land League meetings and platforms were filled with Catholic clergy.

The oxygen of publicity

Another aspect of repression involved the state's attempts to control the circulation of information and comment, primarily through newspapers. The growing importance of nationalist-inclined newspapers in the development of the land war (Legg 1999, Kane 2003, Dungan 2014) was well recognised by the state.[28] What's interesting here is that we find the whole 'terrorism and the oxygen of publicity' discourse one hundred years before the more recent examples of this discourse. Legg (1999: 158) quotes the Catholic parish priest of Ballymacelliggott in Co. Kerry writing to W.E. Forster (then the Chief Secretary for Ireland) in October 1880 as follows: 'for all the mischief being done in our county I hold the *Kerry Sentinel* newspaper responsible. Articles teeming with the most reckless abuse of landlords and agents, with the most pernicious advice and inflammatory utterances, appear in almost every number of that wretched journal… I don't know what power the Executive possesses, but if it could suppress immediately the further publication of the *Kerry Sentinel* comparative tranquillity would shortly return to us'. Thus newspapers were condemned for journalistic terrorism while other state officials believed agrarian outrages would cease if only the state cut off the oxygen of publicity given them by the mass media, thereby ignoring the reality that previous agrarian movements had no problem performing outrages without the need for newspapers.

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[28] It's worth noting that conservative newspapers also took part in the Land League controversy and not only in print: 'The proprietors of the *Mail* helped to plan the Boycott relief expedition, intended as a private-enterprise attempt to show that the Land League could be defeated.' (Maume 2011:559).

Moran (1994:194) notes the importance of James Daly, publisher of the *Connaught Telegraph*, that his 'active role was one of the primary reasons why the movement advanced so rapidly. In the first twelve months he spoke at a hundred demonstrations, contemporaries described him as the 'storm centre' of the movement. Once the agitation extended its geographical base in late April 1880, it became the preserve of the middle- and upper-class farmers. Throughout this period it depended on a literate and avid reading public for its mass support. Daly's role and that of the *Connaught Telegraph* was most effective among that section of tenant society which could read his editorials and reports'. For the growth of the Land League in Leitrim Mac an Ghalloglaigh (1983/1984: 170) places emphasis on the contribution of two newspapermen: 'More important was the work of Jasper Tully of the *Roscommon Herald* and Edward Gayer of the *Sligo Champion* in furthering the growth of the League in the county. Both men, and Joe Biggar to a lesser extent, travelled the county, appearing as guest speakers at numerous rallies, driving home the message of the League and whipping up enthusiasm for it'. Moran (2013) outlines the central role Thomas Clegg, editor of the *Clare Independent*, played in the Land league in Co. Clare.

The government was well aware of the importance of these newspapers and took action when it could, including introducing clauses into the Criminal Law and Procedure Act of 1887 to deal indirectly with the problem these newspapers posed. This legislation 'enabled the executive, first to proclaim districts to prevent the commission of crime, and then prohibit or suppress any associations within these proclaimed districts and make unlawful any assembly connected with the associations and the publication of the objects and proceedings of the associations.' (Legg 1999:166). Legg lists nineteen prosecutions of papers under the Act with the following papers convicted of publishing proceedings of the National League: *Carlow Nationalist* (1889), *Cork Daily Herald* (1887), *Cork Examiner* (1887), *Kerry Sentinel* (1887 twice, 1888), *Leinster Leader* (1889)(conviction squashed), *Munster Express* (1889 twice, one reversed on appeal) and the *Wexford People* (1889) while the following papers were convicted for publishing articles other than reports on League branches: *Limerick Leader* (1889), *Midland Tribune* (1889), *Sligo Champion* (1888, 1889), *Tipperary Nationalist* (three times in 1889), *Tipperary Sentinel* (1889) and the *Waterford News* (1889)(reversed on appeal). (Legg 1999:168-169; see also Fitzgerald 2015). All of these newspapers were provincial or local papers.

Transnational influences and connections: land and labour

As well as the transnationalisation of repressive methods previously referred to, there has been some work on transnational agrarianism. Attention to the transnational aspects of Irish rural agitation has mainly come from foreign authors examining the appearance of traditional agrarian tactics in agitation by Irish labour in England and the US. Particular attention has been paid to the Molly Maguires in the mining districts of Pennsylvania in the US, given their importance in early US labour history. Kenny (1998:9) argued 'the American Molly Maguires make little sense unless the specifically Irish origins of their strategy of violence are understood'. He uses the term retributive justice 'to describe a form of collective violence designed to redress violations against a particular understanding of what was socially right and wrong ... In Ireland, the tradition of violence in question was directed against landlords and their agents, policemen and magistrates, small farmers and tenants. In Pennsylvania, it was directed against mineowners and superintendents, policemen and municipal officials and skilled British miners.' (Kenny 1998: 8-9). The most recent work by Bulik (2015), while suffering from occasional outbreaks of the shillelagh syndrome, has broken new ground by emphasising the cultural aspects of the agitation in Ireland.

Other work has been done on Irish workers on canals and railroads in the US. (Mason 1998, Perry 2013; Horner 2010, Way 1993) Writing of the Lachaine Canal strike in Canada Horner (2010:39) notes 'the forms of resistance carried out by migrant labourers at Lachaine resembled the forms of peasant resistance that Irish historians date to the 1760s'. Margaret Brehony (2014) has argued that 'the evidence strongly suggests that Irish emigrants from the pre-famine era were seasoned agrarian and labour protesters with experience of collective action which they brought to bear on their encounter with industrial capital in Britain, the US and Cuba'. This is certainly true in the case of the Molly Maguires and similar patterns of resistance and agitation have been noted among Irish labourers building infrastructure in the US and Canada, mainly canals and railways, while the Irish provided leadership for certain struggles of the US working class. On the other hand however, as Bruce Nelson (2000) has observed, 'few would disagree with the assertion that the Irish in the US enthusiastically embraced white supremacy and quickly developed an almost maniacal antagonism towards African Americans'. Thus, while first defending those labour niches that the Irish succeeded in monopolising and later integrating into US society in a process aptly described as 'becoming white' and later still providing a model for integration processes for later waves of European migrants, the Irish opposed black workers. Against this must be counted Foner's observation that Irish integration into the US did not necessarily entail assimilation into a middle-class, racist position but assimilation into the radical alternative: 'assimilation could mean a merger not with the dominant culture and its values, but with a strong emergent oppositional working-class culture' (Foner 1980:195).

A very different path has been followed by those who have examined transnational aspects of the Land League, in particular its organisation of funding and support in the US. The Land League became a transnational movement because the Irish had, by emigration, become a transnational people. As Maloney (2004:74) notes 'The Land League was remarkable because it emerged as a transnational movement whose nerve centres included Dublin, London, New York and Boston'. The study of the spread of the Land League to the US has been mainly the preserve of American historians, with historians of Catholic America in the vanguard. An early evaluation by Green (1949) emphasised the support given to the Land League by Irish-American Catholics, lay and clerical. More recently Janis (2015) has provided an extended analysis, which recognises the way the Land League provided women and the working-class with opportunities to partake in political discussion and organisation while recording the eventual victory of conservative nationalism over radical elements in both Ireland and the US. Janis's work looks at the Land League in the US on a national level: it is complemented by Ruark (2014) which looks at the reception of the Ladies' Land League in the state of Georgia.

The American Land League involved an alliance between physical force nationalists, conservative Irish-Americans (Catholic clergy, the middle class and elements of the Democratic Party) and American social and labour radicals. This last group saw the land war as the vanguard of a global opposition to monopoly, whether of land or of industry, and allowed those facing their own struggles in the US to express solidarity with the Irish Land League. In this coalition the Land League succeeded in being all things to all people, due to the many interpretations possible of its wonderfully vague slogan 'The land for the people': 'this popular phrase was sufficiently vague to be acceptable to all shades of nationalist opinion' (Janis 2015:11). But this unity could not last too long: 'An unwieldy coalition of disparate groups, the Land league eventually collapsed under the weight of ideological and class divisions' (Janis 2015:11).

The Land League also provides an early illustration of the problems posed for national movements by dependence on foreign funding. Keyes (2011) illustrates this vital transnational aspect of the land war by noting the differences between US support for the first phase of the land war (1880-1882) as against the second phase (1886-1891) during which it 'struggled for funds to assist evicted tenants in the absence of significant support from America' (Keyes 2011: 7). Indeed Keyes (2011: 120) argues 'The twists and turns of this movement can be directly linked to the ebb and flow of American funding ... and it would be the limitations of that funding that would determine the tipping point when compromise became inevitable and Parnell retreated from the semi-revolutionary Land League.'

As well as work on the transnational spread of the Land League to the US, there has been some work on the influence of the Land League on the development of

Scottish land activism (Cameron 2005; Newby 2004, Newby 2007)[29] as well as on the English Land League. There is also a political analysis of Davitt's work in internationalist terms. (Armstrong 2010). Finally we may note Ohlmeyer's report that 'M.K. Gandhi later attributed the origin of his own mass movement of peaceful resistance in India to the Land League, which served as a model of agrarian disturbance, and to Davitt, who had pioneered peaceful means of agitation, including the use of boycott, rent strikes and the press.' (Ohlmeyer 2015:181).

VI Conclusions

As to the lessons that may be learned by social movements from the history this article sketches out, they are obvious ones, most of which are depressingly familiar to activists from many other movement histories. The most obvious is that movements should be suspicious of charismatic, professional politicians who may offer to lead their struggles. Parnell is the example here, as he was happy to use the Land League and the land struggle for his own benefit and happy also to sell it out when it suited him.[30] The lesson drawn by Henry George, (quoted in Janis 2015:177) sums this up:

> 'The main lesson of the Irish agitation to me is that radical men should not allow themselves any consideration of a temporary expediency to put themselves under the leadership of politicians or to abate one jot or battle of their principles'.

Similarly, movements should beware of being used for campaigns that bring them no benefit. The example here is the winning of Catholic Emancipation under Daniel O'Connell, another charismatic, professional politician. The lesson here is summarised in a well-used quote:

> What good did Emancipation do us? Are we better clothed or fed? Are we not as naked as we were, and eating dry potatoes when we can get them? Let us notice the farmers to give us better food, and better wages, and not give so much to the landlords.

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[29] As an interesting aside, James Hunter castigates academic historians of Scotland in terms he explicitly compares with criticisms of Irish revisionist historians, condemning also 'the parochialism in which academic historians of Scotland –a singularly isolationist breed- have always wallowed' (Hunter 2010:19) while noting how one historian 'adopts a perspective on Highland history in which the mass of Highlanders drop largely from view' (Hunter 2010:26).

[30] Parnell was not of course the only leader of a devious and opportunistic nature. Another Land League official, John J. Louden, was one of the largest graziers in Mayo, who, when he obtained a rent reduction from his landlord in 1879-1881, did not pass that reduction on to his tenants (Moran 1994:205). Later examples can be cited from the Ranch War where in Riverstown, Co. Sligo, leaders of the agitation (mainly expressed through cattle drives) not only had cattle driven from the land they rented as graziers, but also participated in these cattle drives.

Related to both these lessons, is the conclusion that we should be wary of broad front, cross-class alliances which subordinate material interests to broader 'national' interests. The Irish movement provides a useful example of the tendency of cross-class nationalism to betray the interests of the lower classes on whose militancy and support it had relied for its shock troops. Ireland provides a very early example of how cross-class national liberation movements will downplay class issues and call for sectional sacrifice for the good of the nation, suggesting issues such as access to land, wage increases or female suffrage should be put on the long finger, until national independence is achieved, at which magical stage all such issues can be dealt with when the coloniser is expelled from power.

These bourgeois leaderships of national liberation movements normally continue with their betrayal of lower class and peasant groups after independence with a rhetoric of national development requiring sacrifices (and of course it is the poor, the peasant and the indigenous who must make these sacrifices.) Furthermore, groups such as peasants or labour are exhorted not to alienate elite, business and landlord classes whose involvement in the national movement is considered essential for success. Laird (2005) provides a fine series of examples of such calls for sacrifice in the Indian case, where landlordism and serfdom were even more outrageous than in Ireland, combined as they were with the indignities and insults of caste.

Finally however, there is a positive lesson that movements which respond to immediate material interests can have both immediate and longer-term effects that benefit movement participants. While the agrarian movements detailed in this article did not succeed in the end in preventing the commercialisation of agriculture, the defeat of subsistence agriculture and the victory of capitalism, they did impede them, and in their immediate effect won useful victories and over the longer term impeded capitalist development in rural Ireland. Finally these victories were won in the main by spontaneous, local action, often undertaken by the weakest groups, the wretched of the earth. In Scally's words 'It may be a lesson to be learned about colonialism that... the most successful resistance to intrusion was devised by the most ostensibly weakest layer of the native population, not by the intellegensia and organized political movements, but by the subjected peasantry' (Scally 1995:232-233)

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About the author

Tomás Mac Sheoin is an independent scholar who writes on the chemical industry and social movements. He has recently edited with Frank Pearce a special issue of *Social Justice* (41 (1/2)) to mark the 30th anniversary of the Bhopal chemical catastrophe. He can be contacted at tmacsheoin AT gmail.com.

***Interface*: a journal for and about social movements** *Article*
Volume 9 (2): 276 - 299 (Nov/Dec 2017) *Fusco and Carter, Anti-fracking toolkit*

Toward an anti-fracking mobilization toolkit: ten practices from Western Newfoundland's campaign[1]

Leah M. Fusco and Angela V. Carter

Abstract

This article documents the primary practices of the successful anti-fracking campaign that arose in 2012 in the western region of Newfoundland and Labrador, one of Canada's oil-dependent provinces. Drawing on qualitative research that included interviews with 34 mobilization participants in the region, it presents ten general practices that campaign leaders deemed particularly effective. Spanning three themes – building alliances, honing locally-relevant messages, and engaging the public and decision-makers – these practices provide useful information or inspiration to organizers resisting fracking in other rural communities facing similar constraints.

Keywords: hydraulic fracturing (fracking); Newfoundland and Labrador; rural communities; social movements; oil and gas development

1. Introduction

Anti-fracking campaigns began in the US in the late 1990s and have since spread to almost every country where hydraulic fracturing, or fracking,[2] has been applied (Carter and Eaton 2016; McGowan 2015). The first Global Frackdown day of action in 2012 signaled the international scope of the movement and by the 2015 event, more than 1,200 organizations from 64 countries participated in calling for fracking bans. The global rise of this community resistance is a prime example of Naomi Klein's "blockadia," a term capturing the multiplying instances of local mobilization against risky extractive industries, particularly fossil fuels. Klein describes this resistance as inherently rooted in specific places and led by average citizens "with an intense love of their homeplace and a determination to protect it" (p. 344). As blockadia expands, mirroring the spread of extraction, "Suddenly, no major new project, no matter how seemingly routine, is a done deal" (2014: 294-296).

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[1] We thank the individuals we interviewed during this research (names of interviewees are withheld in accordance with ethical approvals received for this study). We also thank Leigh McDougall for research assistant, Nadine Fladd, John Peters, *Interface* editor Irina Ceric, and two anonymous reviewers for revision advice. This research was funded by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada Strategic Research Grant (#865-2008-0062). Authors are listed in reverse alphabetical order; both contributed equally.

[2] Fracking is an oil or gas extraction method that involves forcing large volumes of liquids into underground formations to release reserves that would otherwise be trapped in impermeable rock. Injections primarily include water with a range of chemicals (sometimes very toxic) and proppants to ensure fractures stay open. Produced water (injected liquids plus material from the underground formation) flows back to the surface. The practice of fracking has grown exponentially since the mid-2000s, particularly in the US since it was combined with horizontal drilling. It is associated with a wide range of negative human health and environmental impacts (Carter and Eaton 2016). Fracking was initially developed in the US and the American government and US firms have promoted the technology in North Africa, South America, Europe, India, and China as an energy security opportunity (McGowan 2015, p. 46).

This paper examines anti-fracking resistance that emerged in western Newfoundland, in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), Canada, in 2012.

Community opposition here was arguably unexpected given that the region is primarily comprised of economically struggling rural communities within a province deeply dependent on offshore oil development. Moreover, citizens in the region had limited social activism experience. At the time the opposition arose, we had been drafting a paper analyzing why NL had not experienced the contentious politics surrounding oil that were notable in other oil-rich areas across the country and world. We were intrigued by the opposition to fracking and began following the mobilization to understand its origins and potential policy impact. Over the course of four years, local people constructed a successful campaign that led to a provincial fracking review and a pause on fracking in the province for the foreseeable future.

In a recently published paper, we analyzed why, contrary to theoretical expectations, mobilization arose in western Newfoundland (Carter and Fusco 2017). We build from that work in this paper by examining the central practices of western Newfoundland's effective mobilization. Our aim is to use this analysis to highlight mobilization practices that might be relevant to other rural communities facing unwanted fracking proposals. We recognize that every community will confront unique challenges and opportunities given its particular experiences, history, and socio-economic contexts. However, we also expect that in other economically depressed rural areas where fracking is often proposed (Boudet et al. 2016), there may be similarities in conditions and possibilities that make pertinent the mobilization lessons learned from this case.

In this study, we drew on socio-economic data on the region, corporate and government documents, and media coverage of the fracking debate in regional and provincial newspapers. Our analysis was informed by commentary on fracking regulation drawn from scholarly and grey literature globally, primarily relating to Canadian and American cases (as summarized in Carter and Eaton 2016). Most importantly, in 2016 we conducted 34 interviews with key actors involved in the NL anti-fracking campaign. Interviewees included people from a variety of groups and actor types, including NGOs, municipal government officials, independent experts, non-oil industry representatives, university student organizers, Indigenous community representatives, labour representatives, and faith group representatives. This research was also informed by fieldwork, participant observation, and substantial time spent on site.[3]

This paper proceeds in three parts. First, we provide a background on the province of NL and the western Newfoundland region, outlining the context in which mobilization took place and the primary organizers, structure, message framing, and strategy of the campaign. Next, we reflect on recent social movement literature which provides a framework for our investigation and discussion. We then present what we consider the key practices that contributed to the success of the anti-fracking campaign and provide examples of their application. We conclude with a discussion of whether or how this isolated struggle might contribute to a broader blockadia of fossil fuel extraction arising in response to the climate crisis.

2. Context

2.1. Newfoundland and Labrador as petro-province

Since sustained European contact began in the 1500s, NL has been a decidedly resource-extraction, export-based economy (Cadigan 2009). For most of its settler history, the province was economically, socially, culturally, and geographically organized around the fishery. However, new resources were later exploited in an attempt to diversify the economy, including forestry and mining in the 1800s, hydroelectricity in the 1960s, and oil in the 1990s. After North Atlantic cod fish stocks collapsed due to overfishing, the federal government implemented the cod fishery moratorium in 1992, inciting massive socio-economic turmoil in the province.

Although oil was first discovered offshore NL in 1979, the industry did not rise to prominence until the 1990s, just as the province was reeling from the cod fishery loss. First production began at the Hibernia field in 1997 and since then, particularly over the last decade, the province has become unequivocally economically reliant on oil.[4] The industry has driven unprecedented economic growth, representing as much as 34% of the government's total revenues in 2011.[5] However, since oil production peaked in 2007, the provincial government has actively encouraged exploration offshore and onshore to ensure the continued flow of oil revenue. As a result of the rapid global decline in oil prices in 2014, the province has returned to economic crisis, with soaring government deficits and staggering rates of unemployment again the norm. This economic stress has only intensified the government's enthusiasm for expanding the oil sector.

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[3] Fusco made three field site visits to western Newfoundland over the 2012-2015 period and also observed activism unfold in St. John's. Carter lived in the western Newfoundland region from 2009-2012 and participated in community events and research (Bourgault, Cyr, Dumont and Carter 2014) on oil development off the coast of western Newfoundland. We also participated in or observed key moments of the debate: Fusco attended public consultations held by the Newfoundland and Labrador Hydraulic Fracturing Review Panel, observed meetings between the panel and relevant groups in the region, and reviewed the panel's final report; Carter and Fusco submitted comments to the panel during the review process.

[4] For more detailed history of offshore oil development in NL, see House 1985.

[5] Based on the Government of NL's annual "Report on the Program Expenditures and Revenues of the Consolidated Revenue Fund" reports' data on offshore royalties, contributions to the offshore revenue fund, and corporate income taxes.

Despite rising global awareness of the environmental costs of oil extraction, the province's experience with the cod fishery collapse, and the recent economic volatility due to oil dependence, there has been little public opposition to or critique of the offshore oil industry or the government's reliance on it. The oil as economic saviour narrative has remained strong. While scientists have periodically raised concerns about the province's lacklustre environmental regulatory response (Fraser and Ellis 2008, 2009; Wiese and Ryan 2003), these critiques did not incite broader public mobilization in the province against oil extraction (Fusco 2008)—that is, not until the anti-fracking mobilization in western Newfoundland.

2.2. Fracking and resistance in western Newfoundland

Western Newfoundland is a rural region of the island of Newfoundland. Corner Brook is the most populous city (with approximately 32,000 people), but most communities are much smaller: Stephenville has fewer than 7,000 people and Rocky Harbour fewer than 1,000. These communities are spread out across a geographically large region, some with subpar access to the internet and comparatively low literacy and education rates (Carter and Fusco 2017). The availability of even basic public services is also sometimes limited. In particular, access to drinking water has been an ongoing issue as evidenced by the regular boil water advisories in the region and the frequency with which some towns have to shut off water in the summer months to maintain adequate pressure.


Parsons Pond
Sally's Cove
Gros Morne National Park
Rocky Harbour
Lark Harbour
Corner Brook
Little Grand Lake Provisional Ecological Reserve
Shoal Point
Stephenville
Port aux Port Peninsula
Kippens
Cape St. George
Flat Bay

Figure 1: Map of Western Newfoundland Region
Source: ArcGIS Online

Western Newfoundland also faces longstanding economic precarity. While significant in the eastern part of the island, oil boom benefits have not been evenly distributed across the province (Cadigan 2014; Peters, Cadigan, and Carter 2014). Economic uncertainty remains rampant in this region and is reflected in socio-economic data demonstrating dramatically low income rates, high unemployment, and/or people receiving income support in many local communities (Carter and Fusco 2017). Anti-fracking organizers interviewed echoed this by speaking about the economic "desperation" and the need for "economic relief" in the region, noting the great "fear of the future" due to economic instability.

Amidst this economic uncertainty, two sectors offer hope for stability. Gros Morne National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, is an important tourist draw for western Newfoundland and one of the economic foundations of the region (CPAWS 2012, 18; Brake and Addo 2014, 28; Tourism Synergy Ltd. and Broad Reach Strategies 2016, ii). Tourists are attracted to its ecological beauty and solitude. As one local tourism sector business person explained, "Gros Morne and this location here, we brand ourselves [...] using the word magic.

People come to Gros Morne and they find a certain magic." At the same time, the fisheries continue to be an economic mainstay of the region (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2011, 64). The value of the commercial fisheries (excluding subsistence or recreational fishery), was estimated at over $19 million over the 2000–2007 period for the Bay St. George - Port au Port and Bay of Islands regions (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2011, p. 64).

It was within this context that in November of 2012, Shoal Point Energy, a small independent Canadian petroleum exploration and development company, held public meetings in three communities in western Newfoundland and stated its intention to frack. This was the first time many citizens in the region had heard of Shoal Point's proposal. In response, citizens in the Port au Port and Gros Morne areas began discussing fracking informally around kitchen tables. Most people initially involved in these conversations did not have substantial or recent social activism experience, yet all were highly motivated to stop fracking for a variety of reasons.[6]

Early leaders formed two organizations to address fracking, the Port au Port / Bay St George Fracking Awareness Group (hereafter referred to as the PauP group) and the Gros Morne Coastal Alliance, both of which became central to the anti-fracking mobilization. These groups took a lead position in the campaign and played key roles in crafting messaging, communicating with the public, and growing the mobilization. Leaders connected with existing social and environmental organizations in western Newfoundland, such as the Western Environment Centre in Corner Brook, as well as groups and individuals across the island in St. John's (the capital of the province), such as the NL Federation of Labour and faith groups. Interviewees also noted the close integration of settler and Indigenous groups in western Newfoundland throughout the campaign, with one spiritual leader of the local Mi'kmaq First Nation Band stating that "there's really no separation" between settler and Indigenous groups in the resistance to fracking, "we work together." Coordination across these organizations was provided by the Newfoundland and Labrador Fracking Awareness Network (NL-FAN), an umbrella organization created by campaign leaders in June 2013. As the provincial network was growing, local organizers were connecting with anti-fracking groups across Canada and internationally. All of these connections were fundamental to the campaign but it remained led from the grassroots, by the people and communities surrounding the potential fracking sites.

Local organizers focused on communicating consistently with the public and decision makers about fracking, using carefully considered messages of local relevance (primarily the threat to fresh water, rural quality of life, and sustainable economic sectors). Groups conveyed these messages using a variety of media as well as by organizing events to foster broader public engagement with the campaign. One interviewee explained that campaign organizers aimed to maintain a constant flow of information about fracking, to the point that it would be “in the media so much you couldn’t help but listen.”

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[6] We discuss the origins of this motivation in more detail in Carter and Fusco 2017.

In response to pressure from local groups, in August of 2014 the provincial government announced it would establish an external independent panel, the Newfoundland and Labrador Hydraulic Fracturing Review Panel, to examine the process of fracking and conduct public consultations. The panel’s recommendations would inform government’s general policy on fracking approvals and its decision on the existing proposal for western Newfoundland. While some participants of the anti-fracking campaign contested key aspects of the panel and considered withholding their participation, organizers chose to engage with the process to ensure that panel members heard the full intensity of local dissent.

The review panel released its final report and recommendations in May 2016 and many mobilization leaders considered it a victory. Although the panel did not explicitly advise a fracking ban, it did recommend that the government meet a number of very time and resource-intensive criteria, such as a health impact assessment, prior to accepting new fracking proposals. The report particularly stressed the importance of the provincial government obtaining communities’ social license before approving a fracking project. This implies that the government would not grant approval to frack anywhere in the province without community consent. Although neither the government nor the report indicated how this social license would be obtained, it is highly unlikely to be granted in the western Newfoundland region (the only area considered for fracking to date) given the strength of the local mobilization against fracking.

Fracking in NL is unlikely in the foreseeable future, no doubt due to the organizing efforts of anti-fracking groups in western Newfoundland over the 2012-2016 period. Below we discuss some of the specific practices that contributed to the campaign’s success. First, however, we situate our work within the broader literature on social movements and more specifically on anti-fracking mobilization.

3. Theorizing the rise of anti-fracking mobilization

This case both challenges and conforms to two central expectations in recent scholarly work on collective mobilization against energy projects and fracking in particular. The literature would have us expect little or no collective mobilization against fracking given the desperate need for economic activity and lack of experience with collective organizing in western Newfoundland. Notably, McAdam and Boudet (2012) identify causal conditions for mobilization and non-mobilization against proposed energy projects that, as we have argued in detail elsewhere (Carter and Fusco 2017), would have us expect no collective action against fracking in this case. Similarly, Eaton and Kinchy (2016) accounted for the lack of collective mobilization against fracking in Saskatchewan and Pennsylvania by referring to local citizens’ “ambivalent perceptions of the oil and gas industry.” In those cases, community members in depressed rural regions were torn between the industry's economic benefits and the negative health, environmental, and social impacts. At the same time, they lacked political opportunities and organizational capacity to support a resistance campaign. The well-organized anti-fracking mobilization campaign in western Newfoundland defies these expectations.

Seeking to understand the rise and effectiveness of this anti-fracking campaign, we draw on three streams of the broader social movement literature. The first, resource mobilization literature, highlights the central importance of groups gathering resources (such as money, people, time, and access to media) and applying them via some form of mobilizing structure. This structure can be a formal organization, for instance, a well-established environmental organization. Importantly for our case, however, they can also be informal, drawing on networks of trust and credibility built among family and friends or through work or volunteer activities (McCarthy 1996). Second, we draw on work on political opportunities, which underscores the importance of the wider political and institutional environment for social mobilization (Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004).[7] Changes in this environment alter the political opportunities available to groups and, as Tarrow states, act as "signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements" (1994:54). For instance, the election of an ally to public office might improve a group's chances of achieving a desired policy change and encourage the group to apply additional resources to forward its goal. The political opportunities literature also suggests that groups can be effective by seizing opportunities even if they do not have extensive internal resources (McAdam 1982). Through activities such as protests, groups can alter the normal functioning of society and gain support for their cause. Clearly, this is an essential factor to consider in rural communities with few resources and little experience with environmental activism. Finally, we consider social movement literature on framing. Here the emphasis is on the role of culture and subjectivity in the rise of social movement activity (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Zirakzadeh 2006). How an issue is framed—how it is packaged and presented—can effectively shape public perceptions, gain supporters, and accomplish movement goals. The efficacy of this framing is, according to McAdam, "determined, in part, by the *cultural resonance* of the frames advanced by organizers" (1994:38). In other words, frames have to be sensitive to place and require an understanding of the people and communities involved and their shared experiences over time.

Social movement literature on framing clearly reflects findings in recent research on anti-fracking mobilizations and the case of western NL confirms a central expectation in this work. New research, such as Davis and Hoffer (2012), Willow (2016), and Wright (2013), emphasizes the importance of framing fracking as a multifaceted threat to the economy, health, and the environment as a way to oppose industry's neoliberal framing of fracking as an activity that provides jobs and revenue. Bomberg (2017) further notes how effective framing interprets fracking as a threat to local democracy and sovereignty (that is, the ability of local people to choose their own future) while challenging the trustworthiness of fracking proponents. This literature also finds that focusing on matters of local interest is essential to effective framing. Hopke, for example, attributes the success of community anti-fracking campaigns in Sweden to groups "contextualiz[ing] their activism in terms of local history, with a strong sense of connection to place and concern for local environments" (2016, p. 388; see also Boudet et al. 2016 and Wright 2013). Moreover, this locally-rooted understanding is collaboratively built through the "deliberative conversations among community members" so essential to "informed political participation" (Arnold and Holahan 2014, p. 349).

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[7] What counts as a political opportunity has been subject to debate and the term has developed over time. For more on this, see Meyer and Minkoff (2004).

Despite the contribution that frame analysis has made toward incorporating culture into our understanding of social movements, some scholars still lament the continued focus on structure (for example as discussed in McAdam and Boudet 2012). We agree with research that highlights the relationship between the cultural and structural elements of social movement emergence (McAdam and Boudet 2012; Meyer et al. 2002). We understand the success of western Newfoundland's campaign as a result of strategic framing, the effective use of resources, and the political opportunities available to local groups. Citizens in the region were motivated to seize political opportunities and apply resources because they perceived a risk from fracking. These perceptions of risk were based on shared experiences informed by the socio-economic, cultural, political, and historic context. It was these shared experiences that helped organizers shape culturally resonant frames to gain public support for anti-fracking mobilization.

4. Toward a community mobilization toolkit

In this section, we present ten practices deemed by mobilization leaders as particularly effective in the western Newfoundland anti-fracking campaign. These are organized into three general categories: a) building broad alliances, b) honing locally-relevant messages, and c) engaging the public and decision-makers. As we discuss, these practices reflect findings in recent fracking contention literature, specifically the importance of framing, but also the broader social movement work on resource mobilization and political opportunities.

A: Building alliances

Anti-fracking campaign leaders in western Newfoundland focused on building diverse and wide-reaching alliances. This network provided a structure through which resources could be organized, developed, and strategically applied. Organizers used two main alliance-building practices.

Mobilization practice #1: Build a network from the ground up

Following Shoal Point Energy's public meetings about their plans to frack, citizens concerned about fracking in western Newfoundland organized into two main local groups, the Port au Port / Bay St. George Fracking Awareness Group and the Gros Morne Coastal Alliance. As discussed above, these two organizations built relationships with groups outside the region, province, and country, receiving information, research, and advice about effective strategizing and campaigning. These ties also provided moral support by making local organizers feel less isolated in their campaign. Notably, leaders in western Newfoundland connected with activists in St. John's to spark the creation of the east coast fracking awareness group. They also built a relationship with the Council of Canadians (CoC), a lead NGO that works on fracking nationally and has a regional office in Halifax and a chapter in St. John's. The CoC provided outreach materials, such as buttons and posters, from their national anti-fracking campaign. More importantly, however, CofC provided information on its recent experience navigating Nova Scotia's fracking review process, which gave NL organizers examples of strategies and tactics that could be useful during the NL panel review.

Western Newfoundland grassroots leaders expanded their network across Canada, drawing on groups like the Sierra Club and Ecojustice, as well as on key individuals fighting fracking in their own communities. They established an important relationship with the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS), a longstanding charity focused on protecting public lands and waters, and collaborated with them to create the national Save Gros Morne National Park campaign. Local organizers also made international connections in Europe and the US, initially by Facebook and then through telephone and video calls. As one interviewee remarked, "I went all over by phone and I was bringing that to the table, to the network. [...] I was bringing information from all over." The Sisters of Mercy (a group of religious women active in NL social and environmental justice issues), worked with their international counterparts to send an urgent letter of appeal to the UN as well as to representatives in the Canadian and NL governments. Meanwhile, other mobilization organizers on the west coast of Newfoundland joined CPAWS in writing to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the organization responsible for global World Heritage Sites. They warned about the proposal to frack just outside Gros Morne National Park, the only natural world heritage site in the province. UNESCO's World Heritage Committee later called on the Canadian government to establish a buffer zone around the park.

While external alliance building provided essential information and resources, the mobilization remained locally rooted and led. Because of their dense ties in the region, local organizers were the best judges of what messaging and strategies would be most effective and external groups respected this and committed to "amplifying" the voices and concerns of west coast communities.

Mobilization practice #2: Unify diverse allies

The primary anti-fracking grassroots organizations in the western newfoundland region unified the movement by creating NL-FAN. The network had an open-arms approach: as one NL-FAN initiator explained, "We welcome every single group into our network." It was strategically established to raise awareness about fracking rather than overtly or vocally oppose it. This allowed collaboration toward a shared goal among organizations with different preferred policy outcomes and different approaches to political engagement.

At its peak, the network involved nearly two hundred individual members and seventeen groups, including environmental NGOs, a landowner association, local businesses, a 50 plus club, and religious organizations. This was highly effective as the range and diversity of NL-FAN membership conveyed to the public and government that fracking was a widespread concern and far from a fringe environmental issue. Through NL-FAN, groups came to a consensus to ask government for a pause on fracking until an independent review was completed. The strength of this unified voice undoubtedly contributed to the government implementing a hold on fracking permits and establishing the review panel.

Local Indigenous leadership and involvement were also a central part of this anti-fracking mobilization. For instance, Indigenous leaders organized water ceremonies, which powerfully communicated communities' dependence on the lands and waterways threatened by fracking and emphasized the Mi'Kmaq people's commitment to protecting them. One ceremony was held in Stephenville in the fall of 2015 in coordination with others across the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Local Indigenous leaders also connected the western Newfoundland campaign to resistance efforts in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Thanks to this connection, Indigenous leaders who had participated in the landmark Elsipogtog First Nations' blockade against seismic trucks in New Brunswick 2013 (Howe 2015) visited western Newfoundland in 2015 to bolster the local resistance effort.

B. Crafting the message

In the early days of the anti-fracking campaign, both lead organizations researched fracking and built networks with external groups. They then focused on strategically framing what they learned. With the aim of raising widespread awareness and concern that could be communicated to government decision makers, organizers aimed to create messages that would be meaningful in the daily lives of people in the communities while understating more divisive messages.

Mobilization practice #3: Hone messages that hit home

Mobilization leaders crafted their messaging to resonate with the particular local context and the values and shared experiences of the region. Organizers stated that the most persuasive message was that fracking might exacerbate already precarious access to water. One interviewee explained that older residents in the region vividly remember the physical labour of gathering water from wells with buckets and bringing it home by horse. This person emphasized that "For the people here, the water was everything. And when you have a situation coming up where that is possibly going to be put in jeopardy, nobody, *nobody*, wants to go back to 1930s or 1940s Newfoundland." Moreover, organizers noted that citizens are also keenly aware that home values would be impacted by deteriorated access to water. As another interviewee explained, "If you don't have water to drink, you have no property value," and so "what people had taken a lifetime to build up in terms of property value [...] with plans to hand on to children and grandchildren, that would be gone." Water-related issues motivated disparate groups to participate in the mobilization and stirred first-time activists to join in.

Mobilization leaders also stressed risks posed by fracking to the rural quality of life and landscape of the region. The most tangible impact stressed here was the dramatic increase in truck traffic that fracking would necessitate and the associated noise and potential for spills and accidents. Traffic concerns were particularly relevant given that in some communities, for instance in the Port au Port area where there is only one road to the proposed development site, increased truck traffic would cut through the centre of quiet communities and accidents could potentially leave people stranded.

Fracking was also effectively cast as a threat to the region's economic base. Local people formed the Port au Port Fishery Committee and focused public attention on the risk of oil spills to fisheries and inadequate government regulation. In provincial and national media, they showed abandoned conventional oil wells that had been leaking hydrocarbons into the ocean for years at Shoal Point with no government response. As one committee member noted, the existing leaking wells represented "the heart of the hydraulic fracking issue: how much faith can you have in a regulatory system that can't even deal with abandoned wells?" Another explained that "It doesn't take much to upset the balance in the bay. We would lose our lobster, herring, and shellfish. So it is a very sensitive bay and if the oil industry came in it would be the end of the day for fishing and tourism." Likewise, organizers framed fracking as sullying the allure of the national park. One interviewee recalled envisioning the future of the region as an industrial landscape based on the proponent's description of its development plans. This kind of future would threaten the park, according to a campaign participant in the tourism sector. The "rumble of trucks up and down through the hills would pretty much put us out of business" and disrupt the quiet "magic" that attracts visitors.

Tapping into local people's desires to bring their children home from Alberta, industry predominantly framed fracking as a way to provide employment and economic growth in the region. Black Spruce Exploration Corp. summarized fracking as an "immense opportunity" that "the people of western Newfoundland deserve" (2013: 2). However, mobilization leaders publicly disputed this argument by presenting research on the limited number of jobs that fracking would provide for local people and how these jobs would actually *threaten* employment in tourism and fisheries, the region's sustainable industries.

Mobilization practice #4: Mute messages that divide

While emphasizing locally relevant risks, organizers strategically avoided framing fracking in ways that would be less relevant to, or highly controversial in, western Newfoundland. Perhaps most strikingly, they did not link their opposition to fracking with concerns about oil development in general. They recognized that they would gain little support in NL by speaking out against oil, given how dependent the province is on the offshore oil industry and how reliant citizens in the western region are on jobs in Alberta's tar sands. Instead, organizers stressed how fracking was a new technology with unique risks.

Similarly, organizers chose to bypass emphasizing the impact of fracking on climate change. Although many organizers were concerned about this issue, most interviewees felt it would not resonate locally and foster public opposition to the immediate issue of fracking. Climate change was deemed far less tangible and therefore less persuasive. As one interviewee noted, climate change is "important but abstract" for people in the region.

Also of note was the care organizers took in asserting their position on fracking: through NL-FAN, groups demanded a pause rather than a moratorium on fracking approvals to allow time for an external review and public consultations. While communities across the world have campaigned for moratoria on fracking, organizers in western Newfoundland avoided that specific word as they feared it would call to mind the federal government's 1992 cod fishery moratorium, one of the darkest hours in the province's history.

C. Spreading the word

Organizers conveyed anti-fracking messages using a variety of actions to raise public awareness, capture the attention of government decision-makers, and build support for their goal of preventing fracking in western Newfoundland. Some of these approaches were conventional, what we would expect to find in almost any community mobilization. However, others were very locally rooted and inspired, drawing on specific social and cultural ties within the communities. This section discusses how local organizations drew on existing resources and took advantage of political opportunities to build public interest and influence policymakers.

Mobilization practice #5: Communicate consistently in old and new ways

Organizers used both traditional and digital media to convey their opposition to fracking. They sought to build productive relationships with specific radio, print, and television reporters, sharing information frequently and making themselves available for comment under tight deadlines. Reporters responded with ongoing coverage of fracking issues and events that often featured commentary by campaign leaders. Meanwhile, anti-fracking group members submitted a steady stream of letters to the editor in local and provincial newspapers. They also participated regularly in radio call-in shows (a key political tradition in the province), both as invited guests and as public callers responding to the programming. Radio is particularly significant in these rural communities as it provides a way to share information locally and reach people who might have limited access to computers and the internet or lack literacy skills.

Using signs was another traditional means of communication that helped maintain public interest in the fracking debate. One member of the PauP group purchased $3,000 worth of anti-fracking signs and sold them at public events. They became an important visual aid for the mobilization. When review panel members visited the region, organizers lined the roads with signs from the airport into the communities where the panel was travelling. Displaying signs also allowed people who were not comfortable speaking during public meetings or events to convey their position.

Organizers frequently commented on how significant the internet was to their campaign. Not only did using email, Facebook, blogging, and other social media allow them to communicate easily with each other and tap into valuable international networks, but connecting to other campaigns served as a wellspring of inspiration and support that kept organizers in small communities from feeling disconnected and isolated. Communicating on social media to groups contesting fracking in other areas made mobilization leaders feel that, in the words of one organizer, “we just had this huge massive world connection” and that there was “a real camaraderie.”

Mobilization practice #6: Play electoral politics

Over the 2012 to 2016 period, organizers stayed in direct contact with politicians who would be involved in future fracking decisions. They frequently contacted both elected officials and high-ranking civil servants to request information about the regulatory process and to express their concerns about fracking through formal letters, in-person meetings, or via less conventional communications. For example, the PauP group sent Christmas cards to every member of the provincial legislature in 2014, urging them to “Keep NL Frack-Free” (figure 2).


NO TO PC FRACK OIL
Don't FRACK NL
PICK ONE:
☐ FRACKING
☑ HEALTH
KEEP NL FRACK-FREE
Merry Christmas from the Port au Port/ Bay St. George Fracking Awareness Group

Figure 2: Port au Port/Bay St. George Fracking Awareness Group Christmas card to Members of the NL House of Assembly

Source: Port au Port/Bay St. George Fracking Awareness Group Facebook post, December 15, 2014, reproduced with permission of the organization.

Perhaps most importantly, organizers seized on the fall 2015 provincial election to lobby candidates and ensure they remain accountable. The PauP group formally requested that all candidates declare their position on fracking in writing. These positions were then publicized to inform voters' choices. In the summer of 2015, Liberal Party leader Dwight Ball maintained that if he were elected, no fracking would take place without social license. When he was elected as premier with a majority government in November 2015, anti-fracking organizers were quick to remind him of this commitment.

Mobilization practice #7: Keep it personal

Participants of the anti-fracking campaign drew on their dense interpersonal relationships developed over decades in close knit communities to build public concern about fracking. Person to person interactions were a major conduit for sharing information about the risks of fracking and for heightening the personal commitment of local people to attend events and join the campaign.

Interviewees commented on how they regularly engaged in conversations about fracking with people in a variety of work and social settings. One organizer recalled bringing up the fracking issue "wherever I meet people. I have conversations in the middle of the ski trail." Others would go purposefully to popular places in the community, such as the local coffee shops, barber shops, and garages, to share information about fracking informally with people who might otherwise not engage with the issue. Word would then spread from these locations into homes and other social settings across the region. These one-on-one relationships were also used to inform or remind people about public meetings, events, or opportunities to make submissions to the fracking review panel. Organizers recall setting up in the local grocery store parking lot on a busy Saturday morning to meet community members and invite them, often by name, to an upcoming public event on fracking. Organizers focused their on-the-ground communication efforts to best make use of local knowledge and connections. These conversations with community members sometimes involved debates about the merits of fracking, particularly the potential of the industry to bring young people back home and provide local economic development. However, organizers persisted in conveying the risks of the industry which, they argued, outweighed its uncertain benefits.

Mobilization practice #8: Lead the conversation and show risks in the flesh

Organizers brought the anti-fracking message to new audiences by giving presentations and facilitating small group discussions, initially across the region and later across the province. For example, one member of the PauP group gave approximately forty presentations to various groups and organizations to provide information and open a space to start community-based discussions about fracking. After each event, a volunteer gathered attendees' contact information to grow the campaign's email list and provide reminders about upcoming opportunities to participate. These presentations were done with a variety of groups, including labour organizations, ski clubs, chambers of commerce, Indigenous communities, elementary school classes, ministers of the provincial government, and church groups.

Campaign organizers also sought to lead the public conversation about fracking by organizing community events independent of more institutional bodies (such as university and government-sponsored events or consultations). These public events became important moments in the fracking debate in the region. For example, in April 2013, organizers invited government officials, as well as a knowledgeable member of an environmental NGO from Québec, to a public forum in Port au Port East to speak about fracking and respond to questions from the public. This meeting marked a turning point in the public conversation about fracking. While the NGO representative conveyed substantial knowledge about the risks of fracking based on experience working in other locations, the government officials offered only general assurances about fracking's safety and were unable to answer basic questions about how they would ensure this safety. The meeting thus helped solidify community opposition to fracking in the region.

Organizers brought concerns about fracking onto the streets of their community through a “walk the block” march organized by the PauP group (inspired by a similar action by anti-fracking groups in New Brunswick). The event involved hundreds of local people who gathered with anti-fracking signs and banners and walked the streets of Stephenville to music and drumming. The walk was an impressive visual show of the strength of local opposition to fracking and garnered widespread media coverage. It also heightened the commitment of participants to the anti-fracking position. As one local leader explained, “I felt strongly that we had sort of activated a number of people at the Port au Port forum and in order to keep those people interested, to keep the fracking on the radar, we felt that we needed to get them out there” on the streets of one of the potentially impacted communities.

Another turning point in this local mobilization was when organizers brought in Jessica Ernst, an Albertan and an international icon in the struggle against fracking. Ernst travelled the west coast of Newfoundland and talked with small groups in community meetings, then gave a public lecture to another impressive crowd of approximately four hundred people who came from across the region to hear her speak. Hearing Ernst’s personal account of living amidst fracking and struggling to protect her land and family was a powerful forewarning that resonated intimately with local people. Interviewees repeatedly stressed how Ernst’s talk was a “huge turning point,” in the words of one organizer, and an important “consciousness raising” milestone in the debate, according to another.

Mobilization practice #9: Intervene in conventional processes

As public concern about fracking grew, formal institutions, such as the Government of NL and Memorial University, responded by hosting public events on the issue. Rather than boycott events that seemed to endorse fracking, or contest them from the outside, organizers used them as opportunities to assert the anti-fracking perspective. Organizers carefully prepared to participate “proactively, boldly, intentionally” and spread the word through their networks to ensure a strong turnout of concerned citizens. At events, organizers ensured challenging questions were asked, questions that that would reveal gaps in knowledge about the impact of fracking or the self-interested motives of experts, industry, and government representatives.

By far the most significant formal event that members of the anti-fracking campaign participated in was the series of consultations accompanying the fracking review panel in the fall of 2015. The stakes were tremendously high because the panel’s recommendations would inform government policy on fracking approvals. Yet many mobilization leaders and members of the public considered the panel problematic, even illegitimate, given its composition (the panel was composed of all white male academics mostly with engineering expertise and had no representation from social scientists, the western NL region, or Indigenous communities). However, campaign members chose to participate vigorously rather than boycott. As one interviewee explained,

> My number one reaction would be, this panel is illegitimate. I don't think anyone should participate in it and we should boycott it. But then I realized, look, they're going to do this, it's going to happen, it's going to be part of this process. So what is the most strategic thing to do here in terms of getting people on the west coast and on the east coast and everywhere plugged into it?

Mobilization leaders aimed to "flood" the panel, as one interviewee noted, with public concerns about fracking from the region and from across the province. Groups organized "submission parties" where people could gather to find support in making a submission to the panel. Organizers aimed to inspire contributions by posting easily accessible and shareable audio-visual examples on a Facebook site and a blog.

These efforts contributed to the remarkable number of submissions made by individuals and community groups to the review panel, 488 and 38, respectively. The vast majority (95% of the individual submissions and 87% of the community organization submissions) opposed fracking and called for a ban on the practice (NLHFRP 2016: 80-82). Organizers met their goal of spurring a considerable number of anti-fracking messages that could not be easily ignored by the panel.

Mobilization practice #10: Challenge conventional processes

Although organizers chose to participate in formal government-driven processes, they simultaneously challenged the boundaries of these processes, calling for them to be more inclusive and responsive to the concerns of the people in the region. For example, campaign organizers participated in the panel consultations while also working to "change the rules of the game" and "rehabilitate" a process that seemed designed to "make people feel alienated [...] and therefore not participate." When the provincial government initially established the panel, the appointed panel members interpreted their mandate narrowly as examining only the direct process of fracking at the well site. However, organizers pressured the panel to consider the impact of fracking across the entire development process, from early exploration to final consumption. Similarly, the panel expanded its scope to include the broader social and economic impacts of fracking, such as the impact of noise on the tourism sector. Furthermore, anti-fracking groups insisted on a much broader geographic scope of consultations, which led the panel to add two more sessions in the areas that would most likely be impacted by fracking.

Especially notable was the effort organizers put into pressing the panel to accept unconventional submissions as a way to incite broader public participation. The panel initially sought comments in written form via email, regular mail, or an online form. While organizers had become accustomed to writing letters to newspapers and public officials, they recognized that allowing only written interventions would limit general public participation. In the words of one organizer, it was highly "undemocratic," especially given the high levels of illiteracy and low levels of education in some communities in the region. Anti-fracking groups therefore challenged the panel to accept all forms of public comments and encouraged citizens to create submissions in whatever format they chose: visual art, poetry, music, videos, and so forth. The panel was compelled to accept these unconventional submissions, creating a new "creative" category. Some of these submissions, such as songs, were performed at the public consultations, thus giving the panel very personal accounts of what fracking meant to communities. Organizers felt this change allowed citizens who might not have otherwise participated in the public consultations to contribute poignant statements about fracking.

4. Discussion and conclusion

The case of anti-fracking mobilization in western Newfoundland illustrates how concerned citizens without extensive activism experience built a successful campaign against a proposal that would have redefined the social and environmental geography of their region. This case provides a positive example of how rural communities, increasingly targeted for risky energy proposals, can defy expectations and fight unwanted projects. At the same time, it illustrates how central concepts from the social movement literature were enacted on the ground: local organizers drew on existing resources and built on their unique skills and community relationships to create grassroots mobilization, seized political opportunities, and thoughtfully framed culturally resonant messages.

The work of community members over the course of the four year campaign boosted civic capacity and transformed the social and political landscape of the region. Citizens with limited prior activist experience at the start of the campaign built skills, developed connections central to social activism, and experienced what it takes to oppose an extractive project successfully. One mobilization leader stated that thanks to this campaign, participants are now familiar with oil development regulators, the environmental assessment (EA) process, and ministers of key provincial departments. Moreover, they have become adept at community organizing and media relations. Organizers expected that in the future, citizens would direct this civic capacity to related regional development issues. One noted that "any [proposal] that comes down, we're going to be demanding EAs, health impact statements, we're going to be demanding that the oil companies that are going to drill will come under scrutiny. There will be protests." From this point forward, we expect that future plans for extractive development in this region will be met with a strong local force advocating environmental integrity and authentic democratic participation. The local fracking mobilization in western Newfoundland has tilled rich soil that may well grow other forms of contestation.

There is a clear alignment between this campaign and proliferating instances of blockadia. As Klein explains, blockadia campaigns are usually made of non-activists with a strong connection to place who are concerned that fossil fuel extraction would “weaken or destroy” sectors like fisheries, tourism, and farming, closing off a community’s other economic options (p. 316). Participants of blockadia aim to preserve local identity, culture, and history. At the same time, their mobilization efforts are knit into a densely interconnected, transnational movement through which strategies and information are shared across the globe. These were certainly core characteristics of the western Newfoundland case, as was the primary focus on the extractive industry’s threat to water, which Klein observes as particularly fundamental in motivating resistance.

However, this case contrasts with Klein’s characterization of blockadia campaigns in that there was little attempt to link this local anti-fracking mobilization to a larger struggle against fossil fuel development and climate change. Klein argues that while blockadia participants are primarily protecting local places from extraction, they are also highly attuned to the global climate crisis and its origin in fossil fuel extraction (p. 304). Blockadia is in great part about communities saying “no new carbon frontiers” and “stopping real climate crimes in progress” (p. 295). This is echoed in new research on anti-fracking campaigns in which communities and NGOs use global issues and framings as a central part of their messaging to oppose fracking locally (Hopke 2016; Neville and Weinthal 2016). However, in western Newfoundland, organizers argue that one of the reasons the anti-fracking campaign was so successful is because it *strategically avoided* emphasizing climate change impacts or connecting this issue to larger concerns about the oil industry, on which NL’s economy is highly dependent. Mobilization leaders consciously omitted climate change from campaign messaging, even though most of them recognized its importance.

That said, these strategic omissions during the resistance to fracking by no means imply this local mobilization cannot contribute to a broader contestation to petro-capitalism. As noted by McAdam and Boudet (2012), “[w]ith rare exceptions,” broader social movements “began life as local struggles” (133) and they may also remain so for many of the movements’ participants. Reflecting on the history of American social movements, from civil rights to environmentalism, McAdam and Boudet observe that larger movements grow only as they “inspired or linked up with similar efforts elsewhere” (134). There is potential for these linkages to be made from the fracking resistance in western Newfoundland to a larger resistance movement to carbon extraction. Indeed this might be happening already, taking the form of temporary holds on fracking that are spreading across eastern Canada. Local alliances against this new technology might well develop into an Atlantic anti-fracking block, as one participant suggested, driven by grassroots Indigenous and settler community organizations.

In underscoring these ten central practices that contributed to the anti-fracking campaign’s success in western Newfoundland, this analysis may contribute to the "cross-pollinating" (Klein, p. 322) process that is fundamental to the extension of blockadia. Although these practices are derived from a unique situation, they may serve as guideposts for other communities contesting the ongoing wave of extreme energy extraction.

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About the authors

Leah Fusco is a Ph.D. candidate in geography at the University of Toronto. Her current research examines environmental assessment and review processes related to oil development in NL, including community participation and opposition to project proposals. fuscol AT geog.utoronto.ca

Angela Carter is an assistant professor at the University of Waterloo's Department of Political Science. She researches comparative environmental policy regimes surrounding oil developments primarily in Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan. avcarter AT uwaterloo.ca

From dams to democracy: framing processes and political opportunities in Chile's Patagonia Without Dams movement

Sophia L. Borgias and Yvonne A. Braun

Abstract

This article traces the development of Chile's emblematic Patagonia Sin Represas (Patagonia Without Dams) movement, known for its nearly decade-long, and ultimately successful, resistance to the controversial HidroAysén dam project. We draw on political process theory and frame analysis to examine how the movement grew from a small community struggle in an isolated part of Patagonia into the country's largest environmental social movement. We argue that movement actors achieved widespread support for Patagonia Without Dams by strategically reframing the issue in response to key political opportunities, shifting from a primarily environmental and anti-dam frame to a master frame of social justice and democracy. By framing the controversial hydroelectric project as an issue of historical and structural injustice within Chile's neoliberal economic governance structures, movement actors were able to resonate with broader audiences and build a robust alliance structure. Ultimately, the master frame of democracy allowed for frame bridging with key allies and actors in the mass protests of 2011 and in contemporary movements for constitutional reform.

Keywords: social movements, dams, Chile, framing, democracy, political opportunity

Introduction

On June 10, 2014, the Chilean Patagonia Without Dams movement celebrated an unprecedented victory in its nearly decade-long struggle against the multi-billion dollar HidroAysén dam project. A specially appointed presidential committee halted the project by revoking the highly controversial approval of its Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The original approval of the EIA in May 2011 had sent hundreds of thousands of people into the streets in protest all across Chile, a scale of mobilization then unprecedented since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship. But it was a long and carefully orchestrated process that carried the movement to such heights and finally defeated the project.

Resistance to the dam project started small, originating in the remote region of Aysén in Chilean Patagonia. Announced in 2005, the HidroAysén project proposed to dam the Baker and Pascua rivers and build a 2,000 kilometer long transmission line to carry energy north to Chile's large cities and booming mining industry. This project threatened the local movement for an alternative model of regional development that valued the region as “Reserva de Vida” (a reserve for life). Ayseninos began to mobilize in opposition to HidroAysén, drawing on networks of local groups and NGOs that had been formed in past movements to defend the region from extractive development.

In 2007, more than one hundred Ayseninos, many in traditional Patagonian gaucho attire, marched on horseback into the regional capital with signs calling for a “Patagonia Sin Represas” (Patagonia Without Dams) – a slogan that would become the namesake of the growing resistance movement. By 2009, the Patagonia Without Dams (PWD) movement stretched far beyond Aysén, supported by a network of community groups and NGOs from all over the country and around the world. By 2010, national polls showed more than half of Chileans were against the HidroAysén project, a disapproval rating that grew to 74% after the controversial approval of the EIA that sent hundreds of thousands of protesters into the streets all over Chile in 2011.

In this article, we discuss how the PWD movement, despite its origin in an isolated region of Chile and despite facing a powerful transnational corporation, successfully bridged across socio-spatial and political divides to achieve mass support and recognition. As we will show, PWD strategically used framing tactics in the struggle against the HidroAysén project to appeal to audiences at different scales and to shape and respond to key political opportunities over time. It was the universal environmental and anti-dam framing of “rivers and rights” (Braun and Dreiling 2014) that initially resonated with international organizations and garnered financial support for the PWD campaign. However, in order to mobilize a more diverse range of actors against the dam project within Chile, the campaign engaged key political opportunities (McAdam 1999) with frame bridging strategies (Benford and Snow 2000) to reframe the dam project as a manifestation of an unjust model of development that affected all Chileans in their daily lives.

Growing discontent with neoliberal governance in Chile provided fertile ground upon which the Patagonia Without Dams movement cultivated resistance to the HidroAysén dam project. In analyzing the Patagonia Without Dams movement, we bring political process theory into conversation with our framing analysis in order to capture the dynamic interplay between the movement and the broader political context. Our analysis highlights four key political opportunities, which we argue were crucial moments in which movement actors shifted frames to build resonance among diverse actors across different scales. Activists successfully built alliances through frame bridging strategies that connected the seemingly local concerns of Patagonians to transnational anti-dam movements and longstanding concerns about democracy shared by large numbers of Chileans across the country. This broad-based mobilization ultimately led to elite fracturing on the issue that created openings for broader movements for social change.

We argue that the Patagonia Without Dams movement achieved widespread support by successfully responding to political opportunities ripe for frame amplification and bridging, ultimately framing the controversial hydroelectric project as a symbol of systemic injustice within Chile's environmental laws and governance. Moving beyond a traditional environmental framing, the master frame of social justice and democracy resonated with a broader audience with shared critiques of Chilean elites and transnational corporations. This allowed for frame bridging between the PWD movement and the subsequent Student Movement and Aysén Movement, key allies and actors in the mass protests of 2011 and in contemporary movements for constitutional reform.

Ultimately, the case of the Patagonia Without Dams movement in Chile allows us to explore how resistance movements emerging from seemingly narrow place-specific struggles may catalyze broad-based social mobilization. For activists, this case demonstrates the importance of frame bridging strategies that respond to, and shape, political opportunities. For social movement theorists, the case highlights the potential to draw political process theory into conversation with framing analysis, highlighting the importance of the dynamic interplay between framing processes and political opportunities while also signaling the need for more attention to scale and translation within social movement analysis.

Literature review and theoretical framework

Understanding social movements has been at the heart of a robust, cross-disciplinary literature that includes several well-defined approaches, including resource mobilization, framing, and political process theory. We draw from each of these theories in our analysis, highlighting the dynamic interplay between framing processes and political opportunity structures in order to understand how the Patagonia Without Dams movement expanded into the national and transnational spheres.

Social movements are built upon complex organizational structures or social movement organizations (SMOs). Resource mobilization theorists argue that the structure of the SMO, its resources (both labor and financial), leadership, mobilization, and linkages are critical to the potential success of movement campaigns (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Often, movements are articulated through various levels of coalition-building among SMOs in the effort to "mobilize diverse constituents into a common framework of identity and action" (Bandy 2004, 416). The union of diverse actors within, between, and across linkages promotes the exchange of information and ability to "mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 89).

Building on resource mobilization theory's emphasis on structure and resources, framing theory helps us understand how movement actors formulate and communicate information. Social movement organizations use framing to communicate their main concerns in ways that appeal to different audiences (Benford and Snow 2000). Framing is "the process by which individuals and groups identify, interpret, and express social and political grievances," packaging and presenting them for different audiences and aims (Taylor 2000, 511). Framing also inherently creates the possibility of prompting "counterframing" on the part of opposition actors in a struggle to win public approval (Benford and Snow 2000, 625).

One of the main challenges for any movement is to gain attention and to inspire support and participation among diverse populations across local, national, and international levels. On every level, social movements aim to achieve frame alignment, such that individual interests, values, and beliefs complement and correspond with those of a social movement (Snow et. al. 1986). A shift of public interest to an issue can signal frame resonance, when people relate to the movement's message because of the credibility, centrality and commensurability of the framing (Benford and Snow 2000).

Various frames can be used simultaneously within a movement or across movements through the tactic of frame bridging, "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Benford and Snow 2000, 624). Frame bridging is a tool social movement actors use to maintain frame resonance even as they shift from one place or scale to another. In some cases, though actors engage with many different frames, "a new primary framework gains ascendance over others and comes to function as a kind of master frame that interprets events and experiences in a new key" (Snow et. al. 1986, 475).

While frame analysis is an effective tool for tracing shifts in social movement messaging over time, it is, on its own, insufficient for understanding why and with what logic these shifts take place. Framing processes do not take place in a vacuum. Rather, they shape and are shaped by the broader historical and socio-political context in which social movements are embedded (Braun and Dreiling 2010). In order to capture these complex relationships, we draw on the idea of political opportunity structures from political process theory to trace the connections between the political field and the interpretive and alliance-building power of framing.

Political process theory emphasizes the "dynamic relationship among activists, their political environment, and elites who work to counter the movement's progress" (Friesen 2014, 83). Changes in the political context may open or close opportunities (perceived or actual) for effective challenges to the status quo (McAdam 1999). These changes may be spurred by overt societal crises, such as war, famine, or pandemic, or by more subtle shifts in the political alignments among elites or the presence of new domestic or international allies. Political opportunity structures encompass elements of the socio-political context that encourage collective action as a means for addressing grievances (c.f. Putnam 2000; Tarrow 2005). As social movements work to build frames that resonate across the local, national, and transnational levels, they face the challenge of identifying the political opportunities at the intersection of these diverse political contexts.

In trying to understand the relationship between the local and transnational spheres of struggle, Tsing's (2005) concept of "traveling packages" is helpful in highlighting the tensions inherent in the translation that must take place as frames are transferred from one context to another. Traveling packages may include ideas, slogans, or images that center abstract and universal principles, such as global environmentalism or democracy, that are taken up at the local level and become "marked by the culture and politics of particular moments of alliance and intervention" (Tsing 2005: 238). Tsing argues that allegories of international activism and collaboration rely on the use of universals, which in fact can reflect the "inequalities of global geopolitics even as they promote rhetorics of equality" (Tsing 2005: 238). This concept provides insight into the challenges that social movements face as they reconcile the benefits of adopting broad master frames with the frictions that this may produce at the local level (Braun and Dreiling 2014).

In this article, we use frame analysis in conjuncture with analysis of political opportunity structures in order to understand how the Patagonia Without Dams movement expanded into the national and transnational spheres. This approach allows us to capture the complexity of the movement's transformation within the historical and socio-political context of Chile, while also drawing out broader lessons relevant for other social movements. We focus on how movement actors employed framing tactics to raise awareness and build coalitions in response to key political opportunities in the course of the struggle over HidroAysén. Our analysis highlights the emergence of a master frame of democracy under which PWD activists were able to build alliances with a broad range of other contemporary movements that resonated with that theme. We show how this frame bridging was a strategic response to political opportunity structures that enabled PWD to translate its message across national and transnational spheres and to build broad coalitions for political change.

Methodology

This research takes a case study approach (Berg and Lune 2011) that uses primary and secondary materials to inform a contemporary and historical analysis of the Patagonia Without Dams movement. The first author collected much of this article's source materials while living and researching in southern Chile over six and a half months. In June-July 2012, she traveled to the region of Aysén and Santiago to meet with PWD movement leaders and partner organizations (n=15) who facilitated access to documents generated by the movement. These documents were the core focus of our thematic analysis, which tracked shifts in movement strategy, discourse, and target audience over time. A large number of the sources collected during fieldwork were originally in Spanish, and were translated by the first author for use in this research.

We analyzed materials by first situating them within a chronology of the HidroAysén conflict and then identifying patterns and themes (Berg and Lune 2011) within the framing rhetoric being used by the PWD movement, project proponents, and the media over time. While the focus of the content analysis was on the PWD movement and its campaigns, triangulating this analysis with content analysis of media coverage and the HidroAysén campaign allowed us to trace the dynamic interplay between these different arenas (Rohlinger 2015). We documented shifts in framing within and across campaigns and outreach events, noting the central organizing themes, such as environmental justice or livelihood concerns, at each stage of the movement. Through this process, we were able to trace the way these early frames were increasingly subsumed under and integrated within a broader message about democracy. By considering the results of this frame analysis within the broader contemporary political context, we were able to see the political opportunity structures that produced this master frame of social justice and democracy.

Referencing quotes from public statements and declarations made about the ongoing dam conflict and related issues of democracy, we are careful to present them as only that. To give a sense of the general public opinion and the extent to which it aligned with the PWD movement, we rely on a number of national surveys and polls. By triangulating the data from movement actors and organizations with contextual information from national news sources, polls, and historical analysis of social mobilization in Chile, we are able to construct a deeper, multilayered understanding of the sociopolitical context. By identifying key political opportunities within this context, we can see how the PWD movement was able to use the master frame of democracy to build broad frame resonance, mobilizing Chileans in nation-wide opposition to the seemingly local mega-dam project in isolated Patagonia.

Background

Dictatorship and incomplete democracy in Chile

Contemporary political opportunity structures in Chile, along with the possibilities they open for frame resonance and bridging across diverse constituencies, must be understood within the country's history of political authoritarianism and cycles of contention in the struggle over democracy. The history of mobilization for democracy in response to repressive politics is an important socio-political backdrop against which contemporary mobilizations take place.

General Augusto Pinochet came to power in 1973 after a violent coup d'état against socialist president Salvador Allende. The nearly two-decade long military regime that followed would transform Chile in many ways, characterized by intense political repression and rapid economic restructuring, codified into a new Constitution enacted in 1980. With the introduction of ultra-liberal free-market policies (Klein 2007), unbridled extractive industry and export agriculture spurred a period of economic growth that led some to praise Pinochet for bringing order and prosperity. For millions of Chileans, however, the military regime was a period of fear and repression amidst detentions and disappearances of civilians suspected of socialist leanings or participation in political resistance to the military regime (Constable and Valenzuela 1991).

During the 1980s, the calls for "Socialism Now" that had been used by leftist movements prior to the 1970s were pushed underground by the repressive Pinochet regime, and transformed into the more inclusive "Democracy Now" (Noonan 1995, 106). This master frame of the "return to democracy" was successfully used to mobilize against the Pinochet dictatorship (ibid), bringing together a diverse group of actors with a common vision under the banner of the "prodemocracy movement" (Adams 2002, 29). This social mobilization culminated in the popular campaigns for the "No" vote in the plebiscite to determine whether Pinochet would remain in power.

In 1988, 56% of Chileans voted against Pinochet, though he would remain head of the army until 1998 and then a senator-for-life. In 1990, President Aylwin was elected in the first democratic elections in 19 years, marking the beginning of Chile's long transition to democracy. The transition back to political democracy was neither fast nor easy, however, and few substantial constitutional changes were made in the years following the dictatorship (Garretón 2003; Salazar 2009).

Several scholars assert that Chile's transition to democracy was never fully accomplished (Paley 2001; Garretón 2003; Salazar 2009), hindered by "authoritarian enclaves" that remained embedded in Chile's system of governance (Garretón 2003). Julia Paley (2001) argues that the return to political democracy legitimized the neoliberal system and its international investors, and, at the same time, demobilized what had been an active civil society demanding democracy and participation. Much of the international community applauded the reintegration of basic democratic processes, soon embracing Chile as a leader in Latin American free-market economics. Under the new center-Left government, any protests or efforts to make demands and call for justice were frowned upon as undermining the national project of promoting democracy (Paley 2001).

In the last decade, a new wave of social mobilization has surged into the political arena in Chile as communities stand up against the injustices of Pinochet-era neoliberal policies. Patagonia Without Dams was at the forefront of this wave, and is often referenced as marking a before and an after in recent social movement activity in Chile. Drawing on Chile's history of social mobilization, the PWD movement revitalized the master frame of democracy by emphasizing the lack of space for social democracy and participation within the system of neoliberal policies that had been put in place under the military regime. Framing the dam project as the result of neoliberal policies that favored private economic interests while limiting state accountability, PWD movement actors were able to situate their concerns about the dam project within much broader concerns about democracy.

Chilean water and hydropower conflicts

"The fight over water is a war that the communities and companies confront against the apparent neutrality of the government – a government that many feel disappointed and cheated the citizens, associating itself with economic powers that have installed a concept of society that puts a price on everything, but doesn't put a value on anything." (Segura 2008, 15)

As part of the military regime's economic restructuring during the 1980s, Chile adopted a market-led system of water management, which has been the subject of much debate both in Chile and internationally. The 1980 Constitution formally recognizes water as a public good; however, under the 1981 Water Code, private rights to water use are allocated permanently and free of charge by Chile's National Water Directorate (Dirección General de Aguas, henceforth DGA). These rights are treated as freely transferable commodities that can be bought, sold, transferred, or mortgaged (Bauer 1998, 2009).

While the 1981 Water Code has been effective at stimulating agriculture, mining, hydropower development and expansion of sanitation services (Hearne and Donoso 2005), the market-based system "tends to leave a sort of decision-making vacuum, which is typically filled by those interests with more political influence and the resources to act on their own behalf" (Bauer 1998, 125). Lacking institutional capacity to ensure distribution of the system's costs and benefits (Bauer 2010), the system produces a pronounced disparity among water users in terms of access to resources and decision-making (Bauer 2004, 2009; Budds 2004). Hydropower development has been particularly contentious (Bauer 2009), exacerbated by the fact that the courts are "zealous protectors of the institutional construction of private property, and are inclined to favor hydroelectric interests" (Prieto and Bauer 2012, 143).

During the final weeks of the military regime, the Spanish electricity corporation Endesa S.A. and its subsidiary Endesa Chile (formerly owned by the state, but privatized in 1987) were granted 98% of the non-consumptive water rights for the Aysén region (Prieto and Bauer 2012), home to a large portion of the world's fresh water reserves. As promised by the 1981 Water Code, these rights were granted permanently at no cost to the company, despite the enormous power and wealth entailed by that ownership. Today, Endesa boasts being the largest private multinational electricity enterprise in Latin America (Endesa 2011). However, Endesa's monopoly on water rights and audacious repertoire of large hydroelectric dam projects has not gone unnoticed – or unchallenged.

Endesa's Ralco dam project sparked controversy in the 1990s and faced resistance from the Pehuenche indigenous communities along the Bío-Bío River in south-central Chile (Aylwin 2002). The Ralco project was ultimately completed in 2004, and "stands tall as a symbol of the betrayal of the democratic promise" (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009: 8). This case was fresh in many Chileans' minds when Endesa announced their next big project, HidroAysén, the following year.

HidroAysén: solution to an energy crisis?


Puerto Aisén
COIHAIQUE
Chile Chico
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O'Higgins
Lago General Carrera
Chile Chico
Lago Buenos Aires
Lago Bertrand
Lago Cochrane
BAKER 1
Cochrane
BAKER 2
Tortel
PASCUA 2.2
PASCUA 2.1
PASCUA 1
O'Higgins
Lago O'Higgins
CHILE
ARGENTINA

Figure 1: Proposed location of HidroAysén's five dams in the Aysén Region of southern Chile (HidroAysén 2011)

The HidroAysén project, first announced in 2005, proposed the construction of five dams on the Baker and Pascua rivers of the Aysén region (Figure 1). The project was promoted by the company as the "clean, renewable, and Chilean" solution to Chile's growing "energy crisis." HidroAysén represented a joint venture shared 51% by Endesa Chile, a subsidiary of the Spanish company Endesa (now owned by the Italian company Enel), and 49% by Colbún, the Chilean company owned by the wealthy Matte and Angelini families (HidroAysén 2011). The dams were to generate 2,750 megawatts of installed capacity and 18,430 GWh of annual energy production, aiming to provide about 20% of the projected energy needs for the central electricity system by 2025 (HidroAysén 2011).

Promotional materials claimed that HidroAysén would be "one of the most efficient dams in the world," boasting 3.12 GWh of energy produced per hectare flooded by HidroAysén, as compared to 0.60 GWh produced by Belo Monte in

Brazil (Figure 2) (HidroAysén 2011). However, perhaps the most controversial part of the project was the 2,000 km transmission line that was introduced as a separate project in 2009, bumping the total cost of the project from $500 million to $3 billion (Segura 2010), later rising to an estimated $10 billion in 2013 (Nelson 2012). The fact that these two inextricably connected parts of the HidroAysén project were assessed as separate projects with separate impacts would become a major complaint of the Patagonia Without Dams movement.


51.600 hectáreas
Belo Monte
Amazonia de Brasil
28.000
Gwh/año
Garabí
31.000 hectáreas
Frontera
Argentina-Brasil
6.100
Gwh/año
5.910 hectáreas
HidroAysén
Patagonia Chilena
18.430
Gwh/año
43.785 hectáreas
Cóndor Cliff
Patagonia Argentina
5.100
Gwh/año

Figure 2: HidroAysén campaign graphic comparing the dam project to others around South America by Gigawatt hours per year and hectares inundated represented by the size of the blue water droplet (HidroAysén 2011)

The Patagonia Without Dams movement

We now turn to a discussion of the mobilization of the PWD movement, starting with the roots of the resistance to large development projects in the remote region of Aysén. Tracing the development of the movement from this local context, we then highlight four key political opportunities that shaped and were shaped by the framing processes of the Patagonia Without Dams movement as it expanded across the nation: 1) the formation of a local movement against the HidroAysén project from 2005 to 2007, based on the idea of protecting Aysén as a Reserva de Vida; 2) the struggle over content and process of the Environmental Impact Assessment in 2008 and 2009, which ultimately shifted focus from environmental concerns to issues of governance and democracy; 3) the growing discontent with government that exploded into mass mobilization following the May 2011 Supreme Court ruling that upheld the HidroAysén's EIA process; and 4) the legal battles and elite fracturing that ensued, ultimately ended in a court ruling that overturned the May 2011 decision and halted the HidroAysén project in June 2014.

The roots of resistance: Defending Aysén, a reserve of life

Aysén communities were on the defensive long before the HidroAysén project was ever announced, aware that the region's wealth of natural resources and powerful rivers was widely coveted. A 1972 article in the Santiago Press announced, "the local public opinion is determined to defend under all circumstances the territory of the Baker river, where 50% of the country's hydroelectric potential is found, according to the Endesa company" (Segura 2008, 7). In 1990, the mayor declared the region a "reserva de vida" – a reserve of life (Segura 2008, 6), a concept that would take hold in the region and provide the backbone for the local resistance to HidroAysén.

In 2001, the concept of Aysén as a Reserve of Life became the centerpiece of a community resistance movement against the Alumysa project, a proposed aluminum smelter that would be powered by five dams and three hydroelectric power plants (Segura 2008). Local actors in Aysén formed organizations and coalitions like the Citizen Committee for the Defense of Aysén as a Reserve of Life, backed by national environmental NGOs like CODEFF, Chile Sustentable, Ecosistemas and some 15 others. An "Alliance for Aysén as a Reserve of Life" was formed in collaboration with many of these national NGOs, as well as international NGOs such as Greenpeace. The concept of the "reserve of life" resonated with the conservation values of these national and international environmental organizations, as well as with local livelihood concerns, thus expanding and fortifying the resistance movement.

The Alumysa project was halted in August 2003 due to pressure from the "No Alumysa" movement, which positioned Aysén as a Reserve of Life as a sustainable community-based alternative to extractive private-industry-driven development (Segura 2008). In addition to setting an important precedent for community resistance based on this alternative model of regional development, the No Alumysa campaign forged key organizational structures and alliances between local actors and Chilean and international NGOs, relationships that would later be essential to the expansion of the Patagonia Without Dams movement.

Today, visitors are greeted by a sign stating, "Welcome to the Region of Aysén, Reserve of Life" (Segura 2008). Patricio Segura, who participated in the creation and promotion of the regional development model, expressed, "It's been two decades of non-stop work at all levels that has accomplished transforming what started out as a slogan into what is now recognized as the concept of society that permeates all action taken at the regional level" (Segura 2008, 2). This model of regional development established a set of community values and a vision of the future that acted as a framework for evaluation of all subsequent development projects. It was against this vision of Aysén as a Reserve of Life that the HidroAysén dam project would have to compete.

Opportunity 1: Building opposition through the networks of Aysén as a Reserve of Life

In response to the initial proposal of HidroAysén in 2005, groups that had been involved in the Alumysa struggle formed the Citizen Coalition for Aysén Reserve of Life (Citizen Coalition ARL) and began holding informational meetings and workshops about the implications of the dam projects and the potential avenues for resistance. The formation of the Citizen Coalition ARL was an important political opportunity in that it allowed activists to tap into a rich advocacy network between local and international organizations. In 2006, the coalition made a public declaration of their opposition to the project:

> We have come to the conclusion that this mega-project is not compatible with the model of sustainable development of the Aysén region and Patagonia, nor with the vision of the future established by the majority of its population…[the project] does not only imply the truly violent destruction of the river system, but also presents a threat to all forms of life in the river basin as well as the lifestyle, wellbeing, and vision that those of us who inhabit this land have of integral development, now and in the future for our communities, in the environmental as well as cultural, social and economic spheres. (Segura 2010, 357)

Other local groups, such as the Autonomous Collective for Patagonia, the Defenders of the Spirit of Patagonia, and the Jovenes Tehuelches, also began mobilizing against the dam project. All of them would come together under the banner of Patagonia Without Dams in the iconic horseback march to Coyhaique in 2007. Media coverage of the march conveyed a romantic image of the movement as a struggle to maintain the pristine environment and traditional Patagonian way of life, an image that would be used along with the slogan "Patagonia Without Dams" in publicity campaigns aiming to build support for the movement across the country and around the world.

The part of this framing that was focused on preservation resonated with international environmental groups, enabling the Citizen Coalition ARL to reactivate their ties to the networks that had supported previous environmental struggles in the area, such as the Alumysa conflict. The resistance movement expanded in 2007 with the creation of the Patagonia Defense Council (PDC), bringing together more than 70 organizations, primarily environmental in focus, from all over Chile and internationally. That same year, the PDC launched a nationwide publicity campaign with funding and support from international environmental NGOs like International Rivers and the Tompkins-funded Conservación Patagonica.

It is important to note that some of the local opposition groups, such as Jovenes Tehuelches, actively distanced themselves from the PDC because of a perception that it was beholden to these international funders, seen by some as yet another form of interventionism in their region. These groups continued to mobilize in solidarity under the banner of Patagonia Without Dams, but did not subscribe to the growing list of PDC members. These events demonstrate how convergence among different groups in common cause is not necessarily smooth or complete. Tsing (2005) suggests this might be best understood as an alignment of positions at a particular point in time and context to create a shared voice, albeit with tradeoffs and costs associated with the uneven privilege that influences the reframing of issues to resonate with national and transnational audiences (c.f. Braun and Dreiling 2014).

The PDC's Patagonia Without Dams campaign set out to counter the dominant image of HidroAysén as the solution to Chile's energy crisis. Its initial publicity materials featured the slogan "Patagonia Without Dams" against a background of beautiful views of dramatic Patagonian landscapes obstructed by superimposed transmission lines (PDC 2011). Other images were paired with messages such as "Destruction…It's not a solution!" (Figure 3, left panel) (PDC 2011).

This initial framing was consistent with coordinated opposition to large dams in the international environmental and anti-dam movements (Conca 2006). The universal frame thus functioned as a "traveling activist package" that challenged extractive development agendas as coercive, environmentally destructive, and imperialistic (Tsing 2005: 230). Internationally, and among national environmental NGOs, PWD had effectively amplified its concerns about preservation. Among the general Chilean public, however, HidroAysén was largely seen as a regional concern. The challenge for PWD was to engage this universal traveling package of extractive development in ways that would resonate more broadly across the nation.

Opportunity 2: Environmental Impact Assessment and the struggle for democratic process

In addition to expanding publicity and outreach, the PWD movement had branches working on the technical and legal front, especially focused on carefully monitoring the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the HidroAysén dam project. The EIA process was a key political opportunity in that it opened a space for formal documentation of citizen concerns about the project, while also sparking debate about the need for more accountability within this process.

The formal Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) citizen observation period opened in 2008, and Ayseninos and PWD groups rallied around the opportunity to express their concerns about the project. In November 2008, hundreds of people marched through Coyhaique to the office of the Regional Environmental Commission to submit a compilation of 2,000 technical observations and more than 10,300 citizen observations (El Divisadero 2008). Concerns focused on the impact that the flooding of the project site would have on the unique ecosystems and pristine beauty of Aysén, as well as on the local economy, lifestyle, and social fabric that would be further interrupted by the construction process and influx of workers.

Controversy erupted when the superintendent overseeing the evaluation of the EIA was accused of insufficient review of the public comments, “undemocratic” decision-making, and a lack of transparency (El Diario 2008, 1). The PDC framed the situation as “betraying and violating the Citizen Participation process” and stated in an open letter to the President:

> This situation puts our democracy in question, it undermines the trust we have in our democratic institutions, it injures our country’s image, and it affects our dignity as citizens. (PDC 2010, 35)

While the struggle over accountability for the socio-economic and environmental impacts of HidroAysén resonated regionally within Patagonia, the controversy over the government’s handling of the EIA process highlighted longstanding historical concerns about governance in Chile.

In addition to the discontent with the EIA for the dam, there was frustration about the legal separation of the dam and the transmission line, the assessment of the latter being left for a later time. PWD groups argued that this compartmentalization of the EIA process masked the cumulative consequences of the project and made approval of each part of the project more likely. This concern over process was later addressed by legal reform efforts, but only after HidroAysén slipped through this loophole.

Throughout the battle over HidroAysén, the EIA would remain a central point of conflict between the resistance movement, the project authorities, and the state. This mounting tension was reflected in the way movement actors shifted from emphasizing mostly regional concerns about dam impacts to using a master frame of democracy and justice that would resonate nationally. This can be seen in the previous quote from the PDC, as well as in the language of the Patagonia Without Dams documentary that it released in 2009: “the choice between HidroAysén and a Patagonia free from dams is, at the end of the day, a decision for the development of all of Chile” (PDC 2009). These new framing strategies fused transnational traveling activist packages about exploitative development with national concerns about politics and would be central to the publicity battles between PWD and HidroAysén in 2009-2010.

Framing and counterframing: The publicity battle

By 2009, the HidroAysén conflict had grown substantially and was starting to make waves throughout Chile and abroad. The movement expanded to Spain and Italy, where civil society groups attacked HidroAysén at its source by confronting the Spanish corporation Endesa and the Italian consortium Enel that owned the majority of the investment. In Chile, the PDC was investing more money than ever in the national PWD publicity campaign, putting up billboards and publishing full-page ads in national newspapers. Many of the early themes focused on the negative impacts on the region of Aysén, on the value of Aysén as a Reserve of Life, and on the invaluable ecosystems of the area (PDC 2010). These themes reflected the local concerns that had been raised in the EIA process, which resonated with transnational anti-dam rhetoric, while at the same time pointing to the shortcomings of the EIA process in addressing these issues.

In response to the growing media attention, HidroAysén invested about one million dollars in a new publicity campaign of its own, titled “Let’s talk energy!” that aimed to “counteract the environmentalist campaign” (Marticorena 2009, 3). One of the directors of the Italian energy consortium, Enersis (owner of Endesa), expressed the need to mirror the movement’s tactics, stating, “until now, we hadn’t considered it necessary to go to a more general public, but today we believe that we should start to focus on a more massive and national audience to make the project more visible” (Marticorena 2009, 2). Backed by the public relations giant, Burson Marsteller, the new publicity campaign promoted discussion and education about the project through outreach and presentations at the regional level and TV advertisements at the national level.

In the Aysén region, HidroAysén’s promotional presentations, especially those at local schools, were widely criticized as propaganda by local movement actors:

> It calls our attention to the fact that instead of responding to citizen observations of the Environmental Impact Statement, HidroAysén continues promoting its project and buying up the citizens… completely avoiding the environmental laws that require that they respond to the thousands of citizen comments that were presented in November of 2008. (Patagonia Defense Council Communications 2009, 2)

On a national level HidroAysén publicized the project through short television commercials that depicted the impending energy crisis with dramatic electrical blackouts in ill-fated situations. One such ad shows the electricity go out in an operating room mid-surgery when a pizza delivery boy rings the doorbell next door. Another shows a soccer stadium black out just before a goal when a woman turns on a hair dryer at home. Each ad concludes, “If Chile does not double its energy starting today, in 10 years it will only function halfway…no energy source on its own is sufficient…*a favor de la corriente*… HidroAysén,” which roughly translates to “in favor of the current” allowing multiple interpretations alluding to the electrical current, the flow of water, and the up-to-date or current trends (YouTube 2010). These commercials were later called "HidroAysén's Campaign of Terror" by the Patagonia Without Dams campaign (PDC 2010, 55).

The challenge for the PWD campaign was to maintain momentum and prove the existence of alternative solutions to the crisis that HidroAysén had exposed. This was the intention of the PDC's weekly publication of full-page newspaper inserts. Each week they presented approximately ten new reasons to oppose HidroAysén, and one of the first was titled "Why the dams are not necessary," sharing the results of an academic study by Hall et al. (2009) analyzing the potential to replace HidroAysén with renewable energy (PDC 2010,17).

The PDC increasingly focused its informational inserts on the structural injustices embodied in the project, thus bridging between the more universal anti-dam frames and the growing national concerns about democracy. The inserts started condemning Endesa and Colbún's consolidation of energy and water monopolies, their failure to comply with existing environmental laws, and their collusion with the government. One insert summed up the new message of the campaign, calling HidroAysén the perfect example of "business for few and the ruin of many" (Figure 3, right panel) (PDC 2010, 29). Pointing out the undemocratic management of the HidroAysén project, especially in disregarding citizen comments and appeals during the EIA consultation process, the PDC marked and translated the anti-dam traveling activist package into local cultural and political terms, framing the dam project as a "setback" to achieving "increased and improved democracy" in Chile (24).


DESTRUCCIÓN
¡NO ES SOLUCIÓN!
PATAGONIA
¡SIN REPRESAS!
www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl
9
Razones por qué Hidroaysén es Negocio de Pocos...
y Ruina de Muchos.
¡PATAGONIA SIN REPRESAS!

Figure 3: The changing message of Patagonia Without Dams (PDC 2011). Left: "Destruction is Not The Solution!" Right: "9 Reasons Why HidroAysén is Business for Few and the Ruin of Many."

Opportunity 3: Growing discontent with "government run by businessmen"

With the election of right-wing president Sebastian Piñera in March 2010, the PWD campaign immediately intensified pressure on the government to take a stance against the HidroAysén project. The campaign published open letters to Piñera, urging him to "rectify the irregularities that have been presented in the EIA, rebuilding citizen trust," and demanding that he "see to the unconditional and comprehensive fulfillment of the laws of the republic" (PDC 2010, 38). The letter implored the president to "see to the good of the nation, rather than the corporate interests" and to reject the dam project "as has been advised by 11 public service institutions in the evaluation of the EIA and as expressed by the citizenry" (38).

The new government gave no reply, but the movement judged the government's position later that month when it accepted a $10 million contribution from Endesa for post-earthquake reconstruction (El Mostrador 2010, 1). The campaign declared that Endesa was making inappropriate donations and engaging in "false philanthropy" in order to win support (PDC 2010, 48). A subsequent newspaper insert declared:

> The HidroAysén project is predatory in the environmental aspect, inequitable in the social aspect, and monopolistic in the financial aspect…a true reflection of a model of development through which corporations try to govern the country (PDC 2010, 53).

Having effectively reframed and amplified its critique of the HidroAysén project as a threat to democracy, the PWD movement was rapidly gaining popularity. The movement had a growing presence in social media, with 68,000 followers on its primary Facebook page and thousands more on its 120 additional pages that had been created unofficially by individuals outside the PDC (PDC 2010, 31). A growing number of academics, politicians, and celebrities were voicing their opposition to the project. Polls showed that national opposition to HidroAysén was steadily growing, rising from 46% in December 2009 to 62% in May 2011 (CERC 2011, 29). An even larger percentage (79%) expressed disapproval about how the government had dealt with HidroAysén, regardless of respondents' personal politics on the issue (Vitrina Ambiental 2010).

Growing frustration with the government reached far beyond the issue of HidroAysén, pointing to deeper discontent regarding the model of development in Chile. A May 2011 national survey documented that 65% felt they had not received benefits from Chile's economic growth, and 64% felt they had a "government run by businessmen" (CERC 2011, 37). Only 11% of Chileans felt they could trust their government and institutions (CERC 2011). This context of broad discontent in Chile provided a key political opportunity, fertile ground for the Patagonia Without Dams activists' calls for a more equitable and participatory democracy. Their critiques of the state and neoliberal politics resonated with the lived experiences of people struggling with similar issues in the education and health care systems. In the budding Student Movement, particularly, this resonance would allow for alliance building during a period of mass mobilization.

Mass mobilization for social justice

May 2011 was a month of devastating loss and also great triumph for the Patagonia Without Dams movement. On May 9, HidroAysén's EIA was approved by the Environmental Assessment Commission in Coyhaique. But triumph came in the citizen response to that decision. In Santiago and other cities all over Chile, thousands of people took to the streets to denounce the decision, prompting the New York Times to call it "a surprising national movement" (Barrionuevo 2011a, 1). Public opinion polls corroborated the apparent victory of Patagonia Without Dams in the publicity battle: 74% of

Chileans opposed the decision to approve the HidroAysén project, with majority opposition reflected across all sociopolitical strata (La Tercera 2011).

The protests escalated throughout the month, reaching an unprecedented peak in participation on May 20 when an estimated 50,000- 90,000 people marched through the Santiago streets protesting the decision to approve the dams (International Rivers 2011). The magnitude of these protests, some of the largest demonstrations since the end of the military regime, was completely unexpected, even for leaders of the PWD movement who suddenly found themselves at the forefront of what had “snowballed into one of the greatest environmental movements in history” (Hartman 2011, 1). The PDC released a campaign ad that showed a picture of the mass protests with the heading, “Chile has decided: Patagonia Without Dams!” (PDC 2011).

On June 20, 2011, the movement won another impressive and unusual victory. The PDC’s small team of environmental lawyers achieved a ruling from the Puerto Montt Appeals Court that paralyzed the HidroAysén project until further review of the EIA (Barrionuevo 2011b). It was a very hopeful moment for the movement and temporarily eased the tension surrounding the dam conflict. The moment of triumph was followed by a relative lull in Patagonia Without Dams activity, as attention shifted to the growing Student Movement.

The first national strike for education took place just three days after the mass protests in response to the approval of HidroAysén. Participation in student movement marches regularly reached 500,000 people from May to September of 2011, a period soon deemed “the winter of discontent” (McIntyre 2012, 26). Though the PWD movement was no longer at center stage, the student protests regularly included Patagonia Without Dams signs and banners. These demonstrations of solidarity express an underlying resonance and frame bridging between two different movements who both framed their struggles as responses to the government prioritizing private economic interests over the interests of its citizens.

Opportunity 4: Legal battles and elite fracturing

In October 2011, the Puerto Montt Appeals Court ruled in favor of HidroAysén, rejecting the appeals submitted in June by the PDC’s lawyers. The PDC legal team immediately announced a decision to appeal the decision in the Supreme Court, declaring to the media, “we believe our legal arguments demonstrate that the decision taken by the Environmental Evaluation Committee violates constitutional guarantees and is completely illegal” (Salinas 2011, 1). In April 2012, the court upheld the approval of the multi-billion dollar HidroAysén project, leaving the approval of the EIA for the transmission line as the last barrier to its construction. Though unsuccessful, PDC’s legal actions functioned to amplify PWD’s framing of HidroAysén as undemocratic, as well as its critique of the state facilitating exploitative development by transnational corporations.

Despite its legal victories, HidroAysén had been stalled for more than five years due to the EIA and litigation processes and the project's legitimacy had been significantly undermined by the PWD movement. The companies endorsing the project began to show signs of doubt about the viability of the investment. In June 2012, Colbún, the Chilean stakeholder in HidroAysén, voluntarily suspended the EIA for the transmission line due to "the inexistence of a consensus on a national energy policy" (Concha 2012, 1). Negotiations later continued, but HidroAysén officials remained wary. In April 2013, the CEO of Enel was quoted in the Wall Street Journal saying, "We will continue to support HidroAysén as long as the government supports it on a national and local level; if this is not the case, we will invest elsewhere" (El Mostrador 2013, 1).

The surge of social mobilization and protest in May 2011 had signaled an important shift in Chilean civil society toward contesting Chile's neoliberal model of development (Pulgar 2011). Referring to the period of mass mobilization as "the revolution of 2011," Claudio Pulgar claims that it produced a "generation of new citizens" concerned about the system of governance and interested in deepening democracy (Pulgar 2011, 3). Similarly, the PDC applauded the increased empowerment of social actors who no longer accept being "objects or spectators of political and economic decisions" (PDC 2013, 1). Patagonia Without Dams garnered widespread support by framing the HidroAysén issue as "symboliz[ing] Chile's current model of development, and, with it, what we do not want as a country" (Segura 2013, 1). The PWD movement, the Student Movement, and other social movements all contributed to "pulling together the different causes and reinforcing each other" (Pulgar 2011, 2). By using a master frame of democracy, PWD achieved frame resonance with these other movements, bridging with their constituents, and building a broad coalition for political change.

From dams to democracy

Having framed the 2012 Supreme Court decision as a failure of the legislative and judicial system to function in favor of the majority, PWD leaders turned their attention to constitutional reform. They proposed the creation of a popular constituent assembly, a citizen-led initiative to promote and participate in the creation of a new Constitution. Constituent assemblies have been discussed by some Chilean scholars as a process of reconciliation between citizens and the political system, a chance to mend Chile's "incomplete democracy" (Garretón 2003). That PWD leadership was involved in promoting and organizing this process speaks to the movement's broad frame bridging and alliances with other movements for social justice.

In September 2012, the executive chief of staff of the Patagonia Defense Council organized the Social Summit for a New Chile, bringing together social leaders from diverse movements and initiatives (La Tercera 2012). The objective was to create "a new sociopolitical project that comes from the citizenry" and one that "answers to the social demands of the last two years of protest" (Rivera 2012, 1).

Though much of this work was centered in Santiago, PWD movement leaders from the Aysén region also expressed their support for constitutional change:

> The current Constitution does not represent us because it imposes a State that does not assume responsibility for the common good, and moreover excludes important social sectors which creates an evident lack of trust in all the institutions. (Vicariato Apostólico de Aysén 2011, 50)

Signs of further fracturing among elites came as several high-profile political leaders in Chile soon echoed the call for constitutional change. In her presidential election campaign, socialist Michelle Bachelet grabbed the attention of the media when she stated, "I believe it is necessary to propose a new Constitution" (Fernández 2013, 25). She emphasized the urgency of addressing the issues that lie at the heart of the discontent and protest, which she said reflected the call for "a more democratic society with more sustainable development…a different model of development" (14). She referenced the transformation of the Chilean constituency that is now "more aware of their rights and more demanding…a representative democracy is no longer enough as they want one that is much more participatory, where their voice can be heard" (10).

Upon her reelection and taking office in March of 2014, Bachelet tasked her Committee of Environmental Ministers with reevaluating HidroAysén's EIA approval. On June 10, 2014, the committee announced that they were revoking the approval, sparking cries of victory from the Patagonia Without Dams movement and threats of an appeal from HidroAysén. As recently as June 2017, the Enel has been fighting the government over its refusal to grant it additional water rights (Cárdenas 2017). HidroAysén is not currently included in Enel's portfolio, though the corporation has publicly expressed its intention to keep fighting to move forward with the project (*ibid).*

The victory against HidroAysén does not in any way secure a Patagonia without dams, nor does it signal a definite policy shift away from promoting dams. In Aysén, the PWD movement is now fighting the Energía Austral dam project on the Cuervo River and recognizes that these will not be the last battles. But the struggle against HidroAysén leaves a lasting legacy, with Patagonia Without Dams having become a broader symbol of resistance to unjust and undemocratic development projects. Campaigns in other parts of the country regularly invoke the PWD movement ("Ñuble Without Dams," "Panguipulli Without Dams") and adopt similar frame bridging techniques, in addition to drawing inspiration from PWD's diverse resistance tactics, professionalized movement organizations, and strong local and international networks.

Conclusion

In this article, we have traced the shifting frames used by the Patagonia Without Dams movement as it shaped and was shaped by emerging political opportunities during a period of social transformation in Chile. In the early years of the campaign, PWD was built upon the solidarity network of Aysén as a Reserve of Life, a platform that resonated with the environmental preservation principles and anti-dam goals of international environmental organizations that were willing to lend financial and networking support. In order to expand the movement at the national level, however, movement actors reframed the issue in response to political opportunities that gave resonance to broad social justice and democracy frames.

Activists shifted the message towards a master frame of democracy when the movement encountered limited opportunity for meaningful participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment process. Using legal and communication strategies, such as well-publicized lawsuits about the EIA process, activists amplified this frame and raised public consciousness about the struggle over HidroAysén. Movement actors strategically utilized political opportunities to translate local concerns about Patagonian ecosystems and livelihoods to ones of democracy and governance that resonated across a broad range of social groups and organizations at the national level. PWD was thus able to mobilize a strong, diverse, and widely supported movement that collectively and directly petitioned the government of Chile to address the injustices of the neoliberal model of development. Consequently, when the government decided to approve HidroAysén in spite of nationwide and international opposition, hundreds of thousands of Chileans responded in mass protest.

The master frame of democracy allowed for frame bridging with other struggles for social justice, such as the Student Movement and citizen-led proposals for constitutional reform. Frame resonance sustained interest in the issue over many years of campaigning until the Chilean government finally took action in 2014 to halt the project. Patagonia Without Dams and its framing of dam projects as an issue of democracy continues to resonate in Patagonia and beyond, as the focus shifts away from HidroAysén to a number of other controversial development projects all over Chile.

The case of the Patagonia Without Dams movement in Chile demonstrates the ability of resistance movements with narrowly focused intent to frame their issues to resonate broadly and build alliances across scales. This framing is born from the political context, with activists shifting and amplifying frames via frame bridging strategies that respond to, and shape, political opportunity structures. The development of the Patagonia Without Dams movement highlights this dynamic interplay, with lessons for social movement scholars and activists alike.

In the realm of social movement theory, Patagonia Without Dams captures the rich potential for studying the relationship between political opportunity structures and framing tactics. But it also demands careful attention to scale and translation, an area that would benefit greatly from further scholarship. As Tsing (2005) found in her analysis of struggles over dams and forests in Indonesia, we find tension between the local livelihood concerns and the universal environmental and anti-dam framing used to build alliances transnationally. Yet, movement activists were able to bridge frames to find common ground through the master frame of democracy by emphasizing concerns about process that had wide resonance within Chile and transnationally.

For activists, Patagonia Without Dams provides insight into the power of a broad master frame to bridge across diverse interests and, paired with strategic use of dynamic legal and communication strategies in response to political opportunities, to garner widespread mobilization. It demonstrates the opportunities, and also the tensions, that spring from efforts to translate the core messages of a movement as it pushes to new scales and their associated political contexts. As the national campaign came to focus on the failed promises of the state and elites, activists in PWD were able to translate and bridge frames by building connections to shared critiques of undemocratic processes and neoliberal politics. These shifts in framing were paired with legal opportunities that could both highlight these problems of governance and serve to challenge them. By bridging shared concerns across movements and leveraging key political opportunities, environmental movements can spark more meaningful and inclusive dialog about the complex relationship between seemingly disparate topics like dams and democracy.

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About the authors

Sophia L. Borgias is a graduate student in the School of Geography and Development at the University of Arizona. Her past research with Dr. Yvonne Braun at the University of Oregon focused on anti-dam social movements in the southern part of Chilean Patagonia. She then went on to work with Dr. Carl Bauer at the University of Arizona, where she researched water governance and social mobilization in the Maipo River basin in central Chile. Her work has been published in the *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*. Her current research focuses on the legal geography and political ecology of water conflicts in California. sborgias AT email.arizona.edu

Yvonne A. Braun is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Women's and Gender Studies and International Studies at the University of Oregon. Her research and publications focus on gender, international development, environment, globalization, social movements, and inequality. She has published widely on her ethnographic and interview research over a fifteen-year period in Lesotho, Southern Africa, with her recent scholarship appearing in *Gender & Society*, *Social Problems*, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, *Journal of Environmental Management*, and *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy, and Society*. She is also co-editor of *Women's Encounters with Globalization* (Frontpage Publications, 2012) and winner of the Inaugural Enloe Award from the *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. ybraun AT uoregon.edu

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Volume 9 (2): 329 - 343 (Nov/Dec 2017) *Thydal and Svensson, Facilitating dissident action*

Facilitating dissident action: perils and potentials of a self-organising initiative

Signe Thydal and Christian Franklin Svensson

Abstract

This paper discusses empirical findings from Firefund.net. Based in Denmark, the organisation is a crowdfunding website that provides resources for direct action movements. The organisation deliberately positions itself within a political struggle to provide resources for activists and to create a global solidarity network. This paper sheds light on contemporary non-mainstream activism and activists' motivations to change social arenas. We highlight Firefund.net's challenges and possibilities in relation to juridical issues and issues of control and sharing responsibility in a supposedly self-organised organisation. Two main dilemmas are discussed. Firstly, how to build both an effective and self-organising website: the internal organising of Firefund.net is a key challenge, not least when it comes to including communities of activists. Secondly, how to support radical initiatives without breaking the law: some activists sympathise with movements in a juridical grey zone. Both issues are relevant to dissident movements and activism in general.

Keywords: Self-organisation, civil society, dissidence, activism, organisation, crowdfunding, community development

Introduction

> Imagine the common cartoon narrative that we saw as children, where you have a group of nice people all living happily together until a wicked villain shows up. In our supposedly democratic society, these people would be assigned an area from where they could yell, and the villain would then decide whether or not to listen. Who considers that a happy ending?[1]

With this anecdote Mikkel, one of the two co-founders of Firefund.net, expresses his view on current civil rights as being make-believe. Firefund.net is a crowdfunding website (established in 2015) directed at political movements and activists, created from a desire to apply direct action to address what the founders perceive as an acute lack of constructive solutions.

The activists and founders of Firefund.net share the view that global inequality is on the rise with an exclusive elite becoming richer and more powerful. A central problem with this is the way we as citizens show our support for the underprivileged. Activists of Firefund.net believe that instead of supporting struggles directly, we merely support mainstream organisations and collectively ignore conditions of the underprivileged. In their view, the consequence is that social imagination is reduced to something unrealistic or utopian.

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[1] All quotes are translated from Danish to English.

The real problem is relying on representation, which means putting your lives in the hands of people in power and expecting that they will make things better for you. The claim is that nothing will change for the people if they do not take matters into their own hands. Thus, direct action is essential.

Direct action is here distinguished from political action or civil disobedience. Political action is defined as strategies using the system already in place to try and influence the people in power to make changes (Walt and Schmidt 2009, 138). Civil disobedience is defined similarly, as a method questioning specific unjust laws, but not the legal order itself (Graeber 2013, 234). This supposed discrepancy is captured in the argument that it would be impossible to constructively create social change by keeping relations to the current seat of power or their institutions (Drabble 2013, Holloway 2005).

With Firefund.net the two founders want to make it possible to transform symbolic solidarity into direct action. Instead of waiting for likes and re-tweets to pressure politicians to change their minds, movements should have the possibility of earning the necessary funds themselves and create the needed networks for change.

The research was conducted during the first year of Firefund.net’s online life. Our observations started shortly before the beta version of the website was launched in June 2015 and continued until a few months before the launch of the final website in October 2016. Since then the development has been followed from afar. Thus, we are able to include some reflections on the organisation’s development and changes.

The paper begins by presenting the fieldwork, followed by an overview of the organisation and of the ideals behind the initiative. The discussion sections take a closer look at challenges of organising a global network of activists supposedly without hierarchies. Here we discuss issues of control, delegating, and sharing responsibility in a self-organised organisation. We argue that internal organising is an extremely important, and often contested, element when it comes to this project championing equal participation. The final section shines a light on Firefund.net’s challenges and possibilities concerning legal issues when facilitating dissident activism.

Research design

Fieldwork on Firefund.net was initiated in June 2015 at a time of rapid change for the organisation. Research ended in June 2016, however we have since followed the development of Firefund.net, and are thus able to include details of how Firefund.net have worked with the challenges defined in our analysis.

Data-source triangulation was applied based on observation, participation, interviews and document analysis. The primary data source is field notes obtained through observation and participation in the daily work at Firefund.net's office (including weekly scrum meetings with the founders), at activist meetings (once a week for four months) and 10 training and development workshops. These sources are supplemented by 1) two interviews with the founders, and two interviews with two different activists. 2) Internal documents developed during the year of research, where Firefund.net was still defining itself and its raison d'être: manifestos, communication strategies, market analyses and website development papers. 3) External communication about Firefund.net: an article written about Firefund.net (Ruggaard 2015) and a radio program (Radio24Syv 2015) with one of the founders.

Using several methodological approaches serves as a tool to address inconsistency in the data (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). By using different sources of information and having access to all internal documents including internal communication, it has been possible to follow the development of discussions and ideas. Because of the novelty of the organisation, the fieldwork makes use of the principle that absence of knowledge can contribute to significant insights into a field (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). This has an explorative quality where the analysis process inductively is guided by the findings in the field (Geertz 1973).

Insights were at times challenging to capture. However, it has been an interesting platform for exploring initial stages in this kind of organisation since it has gone through a significant process of learning by doing (Turner and Bruner 1986) while developing the website and activist networks.

Throughout fieldwork, fieldnotes were continuously scrutinised to make sense of empirical data. This was a process where the analytical notes gradually became more advanced and where the research themes became more specific. The iterative process of going back and forth between findings and theory was important in order to carry out an informed analysis (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007).

Except for the two founders, Karl and Mikkel, the informants are anonymised and given pseudonyms because of the often precarious and controversial issues involved.

Introducing Firefund.net

Initially a beta version of the website contained two campaigns for public display. The founders began involving more people both online and face-to-face, and gradually work continued to finalise the website. Since the launch of the website in October 2016, 13 different movements have run 15 campaigns through Firefund.net. In total, they represent nine different countries on three continents. The campaigns vary from support to a festival for QTIBPoC [Queer, Trans, Inter Black People and People of Colour] to legal aid for activists in Uganda, Germany, Palestine, Ukraine, and an autonomous centre in Macedonia. Eight of the campaigns reached their campaign goal, and five campaigns are still running as we write. Thus, Firefund.net has indeed succeeded in creating a crowdfunding platform. However, building a platform that can facilitate a global network still needs work.

Firefund.net is a crowdfunding site aimed specifically at social and political movements. The problem with most present-day crowdfunding sites, according to Mikkel and Karl, is that they leave little room for non-mainstream political projects. However, as Karl says, crowdfunding is basically 'people equals power' because if a lot of people donate small amounts it will accumulate to one big donation.

From the very beginning Mikkel and Karl have envisioned the organisation as being able to facilitate a global network of movements, helping each other to seize power through sheer volume of supporters. In Mikkel's opinion, in order to counteract a global unjust development, Firefund.net should contribute to a tradition where local struggles strengthen global alliances: "Firefund.net will enable global alliances even when it comes down to smaller local struggles, because basically we are all fighting for the same cause".

For the two founders direct action is key to doing this work. Even though symbolic solidarity such as mental support, likes on Facebook and re-tweets are able to strengthen belief in your cause, it does not actually change anything, they say. Instead people need to act on their solidary feelings, e.g. by donating money to or by contributing to the mobilisation of movements that are essentially doing something to fight the system (Radio24Syv 2015).

It has been important for the two founders from the beginning to create structures in the organisation that make room for everyone everywhere to participate on their own terms. Thus, openness on all levels from source coding to internal and external communication is a priority. This effort is seen on three organisational levels:

The community level is open to anyone with a computer and an interest for the project. At this level, there are several possibilities of engagement taking place primarily via the Internet. Through Open Source and a Reddit community, people can engage in discussions and in development of the website. The community is growing slowly, as more and more activists are learning to code the website. Approximately 15 activists are affiliated to Firefund.net today. Most of them are Danish and close to the founders, and the founders and current activists are still learning how to open up this level.

The second level is the solidarity network [Solinet]. The point of this level is to have groups that sympathise with Firefund.net's goals. These groups should all be loosely connected to the organisation and not committed to any specific promises or tasks. The role of the solidarity network is spreading word globally of every new campaign launch. It is still an ambition to build up and increase this level.

The third level is an activist level consisting of a more stable group of people with a steady workflow in the organisation. On this level, there are several tasks like assisting movements using Firefund.net, preparing crowdfunding campaigns or helping the day-to-day management. The aim is to establish these activist groups globally. The activist level is still most active in Denmark, but with the potential to start up in Germany soon.

In the beginning a fourth organisational level consisted of day-to-day management with two programmers and the two founders. However, this level has been taken over by the activist level, which is a big step in terms of overcoming challenges of internal organising and lack of inclusion of activists.

Imagining another world and dissidence

When posing the question to Mikkel and Karl “what is wrong with the world?”, they agree that the way current society is organised is a pressing issue. In Mikkel’s view, mainstream economic systems make “logical” solutions impossible, because these solutions are not always profitable: “It is logical that devastating Mother Earth is a really bad idea; however, the system has not yet found a solution to this problem.” Karl’s view is that we are not seeing the bigger picture, and therefore we have a system that is failing the majority of the population as well as the earth we inhabit together.

Because of their view that political activity behind societal change is essential Mikkel and Karl maintain there is a need for dissident movements. They wish for a society where social change is created collectively from the bottom up. Karl points out that anything growing on its own will usually not develop in a very pleasant way, so there is a need for movements that dare propose alternatives.

People are affected by reproduction of structures and systems, even when they seem unjust or illogical. It may be possible for people to have power through more public participation and organisation, but this train of thought is contested by the argument that change cannot happen from within the system (Drabble 2013, Freeman 1970, Graeber 2013). Classical critical theorists such as Horkheimer (2002 [1972]) perceive systems where economic interests are put before human interests to be unwise, and he does not believe that the realisation of a fair society is a matter of historical development. On the contrary, it requires imagination, clear visions, and collective action to realise a different society.

Firefund.net’s aim in this regard is a noble one, but changing systems and organisations is difficult, because illegitimate power often does not exist formally and therefore power systems are difficult to identify for the organisation itself. A critique of neoliberalist economy is evident in this discussion. According to Susan George, individuals and corporations “with a turnover much greater than the Gross Domestic Product of many of the countries where they operate (…)” (2015, 1) exercise power through lobbyists or directly through government. She views this as illegitimate power, because it is neither accountable nor loyal to the citizens or to the countries in which they operate. This makes power structures extremely difficult to identify.

David Graeber (2013) points out that most radical change happens through social movements willing to break the law, because governments do not of their own account grant new freedoms or even rights for radical groups. The problem is that even if a constitution grants its people the right to resist unjust governments, how then is exercising this right distinguished from mere troublemaking? According to Graeber, the issue is that governments do not make this distinction and object to signs of insurrection. This complicates life for movements working with dissident projects, because it leaves no options for systemic change within the legal system (van der Walt and Schmidt 2009). These issues are also current for Firefund.net, which legitimises labelling the organisation as dissident.

Ideally, research contributes to the realisation of more just societies by looking at the dialectic relationship between macro and micro levels (Mills (2000[1959]), Wright 2010). With this aspiration, Graeber analyses dissident organising, direct action and consensus, and uses real world examples to illustrate how maintaining a free market has turned out to require a system heavy on regulations and policy. He sees several examples of the ability to imagine another world like the Occupy movement, the Arab Spring and the Global Justice movement (2015). These sort of activities challenge power structures, and Graeber reminds us that if humans have built something, we can just as easily generate new knowledge, initiatives and movements.

Facilitating dissidence

Susan George frames unequal development in neoliberalist systems like this: “It [neo-liberalism] has steadily gained ground despite overwhelming proof that it is harmful to nearly everyone, except for the extremely wealthy, the topmost people on the corporate ladder and those who enrich themselves by manipulating money in the international casino economy.” (2015, 10).

We are often not capable of imagining doing things differently: “(…) the world doesn’t just happen. It isn’t a natural fact, even though we tend to treat it as if it is – it exists because we all collectively produce it.” (Graeber 2015, 89). The challenge of this is to be able to imagine something radically different and not to be caught in systems. Consequently, we find ourselves living in a society dominated by elites, resulting in exploitation of human and natural resources, inequality, climate changes, and undemocratic practices (George 2015).

The problem is not just one of inequality in wealth, but also inability in the power to control one's own life (Noys 2013). A solution to this development could be more influence among citizens and organisations (Dearden 2015). This subscribes to a view that change can only happen outside dominating systems, because if one attempts to overthrow the system using the system's methods nothing will change, and a new oppressive system will take its place (Graeber 2015). A way toward change may be achieved through dissident activities around the world (Drabble 2013) as we may be seeing in the example of Firefund.net.

Organisational emancipation often comes from movements opening up small cracks in existing systems where it is possible to do things differently to create lasting change (Davies et al. 2013, Fernándes-Savata 2014). In this sense Firefund.net can expand the cracks by facilitating a platform for activists using the possibilities of the Internet. This, however, requires a conscious approach to Firefund.net's organisation. In the following, we will take a closer look at these challenges and possible solutions.

Delegation or control

One of the first things Mikkel said when fieldwork began was: "If you find anything interesting about how to facilitate rallies without putting people to sleep, or how to make consensus effective, please let me know". Karl added that the organisation has succeeded when "people embrace the project and develop it as they go along, ensuring that this tool always matches the needs of the movements and the struggle."

Both Mikkel and Karl have previous experience organising political action, and they have often experienced the ineffectiveness caused by the arduous process of consensus. Thus, it has been important for them to seem professional, effective, and in control. However, they are aware that they do not wish to appear "business-like", which they feel would alienate their target group and the activists. This dilemma balances between wishing to be efficient while still showing contempt for unjust systems and keeping the project open for activists.

From the very beginning they have put a lot of thought and effort into this specific challenge. In spite of their aspirations Firefund.net has often been viewed as Mikkel and Karl's project.

In November 2015 an evaluation meeting was held to find out how the activists were doing and if they liked being part of the organisation. At this meeting several activists mentioned that they lacked information and understanding of what is going on in Firefund.net.

One activist phrased her comments like this:

> It is good that we are introduced to what we are supposed to do. However, it is difficult imagining how we can become self-organised, because you [Karl and

> Mikkel] know everything. It is hard to imagine how we are supposed to work alone without your instructions. We need more information and updates between meetings in order to be able to meet without you. I am fine with being told what to do, but this is more a question of how it will work in the future.

She captures the essence of the problem: if the aim is to decentralise as much as possible, it is imperative to share information and delegate tasks.

The more time one puts into a project the better access to information one will have. Information is power, and the more one knows about how an organisation works, the more effective one can be, which will automatically increase influence (Freeman 1970). Even in egalitarian-based organisations like this one it is not possible to avoid that some people spend more time on a project than others and thus increase their access to information, so it is important to acknowledge that "The best democratic process depends on the nature of the community involved" (Graeber 2013, 208).

As initiators of the organisation, Mikkel and Karl have more invested in the project than the other activists, and it has been difficult for them to delegate and share their knowledge, which creates difficulties in terms of involving others.

Mikkel used this analogy to describe his and Karl's relationship to Firefund.net:

> At some point it becomes old enough to make its own decisions, and we just have to believe that the upbringing we have given it is good enough to drive it in an acceptable direction. Overprotection can hurt a child and its development. Everyone should have the opportunity to learn – and sometimes kids themselves know what is best for them.

This somewhat paternalistic position may be a practical way to view the situation, but there is a danger that the founders will remain overprotecting parents unable to let go, because they are afraid the organisation will get hurt or will make non-reversible mistakes if they are not involved in every aspect of its development.

A specific example is from a lengthy period of press strategy preparations. Karl was in Norway working on the website with one of the programmers and said that he would work on the strategy while the programmer was busy with other tasks. Mikkel and an activist therefore worked together on producing a draft for a press release, but when Karl was asked to give his comments, he ended up rewriting the whole draft. If they are not diligent, Firefund.net may fall into the trap of over-organising because the two founders themselves want to participate and be involved in every activity, which does not leave much room for others to learn.

However, Jo Freeman (1970) argues that the worst possible method is not to organise at all, because there is no such thing as groups without some sort of structure, and pretending there is will only result in informal elites that no one is able to control. Organising is in this sense important to avoid informal elites emerging caused by the lack of formal structures to prevent them.

At one point there was a danger of the two founders establishing themselves as a small centralised elite, not necessarily because they wanted to, but because they were putting so much work into the project, being the only ones working full time despite the fact that they constructed the levels of organisation to avoid this development.

Engaging the community of activists

Organising is particularly interesting when it comes to dissident initiatives because how to organise defines possibilities for development as well as who is included or excluded. Much effort has been put into training and involving the activists on the three levels of involvement and in the extensive communication system. Crowdsourcing, Reddit communities, GitHub, Slack, and Trello are tools the Internet provides for non-established organisations to organise. Firefund.net aims to use these to be transparent and to allow broad involvement in campaign consulting as well as website development and coding.

Mikkel and Karl worked full time for a year to get the website up and running and getting word out that they were ready to host campaigns, but they ended up burning out because the hard work did not pay off as they had hoped. They decided to take a break and only do the minimum amount of work required to keep the website running. This did not mean that things slowed down. On the contrary, campaign proposals kept coming in, more campaigns were successful and more activists claimed responsibility. This confirms the hypothesis that more room for the activists will lead to wider participation.

It is unclear which came first. If Mikkel and Karl had not put so much effort into the project initially, it might not have run so smoothly when they began letting go. Maybe they could have let go much earlier; maybe they were just lucky. Their own view is that when more people get involved on the three levels of participation, then the need for day-to-day management becomes smaller.

This has proven correct; however, it still seems to be a challenge to involve activists as much as the founders would like in terms of skills as well as geography. Training activists with the necessary skills and knowledge to get involved is difficult in a global network. However, it is a challenge that the founders and the other activists are currently working to solve.

Firefund.net has the potential to become a de-centralised global network. The biggest challenge in this regard might be the issue of who will take responsibility for keeping Firefund.net within legal boundaries, and who steps in if it slips. In the following section, we will take a closer look at this theme.

Balancing on the edge of the law

Dissident organisational theory argues that it is impossible to create constructive social change by maintaining relations to seats of power and their institutions (Drabble 2013), or as Holloway argues: "(…) any engagement with the state pushes us in the direction of reconciliation with capital." (2005, 40). Graeber (2015) mentions this as a dilemma that all social movements run into as soon as they begin to own something, because ownership absorbs them into the maelstrom of insurance, levies, and legal forms. The problem with this is that only individuals, corporations, or other organisational forms recognised by the state can own things, but networks cannot.

Mikkel began a workshop by presenting the rules restraining Firefund.net to keep out unwanted actors and projects. The three written rules for projects funded through the website are: 1) Target the oppressors, not the oppressed, 2) Do not fundraise on behalf of others – you fundraise your own struggles, and 3) Be honest. Additionally, two unwritten rules are: 1) No funding for weapons. 2) No funding for organisations listed as terrorist, as these will result in the website being shut down.

With this in mind Firefund.net are aware of the fine balance between building a website that does not break the law, but at the same time does not necessarily discourage the individual activists to do the same. Karl stresses that abiding by the law is a crucial element. On the one hand, it is necessary for Firefund.net to abide by regulations to survive. On the other hand, some of the activists using the platform sympathise with organisations that are considered illegal. This balance between being a legal platform and making room for potentially illegal projects is difficult and presents a recurring discussion among the activists.

A specific example is from a workshop where the purpose was to get feedback and ideas on what information to include in different sections of the website. Four activists joined the workshop. Three of them knew each other in advance and all four of them knew Mikkel, which created a pleasant atmosphere where everyone participated actively.

The unwritten rules generated the most debate about how Firefund.net is be able to ensure that money raised will not end up being used for weapons, and whether or not there is any room for groups known to use weapons. During the discussion Tommy, an activist, asked, "what if ISIS wants to do a campaign? Which of course they can't." Another activist, Susan, immediately commented: "A pitfall about having general rules is that we have to state that supporting PKK [a Kurdish labour party, listed as terrorist] is not allowed, which would be a shame, because we could support them through blogs or whatever without funding them." The dilemma here being that some activists sympathise with movements that are listed as terrorist, or at least could be involved in illegal activities.

Everyone present at the workshop pragmatically agreed that raising money for "non-illegal" activities is fine no matter how the funds are used afterwards.

Susan gave an example of this by mentioning a crowdfunding campaign raising money for masks and scarfs, which on their own are not illegal objects. However, they could be used in demonstrations where the protesters are masked, which *is* illegal in some countries.

The question is how Firefund.net is able to facilitate change while not directly challenging the law. An important point here is that they do not see themselves as creators of change, but merely as facilitators of change. According to Karl, they have not actually invented anything new. Instead, they wish to take already existing elements to facilitate dissident action. This, however, requires a conscious stance on how to deal with legal issues and who assumes responsibility.

Legal responsibility

The Internet provides vast possibilities for communication, involvement and exposure, which more than ever enables a global platform for activism. However, the Internet also presents Firefund.net with the challenges of surveillance and who assumes responsibility in the organisation. Thus, a core focus in the development of Firefund.net is how the website is built.

In order to make use of the possibilities presented by the Internet, Firefund.net have several considerations to avoid problems pertaining to surveillance: “It is important to provide a high level of digital protection for our users. It is a matter of principle for us to make our cashflow difficult to track to make our users safe, because not all governments are great fans of political movements, even if they are legal,” says Karl (Ruggaard 2015, 22).

Even though the Internet presents security issues, the use of Bitcoins and other measures provides some protection. According to Karl, certain payment systems like PayPal shut down accounts or money flows if they pick up a political vibe. Bitcoins, however, has proven to be a system that resists these shutdowns.

Using tools like Bitcoins, however, does not address the issue of how to keep the platform within legal boundaries among a global community of actors with extremely diverse perceptions of right and wrong. Karl expresses this dilemma in an interview in Danish radio:

> We are not supposed to be judges deciding who is okay and who is not, but somehow we are. We have to be, seen from a juridical legal perspective, because we do have some limitations. A nazi project will never appear on our site, so in some ways we have a political delimitation. Luckily, it is not just me and my mates who have to decide. We are a whole community, so I think it will solve itself (Radio24syv 2015).

Karl’s point is that Firefund.net is able to avoid fraudulent organisations on the platform because someone in the network will always have the ability to stop them. However, there is a recurring dilemma of who decides which projects adhere to the organisation's own rules and which do not, and who should assume responsibility for making these decisions.

The current arrangement is designed to work across international borders, so when activists contact Firefund.net with a project proposal, any activist in the community can in theory assume responsibility for each project and approve it for the website. However, in legal terms, the final juridical responsibility cannot lie with each individual activist, and the question is whether the people with the legal responsibility will allow others to have a say in these decisions.

In practice, having the juridical responsibility may in the end mean that only a few people have the right to decide or to veto. This is only an issue for projects outside the legal area, but it is already a principal challenge and discussion in terms of how to engage a decentralised community of activists supposedly sharing responsibility.

The activists see a profound need to clarify how to handle potentially illegal methods. Here Karl points out his attitude to the Danish government's legislation on terror: "It is important to stress that we are trying to build a pragmatic tool that can strengthen the left wing and living movements. Our purpose is not to challenge the law by supporting organisations listed as terrorist, or to make a quibbling political point of the fact that the legislation on terrorism is really random" (Ruggaard 2015, 22). Even though he does not want to break the law, it is evident that he thinks it might be necessary for some movements. His opinion is that each movement must do what they have to do. However, Firefund.net needs to put up some boundaries because if blame falls on Firefund.net there will no longer be any platform to use for future projects.

Conclusion

The crowdfunding platform Firefund.net aims to facilitate network and resources for activists fighting against social oppression and inequality. The root problem with most political systems, according to activists involved in the platform, is that they rely on representation, which means putting your lives in the hands of people in power and expecting them to make things better. As an alternative, the wish is to create a platform that facilitates activists globally in order to strengthen a worldwide struggle against perceived neo-liberalist systems.

Our findings show that Firefund.net may indeed be on the way to actively opposing non-egalitarian structures, but the organisation does have some issues to be aware of.

A main dilemma, if the founders want to engage the community of activists, is that they need to delegate and share knowledge and responsibilities. If this does not happen, the activists become passive users or disappear altogether, which will defeat the self-organising intentions.

Firefund.net balances on a fine line between a legal framework and facilitating potentially law-breaking movements. By being a platform for dissident movements, the organisation may find itself in a dilemma between following the law to avoid sanction vs. breaking the law to create change. The platform attempts to balance this out by applying different tools, primarily by utilising security measures on the website, having regulations against organisations listed as terrorist and through continuous communication with the activists. In this way, Firefund.net wishes to remain a legal platform that activists can use to raise funds for projects that they would not be able to raise through existing mainstream channels.

The aim of Firefund.net is to create an open platform to facilitate and strengthen social and political movements, and how they organise is crucial to the change they wish to see. Organising can be constructive or counterproductive, and it is important consistently to reconsider ideas and plans. This is as important for established organisations and businesses as it is for organisations with participatory, self-organisational aspirations.

Constant reinvention keeps a dissident movement like this alive, but at the same time it is not possible to define a singular form of resistance applicable to every dissident organisation. Thus, leaving the Firefund.net platform open to the activists seems a serviceable way to ensure that it keeps on fulfilling its goal of being an initiative for the users by the users. If Firefund.net can manage to balance these challenges and possibilities, there is a genuine potential for facilitating the envisioned dissident action.

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About the authors

Signe Thydal has an MSc in Social Entrepreneurship and Management from Roskilde University. Her focus is on organising and mobilising for structural change. She is engaged in political work on an extra-parliamentary level and is a project manager in Young Cancer Denmark, an organization that fights to break down prejudices about young cancer victims. thydal AT hotmail.com

Christian Franklin Svensson has a PhD in anthropology and social innovation. He is assistant professor at Department of Sociology and Social Work at Aalborg University, where he teaches qualitative methodology, social science theory, entrepreneurship and development studies. His research interests include in-/exclusion processes, emancipatory organisation, cultural diversity and civil society. cfs AT socsci.aau.dk

El tractament de les vagues a la premsa espanyola: anàlisi de la informació sobre causes i conseqüències

Iván Carretero-Navarro, Eva Espinar-Ruiz

Abstract

Using a qualitative methodology, we select and analyze a sample of news about labor strikes from three major newspapers in Spain. Results indicate that the information is partially focused on the immediate causes and consequences of the strikes and does not frame the protests within a systemic perspective but through a circumstantial one. Thus, newspapers concentrate the attention on the specific negative effects of each strike for companies, consumers, the general population, and even for strikers themselves. Highlighted causes are generally conjunctural and not related with structural factors such as the contradiction between capital and labor. This media treatment builds two opposing sides: strikers versus the rest of the population. The article finishes with a discussion around the practical consequences of these conclusions for the strategies of labor and other social movement organizations.

Keywords: strikes, press, qualitative content analysis, capitalism, protest paradigm.

Resum

Mitjançant una metodologia qualitativa s'ha seleccionat i analitzat una mostra de notícies sobre vagues laborals procedents de tres dels principals diaris de l'Estat Espanyol. Els resultats indiquen que la informació se centra, principalment, en les causes i conseqüències immediates de les vagues, i no emmarca les protestes dins d'una perspectiva sistèmica sinó conjuntural. És així que es posa l'atenció en els efectes negatius que cada vaga té per a les empreses, consumidors, població general i fins i tot els vaguistes mateixos. Les causes destacades són generalment conjunturals i no relacionades amb factors estructurals, com és la contradicció entre capital i treball. Aquest tractament mediàtic col·labora en la formació de dos bàndols enfrontats: vaguistes front a la resta de la població. L'article acaba discutint les conseqüències pràctiques d'aquestes conclusions per a les estratègies dels representants dels treballadors i d'altres moviments socials.

Paraules clau: vagues, premsa, anàlisi qualitativa de contingut, capitalisme, paradigma de la protesta.

1. Introducció

La propietat privada dels mitjans de producció necessitada de força de treball és a les bases del sistema capitalista. El conflicte entre treball i capital s'expressa amb una raó inversa (Marx 1968): per al capital, el guany augmenta a mesura que disminueix el salari i viceversa. Diverses transformacions han fet l'economia actual molt més complexa que la del segle XIX: el pas del fordisme al postfordisme, la flexibilitat en la producció, el major pes del treball immaterial i intel·lectual (Arriola i Vasapollo 2005), l'economia financera, etc. No obstant, la contradicció fonamental entre capital i treball encara és vigent i les vagues en són un reflex.

No obstant, així com existeix una producció teòrica i empírica àmplia al voltant del tractament mediàtic dels moviments socials i de diferents formes col·lectives de protesta (McCurdy 2012), són escasses les investigacions sobre el cas específic de conflictes i vagues laborals. Els estudis existents coincideixen en concloure que la representació mediàtica de les vagues es caracteritza per l'èmfasi en esdeveniments concrets i en les seues conseqüències negatives (Morley 1976; Coscia 2009; Cárdenas 2014; Bruno 2009; Wright 2001). S'exclouen del discurs les causes no immediates, "rarely offering any analysis of the relationship between particular events and underlying structural processes" (Morley 1976, 206). En aquest sentit, Coscia (2009) destaca el marc de por i alteració pública que domina la informació sobre les vagues. Com a resultat, els vaguistes i les organitzacions sindicals són representats com un problema per a la societat (Walsh 1988) i els seus actes de protesta són deslegitimats.

Aquests resultats coincideixen amb les recerques sobre la protesta social en general, que solen identificar la mateixa tendència de suport mediàtic a l'*status quo*. La cobertura mediàtica basada en deslegitimar o marginalitzar els grups de protesta que desafien el poder, focalitzant en les manifestacions i la violència i no en les causes, es coneix com el "paradigma de la protesta" (McLeod i Detenber 1999). Es crea una narració que se centra en episodis concrets de conflicte; es trasllada la idea d'un escàs suport per part de l'opinió pública i es titlla als protagonistes d'extremistes i radicals. No sol acudir-se a les fonts pròpies dels moviments socials i la informació se sustenta, en gran mesura, en les fonts oficials. Aquest marc dominant suposa un repte per als activistes: la no presència en els mitjans dificulta la possibilitat d'influir en l'agenda mediàtica i en l'enquadrament dels temes rellevants; mentre que la seua aparició pot anar acompanyada d'un tractament negatiu (Armstrong i altres 2012).

Considerant els resultats de les investigacions prèvies, el present article pretén analitzar les principals característiques del tractament de les vagues laborals en la premsa espanyola, atenent al discurs elaborat entorn a les causes i conseqüències de les mateixes. En el següent apartat es resumeix el plantejament metodològic, a continuació els principals resultats i es conclou amb una discussió sobre les conseqüències que els resultats obtinguts tenen per a la pràctica de les organitzacions obreres i els moviments socials.

2. Apunts metodològics

S'ha optat per l'aplicació d'una anàlisi temàtica qualitativa (Braun i Clarke 2006) a una mostra de notícies de diferents periòdics de l'Estat Espanyol. Com a suport, s'ha utilitzat el programa informàtic Atlas.ti, que facilita el procés de codificació de la informació recollida. Aquest procés de codificació ha conjugat codis provinents del marc teòric i codis inductius derivats de la lectura directa del material (Sabariego, Vilà i Sandín 2014).

Els diaris seleccionats són *El País, 20 Minutos* i *El Mundo*, tots ells en la seua versió digital. El País.com i 20minutos.es són els llocs web més visitats, en l'Estat Espanyol, en la categoria de mitjans generalistes. *El Mundo* és el segon mitjà imprès d'informació generalista amb més audiència per darrere d'El País (AIMC 2017). El període de temps considerat per a la recol·lecció de notícies és d'11 mesos (març 2015- gener 2016). Dins d'aquest període, s'han emprat els cercadors de les pàgines dels periòdics, introduint la paraula "huelga" ("vaga" en la llengua dels diaris, el castellà). En cada mes, i per a cada periòdic, s'han agafat les 2/3 notícies més rellevants (segons la presentació de resultats del propi diari, basats en la coincidència amb la paraula buscada). En cas d'haver-hi dues notícies amb la mateixa rellevància, s'ha escollit la que parlava del tema menys tractat en la mostra, per tal d'arreplegar una major diversitat de conflictes. Hem construït, llavors, una mostra qualitativa, no determinada pel criteri de representativitat estadística. La mostra final és de 26 notícies per periòdic i un total de 80 notícies.

3. Principals resultats: les causes i conseqüències de les vagues

Un 64% de les notícies de la mostra inclouen referències a les causes de les vagues. Aquestes poden classificar-se en dues categories: explicacions contextualitzades i conjunturals. Predomina la segona opció, mentre que les referències contextualitzades són escasses. En la taula 1 es recull una tercera categoria (teòrica), que implicaria la referència a causes estructurals i que no està present en la mostra.

Taula 1. Explicacions de les causes de les vagues

Explicacions conjunturals (de cada vaga)	**Expliquen el sistema**	
	Contextualitzades	**Estructurals** (no apareixen en la mostra)
Sou congelat, hores extra no pagades, acomiadaments, desplaçaments forçats, retallades en serveis públics, etc.	Socialment Políticament Econòmicament	Contradicció capital/treball, manteniment taxa de benefici, apropiació de plusvàlua, etc.

Font: elaboració pròpia

La categoria d'explicacions contextualitzades engloba notícies que situen les causes dins d'un marc més ampli que la vaga o empresa concreta. Fan referència a elements característics de la lògica capitalista o, si més no, de la seua versió neoliberal. Prenen una concepció col·lectiva de les i els treballadors i contextualitzen socialment, econòmicament i políticament la informació. Es parla, per exemple, dels canvis en els processos de negociació, la identitat col·lectiva dels treballadors, altres protestes relacionades, els beneficis empresarials, els processos d'externalització o deslocalització, les desigualtats d'ingressos, les reformes laborals, etc.

> La externalización de los procesos productivos a través de empresas multiservicios que escapan al convenio colectivo sectorial, aplicando condiciones de absoluta precariedad a los trabajadores que emplean, está provocando esta situación (P76. 4/12/2015. 20 Minutos).

Les explicacions conjunturals centren la informació en les causes immediates de cada conflicte. S'explica el conflicte com si fóra únic, basant-se en qüestions concretes com ara reduccions salarials, empitjorament d'algunes condicions laborals, trasllats, etc. Aquestes explicacions no són emmarcades en processos més amplis (capitalisme, lluita de classes, plusvàlua, neoliberalisme, etc.) ni paren atenció a la natura col·lectiva, social i estructural de les tensions.

> "Los representantes de los trabajadores demandan la retirada de la relación de puestos de trabajo (...) que supondría el despido de 170 trabajadores; que se frene el traslado forzoso de otros 150 empleados y que la parte de la plantilla eventual tenga la posibilidad de pasar a fija" (P28. 25/03/2015. El Mundo).

D'altra banda, vora el 40% dels titulars de la mostra, arrepleguen referències de les conseqüències de les vagues. L'atenció se centra, principalment, en les conseqüències negatives que pateixen la població no participant o les empreses (pèrdues econòmiques). La relativa sobredimensió de les conseqüències converteix les vagues en un problema públic d'agitació i obstrucció de la vida quotidiana. Així, durant la vaga és possible perdre: l'accés a serveis (transports o telecomunicacions); l'accés a consum (tancament de botigues o fàbriques); o l'ús habitual de l'espai públic a causa de la violència, deterioració i l'obstrucció per part de manifestants o piquets:

> "Manifestantes [en] contra de las condiciones de los técnicos instaladores de Movistar circularon pretendidamente despacio [...] provocando grandes retenciones en varios kilómetros" (P56. 10/4/2015. 20 minutos).

Aquest tractament implica l'amagament de la contradicció capital/treball present a les vagues, tal i com es resumeix al gràfic 1. Els mitjans determinen, en un primer moment, el terreny de disputa del relat, emmarcant les explicacions del conflicte a nivells conjunturals i anul·lant o dificultant la discussió sobre les causes profundes. La no discussió sobre les causes primeres condiciona la batalla per l'enquadrament de cada conflicte laboral, que continua en el segon moment, en el qual es ressalten les conseqüències negatives de la vaga i es deixen fora del relat altres elements importants com ara la solidaritat amb els vaguistes, el patiment de treballadors i treballadores, l'apropiació de la plusvàlua, la distribució d'ingressos, els acords a què s'arriben, etc.

Gràfic 1. Ocultament de la contradicció entre capital i treball en la premsa



1er moment: marc causal
Conjuntural
Estructural

2n moment: components del relat	
Incidència en les conseqüències negatives de les vagues (la vaga com a disturbi)	Solidaritat, acords, assemblees, distribució d'ingressos, l'apropiació de plusvàlua, patiment famílies treballadores, etc.

Font: elaboració pròpia

La conseqüència és un procés de construcció de dos bàndols enfrontats: per una banda els i les vaguistes (principals responsables dels disturbis i de les conseqüències negatives) i per l'altra la resta de la població, fent veure, implícitament, que els empresaris i els treballadors no participants en la vaga tenen interessos comuns. En concret, es desenvolupa una representació diferencial de vaguistes i empresaris. Als i les vaguistes se'ls representa sovint com a irresponsables o desmesurats: "Alemania no se ha recuperado todavía de la anterior y el sindicato de los maquinistas alemanes GDL acaba de anunciar una nueva huelga" (P33. 18/5/2015. El Mundo). Especialment perquè no existeix una explicació adequada de les causes que motiven les seues actuacions. Als empresaris, encara que les referències directes siguen infreqüents, se'ls mostra disposats al diàleg i víctimes del conflicte: "Desde la empresa recuerdan su firme "voluntad de negociar" y recuerdan que se está haciendo "mucho esfuerzo" para sacar el negocio adelante" (P45. 30/10/2015. El Mundo).

4. Conclusions i apunts per a la pràctica

Després d'aplicar una anàlisi qualitativa a una mostra de notícies sobre vagues publicades en tres dels principals diaris de l'Estat Espanyol, es pot afirmar que els resultats obtinguts són coherents amb els estudis previs. Les principals conclusions són:

1. La inexistència de referències a les causes profundes de les vagues. Llavors, es desplaça el conflicte des de l'estructura del sistema i la contradicció capital/treball, cap al cas concret (Cárdenas 2014; Bruno 2009; Morley 1976).
2. Es dóna un considerable protagonisme a les conseqüències negatives de la protesta (Coscia 2009; Wright 2001; Walsh 1998), convertint la pròpia vaga en el problema i no les seues causes. El conflicte ja no és la contradicció estructural, sinó la reacció i protesta davant d'aquesta contradicció.
3. Com a resultat del tractament periodístic de les vagues, els vaguistes i les seues organitzacions queden deslegitimats i aïllats en l'escenari de l'opinió pública i, per una relació dialèctica, es legitima la posició de les empreses.

Aquestes conclusions donen suport a la idea de que els mitjans de comunicació compleixen una funció de reproducció i perpetuació del sistema capitalista (Curran 2005; Holzer 2017; Mills 1960), obviant la representació de les tensions estructurals pròpies del mateix. Finalment, el procés d'invisibilització de les contradiccions intrínseques al sistema obstaculitza el desenvolupament i èxit d'alternatives socials, polítiques i econòmiques.

Per altra banda, els resultats obliguen a repensar les tàctiques mateixes de les organitzacions que representen als treballadors. En concret, per intentar combatre aquests tres punts (ocultació del conflicte estructural, criminalització de la protesta i aïllament dels vaguistes) i millorar el tractament rebut als mitjans de comunicació, es poden plantejar dos opcions interrelacionades: modificar la forma de lluita o modificar les estratègies comunicatives. Quant a la primera, una protesta simbòlica i discursiva, menys confrontacional i que no ataque la producció podria ser millor tractada als mitjans i més acceptada per la societat, però probablement menys efectiva (Evans 2015; Kowalchuk 2009). En aquest sentit, la posició estructural de la classe treballadora en relació al capital limita la seua influència i les possibles formes de lluita i comporta un estigma negatiu de partida en els mitjans de comunicació.

Això ens porta a la segona opció de canvi, l'estrictament comunicativa, que pot tenir com a eix central l'objectiu de convertir-se en font primària de la informació. Amb aquesta finalitat, la representació dels treballadors ha de conjugar la participació als mitjans de masses (amb unes limitacions difícilment salvables) amb la clara aposta per mitjans alternatius, col·lectius o horitzontals o, fins i tot, pels mitjans propis, superant parcialment els obstacles politicoeconòmics dels *mass media* tradicionals. Els ja existents mitjans dels sindicats han de deixar de veure's com sectorials per dirigir-se a un públic més ampli. Es necessita renovar la forma comunicativa i fer-la accessible en format digital i paper, superant la seua actual invisibilitat. Si bé les xarxes socials digitals s'han mostrat eficaces per als activistes, opcions més tradicionals com els correus electrònics, els SMS, els diaris, les convocatòries, actes i parlaments públics o l'organització en el lloc de treball continuen mostrant-se efectius per mobilitzar la població (Mattoni, Berdnikovs, Ardizzoni i Cox 2010; Askanius i Gustafsson 2010).

Finalment, creiem essencial consolidar les aliances dels sindicats amb una àmplia diversitat de col·lectius i organitzacions, per tal d'implicar la comunitat i humanitzar els vaguistes. És important trobar objectius comuns amb altres demandes i moviments socials (de la qual cosa poden ser un exemple les protestes conjuntes d'usuaris i treballadors en els sectors educatius i sanitaris), introduint-hi i aprofitant l'experiència i coneixements dels sindicats en matèria laboral. Un repte d'especial dificultat serà recuperar en l'imaginari i discurs dels moviments socials la variable classe social com a identitat col·lectiva i transversal i que pot enfortir la solidaritat cap als vaguistes. Un pilar de l'hegemonia cultural actual és la fragmentació postmoderna de la identitat i la despolitització dels estils de vida causada per la mercantilització de la vida diària (Carroll 2010). Hem passat d'una societat regida per la producció a una societat de consum de masses i, una vaga, en tant que afecta al consum, desperta resistències que calen ser explicades i superades. Açò no serà possible si no s'integren en el discurs les esferes de la producció i el consum, dissociades pel fetitxisme de la mercaderia que oculta l'explotació al consumidor (Martin 2004).

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Sobre els autors

Iván Carretero-Navarro és sociòleg, titulat per la Universitat d’Alacant, format a més a més en la Universitat de Barcelona gaudint del programa de mobilitat SICUE i en la Universitat de València. Ha realitzat practiques formatives en el Gabinet d’Iniciatives Per a l’Ocupació de la Universitat d’Alacant, treballant sobre la inserció laboral dels estudiants. Actualment cursa el Màster Interuniversitari en Cooperació al Desenvolupament coordinat per 5 universitats del País Valencià (Estat Espanyol), entre elles la Universitat Politècnica de València, la Universitat de València i la Universitat d’Alacant. Ha participat en moviments socials com el 15 M o la Plataforma d’Afectats per la Hipoteca. Ha format part d’un dels òrgans de representació estudiantil de la Universitat d’Alacant per part d’un sindicat d’estudiants. Es pot contactar amb ell en icn4 AT alu.ua.es (en espanyol, català o anglès).

Eva Espinar-Ruiz és doctora en Sociologia i Professora Titular de Universitat en el Departament de Sociologia II de la Universitat d’Alacant. En aquesta mateixa universitat, és la secretaria acadèmica de l’Institut Interuniversitari de Desenvolupament Social i Pau (IUDESP). La seua activitat investigadora se centra en els camps de la sociologia de la comunicació, els estudis de gènere i els moviments socials i la participació política. En aquestes àrees ha publicat nombrosos articles en revistes científiques. En l’actualitat forma part dels equips de dos projectes d’investigació: el primer sobre les estratègies comunicatives de l’activisme contra la violència de gènere en les xarxes socials; el segon sobre les diferents formes de compromís i transgressió que adopta la participació de les dones en partits polítics i moviments socials. Ha sigut investigadora visitant en diferents universitats europees, com ara la Universitat d’Oxford i les universitats sueques d’Uppsala, d’Umeå i Lund. Pot contactar-se amb ella en eva.espinar AT ua.es (en espanyol, català o anglès).

***Interface**: a journal for and about social movements* *Article*
Volume 9 (2): 353 - 379 (Nov/Dec 2017) *Foran, Gray, Grosse, Not yet the end of the world*

"Not yet the end of the world": Political cultures of opposition and creation in the Global youth climate justice movement

John Foran, Summer Gray, and Corrie Grosse

Abstract

Based on participant observation and in-depth interviews with two dozen young climate justice activists at the U.N. climate summit COP19 in Warsaw, Poland, in November 2013, this research uses the concepts of "political cultures of opposition and of creation" to analyze the political orientations, discourse, and actions of global climate justice activists attempting to impact the negotiation of a universal climate treaty. Capturing relationships among experience, emotions, ideology, idioms, and organization, the concepts of political cultures of opposition and of creation shed light on the ability of these actors to fashion social movements of their own making. Through an analysis of actions in which youth delegates from divergent political cultures within the global climate justice movement worked collectively to realize a common vision, the formation and frictions of the larger global climate movement is made more legible to observers.

Keywords: Global climate justice movement, youth, COP19, UN climate summit, political cultures of opposition and creation, revolution vs. reform

> Sam Smith encourages each of us to find a way to contribute to our transformation to a just society, to find our path and walk it. He writes:
>
> > Above all, we must understand that in leaving the toxic ways of the present we are healing ourselves, our places, and our planet. We must rebel not as a last act of desperation but as a first act of creation.
>
> And that is what we mean when we say, "Stop the machine and create a new world."
>
> > – Margaret Flowers and Kevin Zeese (2015), quoting Sam Smith (2015)

The world today is beset by massive social problems – the obscene poverty and inequality that neoliberal capitalist globalization has wreaked on at least two-thirds of humanity, the cowardice and immobility of the political elite almost everywhere (and of course, the massive disruptions caused by the Trump administration in the United States), and cultures of violence that poison our lives, from the most intimate relations to the mass murder of the world's wars.

And now, climate change. Or better, climate disruption, climate chaos, climate crisis. It feels like we are facing a perfect storm, a very wicked, intersecting zone of suffering. In fact, given the timeline that climate science has given us, we confront a crisis of humanity that will be resolved for better or worse by those living on this precarious planet today.

Yet history (and sociology) remind us that where there is crisis, there will likely, perhaps always, be opposition to the forces that have set it in motion. The global climate justice movement that has emerged in the past decade is one sign of the times. Working to ensure that social justice is at the center of how society addresses climate change, in contrast to the larger climate movement, the climate justice movement represents one of the leading edges of a wave of movements for radical social change that have been challenging the terms of neoliberalism's victory since the ragtag Zapatista army of the poor and indigenous, led by women as well as men, rose up on January 1, 1994 at the *precise moment* that the NAFTA free trade treaty was being inaugurated over our heads by the leaders of Mexico, Canada, and the United States. A new high point was reached in the streets of Seattle in the last month of the millennium, when an extraordinary alliance of labor, students, environmentalists, indigenous peoples, parents, and other concerned Earth citizens halted the progress of the World Trade Organization, and in the first years of the twenty-first century when left-leaning governments started taking power through elections across Latin America. 2011 brought us the Arab Spring and Occupy, 2013 Black Lives Matter in the US, 2014 the rise of Podemos in Spain, and 2016 Standing Rock, again in the US, making us wonder, what will the next five years bring?

These are hopeful signs in dark times. In this article, we try to illuminate a small corner of the emergent global climate justice movement's contribution to this history in the making. This movement is not about taking state power; it is something more modest yet less limited. We hope to make sense of the discourses and experiences of a group of young climate justice activists, and suggest that the strategies and visions of these young activists may contain valuable practical lessons for ways forward for the larger global climate justice movement. Along the way, we propose a new way to study movements for radical social change by building on the concept of "political cultures of opposition" and broadening it to enable the detection of "political cultures of creation." For that is what the present moment is about: resistance and creation.

Radical social movements and their political cultures

Jean-Pierre Reed and John Foran's concept of political cultures of opposition and resistance (Reed and Foran 2002) explores how people make political sense of the social settings that constrict and enable their lives, in ways that can sometimes lead to the formation of strong social movements. In doing so, their work brings together a number of the themes of the U.S. and European social movements literature of the last two decades, including valuable work on political processes and opportunity structures (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001), collective frames, discourses, and identities (Cress and Snow 2010; Snow, Tan, and Owens 2013), and the roles of culture, emotion, and agency (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001).

The origins of such political cultures start with the experiences of people, in the ill treatment they endure and the emotional and political responses they articulate, using every available cultural tool and historical memory they possess. For example, when collective discourses like environmentalism or feminism are available in the form of consciously articulated ideologies, would-be social actors take them up and put them to work locally, and in this way, they tend to diffuse through activist groups into local settings and circulate among social movements. Perhaps more importantly, popular idioms or folk understandings – what might be called "rich stories" (Selbin 2010) or cross-generational political imaginaries (Widick 2009) – are also available for use, providing new social actors as well as seasoned activists with locally understood, everyday terms such as fairness, justice, or democracy. In the case of climate activism, this might include justice, resilience, historical responsibility, or intergenerational equity. When these take hold in a large enough social group or wider society, often through the work of some type of radical/progressive organization or network, a social movement can gain enough committed followers to take decisive action. The forging of a strong and vibrant political culture of opposition is thus a collective accomplishment, carried through by the actions of many people.

In any given society, there usually exist multiple political cultures of opposition, for people do not necessarily share the same experiences, speak similar idioms, or respond as one to the call of formal ideologies. The most effective social movements find ways of bridging the differences through the skillful creation of a common goal, such as the concise demand for "System change, not climate change!" raised at the United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009. When this happens, a movement's chances of growth and success are considerably increased.

Thus, at the center of movements for radical social change we find the elaboration of effective and powerful political cultures of opposition and resistance (PCOs) taking hold across a broad array of actors. The term refers to the process by which both ordinary citizens and revolutionary leaderships come to perceive the economic and political realities of their societies, articulate understandings that simultaneously make sense of those conditions and give voice to their grievances, and communicate discourses capable of enjoining others to act with them in the attempt to remake their society.

Figure 1 The making of political cultures of opposition (dotted lines indicate relationships that are more loosely connected).
Source: Reed and Foran 2002.


Formal ideologies
Subjective experiences/ emotions/memories of past uprisings
Political cultures of opposition
Organizations/ networks and their practices
Cultural idioms, memes, and practices

What we might term the old or classical cultures of revolution typically featured armed insurgents who directly engaged the state and its military, though these were aided in all cases by non-armed groups, organizations, and courageous individuals who engaged in support activities of many kinds. A common thread across cases is the hierarchical structure of the movements, with well-identified individuals at their head – Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa in Mexico, Lenin and Trotsky in Russia, Mao Tse-Tung in China, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba, Khomeini in Iran, and the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua under the Ortega brothers. The hierarchical nature of guerrilla militaries, socialist parties, and of religious leadership meant that influential figures – always male, and often privileged in background – would lead *in the name of* the people.

No revolutionary movement of the twentieth century came close to delivering on the common dreams of so many of its makers: a more inclusive, participatory form of political rule; a more egalitarian, humane economic system; and a cultural atmosphere where individuals and local communities may not only reach full self-creative expression but thereby contribute unexpected solutions to the dilemmas faced by society. The past, however, may hold other messages for the future, if we know how to read them.

In the twenty-first century, the nature of movements for what we might now call radical social change (a broader concept than revolution) has itself changed, as activists, reformers, dreamers, and revolutionaries globally have pursued nonviolent paths to a better world, intending to live and act as they would like that world to be. That is, the ends of justice are no longer held to justify the means of violence, but the means of non-violent resistance reflect and guarantee the ends that they seek. In this, they embody and illustrate the virtues of "prefigurative politics" (Polletta 2002) and in particular, horizontalist ways of realizing them (Sitrin 2006, 2012; Zibechi 2010).

Foran (2014) calls these positive, alternative visions "political cultures of creation" (or PCOCs, which he notes may be conveniently read out loud as "peacocks"!). Movements become even stronger when to a widely felt culture of opposition and resistance they add a positive vision of a better world, an alternative to strive for that might improve or replace what exists. As David Pellow has put it: "Many movements begin with a grievance or a critique, but what sustains them and pushes people out into the streets (or underground) is often a vision, a dream of something better" (2014: 1). Viewed from this angle, some of the differences between old and new movements for radical social change seem to include the attempt to get away from the hierarchical organizations that made the great revolutions and move in the direction of more horizontal, deeply democratic relations among participants; the expressive power of using popular idioms more than ideological discourses; the growing use of nonviolence; and the salience of political cultures of creation alongside political cultures of opposition and resistance.

Rather than thinking of PCOs and PCOCs as mutually exclusive categories, the complexities of our interviewees' words suggest that the concepts are best seen as blending and blurring into each other. This not only better honors the richness of actors' viewpoints, it removes the need for analysts to continually classify which one a given statement exemplifies and reduces the temptation to divide into two those views which rely on both cultures.

Worldwide, these new political cultures of opposition and creation have so far taken two distinct and rather different paths to change that have been pitted against each other by scholars and activists, and practiced by participants on the ground. One of these is the coming to power of progressive governments through elections, as in the elected left-of-center governments of Kerala, India, and the Latin American "Pink Tide," pushed from below by efforts to build more participatory societies on the part of diverse sectors of their population, most radically, in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The other is the path of consciously *not* taking national power, but seeking to transform its nature in less hierarchical bodies which govern themselves far more directly, carving out autonomous spaces both below the nation at the level of the community as the Zapatistas and Occupy are (or were) doing, or above it, as the many strands of the global justice movement and now global climate justice activists have sought to do. We might think of these as the "taking power" strategy versus the "re-making power" approach. These new options are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2 The emergence of "new" political cultures of opposition and creation in the twenty-first century (dotted lines indicate relationships that are more loosely connected): the cases that are bolded have pursued the path of not taking power, while those in italics have taken, or sought to take, national power. Commonalities across both types are left in plain text without italics or bolding. ***Source: Foran 2014***


Ideologies of *"21st century"* *socialism*, *nationalism*, **alter-globalization**, **non-violence**, *formal democracy*
Subjective experiences of exploitation and exclusion under globalization/ emotions of anger, love, and hope
Political cultures of opposition and creation
Non-hierarchical networks in Chiapas, the global climate justice movement, Occupy/ *Left political parties in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Iceland, Kerala*
Rise of cultural idioms of **direct democracy**, dignity, social justice, **climate justice**

The Arab Spring opened up a third path, starting with massive non-violent direct action and following up with a protracted struggle for new democratic institutions, now maintained only in Tunisia. And there may well be other pathways. What's interesting is that all of these paths can be distinguished from their twentieth-century predecessors (though we can see precursors in May 1968 in France, Allende's Chile, and indeed, the Iranian Revolution), and not least in the new political cultures that have attracted people to them.

By looking at these diverse new radical political cultures and strategies around the issue of taking state power or not, scholars and activists can ask questions such as: What are the strengths and limitations of the Latin American Pink Tide's electoral path to "twenty-first century socialism" in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia or of Syriza's ill-fated electoral victory in Greece versus the strengths and weaknesses of the more horizontally organized attempts to radically change the world by the Zapatistas, the global justice movement, and the Occupy movements? What are the lessons (positive *and* negative) of each of these experiments in radical social change? What potential exists for such movements – including the global climate justice movement – to work together in various ways as parts of a larger, emergent global project? Finally, do these diverse phenomena foreshadow new paths to radical social transformation in the future? In other words, is there some way to win the centuries-old struggle for political and economic equality?

In the following section, we use the concept of "political cultures of creation" to analyze the political orientations, discourse, and actions of global climate justice activists attempting to impact the outcome of a universal climate treaty negotiation from within. Our analysis shows youth from competing political cultures within the global climate justice movement coming together to challenge delegates to take decisive action to end climate change and mitigate its impacts.

The basis for this essay is a set of twenty-six videotaped interviews conducted in 2013 with youth activists in Warsaw, Poland at the 19th Conference of the Parties (196 countries) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP19.[1] In the style of "conversations with a purpose" (Burgess 2002 [1984]; Bhavnani 1991), the interviews were free flowing, covering young people's activism at the COP and in their home countries, the pathways they advocate for addressing the climate crisis, and their journeys into activism. They varied in length from fifteen to 90 minutes, with a median length of forty-three minutes. We have published a compilation of these interviews where they can be seen whole and in context (Ellis, Foran, and Gray 2014). Rich video and photographic data was also collected as well as data from short interviews conducted during protests, some of which we will draw upon to show these emergent political cultures in action.

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[1] The designation of "youth" at the UN climate talks is a broadly conceived and includes young adults under the age of thirty-five.

Radical content and revolutionary context

Both our readers for *Interface* raised questions about how “revolutionary” the part of the global youth climate justice movement we will call “the radicals” below actually is. And rightly so. As Nonty Ntokozo Charity Sabic put it late in 2017 at COP 23 in Bonn: “I don´t feel that COP23 brings together all the stakeholders in a fair way, there is a lack of inclusivity and respect when it comes to the people who are directly affected in their lives by climate change, for example people who already live in the areas of fracking and mining in the North and people from the Global South” (quoted in Maschowski 2017).

For how can we compare a handful of mostly Northern, well-educated (i.e. upper-middle class), predominantly white activists in their late teens and twenties with the social forces that made the Arab Spring, let alone the great social revolutions of the twentieth century which overthrew dictators, monarchs, generals, and colonial powers? This question could be addressed on so many levels and in enough depth to constitute an essay of its own. Here we will direct our readers with a few observations which may put the question in a clearer context.

We have already distinguished the movements for radical social transformation of this century from those for revolutionary state power-taking of the twentieth, and the broad global climate justice movement is in the right company alongside the territorial scope of the global justice movement and the non-violence of the Occupy and the Arab Spring movements. Indeed, on its face it seems at least as heterogeneous and intersectional as any of the twenty-first century movements so far: its political scope and sweep make it – arguably, and in potential only, to be sure – a candidate to become one of the biggest, broadest social movements in the history of the world, as one of its senior strategists, Bill McKibben (2012), has called on it to be.

If this premise is granted – and we understand that not all will do so – the question remains: how can the actions of a motley association of youth groups, fledgling civil society organizations, think tanks, and groups of individuals numbering no more than several thousand individuals, who gather for two weeks a year at considerable expense, be compared with the struggles of front-line communities like those of the peasants of the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil, the Zapatista villages and hamlets, the encampments at Standing Rock, and so many other local, regional, and national-level movements for climate and related forms of social justice?

The answer to this question lies embedded in the nature of the global climate justice movement itself, which is strictly speaking no more than a network of movements dispersed across the world. For there is no doubt overlap, perhaps substantial, between the frontline communities and actions of blockadia and the duly registered civil society activists inside a COP: when the latter make their ways home, many resume work in frontline fights for climate justice at every level and on all continents, in leftwing and ecological parties and organizations, in labor movements, student movements, women's movements, and movements for the rights and dignity of indigenous and other communities of color, among many others. Theirs is a multi-issue activism where each level informs the others, and where their very participation across levels enriches analysis and action.

If this is conceded, or at least entertained, we may still ask: Why youth activists at the COP, and not others? Are the youth with whom we spoke the most radical actors at the COP? Not necessarily, no, but neither are they the least radical ones. As a group, they stand in a particular relationship to the issue of intergenerational justice which lies at the heart of the climate crisis, and the irony of older, wealthier, more privileged negotiators and UN bureaucrats making decisions for the rest of the world is not lost on them, nor is the responsibility they feel they owe everyone who is excluded from the halls of the COP. Coming from social movements as well as NGOs, they are lumped together by the UN at the COP as YOUNGO, the "youth NGOs."

Thus the question of how radical our subjects are opens onto some of the key debates and daunting unanswered questions we may ask of all radical social movements today: Who will change a world in the midst of the steady erosion of its economic, political, cultural, and ecological systems toward breakdown? How will this global revolution be accomplished? And, above all, for present purposes, what cultures of opposition and creation might inform it, and under what conditions might they ally?

These questions resist easy answers, and all answers are inevitably partial and situated. Humility, openness, and collaboration suggest themselves as indispensable to the methods of scholars and activists today. We're all in this together, or else none of us are likely to get out alive. Meanwhile, the clock continues to tick.

Political cultures of opposition and creation at the COP[2]

A brief history of the global climate treaty negotiations

The Conference of the Parties (COP) has its origins in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], founded just before the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and has been taking place annually for two weeks in different cities around the world since COP1 in Berlin in 1995 (as did COP 23 in 2017). At COP3 in Japan in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, a binding climate treaty which required greenhouse gas emission reductions from the global North. In Copenhagen at COP15 in 2009, the world's expectations for Kyoto's successor were dashed in a spectacular failure to agree between the global North and South on the terms of the treaty. Following that debacle, parties agreed in Durban in 2011 to complete negotiations for a universal climate treaty to apply to all nations by COP 21 in Paris, scheduled for December 2015. Our study of youth activists at the COP comes toward the end of this sequence, when COP 19 took place in Warsaw, Poland, between November 11 and 23, 2013. Two years later, at COP 21 in Paris, 195 nations would negotiate the Paris Agreement (not a binding treaty, but a set of national pledges, which even if all met, would still take the world well into extremely dangerous warming by the middle of this century.

In the most emotional moment of COP17 in Durban, South Africa in 2011, Anjali Appadurai, the very last speaker at the very last open session of the meetings, walked onto the main stage to represent the voices of youth activists worldwide. Dead serious and dressed in a white t-shirt with an image of Earth in large black brackets,[3] she looked across the podium and delivered a speech that stung the ears of everyone in the auditorium. "Where is the courage in these rooms?" she demanded, looking directly at the delegates in front of her. "Now is not the time for incremental action," she continued, pointing to the preponderance of missed targets and broken promises that had emerged from the decades-long negotiation process. "In the long run, these will be seen as the defining moments of an era in which narrow self-interest prevailed over science, reason and common compassion" (Democracy Now 2011). Anjali's words rattled the room enough for one moderator to admit that youth ought to be heard first, not last, at the negotiation table. In many ways, this was a defining moment for the youth climate justice movement, systematically silenced by those in positions of power. The speech constituted a collective scream of resistance to the exclusivities and biases of the process as well as its ineffectiveness in bringing about meaningful change.

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[2] Unless otherwise noted, all interviews quoted were collected by the authors while at COP19 in Warsaw, Poland.

[3] Earth in Brackets emerged serendipitously after several students at the College of the Atlantic in Maine, USA, created an image to illustrate their frustration at the negotiation process. Brackets commonly appear throughout proposals for climate treaties put forward by different countries at COPs; those containing more radical statements are inevitably dropped at some point. For the group, the climate crisis is such that the future of the planet is now in brackets and thus in danger of being deleted from the global climate treaty. As their website puts it: "[Earth in Brackets] as a concept highlights the fact that government negotiators have essentially put the entire planet onto the negotiating table."

When we spoke to Anjali at COP19, she informed us that the global youth climate justice movement was "on the cusp of an important moment," but complicated by political cultural divisions. She spoke of a split between "people who are focused on justice and equity," and "people who [are] more in the politically possible realm." This divide, between groups and individuals focused on issues of justice and historical responsibility – encapsulated in the concept of climate justice – and groups emphasizing what seem to be more practical and politically feasible solutions, captures an important friction within the global climate youth movement.

As we will show below, while these divides are significant, they are not insurmountable. Rather, the convergence of these political cultures of opposition around climate action at the COP is helping to shape a vision of the future in which people from all walks of life rise up against the forces of global environmental destruction, utilizing a broad set of strategic approaches – emergent political cultures of creation – to transition to a just and sustainable future.

Youth political cultures in action at COP19

During the two weeks of negotiations that took place at COP19, housed within Warsaw's labyrinthine National Stadium, we witnessed a range of creative actions shaped by diverse political cultures of opposition associated with the global youth climate justice movement. Their efforts culminated with widespread youth participation in a collective action involving many civil society organizations who came together within the conference space to bridge – at least temporarily – their differences around the urgency of climate action.

On one side of the global youth climate justice movement are those who oppose the systemic forces of capitalism and corporatization. This radical, and in some cases anti- or post-capitalist perspective is characterized by a concern with historical responsibility for the climate crisis, the failure of the COP to deliver a meaningful global treaty, and issues of climate and social justice. Jamie Peters and Louisa Casson, both with the United Kingdom Youth Climate Coalition (UKYCC), exemplify these views. In an interview at COP19, Jamie observed that the youth climate justice movement is "becoming less of a 'climate movement', and more of a collection of groups demanding what is right and just in a lot of different areas of society.” He continued, “We are sick of corporations carrying out abuses at all levels, tired of politicians, and tired of a system that is failing us.” Louisa, also at COP19, added, “climate justice is trying to rebalance this kind of historical responsibility that developed countries have for massively contributing to climate change through their industrial revolutions.”

The daily actions of this group emphasized the hypocrisies of the COP process and were delivered in a fashion that drew upon irony and satire. For example, youth set up a mock Lemonade Stand to raise money for the Adaptation Fund, showcasing the paltry contributions made so far by developed countries. Ben Liddie, from California, showed his contempt for the selfishness of the wealthy nations by putting in a half dollar – literally, a dollar bill ripped in two.

ADAPTATION FUND
Lemonade Stand
COMING SOON:
Green Climate Fund $100
BAKE SALE!
CASH

Photo 1: Lemonade stand to raise money for the Adaptation Fund (photo by John Foran)

Photo 2: A dollar bill for the Green Climate Fund ripped in two by a young activist (photo by John Foran)

To further protest the corporate presence at the COP, youth arranged a mock auction of the climate to the highest bidder. Poised atop a makeshift soap box and looking elegant in a black suit, youth activist Pascoe Sabido of the Corporate Europe Observatory played the part of auctioneer. In attendance were activists playing corporate representatives from IKEA, BMW, ArcelorMittal (the world's leading steel and mining company, according to their website), and LOTOS (a Polish oil and gas exploration company who sponsored the COP by showering delegates with embroidered LOTOS satchels). Opposite these corporate bidders stood youth activists holding signs that read, "STOP corporate capture of climate talks" and a banner "Reclaim the COP." Onlookers wore WTF "Where's the Finance?" pins, playing on the common social media tag for "What the Fuck?"

UP FOR AUCTION
OUR CLIMATE
To the highest bidder
STOP CORPORATE CAPTURE OF CLIMATE TALKS

Photo 3: The climate auction for corporations (photo by John Foran)

#WTF
Where's
The Finance?

Photo 4: "What the fuck?" (photo by John Foran)

Some also took to the internet. Marco Cadena, a movement coordinator with Young Friends of the Earth Europe and Reclaim Power, created a Yes Men-style twitter page, doctored to look like the official twitter feed of COP19. He used this to post both wishful and satirical tweets during the two weeks of climate negotiations in Warsaw. Marco explained that the creative energy of youth is key to an integrated radical movement in the face of the "democracy deficit," the feelings of many people that neither their governments nor any of the existing parties credibly represent their desires.

Silje Lundberg, a longtime environmental activist and Chair of Young Friends of the Earth Norway, who had been to every COP since Copenhagen in 2009, characterized COP19 as "the most corporate COP that I've seen." This was a consistent point of critique among youth activists and civil society more broadly. The rejection of the overwhelming corporate presence and effective political capture of the COP expressed in these words and actions point to a radical, even "post-capitalist" political culture of opposition. In a protest away from the conference activist youth presented a skit with some playing lobbyists and others doctors and health practitioners in front of the building that was hosting the World Coal Association's International Coal and Climate Summit across town. A giant pink blow-up lung ultimately rose above the "lobbyists," who, at the event's conclusion, lay on the ground, amidst paper flakes of coal dust and beside a banner demanding "People Before Coal."

WHO RULES THE WORLD?
FOSSILE INDUSTRY OR THE PEOPLE?
WHO RULES POLAND?
COAL INDUSTRY OR THE PEOPLE?
GREENPEACE

Photo 5: At the World Coal Summit: Greenpeace banner (photo by John Foran)

The outrage felt when UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres agreed to speak at the Coal Summit was such that her invitation to speak at the three-day Conference of Youth (COY) that preceded COP19 was revoked. Some activists used the second week of the negotiations to stage actions that blended irony with their demand for increased representation, protesting the use of carbon credits to finance mega-projects for dams and coal, and insisting that negotiators not discount their future, either economically or morally.

On the other side of the global youth climate justice movement are those who focus on the inequity and inefficiency that characterizes the COP process itself. This "reformist" perspective works to build a COP re-structured so that participation and representation are ensured and countries cooperate and make compromises for the good of the international community. This translated into appealing to arguments based on economics, incentives, technology, and the power of individual actions. Reformists want countries to be accountable to the international process that is the COP – they want to fix the COP. For example, Tim Damon, a self-described "policy wonk" and member of SustainUS (U.S. Youth for Sustainable Development) from rural Ohio, argues that "this is the only process we have and I think it's actually all the more reason that we need to be here, we need to be vocal." Tim emphasized the importance of having a seat at the table and representing youth at the negotiations. Reem al-Mealla, a member of the then year-old Arab Youth Climate Movement, and one of just a handful of Bahraini women biologists, agreed with this view and was frustrated with the lack of opportunities for participation in the COP: "The thing is this year has been a bit frustrating because every time we go somewhere the meetings are closed." Antoine Ebel, a French leader of CliMates, a group that runs model COPs for youth around the world, shares the desire to make meetings more open so that youth can have a voice. Antoine emphasized the need for countries to change their behavior to enhance cooperation. "If here in the climate talks, there was at least some empathy and respect and trust between the delegates, more compromises could probably be found."

Youth who came to COP19 with the goal of reforming the process utilized actions aimed at increasing representation, emphasizing the importance and promise of individual actions and technological innovations for addressing climate change. For example, the group Connected Voices brought viewpoints of Pacific Island youth to the conference halls in the form of posters. Standing in a line along the path that negotiators use to enter their closed sessions, youth held placards with photos of young activists who were unable to afford to attend COP19, each of whom in turn was pictured holding their messages as written signs. At the front of the line of posters was a world map reading "WE ARE

HERE/WE ARE NOT," indicating that youth from the Global South were absent from the COP19.

WE ARE HERE
WE ARE NOT

Photo 6: World map reading "WE ARE HERE/WE ARE NOT" (photo by John Foran)

Reflecting on the previous year's Connected Voices action at COP18 in Doha, Qatar, David Gawith, a New Zealander pursuing his master's research on climate change adaptation in the Himalayas, explained that he received positive feedback from negotiators: "It felt like something that was really practical and worthwhile, and I guess that's all I've really wanted.... I'm hoping for a really good response again this year." For David, negotiator acceptance and praise made the action practical, and therefore, useful, building bridges from the youth movement with the negotiating process itself.

In another action, Tim Damon and a team of youth activists proposed the concept of Intergenerational Equity to correct for the practice of economic discounting, where present costs take priority over future benefits. As Tim explained, in order to get powerful countries to respond to the climate crisis, youth would need to convince them of "the economic necessity of taking action on climate change." This, Tim argued, could be "a new way to get everyone focused on the ambition." Through youth efforts, Intergenerational Equity was inserted into the text for the Ad-hoc Working Group for the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) up to the 2015 climate agreement negotiations (in brackets, of course), and it was indeed referenced in the 2015 Paris Agreement, along with "the importance for some of the concept of climate justice" – both relegated to the less prominent "Preamble" (UNFCCC 2015). At COP19, based on the concept of Intergenerational Equity, youth held an action where they kneeled with tape on their mouths and held signs reading "born in May 2050," and other dates far into the future, demonstrating the lack of voice that as-yet unborn generations have in the climate talks.

Reformists emphasized effective actions, using language about efficiency when describing how they and their organizations organize. If industrial and technical inventions had created climate change in the first place, these youth felt that they could yet be turned around and used for a sustainable future. As Antoine Ebel, explained: "When I look at an offshore oil platform, I'm both horrified and pretty amazed at the kind of technology and savvy that people are deploying to get that stuff out of the ground. If we manage to put the same kind of ingenuity and resources to keeping it there, then everything is possible." Radicals, on the other hand, tend to turn this logic around, maintaining that confidence in some future techno-fix deters action now.

These ideological divides can run deep and become very personal, coming out clearly in activists' views of each other and debates over how, or even whether, to take part in events organized by controversial institutions such as the World Bank. For example, Nathan Thanki, a member of the group Earth in Brackets, would like to see more radical youth involved, youth who are "more extreme than any of the parties [i.e. national delegations] … more extreme than any of the brand NGOs." He describes the COP negotiations as a corporate-driven process that should be resisted and in some cases boycotted. In an interview at COP19, he expressed his frustration with youth delegates who adhered to a position of advocating for politically feasible solutions, preventing youth from holding strong positions within the COP process.

> I call them "baby bureaucrats." They water down a lot of things, and it makes it really difficult for us to come to any sort of strong statement on anything. We just end up following the lowest common denominator all the time, and getting wrapped up in these very, very tiring, energy-sucking conversations, and bickering, but very politely, in the face of the sort of to-ing and fro-ing about nonsense.... It's not just about getting youth into the text; it's not even really all about just the text and the words on the paper. It's more [about] setting a precedent and drawing our red lines really clearly in terms of demands.

Reformist youth activists were similarly frustrated with their anti-capitalist counterparts. For example, David Gawith voiced his concerns that youth delegates who adhered to radical positions did so for selfish reasons.

> While I have been inspired by the work of many young people in the movement, I have also seen fairly extreme narcissism among some who seem closely tied to their own activist image and persona and appear more concerned about being completely correct and true to their activist philosophies than being effective. I think these people should consider what young people in areas that stand to lose the most from climate change may think of their conduct. I think they would say, "We don't have time to parade around on our philosophical high horses; try to make progress NOW even if it means departing from the steadfast images you have of yourselves." We simply don't have time to be totally correct or totally ethical about everything.

These frustrations boiled over into arguments during youth delegate meetings at COP19. This included disagreements over wording on signs and others messages, taking precious meeting time to adjudicate, not even always successfully. As Canadian activist Leehi Yona noted: "[People] can be divided into camps, they can have disputes, like you say, sometimes even personal, and the disputes can really leave a sour taste for a lot of people." By the end of the first week, youth felt a need to hash these problems out, and an unprecedented meeting was held that by some accounts lasted seven hours on the "day off," Sunday, when the negotiations are closed. Even with this, some participants told us, no one really changed their views.

Differences between these two political cultures stem in part from the types of activism youth engage with at home. Those in the radical camp tend to support the efforts of grassroots and frontline groups while those in the reformist camp typically work within local or international NGOs and policy groups. However, this distinction can be complicated. Anjali Appadurai, who is also a member of Reclaim Power, an organization dedicated to building a vision for creating multilayered, non-hierarchical, almost "placeless" connections among global youth, elaborates on what she sees for the future of the global climate movement:

> It's really interesting because a lot of us in this movement are fluid across borders. I am not based anywhere; I live in Vancouver, Canada but I am not like "that girl from Canada," and I think a lot of us are like that in this

> movement, and it's only going to grow, this generation of people who just don't really identify with place-based activism.... Each of us in this alliance has our own network, our own community and our own activism back home, and we are trying to link those in really powerful ways. And the beauty of it is that it's all online. It's a purely leaderless, hierarchy-less, placeless movement – it's non-place-based activism and I think we need this type of cross-border movement to work alongside community struggles.

Interestingly, the need for both sides of the global climate youth movement to come together to make a difference *was* felt across the spectrum at COP19. As Anjali Appadurai noted, this divide is a common characteristic of progressive activism, and needs to be broken down for each "side" to recognize the value of the other's contributions:

> We need people doing policy stuff. We need people at the UNFCCC – it's dead space, but it's still a space, it's still happening, there are still millions of dollars going into these convergences and policy coming out. And we need the grassroots because you can't fight a struggle without communities' needs being amplified to an international level.... We connect in different ways.

Leehi Yona, a Canadian activist attending Dartmouth College in the United States, articulates the potential of deeply shared common convictions to unite people:

> My sense of how the global youth justice movement works is that it is a mosaic of different ideals, hopes, and beliefs. It is a community comprised of many smaller communities around the world who, despite sharing different political opinions on various issues, come together for a common goal: a real, ambitious, fair solution to the climate crisis. It is a community whose members recognize that we are all inextricably bound together by our presence on this planet, by our identities as global citizens, by our acknowledgement of the immense challenge we face – and by the deep hope we hold for the future, for humanity to rise to the occasion.

As we shall see, this potential was realized on two occasions at COP19, with very effective results: youth, and the global climate justice movement more broadly, came together in solidarity with the victims of Typhoon Haiyan and in a walkout to protest the failure of the negotiations.

Coming together: the two cultures united in action

In the opening week of COP19, youth activists became very involved in solidarity with the Philippines, hit by Typhoon Haiyan on November 8, 2013, just three days before the COP began, holding signs, "Honor Haiyan, Honor Climate Promise" and red dots, "#westandwithyou" (red dots had been used by activists at COP18 in Doha the year before when, incredibly, the Philippines was hit by another superstorm, typhoon Bopha, on the middle weekend of the two-week COP). After an emotional seventeen-minute speech describing the "madness" of climate change, Yeb Saño, the head of the Filipino delegation, left the room escorted by three youth activists with an unpermitted banner that read "2012, Bopha, 1,067; 2013, Haiyan, 10,000-plus? How many more have to die?" These activists were unceremoniously kicked out of the conference and harshly banned for a period of five years to life. Anjali Appadurai saw this "embarrassing reaction on behalf of the Secretariat" as an unprecedented moment for youth at the COP.

The overreaction united youth from both political cultures against a clear target, the unacceptably punitive crackdown on anything (i.e. posters and protests) that is not "permitted" and approved in advance by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In a wider act of solidarity, activists from both political cultures joined Saño's hunger strike, starting on the first day of the COP and pledging to continue it until a significant step was taken to address the problem of devastating extreme weather events.

This initial coming together set the stage for another action – the political climax of COP19 – in which youth activists organized a nearly complete walkout of civil society on Thursday, November 21, the day before the negotiations were scheduled to finish. Seeing no meaningful progress in the talks, finding themselves excluded from the process on many levels, and witnessing the blatant corporate presence – even sponsorship – at the COP, hundreds of activists staged a walkout from the National Stadium, most of them vowing not to return for the final day of negotiations.

We witnessed some of the preparations for this the day before both inside the National Stadium and at the Convergence Space, an old two-story building with rooms for the movement to use during COP19. The walkout was conceived and planned by the more radical of the young activists and youth organizations, but it came to enjoy broad appeal (it had a predecessor in the mass walkout of civil society at the Rio+20 meetings in Brazil in June 2012). In addition, veteran organizers from Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, ActionAid, the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance, the Bolivian Platform on Climate Change, LDC (Least Developed Countries) Watch, the International Trade Union Confederation, the Philippines Movement on Climate Change, and the more conservative World Wildlife Fund, among others, lent the names of their organizations to the action, and Kumi Naidoo, the executive director of Greenpeace, turned up to deliver the principal remarks at the press conference that preceded the walkout.

Moments before the walkout, groups of activists met up in many corners of the National Stadium to pass out white shirts smuggled into the heavily securitized conference by youth organizers. At precisely 2 p.m., the walkout commenced, converging on the ground level of the building which led to the exits. We filmed civil society delegates and youth activists as they streamed by, in the hundreds. The mood was defiant; the white shirts read “Polluters talk, we walk!” and on their backs, “Volveremos!” (“We will be back,” a reference to their plans for the 2014 COP in Lima, Peru). The messages were clear, passing judgment on the complete inability of the UNFCCC to advance the treaty process at COP19, and signaling that this walkout was the beginning of a collective movement that would return, with renewed force, to future COPs.

California student Ben Liddie, a radical, described the feeling of that moment as “fucking magical. It’s awesome to see so many people out here; I would not expect to see so many people from different groups out here.” Ashok Chandwaney (a more reformist presence at COP19) of the Sierra Student Coalition (US) commented: “I would describe it as unprecedented. I don’t think that the WWF (World Wildlife Fund) and Greenpeace have gotten together on something, like, since I was born” (both of these remarks were made on a video of the action shot by Summer Gray 2013). Reem Al-Mealla, introduced earlier as reform-minded, summed up its political significance for the movement and for the individuals who make it up: “Being here and looking around me, I’m like ‘Oh my god, I’m just a dot in this big ocean of people who are fighting for climate justice, fighting for a better tomorrow.’ That really gives me the motivation and inspiration and hope!”

At the Convergence Space the next day, Marco Cadena drew out the political lessons for radicals, indicating that the walkout marked the beginning of a collective vision and a stronger movement:

> I think the walkout we saw yesterday was a *huge* momentum for our movement. We had a *huge* array of different organizations, who sometimes we have very different views or takes on certain issues. But we were really united and stood strong, shoulder-to-shoulder, and today we had loads of discussions about how to continue that. So, I’m really positive on the movement side. We are really, really building something big. And we’ve not just stopped because of all the leaders and everyone inside just basically failing the planet and failing the people. So I think we’re starting. This is a continuation of something that’s already began, but I can really feel the scaling-up of this movement.

The emotion of hope, memories of past victories, the powerful meme of climate justice, and the scaling up of a global movement – these are the constituent parts that have led to the formation of stronger political cultures of opposition and creation that are growing in vision and numbers with each passing COP. The walkout was an act of opposition and creation – opposition to all that is wrong with the COP and creation of a unified movement (if only for a few hours), made possible when activists can find common purpose amidst their differences.

Did the actions of civil society make a difference? At the very end of the Warsaw meetings, the COP finally created a "Loss and Damage" mechanism that would presumably be funded when the final treaty was signed in Paris in 2015 (the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage was not funded in Paris, but merely mentioned in the final Agreement, with details to be worked out in future COPs (UNFCCC 2015). For many, this was an example of the success that is possible when civil society is united and stands in solidarity with progressives inside the negotiations. It should be noted that Yeb Saño did not come to COP 20 in Lima in 2014, due to what many suspect was pressure on his government to silence a critical voice in the negotiations. Yeb Saño is now part of the civil society side of the global climate justice movement.

Conclusion

Two of the largest questions that confront us as scholar-activists are: Where do social movements come from, and what holds them together? We have suggested that the wellspring of activism comes from powerful emotions, is based on collectively shared but individual experiences, and comes to be expressed in words and actions when all of these are deeply felt and widely shared. Given the failure of world leaders to act in their interest, increasing numbers of young people around the world are taking the matter of climate crisis into their own hands. They may be divided by many things – nationality, gender, race/ethnicity, education, or class among them – but they come together around a common conviction that something must be done, and there's no one else who will do it for them (Stephenson 2015).

The impression that, like their elders, youth climate justice activists are polarized between those embracing reformist identities who seek change within the existing political and economic arrangements, and a radical side that rejects the existing order is real, but it also has been seen to be fluid and subject to change based on the steady worsening of the climate crisis and individuals' and groups' experiences within it. Differences can be overcome when emotions and stakes are high, as in the global reaction to the disaster in the Philippines or the general stalemate of the COP process itself, which resulted in the walkout. It may be best to view the political cultures of opposition and creation we have identified as lying on a spectrum, without clear boundaries. Indeed, climate justice activists themselves see the larger picture as a spectrum of consciousness (Russell 2012). For global youth today, this looks more like a broad, ongoing debate or conversation among complex individuals who share far more with each other than their older counterparts in the national delegations to COPs do.

Political cultures change over time, both for particular individuals, and for whole organizations and now, global networks. Their differences may not be as deeply entrenched among young people across the range of struggles for social justice as they are for the current and past leadership of the older generations. Given the inexorable march of climate change, we may be on the cusp of a sea-change in ecological consciousness and political cultures on a mass scale: as Naomi Klein (2014) has put it, *This changes everything*.

COP19 in Warsaw, November 2013, will not go down in the history of the climate negotiations as an event where much of significance was accomplished, at least as far as making progress on a global climate treaty is concerned. But it will be remembered in the history of the climate justice movement, both for the dramatic political action that occurred there and the less visible but equally important movement building (Juris et al. 2014) and learning – experience in how to act as a broad-based brilliantly diverse movement – that occurred behind the scenes. And the youth who were there were in large measure responsible for both of these outcomes.

As for the future:

> The story ends well; of course it does: Why else would we be fighting? The head of one of the Norwegian environmental NGOs, Frederic Hauge, who was part of the Young Friends of Norway in his youth, said when they were working in the environmental movement they used to say that “Everything’s going to hell, but at least we’re going to make it difficult for them on the way.” And that’s not how it should be; it can’t be that we are [just] going to be making it a bit difficult on the way.
>
> We are not going to go that way because we are going to stop it. That’s the story we are going to tell, the story of how our planet is going to look in fifteen, seventy, one hundred years, and that it’s going to be a more beautiful planet to live on than the planet we have today. A planet where everything is better.... We will have clean energy that isn’t ruining the planet. We’ll have ... energy for all, so that we don’t ruin our planet by simply surviving (Silje Lundberg, interview, 2013).

In terms of the big questions we have raised – Do these diverse phenomena foreshadow new paths to radical social transformation in the future? In other words, is there some way to win the centuries-old struggle for political and economic equality? – while it's too soon to tell, it's not yet the end of the world.

Links to Interviewee Organizations

Connected Voices: http://connected-voices.org/

Earth in Brackets: http://www.earthinbrackets.org/

Arab Youth Climate Movement: http://aycm.org/

Push Europe: http://pusheurope.org/

CliMates: http://www.studentclimates.org/

Sierra Student Coalition: http://www.sierraclub.org/youth

SustainUS: http://www.sustainus.org/home

UKYCC: http://ukycc.org/

Reclaim Power: http://www.reclaimpower.net/

Young Friends of the Earth Europe: https://www.foeeurope.org/yfoee

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About the authors

Corrie Grosse is Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies at College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University. She specializes in the intersection of energy extraction, climate justice, and grassroots organizing. Her research examines how communities in Idaho and California work together to resist hydraulic fracturing and tar sands. Her contact E-mail is cgrosse001 AT csbsju.edu

Summer Gray is Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where she teaches courses on infrastructure, adaptation, and the environment. Her research highlights the lived experiences of coastal communities throughout the world facing the threat of sea change and the unintended consequences of coastal development. Her contact E-mail is summer_gray AT ucsb.edu

John Foran is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he teaches courses and publishes work on the climate crisis, climate justice, and the world in 2050. Much of his writing can be found at www.iicat.org/john-forans-iicat-research-portal/ His contact E-mail is foran AT soc.ucsb.edu

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Ghosts at Work: Notes on Workplace Hauntings

Bert Lewis

1. Introduction

It's early October 2017 and Halloween is already creeping up on us. The shops are full of decorations and costumes and although I'm over fancy dress parties, I'm excited about the excuse to watch old horror movies and dig out Danzig-era Misfits records. Knowing how much I like white chocolate, my partner has already given me a chocolate ghost. In keeping with the unreliability of specters, this has disappeared into the ether long before 31st October.

I'm not sure how Marx felt about Halloween, but the specters he wrote about in the introduction to the *Communist Manifesto* weren't seasonal or made of candy or ectoplasm. Neither are the ghosts presented in Richard Gilman-Opalsky's *Specters of Revolt* (Repeater, 2017). With a title that echoes Derrida and published by Repeater Books, co-founded by the late Mark Fisher, *Specters* is a work of political philosophy that seeks to understand and learn from revolt in the age of 'capitalist realism'.

Disregarding Gilman-Opalsky's larger argument in honour of the season, this research note draws upon the first chapter of *Specters* to model a materialist vision of ghosts and the connected theoretical practice of *becoming-ghost* in a trade union context. Gilman-Opalsky asks:

> What is the social and political history that leaves a place haunted, and what is it exactly that does the haunting? Can we speak of ghosts in materialist language? What do such ghosts tell us, what do they do? (2016, p.21)

The answers to these questions are arguably useful in a Labour Studies context for understanding and developing work place struggle. Focusing momentarily on supernatural ghosts, apparitions present a paradox. Often unable to directly intervene in worldly affairs, they are in this sense, impotent and powerless, unable to physically coerce those who they haunt. Despite this, ghosts frighten and unsettle – and ultimately, to be rid of them, the target of the haunting must typically carry out an act specified by the specter that (at best) they would not chose to do (*ibid*, p.64). Ghosts lurk as uncomfortable beings demanding restitution.

This seems a metaphor for one reading of trade unions in the UK. Numerically in decline (ONS, 2017) and lacking the power in many circumstances to engage in coercive action (e.g. Porter, Blakey et al, 2017 on the Trade Union Act), unions nonetheless remain a delightfully uneasy presence in many workplaces, challenging the purgative of management even if ultimately they cannot stop it. Where consigned to this role, an understanding of the materialist reading of ghosts may potentially improve the understanding of a weak union position and hint at ways to be more effective.

In this context, part two of this note presents a reading of chapter one of *Specters,* outlining the theory of a materialist ghosts and *becoming-ghost*. This theory is applied to Charles Dickens' classic text *A Christmas Carol* in part three. Taking each ghost in turn, the supernatural is stripped away before the materialist ghost is transposed to the workplace and a praxis for engaging in haunting suggested.

Language

"Manager" indicates an authority figure in the work place hierarchy: a supervisor, manager, CEO etc. "Employer" indicates the body employing the worker, be it public or private sector. "Ghost," "specter" and "apparition" are used interchangeably. Gilman-Opalsky contests the term "paranormal" so this paper refers to the paranormal as "supernatural." This is contrasted with the materialist ghost, where materialist is used in a very loose way as "…a set of related theories which hold that all entities and processes are composed of – or are reducible to – matter, material forces or physical processes" (Stack, 2000, p.535). This means of course that the materialist specter cannot be the spirit of the dead.

Finally, the language of ghosts is academic; it is not a call to start producing newsletters calling on union members to haunt their managers. Instead, viewing disputes through this prism of theory may offer insight and understanding that is currently obscured. This insight should be expressed on the shop floor in more prosaic terms.

2. Materialist Ghosts

This section outlines two key concepts from the first chapter of *Specters*: the materialist ghost and *becoming-ghost*. Inspired by Derrida (Gilman-Opalsky, 2016, p.9), Marx (ibid, p.53), Kristerva (ibid, p.48), and Guattari (ibid, p.58) - Gilman-Opalsky outlines philosophical arguments to support his model (e.g. the meaning of *Geist* (ibid, pp.30-32))*,* but this reading accepts these arguments without contention. The focus is on presenting and expanding these concepts in a manner relevant for developing labour movement praxis.

Haunting

Gilman-Opalsy strips away the supernatural aspects of ghosts to leave a materialist definition. Asserting that "what is truly 'paranormal' is their absence (ibid, p.29)", the materialist ghost is defined by its principle act, haunting, where "to be haunted is to be troubled by the presence of some invisible thing, some unseen entity that one nonetheless feels or knows to be present." And who is not haunted by something, in the sense of "…being haunted by personal or political history, being haunted by the bad things we have done, or have been done to us? (ibid, p.30)"

Although these sensations can be expressed in many ways, the language used to describe the supernatural can be identical to the psychological. This language renders ghosts as a very normal phenomenon, opposing a "paranormal… [that] designates experiences outside of the range of normal human experience (ibid, p.32)"; therefore, "…every human person with a history of experiences in the world is haunted by some ghost(s) (ibid, p.33)." A subject can be said to be haunted by memories of heartbreak, just as they can be haunted by a specter.

This reading enables the suggestion that some things *should* be haunted - an exploitative institution should be haunted by memories of its victims and a specter here is "…an active moral conscience." Here "…the haunting is reassuring thing, a thing that afflicts and worries the existing state of affairs (ibid, p.33)." These apparitions can also manifest as a fear of a future event that has yet to occur, such as a manager haunted by a fear of future insubordination inspired by collective memories of past revolt.

This note asserts that many employers *should* be haunted, by memories of discarded employees and decisions that put profit before social justice. Fox Piven and Cloward assert that workers do not experience capitalism but factory foreman, guards etc (1979, p.20-21). Similarly, whilst an employer is more directly experienced than an economic system, arguably for employees this is embodied through regular contact with its representatives. Whilst these managers may 'simply be doing their job', it remains individuals not abstractions that implement and live with fateful decisions. Adopting the perspective of organised labour, in this note it is the employer or managers who are haunted. The haunting of individuals echoes Alinsky's tactic of personalising targets (1971, p.131) and presents a similar ethical dilemma: at what stage in the hierarchy does targeting individuals become morally acceptable? Either way, assuming an adversarial relationship, these apparitions are 'good ghosts' (Gilman-Opalsky, 2016, p.36), antagonistic to employers and managers and reminders of what will not quietly go away.

Becoming-ghost

Gilman-Opalsky notes the supernatural ghosts of workers, highlighting "…workers [who] have been fatally exploited, expropriated, or abused… ghosts [that] come from abuses of the unexceptional or banal lives of "regular" unnamed people (ibid, p.43)." But his focus on the construction is misguided, as though injustice only occurs from before or during the erection of "…some grand fortress or bourgeois moment," and there are no memorable acts of exploitation within these occupied buildings. The indignities inflicted through employment provide ample opportunities for haunting without any need for fatalities, where exploited and restructured, overworked and bullied workers linger on to remind employers of poor choices and past work cultures. Whilst it would be better for these ghosts never to exist, it should be clear that organised labour shouldn't work to exorcise these ghosts but "...find some small consolation in the haunting of the perpetrators (ibid, p.48)".

It is through the concept of *becoming-ghost* that "...more of what should be haunted will be haunted (ibid, p.62)." *Becoming-ghost* echoes Guattari's concept of *becoming-woman*, a subversive collapsing of a dichotomy (ibid, p.58). Just as *becoming-woman* means becoming more or less feminine as feelings dictate (ibid, p.59), *becoming-ghost* means becoming more or less ghost-like as the situation demands. In clearer terms, it means becoming more or less engaged in what ghosts do:

> Haunting is an upheaval in an immediately understandable way: to haunt is to unsettle what was settled, to disrupt the semblance that there is nothing here to see. An active haunting shakes us and wakes us, making us see something that we didn't (or couldn't) see before... Too much is settled too often. Becoming-ghost is a way to unsettle things (ibid, p63).

Becoming-ghost is to become an active reminder of what would be preferred forgotten.

Taken to one conclusion, in *becoming-ghost,* a worker may haunt for another. The supernatural ghost is the spirit of someone who has died; by definition however, a materialist ghost cannot engage in *becoming-ghost* if the worker is dead or absent. It is for other workers to remind employers and managers of the colleague who has passed or moved on to other employment. In *becoming-ghost* the workers who remain are not *becoming-ghosts* of themselves but *becoming-ghosts* of their co-worker. Doing so is a form of solidarity.

Regardless, both supernatural and materialist ghosts typically require a resolution of their grievances in order to put an end to their haunting (ibid, p.64); thus *becoming-ghost* can be seen as the act of unsettling of an employer or manager that persists until some form of restitution is made.

3. A Christmas Carol

Charles Dickens' novella *A Christmas Carol* (1915)[1] provides a fictional account of a haunting of a manager, Ebenezer Scrooge. Infamous as a miser – the noun "scrooge" is a well understood label for "...a person who is mean with money (OED, 2009, p.1294)" – the protagonist is also the exploitative master of Bob Cratchit (Dickens, p.7).

In understanding materialist ghosts, the attraction of the text is three-fold:

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[1] The text quoted is the 1915 edition, available as a PDF: www.archive.org/details/christmascar00dick

- It provides examples of specters that, once stripped of their supernatural elements, can be drawn upon to discuss possible praxis of *becoming-ghosts* in the hypothetical.
- These ghosts not only haunt from the past but also the present and the future meaning that Scrooge is haunted by possibilities as well as what has already occurred.
- Of Dickens' four specters, only Jacob Marley fits the model of someone who has passed. Problematic given the other specters function like angels offering prophetic visions, this nonetheless is useful in breaking the link between ghosts and death outlined above.

To conclude the research note, this section sketches the supernatural meaning of each ghost in turn, before suggesting a materialist comparison, noting on the implications for workers *becoming-ghost* and haunting their managers through official or infra-political acts. This can be understood as a methodology – identifying the meaning of the haunting, theorising how this message could be conveyed without the supernatural and then transposing the result to the modern workplace.

It is worth noting that Dickens does not advocate systemic structural change but rather charity (e.g. ibid, p.11-14). When Scrooge gives Cratchit a pay increase, there is no structural adjustment implemented that will protect Cratchit should Scrooge later rescind his kindness (ibid, p.146). The Conservative MP Jacob Reece-Mogg's views on food banks serve as a reminder that charity can uphold the worst of the status-quo:

> [The state] provides a basic level of welfare … but on some occasions that will not work and to have charitable support given by people voluntarily to support their fellow citizens I think is rather uplifting and shows what a good compassionate country we are. (Peck, 2017)

Whilst it may be that ghosts haunting on the managerial scale are drawn towards solutions that mirror the logic of charity, the likelihood is that this issue is grounded in the types of demands made by ghosts as the conditions of their exorcism just as demands made of employers in other ways do not always consider necessary structural changes to build meaningful power in the workplace.

Jacob Marley

Marley is Scrooge's first visitor, a former business partner, 7 years dead (Dickens, 1915, p.11) with a chain "… of cash-boxes, keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds and heavy purses wrought in steel (ibid, p.23)". This chain was self-forged through the acts he prioritised in life. Marley's message is that man's nature is to travel and keep company with others in life - because his "...spirit never walked beyond our counting house (ibid, p.27)", he is doomed to wonder the earth as a witness who cannot intervene to alter the course of events (ibid, p.26).

Conceivably Marley does not have to be dead in order to impart his messages of regret at mis-prioritising his life (ibid, p.30) and call upon Scrooge to change the course of his (ibid, p.31); a materialist reading might find a long forgotten friend visiting who having come to the conclusion too late to alter his own life, begs Scrooge to do what he cannot. For the workplace, Marley's assertion that "the common welfare was my business (ibid, p.30)" implies a call to improve the conditions of employees that might manifest as a respected mentor appearing to point out the folly of his former apprentice's neglect of the workforce - *becoming-ghost* might mean facilitating and amplifying this psychologically haunting intervention or ensuring its memory is sustained.

Ghost of Christmas past

This specter, "...like a child... [but also] like an old man, viewed through some supernatural medium... from the crown of its head there sprang a bright clear jet of light..." (ibid, p.40)," reminds Scrooge of the ramifications of the past, both his own acts and those of others, such as the joy brought by his former master Fezziwig's (ibid, p.52) Christmas eve celebrations.

The ghost reminds Scrooge of a lost love - a "...fair girl in a mourning dress: in whose eyes there were tears.... (ibid, p.57)." His betrothed reproaches the younger-Scrooge for being taken over by "...the master passion, Gain..." that has "displaced" her in his affection (ibid, p.58). Here Scrooge turns to the ghost, distraught, asking: "Why do you delight to torture me? (ibid, p.61)" - the specter then of course shows him the painful vision of the girl older, with family (ibid, pp.61-64).

Stripped of the supernatural, other stimuli could prompt the recollection of the relationships dissolution - stumbling across old paperwork/photos for example. Transposed to the workplace, the soured romantic relationship is analogous with a soured professional relationship, such as a valued and respected member of staff broken by the manager's pursuit of profit. Here, *becoming-ghost* would mean engineering the stimuli that keep this mistake visible as a haunting reminder of past malpractice.

Ghost of Christmas present

The ghost of Christmas present is a "...jolly Giant, glorious to see; who bore a glowing torch, in a shape not unlike plenty's horn...". This ghost illuminates Christmas Eve in the present, shining a light upon what Scrooge cannot see because of the perspective offered by his own structural position.

Dickens describes at length the Christmas 'feast' Bob Cratchit:

> [They]...were not a handsome family... but they were happy, grateful, pleased with one another and contented with the time... (ibid, p.92).

It is when Cratchit toasts his manager that the scene briefly turns bitter, with Mrs Cratchit articulating the family's feelings for Scrooge:

> "It should be Christmas Day, I am sure... on which one drinks the health of such an odious, stingy, hard, unfeeling man... I'll drink his health for your sake and Day's... not for his. Long life to him!" (ibid, p.91).

Into this heady mix can also be factored the impending death of the youngest child, Tiny Tim (ibid, p.89).

A materialist version would involve uncovering true feelings via non-supernatural means, with Scrooge stumbling across these scenes through error. Transposed to the workplace, there are two elements to the vision presented to Scrooge - his employee's true feelings for him and the implications of his greed upon their family. This could be revealed via a conversation 'accidentally' engineered within ear shot or a 'miss-sent' email, where a manager's confidant is 'accidentally' CC'd. Minor acts of infra-political dissent also reveal true feelings behind a professional veneer – such as continually missing managers out of tea rounds. Engineering these haunting exchanges might also be understood as *becoming-ghost*.

Ghost of Christmas yet to come

This ghost "...was shrouded in a deep black garment, which concealed its head, its face, its form, and left nothing of it visible save one outstretched hand. (ibid, p.111)." Showing Scrooge a vision of the future, this specter demonstrates the notion of being haunted by a potential future.

This section focuses on the vision of the death of Scrooge - the paupers with such little regard for him that they stole his bed curtains and blankets from around his corpse (ibid, pp.121-122) and the lack of emotion from his contemporaries regarding his death and the corresponding lack of enthusiasm for attending his funeral (ibid, p.113-115). Removing the supernatural, a materialist version could hear Scrooge discover correspondence that reveals the lack of respect for him - or in perhaps a heated exchange, a confidant might exclaim prophetically that "if you continue to behave like this, no one will mourn your passing!"

Transposed to the workplace, retirement is a symbolic death from the position of the employer: the employee ceases to exist in terms of the labour that can be extracted from them. Thus, forewarning an unmourned passing is mirrored in a warning that a career will not be celebrated. *Becoming-ghost* might mean curating haunting evidence of this - at the more creative (albeit largely impractical) end, a 'rehearsal for retirement party' that no one turns up to except a photographer in order to show exactly how well regarded the manager is.

Conclusion

Like so many papers, this research note poses many new questions. Can a certain type of workplace struggle, pursued doggedly with little hope of real success, be understood as haunting? What does this reveal? What does it mean to haunt with without knowing that you are haunting, to engage in *becoming-ghost* without consciously doing so? What relationship do trade union ghosts have with the unofficial acts of specters engaged in infra-politics?

Shifting focus, the example of provided by Dickens shows how ghost stories could inspire acts of protest and resistance in the workplace. What would it mean though to consciously approach real-existing workplace issue in this way? What could a campaign run with a view to haunting an employer look like? What tactics to *becoming-ghost* would develop through struggle?

Answering these questions are beyond the scope of this paper, but since we are up at night anyhow trying to work out how to make rent, it doesn't hurt to think about why our employers might have sleepless nights too… happy haunting.

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About the author

Bert Lewis is a pseudonym of the colleague who smiles insincerely and you suspect has hidden your favourite work mug. You can contact them via *Interface*.

Book reviews: *Interface*, *9*(2)

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Books reviewed in this issue:

Donna Haraway, 2016, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*. Durham and London: Duke University Press (296 pp., paperback, $26.95)

Review author: Carolyn Elerding

Chris Robé, 2017, *Breaking the Spell: A History of Anarchist Filmmakers, Videotape Guerrillas, and Digital Ninjas*. Oakland, CA: PM Press (468 pp., paperback, $26.95)

Review author: Beth Geglia

Sharpe, Christina, 2016, *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being*. Duke: Duke University Press (192 pp., paperback, $22.95)

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Review author: Harry Warne

Book review: Donna J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*

Review author: Carolyn Elerding

Donna Haraway, 2016, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*. Durham and London: Duke University Press (296 pp., paperback, $26.95)

Leftists situated by social disadvantages have had many occasions to critique oppression sustained in the name of militancy, solidarity, or justice. Nevertheless, what Donna Haraway describes as “staying with the trouble” remains a far better strategy for radical change than giving up on one another. Nowhere is this difficulty better exemplified than by the aggressive disapprobation from former allies that Donna Haraway has endured with impressive magnanimity since publishing her famous “cyborg manifesto” in the mid-1980s (Haraway 1985). I will refrain from commenting on other reviews, even their strengths, such as the detailed accounts of the manifesto’s reception history many of them contain. Despite shrill opposition and the often challenging and idiosyncratic style of her writing, Haraway has continued to build an enthusiastic international readership.

As a graduate student, I began teaching science and technology studies (STS) and wrote an interdisciplinary dissertation about the materiality of digital media, technology, and culture. I soon discovered a strong resonance between Haraway’s understanding of “material semiotics” and the ecumenical materialism I had begun to develop through comparative readings of theorists such as Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Marxist and materialist feminists. It was my interest in intersectional feminist research on digital culture, such as Lisa Nakamura’s, that first guided me toward the queer and feminist new materialists with whom Haraway is frequently categorized. Similarly, through my participation in FemTechNet, an international cyberfeminist network of instructors interested in critical pedagogy, art, and STS, I learned of the impact of Haraway’s ideas in queer and feminist theory and practice across disciplines and movements. Another reason for my interest in Haraway is that, while many of her detractors invoke ultimatums, Haraway has never stopped including anti-capitalist argumentation, as well as references to Marx and Marxists, in her analyses. In other words, rather than draw lines in the sand, Haraway weaves webs (to indulge in a bit of respectful imitation of Haraway’s adeptness with metaphor).

Staying with the Trouble, Haraway’s most recent book, is best known for its contribution to debates surrounding the term “Anthropocene.” However, the book’s significance to the current era’s interlocking “urgencies,” to borrow Haraway’s characteristically precise term, is far more extensive (p. 37). These urgencies include racism, global inequality, patriarchy, cis- and heteronormativity, and damage to the biosphere, as well as the capitalist socioeconomic system that incentivizes all of the above. Providing a plenitude of intriguing and unforgettable examples, Haraway envisions staying with the trouble as nothing less than a comprehensive materialist theory and praxis for a multi-generational, multi-species, and global project of "ongoingness."

If potential connections with feminist traditions engaging social reproduction seem obvious, it should also be clear that Haraway's engagements with these currents constitute a queering and diversification of the meanings of reproducing society. At times, with Haraway's irreverent playfulness and refusal to sacrifice inquisitiveness and creativity to organizational or disciplinary belonging, she seems to dare readers to read less than generously. See, for instance recent claims that *Staying with the Trouble* implies a eugenics agenda when it raises the question of population control—this despite Haraway's prescient care in addressing these critiques (pp. 208-10). Haraway emphasizes that non-reproduction must remain a choice and primarily the responsibility of the privileged rather than the marginalized.

Haraway's sense of the temporality and spatiality of struggle facilitates her capacious generosity toward difference and disagreement, resulting in a politics of critical inclusion rather than antagonistic exclusion, a broadening rather than narrowing—but without losing the incisive emphasis on localized specificity as a basis for action (p. 131). In keeping with numerous currents in materialist and intersectional feminisms (some of them inspired by her own earlier works), Haraway has always and continues to insist upon situated foci and includes numerous case studies.

Haraway underscores the power of storytelling and other creative arts as ways of knowing and changing the world. Troping on Marilyn Strathern's words (*Reproducing the Future*, 10), Haraway writes: "It matters what thoughts think thoughts. It matters what knowledges know knowledges. It matters what relations relate relations. It matters what stories tell stories" (p. 35). Inspired by Ursula K. Le Guin's "carrier bag" theory of politicized storytelling (pp. 120-22), Haraway links her many ideas into a single flexible network: "SF: science fiction, speculative fabulation, string figures, speculative feminism, science fact, so far" (p. 2). Each iteration of SF presents a form of "becoming-with" by means of "rendering one another capable" through thinking and making (p. 96). On this basis, Haraway elaborates a mindful politics of learning to think and do in new ways and across species as well as cultural differences (pp. 12-14). Those seeking a formula, however, will be disappointed, since overall what Haraway formulates is an approach to formulating an approach.

Haraway's exceptional ability to master and connect numerous fields and disciplines aptly mirrors the interrelatedness and complexity of current challenges to the flourishing of life. However, this quality in Haraway's work also presents a great difficulty, even for well-prepared and highly motivated readers. Haraway's interdisciplinary acumen and ability to think in so many different ways reflect her extraordinary path through the North American academic system. Yet, also for these reasons, *Staying with the Trouble* contains something for nearly every reader. Deploying a variety of media and styles in multiple registers, the book speaks to long-term activists and theorists, the newly politicized, and those returning to activism, as well as to Haraway's dedicated readership and those new to her notoriously challenging prose.

Haraway illustrates her conceptualization of material semiotics with numerous examples, including works of visual art, as well as a new development in Haraway's writing, her own science fiction storytelling (so as not to ruin the effect of "The Camille Stories," I will avoid sharing particulars). Both new and experienced readers of Haraway should consider starting with the final chapter, "The Camille Stories: Children of Compost." I recommend beginning at the bottom of Page 143 where Haraway's science fiction story starts, rather than with the opening sections of the chapter in which she details the project's provenance. For newcomers, the more theoretical overview of the major ideas presented in the Introduction will prove much more amenable with the science fiction story in mind. For others, engaging with Haraway's literary experiment will illuminate the significant expansions contained in this book relative to previous publications.

Readers interested in Haraway primarily as a theorist of epistemology (ways of thinking, learning, and knowing) may wish to turn first to the short essay "Making Kin: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene," as it prismatically engages each major theoretical point in the book. "Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene" and "Sympoiesis: Symbiogenesis and the Lively Arts of Staying with the Trouble" would also make effective starting points for epistemologists. These two sizeable chapters of previously unpublished theoretical material explore examples and potentialities of SF through an epistemological strategy Haraway describes as "tentacular thinking," closely related to the biological process of "becoming-with" or "symbiogenesis." Haraway also uses the term "sympoiesis" for its more cultural implications. However, her refusal to divide natureculture and the phrase "material semiotics" demonstrates the limited usefulness in her work of drawing too fine a distinction between the biological and the cultural. More importantly, it suggests the interpretive power of recognizing their mutual imbrication. In the interest of this epistemological politics, Haraway delineates her case for replacing, or at least augmenting, the controversial but now ubiquitous term "Anthropocene" with "Chthulucene": "To renew the biodiverse powers of terra is the sympoietic work and play of the Chthulucene. Specifically, unlike either the Anthropocene or the Capitalocene, the Chthulucene is made up of ongoing multispecies stories and practices of becoming-with in times that remain at stake, in precarious times in which the world is not finished and the sky has not fallen—yet" (p. 55). It is difficult, not to mention unsatisfying, to redact Haraway's phraseology.

To even the most skeptical, *Staying with the Trouble* will at least provide opportunities for valuable thought experiments, and for many it offers much more.

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About the review author

Carolyn Elerding is a recent PhD teaching on culture, media, and technology in the NYC area. A recipient of the Sprinker essay prize, Elerding's research and criticism is published in journals including *Postmodern Culture*, *Mediations*, *Reviews in Cultural Theory*, and soon, *Communication, Culture & Critique* and *First Monday*. Elerdinc AT tcnj.edu

Book review: Chris Robé, *Breaking the Spell: A History of Anarchist Filmmakers, Videotape Guerrillas, and Digital Ninjas*

Review author: Beth Geglia

Chris Robé, 2017, *Breaking the Spell: A History of Anarchist Filmmakers, Videotape Guerrillas, and Digital Ninjas*. Oakland, CA: PM Press (468 pp., paperback, $26.95)

I read most of Robé's *Breaking the Spell: A History of Anarchist Filmmakers, Videotape Guerrillas, and Digital Ninjas* on a couch in a DC WeWork. A friend of mine had a membership and routinely gave me access to the shared workspace, a place where young freelancers, consultants, startups, and NGO workers estranged from office spaces encounter some semblance of community by working silently next to one another and enjoying the occasional free happy hour, networking event, or music show. As I read, the walls around me displayed multicolored motivational posters, one with the word "HUSTLE", another lining the wall across from me with the words "You are good, do better."

I mention the WeWork space because it is but one of many manifestations of a decollectivized, neoliberal work world, in which filmmakers, media strategists, and digital campaigners currently partake. In this neoliberal era where media work has joined the contours of the increasingly atomized "gig economy" (De Stefano 2015), and of an NGO-ized civil society resting evermore on contingent labor and self-branding, Robé calls on us to explore a history of alternative, anarchist-inflected media organizing strategies. *Breaking the Spell*, however, is as much a history of such media movements as it is a theoretical reflection on the changing nature of work, deindustrialization, neoliberalism, and the emergence of "new anarchism" (pp. 6).

The book begins by establishing the important role that media production takes in a neoliberal context. As capitalism seeks out new frontiers of accumulation, it increasingly encroaches on every aspect of life, even subjectivity itself. Thus, Robé approaches neoliberalism not as a set of pro-market policies but, at its core, as a remaking of the "self" under a capitalist vision. It is here where media activism, when done effectively, can deconstruct the neoliberal subjectivity imposed by corporate and mainstream media.

Breaking the Spell maps media activism onto the history of neoliberal transformation 1960s-present, including that of labor relations and the nature of work. This mapping is congruent with Robé's argument that media production is itself labor, and therefore it can either mirror the dominant social relations of production of the time or resist them. Robé essentially *defetishizes* the film, TV, and multimedia works he analyses by interrogating the race, class, gender, and power hierarchies embedded in the organization of their inception, production, distribution, and consumption. When viewed as a holistic process, we see that new subject formation takes place not just as the point of consumption (viewing), but that collective subjectivities can be fostered through every stage of the process. Taking a nuanced look at the various ideological sub-currents of anarchist-inflected social movements, Robé points to grey areas in which neoliberal ideology and new anarchism have dangerously overlapped. Thus he stresses the importance of critical socio-historical analysis of such anarchist practices in order to avoid the reproduction of neoliberal subjectivities.

Breaking the Spell begins in the 1960s with Third Cinema, an "anticolonial politicized approach to filmmaking" (pp. 16) that emerged internationally in the 1960s and has since inspired generations of activist filmmakers. In Third Cinema, film was used to critique oppressive structures while converting the spectator audience into an agentive collective with newfound consciousness. Robé discusses Patricio Guzman's *The Battle of Chile* as foundational to the genre, as well as to Chile's collective memory, class consciousness, and historical grappling post Pinochet dictatorship. He then moves to Detroit to tell the story of the making of *Finally Got the News* (FGtN) by the League of Revolutionary Black Workers. A fraught process between white activist filmmakers and black auto worker unionists complicates our understanding of Third Cinema, as Robé uses the example of FGtN to tease out the politics of participation, voice, and representation both in the movements surrounding these documentaries and the documentaries themselves.

The book proceeds chronologically to examine influential anarchist-influenced media projects through a similarly critical lens. Robé traces the rise of "video guerrillas" who attempted to use low powered television to claim an alternative space within cable TV. He focuses on the groups Videofreex and Top Value Television (TVTV) to look at the anarchist-leaning decision making structures that coexisted with the appropriation of new technology, as well as the factors that influenced TVTV's gradual absorption into commercial broadcast television. Robé then moves to the environmental and alter-globalization movement of the 1990s/ 2000s. He links the rise of the internet as a platform for new decentralized media hubs with the systematic dismantling of alternative video in the 1980s, which stemmed from the Reagan administration's defunding of public TV and the subsequent privatization and commodification of communication. He compares eco-video activists in the Pacific Northwest with Indymedia to look at how both groups used open-access websites to foster solidarity, while perhaps overvaluing the individual at the expense of collective process and collaboration.

Particularly interesting is Robé's chapter on ACT UP titled "Testing the Limits," which explores the radical anti-AIDS campaigns of the 1980's. Here, Robé shows how the combination of spectacle-based media and direct action as a protest tactic helped move the private domain, the body (and illness), to the social domain. Access to healthcare and state neglect became questions of life and death. By deploying their own media, anti-AIDS activists were able to effectively puncture mainstream coverage of the epidemic and highlight homophobia and racism as central to the inequalities in care. Meanwhile, the embodied use of direct action tactics challenged the media's portrayal of HIV-inflicted bodies as sick, degenerate, and helpless. As Robé puts it:

> If we accept Autonomous Marxism's belief that subjectivity itself became a key terrain of struggle as capitalism increasingly infringed upon it, AIDS video activism dramatically highlights the centrality of where bodies converge with the means of communication over such fights (pp. 123).

In this discussion, Robé is able to celebrate the merits of spectacle-based media and consensus-based direct action while balancing this with a critique of "image events" that continues on through the rest of his case studies. Later, Robé laments how the low-resourced, rapid production of movement material risked feeding into a "riot porn" genre that fetishized confrontational tactics and rendered long-term organizing invisible. Ultimately this material energized only the left and failed to provide a counter-narrative to the broader public. As an alternative to that tendency toward self-satisfying, insular media, Robé discusses SmartMeme and a broader shift towards the production of viral internet content for mass consumption, although he ultimately criticizes such tactics for their "new age feel" (pp. 285), repurposing of corporate marketing tools, and lack of historical material analysis.

Another recurring tension identified in *Breaking the Spell* is the use of horizontal structures and unpaid labor in the production of film. While rooted in anti-capitalist ideology, Robé admits that when these occurred, they often reproduced the privileges and hierarchies of access to participation from the outside world. For example, those with the means to engage in time consuming and unpaid media production were often white males. While groups often saw the use of unpaid labor as either a material necessity or a rejection of the non-profit industrial complex (reliance on grant funding), and the alienation of wage labor, Robé argues that such practices overlap with neoliberal trends toward increasingly unpaid work. He highlights how later models, such as Canada's Media Co-op (MC) sought to remedy this dynamic by adopting an "own your media" mantra in which consumers became stakeholders in their own alternative media and collectively sustained its production by hiring paid staff. However, the inability of the MC to provide fair and adequate compensation for its contributors ultimately contributed to its near-collapse.

Robé closes *Breaking the Spell* by highlighting the work of a series of contemporary media collectives, including Philadelphia's network-based Media Mobilizing Project (MMP); Mobile Voices (VozMob) a mobile phone app developed for and with day laborers in Los Angeles; Outta Your Backpack Media, an Indigenous youth-led media organization in Arizona, and other groups that maintain a strong focus on skill-sharing and working-class capacity building. While not perfect, these groups provide examples where participation and access took precedent and were more effectively distributed across racial and economic lines.

In *Breaking the Spell*, Robé provides a unique contribution to both social movement history and media studies by combining detailed analysis of the audio-visual material itself with an ethnographic analysis of those who made it. The case studies at times seem disjointed, and the reader could benefit from a stronger theoretical thread connecting them throughout. It is not until the final chapter, in discussing a more individualized media agent, the "video ninja" does Robé re-enter into a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of various strains of anarchist politics.

Nonetheless, *Breaking the Spell* re-groups at the end to draw important conclusions to be considered by the world's future media makers. First, he argues that we must interrogate the limitations of anarchist-inflected practices in achieving media production by and for marginalized and oppressed groups. Such organizing models fail to recognize the "significant amount of cultural, political, and economic capital required to engage in… consensus decision-making and aggressive direct action protests" (pp. 406). Likewise, more "lifestyle activism" forms of anarchist practices might feel exclusionary to the communities being targeted for outreach, and women are often disenfranchised (work becomes gendered) when such spaces lack a feminist analysis.

Second, Robé concludes that media activists must study past movements to weigh the importance of aesthetics versus content. He warns against a glorification of commercialized aesthetics, noting that these do not necessarily translate into mass distribution and are less easily produced by lower-resourced communities. Instead, activists should not discount or undervalue media as an *internal* tool for movement education and networking. When we allow media to act as a central nervous system to our movements, it can foster solidarity, coalition-building, mutual support, and collective consciousness. Finally, Robé stresses the importance of process in media making over that of quality of output. As case studies have shown throughout, the process of organizing labor and resources around media production is itself a site of counter-hegemonic struggle, of individual and community empowerment, and of forging new subjectivities.

Perhaps missing from the end of Robé's long foray into the history of anarchist-inflected filmmaking as a counter power to neoliberalism is further discussion of new media movements' reliance on social media sites for distribution. While touched upon in his discussion of Occupy's shortcomings, Robé neglects an important point that he himself makes early on, and that is central to our understanding of neoliberal media consolidation. Beyond a simple concentration of mainstream media in few private hands, Robé notes that the proliferation of social media marks a transformative moment in the relationship between media and capitalism. He states:

> Capital's harnessing of profitability from subjectivity itself can be no better exemplified than by the rise of social media, where users become both content producers and consumers. Corporate entities provide platforms where users dedicate untold numbers of hours producing and consuming content, distributing information, and willfully disclosing critical personal information to third-party providers. Leisure and work conflate as production and consumption radically converge…" (pp. 10)

We are left to ask how alternatively-produced media can be distributed and consumed outside of platforms that generate massive corporate profits and capture surplus value from the work of media activists.

Breaking the Spell provides an expansive and detailed history of media activism bound to interest and inspire anyone engaged in movement media today. This history demonstrates the rich diversity of tactics employed by collectives to respond to and organize against the particular political, economic, ideological, and technological configurations of the time. His work is not meant to provide definitive answers as to which strategies worked and which did not, nor propose a one-size fits all solution, but instead to interrogate each method, each form of organizing, against the backdrop of larger movement dynamics; gender, race, and class hierarchies; and capitalist modes of production. Beyond the quest for media strategies that are simply politically effective, Robé challenges movements to ask ourselves: how are we organizing media in line with anti-neoliberal praxis? Ultimately, *Breaking the Spell* provides contemporary media warriors with tools to more deeply interrogate our current work.

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About the review author

Beth Geglia is a filmmaker and a PhD candidate in anthropology at American University, where she researches new corporate enclaves in Honduras and incorporates documentary film into both research and activism. Prior, she studied documentary film at Duke University's Center for Documentary Studies. She is co-director of the feature length film *Revolutionary Medicine: A Story of the First Garifuna Hospital*, and has produced short films with grassroots groups in the U.S. and Central America. bgeglia AT gmail.com

Book review: Christina Sharpe, *In the Wake*

Review author: Shannon Walsh

Sharpe, Christina, 2016, *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being*. Duke: Duke University Press (192 pp., paperback, $22.95)

It took me some time to write about this book. What words can I use to explain it, to comment on it? The effect (and affect) of its reading was such that it left me wanting to reinvent language, to find a new way to speak and to write. It forced me to see the language we have as inadequate, partial, always already corrupted. The poetry that Christina Sharpe brings to this work is not a formalist consideration, a writer's flourish. It is a necessity. A way to describe something that sits outside the way the world we share is expressed, but that has not been truly addressed. In her experimentation she attempts to describe what has been omitted, cast out, negated.

Her journey in the book begins in pain. Sharpe minces no words and does not attempt to hide the personal place that *In the Wake* emerges from. But the personal is used as a facet through which to view the structures of violence and antiblackness that describe Black life in America. She begins the book with stories of a series of deaths of people close to her, and their reverberations in her family and herself. These stories anchor what is to follow, keeping the reader tethered to the very real stakes for Black people in America. The stories remind and insist that theorizing is an urgent task, a way to make sense through the maze that so often tells Black people to move on, get over it, give up. Sharpe forcefully makes a case for why we, all of us, are still in the wake of slavery. Being in the *wake* for Black people, within a time of ongoing antiblackness, is being in the present. "In the wake, the past that is not past reappears, always, to rupture the present" (9).

Sharpe plays with words, turns them over like shards of glass, like the fragments in *Hanging Fire (suspected Arson)*, the Cornelia Parker image that adorns the cover of the book. Parker's image is an explosion of what looks like burned fragments, a disintegration, held together by wires in suspension. A still life of something alive and yet immobile, held, stuck. Similarly, Sharpe's language is a continual dissembling, a falling apart and reconstructing. "A mother slaps a child; the guards yell, hit, and pull; language falls apart" (69).

How to write in the wake of everyday violence, of a history of slavery, of things that do not disappear, even if we will them to, if we want them to? We are surrounded by ongoing antiblackness; it is as foundational as the air we breathe. Antiblackness is as alive as ever, and Sharpe makes a stunningly strong argument for why we are in the wake of the slave ship, still in the hold. Antiblackness is the weather. It is the hurricane. It is the flood.

Sharpe ties together past and present, doubling, revealing and re-imaging the past into the present. We are there in 2013 on the boat with refugees, in 2010 on the streets with Eric Garner as he gasps, "I can't breathe." Moments colliding. Time's arrow, from the past to the present, all lived at once, overlapped and superimposed. What others have called the fungibility of Black life, Sharpe calls its "killability" (35). She writes of the *Zong*, a slave ship full of abducted Africans on its way to Jamaica, where black bodies were thrown overboard in a sick economics which could claim them as 'goods' for insurance, a sacrifice deemed acceptable for the insurance payouts it would make. Objects outside the realm of the so-called Human. Sharpe insists, echoing Black Lives Matter activists, that these lives be seen, heard, acknowledged. That we say their names. Then, as now. Sandra Bland. Trayvon Martin. Michael Brown. Philando Castile. And on, and on and on.

In the Wake is also a jazz ballad of references to contemporary Black intellectuals, building, playing, singing, vibrating against the work of Frank Wilderson III, Hortense Spillers, Fred Moten, Joy James, Saidiya Hartman. Dialogues, conversations almost, with these thinkers vibrate through the pages. Sharpe rejoins scholars who attempt to disentangle antiblackness and "our abjection from the realm of the human" by looking "at current quotidian disasters in order to ask what, if anything, survives this insistent Black exclusion, this ontological negation, and how do literature, performance, and visual culture observe and mediate this un/survival" (14).

The wake is the afterlife of slavery, it is what is left behind in the cumulative deaths of Black people, it is the wake of being awake, of being aware, a state of wakefulness; it is life in the wake of disaster and the mess created by racialized poverty and precarity; attending to wake as vigil, of watching over the dead. Sharpe suggests "…rather than seeking a resolution to blackness's ongoing and irresolvable abjection, one might approach Black being in the wake as a form of *consciousness*" (14).

In the Wake demands to be read by those interested in ways to understand ongoing racial inequality and antiblackness that permeates the world we live it. It demands of us to look again, awake, with fresh eyes, and to sit (in wake) with the discomfort of a world that is still in the wake of slavery and antiblackness.

About the review author

Dr. Shannon Walsh is a filmmaker and theorist who has written and directed three feature documentary films, which have screened in cinemas, museums, and over 60 film festivals around the world. Walsh is an assistant professor in the Department of Theatre and Film at UBC. Contact email shannon.walsh AT ubc.ca

Book Review: Robbie Shilliam, *The Black Pacific*

Review Author: Lewis B.H. Eliot

Robbie Shilliam, 2015, *The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections*. London: Bloomsbury (251 pages; $21.99)

In *The Black Pacific,* Robbie Shilliam offers a thought provoking examination of relationships between previously colonized peoples in the former British Empire. Shilliam uses an ethnographic description of a 1979 Te Hãpua (ceremonial Māori greeting) performed for a London-based Rastafari band and theater troupe when on tour in New Zealand as a point of departure for his analysis. From here, Shilliam poses two principle questions: How does a meeting between formerly colonized, yet otherwise completely unconnected, groups resonate with the two parties? And why are such rituals so rarely engaged with, both academically and among the broader public?

In approaching these questions, Shilliam presents four aims for *The Black Pacific*. He first explores the possibilities of analyzing connections and solidarity between colonized groups beyond the paradigms formed by the colonizers themselves. Second, Shilliam seeks to place Africa and Africans further towards the center of anti-colonial struggle globally. His third aim is to underline the fact that all European colonization was based on “super-exploitation” of local labor forces specifically for white mercantile gain. Finally, the author argues that the colonial oppressed are bound by a “deep relationship” not associated with geographical distinction, race, or “sociological hue” (pg. 2).

Although one of Shilliam’s goals is to increase engagement with post-colonial studies among the non-academic community, he does make two historiographical points central to his thesis. He takes aim at subalternism for being both insufficiently specific and for collapsing itself into post-structuralism in a way that avoids understanding global democratization as the contemporary guise of white power. Then, as the title suggests, Shilliam pushes against Paul Gilroy’s *Black Atlantic* thesis for silencing Africans in Africa. Indeed, Shilliam argues that anti-colonial struggles actively referenced Africa “as part of a global infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity” (pg. 10).

For the most part *The Black Pacific* is structured chronologically. The bulk of the analysis is focused on New Zealand (referred to throughout by its Māori name Aotearoa) and examines the impact on native peoples of cultural discourse emanating from Africa and those of African descent throughout the world. The book’s first chapter focuses on how to relate narratives that link disparate colonial peoples outside the structures of the imperial machine, a process Shilliam refers to as the creation of ‘deep relationship’ – connections beyond “the cause-and-effect laws of manifest domain” (pg. 15).

Chapters two and three focus on cultural politics. The second chapter concentrates on Māori youth adopting Black Power rhetoric in the struggle for native recognition in the region. This is an important development as it not only underlines the deep relationship between two colonized peoples, but also because it publicly decimated the assumption that Aotearoa was exceptional among settler societies in its “enjoyment of racial harmony" (pg. 36). The third chapter examines the permeation of the hardline racial ideology inspired by Black Power beyond the Māori to other Pacifika groups – immigrants to Aotearoa from throughout the Pacific – and into national political discourse. Here Shilliam points to the South African national rugby team's 1981 tour to Aotearoa. The South African team – known universally as the Springboks – was, as per apartheid laws, white only. Much debate in Aotearoa at the time centered on whether the rights of non-white South Africans were at all comparable to those of Pacifika peoples. The public airing of this debate finally ended any narrative of New Zealander exceptionalism among former British colonies.

The next three chapters examine the role of colonial religion in the context of deep relationship among colonized groups in the British Empire. Chapter four explores the role of the Christian church in black liberation theology. While, by Shilliam's definition, subaltern, he does note that Pacifika churches proved as willing to engage with Black Power rhetoric as their congregations and lay activist groups. Chapter five delves deeper into the connections between non-European churches and native religious beliefs through close analysis of theological imagery and iconography. Shilliam points to the importance of shared ancestral connections as a corollary for blackness when engaging with the African diaspora. The sixth chapter makes these connections still more explicit by thoroughly analyzing indigenous Aotearoan relationship with Rastafari. Shilliam makes reference to the generational aspect of these deep relationships – those that supported Black Power in Aotearoa in the 1960s and 1970s disapproved of Rastafari's close relationship with reggae music and ganja smoking. Much of Rastafari's appeal lay in its ideology of colonial restitution, an important subject among Pacifika peoples.

The following chapters of *The Black Pacific* focus on the role of native religion in the generation of deep relationships across colonized groups. The seventh chapter discusses creolization, in particular the marriage of Christian and Māori traditions of prophecy. Shilliam argues that the domination of Māori prophetic tradition over its Christian counterpart created an "anti-colonial connectivity that has been retrieved from the spiritual hinterlands" (pg. 147). Chapter eight examines inter-religious connections, this time between Māori and Rastafari spiritual traditions. It is here that Shilliam makes his most explicit conclusions regarding the realities of deep relationship. The author argues that both religious traditions represent a distinct rejection of colonial authority and therefore warrant combined analysis as specific anti-colonial ideologies as well as religions in their own right independent of politics.

The Black Pacific's final chapter, where Shilliam's writing is certainly the most passionate, represents a stinging rebuke to "colonial science" (pg. 172). This refers to the knowledge gathering practices of European colonizers throughout the world, approaches to knowledge that were ultimately utilitarian and so often downplayed or completely ignored many aspects of colonized cultures and societies, instead focussing on the ways in which colonizers could best benefit imperial interests. Shilliam argues that colonial science – which only attentive to "endless accumulation" of knowledge without thought to connections between disparate information – ignores the significant Pacific slave trade that operated between Oceania and Africa (pg. 174-6). The relative silence in the academic canon concerning this trade, known as blackbirding, is, as Shilliam concludes, a significant justification a wholesale rejection of colonial scientific practices, including subaltern approaches to analysis, in favor of newer methodologies including the highlighting of deep relationships.

Of the four contributions that *The Black Pacific* aims to make to post-colonial literature, three are certainly achieved. Shilliam has done a sterling job of presenting the details of Māori struggles for recognition in the second half of the twentieth century, extended the accepted boundaries for the African Diaspora well into the Pacific World, and made still clearer the reality that European imperialism was, at its core, a racist exercise. Shilliam calls for the academy to work harder to identify anti-imperial connectivity among colonized communities, specifically by rejecting the "privileged narcissism" of universities' ivory towers. Unfortunately, it is here that Shilliam's work is at its weakest. While an academic audience may have no trouble reading and understanding this book, for a lay audience the jargon is too heavy, and many of the themes would require a widely read audience to fully appreciate them. Those who are familiar with the works of Georges-Louis LeClerc or Carl Linnaeus, would find Shilliam's issues with colonial science accessible and poignant. Non-academic readers, however, may find *The Black Pacific* hard-going. This is not to say that those without advanced academic training should shy away. The arguments made here make Shilliam worth reading despite this potential difficulty.

In an otherwise fascinating book, one concern stands out, this one regarding methodology. Much of the analysis in *The Black Pacific* concerns connections between Black Power ideology, Rastafari spiritualism, and the Māori rights movement. Irrespective of any commonality of experience, it is common language – English – that facilitates initial contact so that they can share those familiarities. Given that English is the language of the oppressor, the connections here are surely subaltern and this therefore somewhat weakens Shilliam's advocacy for modes of analysis that eschew any connection between imperial powers and colonized communities.

These are, however, minor concerns in an otherwise beautifully written, acerbic, and important post-colonial analysis that raises many pertinent issues regarding the post-imperial legacies of formerly colonized communities. That such groups continue to feel and resist the painful effects of domination by Europeans and those of European descent makes Shilliam's work an important study for most scholars of the humanities. Sociologists and anthropologists will appreciate the maverick theoretical paradigms in which he works, as well as his use of ethnographic and observational sources. Historians will be interested in the author's rejection of subalternism and thereby offer up fresh pathways into the historical analysis of colonized groups.

About the review author

Lewis B.H. Eliot is a PhD Candidate in History and Presidential Fellow at the University of South Carolina. He received a BA in History and Ethnomusicology from the School of Oriental African Studies (2012) and an MA in Modern History from Queen's University, Belfast (2013). His research focuses on the impact of anti-slavery rhetoric on those of African descent in the Atlantic World in the nineteenth-century. leliot AT email.sc.edu

Book review: Ingeborg Gaarde, *Peasants negotiating a global policy space*

Review author: Maria Vasile

Ingeborg Gaarde, 2017, *Peasants negotiating a global policy space - La Via Campesina in the Committee on World Food Security*. Oxon: Routledge (212 pp., hardcover, £85)

Since the post-war era, food production, distribution and access have become transborder matters and food governance takes place across local, national, regional and global levels (Margulis and Duncan 2015). At global level, a multitude of institutions, actors, norms and power relations emerged and are shaping decision-making on agriculture and food matters. In this context, rural social movements (together with other non-state actors) are increasingly participating to international policy consultations and negotiations, putting forward rural people's knowledge and opinions on global political arenas (Duncan 2015). Many of these movements call for a shift away from neoliberal globalisation, a change in agriculture and food policies and advocating for alternative values and practices to transform the dominant agricultural model.

Peasants negotiating a global policy space - La Via Campesina in the Committee on World Food Security by Ingeborg Gaarde is an important contribution to research exploring how social movements launch into different levels of activism, engaging in global politics, while continuing to partake in local and national struggles. By looking at the international peasant movement *La Vía Campesina*, the author challenges dominant theories of social movement institutionalisation, predicting that social movements' access to institutions and internationalisation results in processes of centralisation, bureaucratisation, de-radicalisation and cooptation (e.g. Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004).

More particularly, Gaarde analyses how *La Vía Campesina* creates a space for small-scale producers and other rural people to participate in UN global policy-making processes related to food and nutrition security, namely the 2009 reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS). By analysing how the members of *La Vía Campesina* organise their participation in practice, she argues that the movement managed to develop complementary local-global strategies, and that internationalisation allowed for greater consolidation both in terms of cross-border alliances and internal linkages.

The reform of the CFS is of historic significance for the direct participation of producers and other rural people constituencies in transnational food and agriculture governance (Brem-Wilson 2015). It allowed civil society to engage in the Committee as official participants (and no longer as observers) and established a body facilitating the consultation and participation of global civil society, the International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism (CSM). *La Vía Campesina* played a key role in the design of the CSM and its methodologies, contributing to build a diverse, autonomous and self-organised arena. The CSM is described as

> A strategic space where power analyses are made, where both strategy and tactics are discussed and decided. In the CSM space, civil society actors engaging in the CFS seek to develop their own - to use Tarrow's (1998) term - 'action repertoires', ranging from debate to confrontation (Gaarde 2017, p.73)

By combining fieldwork and theoretical explorations, Gaarde analyses how *La Vía Campesina* organises to take part in the CFS discussions. The movement is both an actor and an arena, as it is composed of heterogeneous member organisations representing peasants, small and medium-size farmers, landless people, indigenous people, among others. The author elaborates on the evolution and consolidation of the movement and points out the importance of their common framework for action (originated around the concept of food sovereignty), not only for holding members together (by defining common language and identity), but also to ensure consistency between the different struggles with which they challenge the dominant neoliberal model of food production and consumption, both at local and global level.

Among other characteristics and practices of the movement described in the book, it is interesting to point out the relevance given to decentralised and participatory decision-making in practice. For the CSM, the movement encourages all members to share their different experiences and raise their concerns in the UN arena. To do so in a functional manner, the members of *La Vía Campesina* take forward processes of continuous dialogue and preparation with their grassroots constituencies, internal strategizing and evaluation, and alliance building.

These characteristics do not render the participation to global policy arenas simple and often conflict with the praxis, rhythms and language used in the UN context (for example, in relation to language barriers, the author expands on the crucial role of CFS interpreters). Similarly to what happens in local participatory governance arenas, social movements' members often need to adapt to prevailing mode of communication and norms, which correspond to persistent barriers to effective participation. That is why, Gaarde explains, the social movement battle is not only to influence the output of ongoing discussions but also to fight for the right of people for democratic control and effective participation, characterised by rules and norms that address structural power gaps. In this context, the authors depicts the CSM as a laboratory for social movement engaging in formal political spaces, "an antagonist arena, with room for disagreement, conflict and confrontational politics" (Gaarde 2017, p. 88).

Overall, the book represents an important contribution to literature on global food security governance but also on grassroots movements' engagement in policy-making processes more generally. By reporting on the ways in which *La Vía Campesina* links local struggles to a global policy space, Gaarde provides a comprehensive analysis of challenges and synergies arising from peasant's engagement in multi-site governance. These synergies are important both for internal reflexivity and strengthening of the movement, as well as for advocating for enhanced democratic control in governance arenas. Above all, such participation is beneficial for improving the general quality of discussions and achievements in the policy space.

Gaarde's study is also a methodology lesson on how to analyse social movements, as she reports on innovative research methods, discusses the difficulty of getting close to rural activists and the importance of trust building. Based on her experience, the author invites us to further reflect on potential and challenges of scholar-activist relations for producing knowledge in favour of social movements' struggles.

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About the review author

Maria Vasile is a consultant in social protection at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, where she supports the thematic priorities related to *Expansion of coverage and scale-up of social protection to rural areas* and *Social protection and resilience.* She also researches on food governance and grassroots organizing. Mrvasile AT gmail.com

Book Review: Signifying Black Radicalism: Reading Black Lives Matter in the Wake of Trump

Review author: Andrew Kettler

Wesley Lowery, 2017, *They Can't Kill Us All: The Story of Black Lives Matter*. London: Penguin Books (248 pp; £9.99).

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, 2016, *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation*. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books (270 pp; $17.95).

Christopher J. Lebron, 2017, *The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History of an Idea*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press (187 pp; $27.95).

I write as the torches of Charlottesville still smolder. I hope that as you read that signifier has not been misplaced by the irrational rapidity and perpetual neurosis of the Trumpian news cycle. Because Charlottesville, like Ferguson and Cleveland, like Charleston and Baltimore, should be consistently evoked, so as not to be pushed aside by the constant drudgery of living under a rhetorically manipulative demagogue and his fatuous proclamations of Heritage, History, and the Rule of Law. I therefore also write against the causes of Charlottesville, the alt-right white nationalism that was born of internet misogyny and irrational fears of globalization. This review essay is not objective, as it stems from a place rational enough to understand that objectivity can never be neutral, especially in a time when protecting the memory of the treasonous Confederacy has become a legitimate and romanticized discourse for covetous American politicians.

The task at hand is to review three recent works on the emergence of Black Lives Matter within the American political spectrum. The actions that inspired the three books under review occurred during the Obama presidency, prior to the 2016 election, an electoral process that created freshly racist discourses through both subversive dog whistles and conscious internet amplifiers. The central challenge of this review essay is therefore temporal, pushing through the impracticality of judging three works that all ended with the hope of Black Lives Matter in the summer of 2016, before a nationalist challenge to identity politics created the present conditions of the racialized American public sphere.

The three books reviewed here offer explanatory potency to questions of racial violence. As an introductory list to the tragedies of recent American race relations, the works reviewed inform discussions related to: the police killing of Oscar Grant in Oakland on New Year’s Day in 2009, the martyrdom of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida in February of 2012, the killing of Jordan Davis in Jacksonville during November of 2012, the strangulation of Eric Garner by police in New York City in July of 2014, the police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri on August 9, 2014, the shooting death of Tamir Rice on

November 22, 2014 in Cleveland, protests following the death of Freddie Gray in police custody in Baltimore of April 2015, the slaying of Walter Scott that same month, the slaughter of parishioners in nearby Charleston on June 17, 2015, the ignorant policing that led to the death of Sandra Bland in the next month, and thousands of other cases, too many to name, of similar racial injustices against African Americans during both everyday traffic stops and more violent law enforcement encounters.

Wesley Lowery's *They Can't Kill Us All: The Story of Black Lives Matter* (2017) is a journalist's summary of the emergence of Black Lives Matter, from the roots of the movement during the trial of George Zimmerman, through the rage in St. Louis, and into the tumultuous role Black Lives Matter played in the racial protests that followed police action in Baltimore and Cleveland. Lowery, a journalist at the *Washington Post* who released an earlier version of this work under the title *They Can't Kill Us All: Ferguson, Baltimore, and a New Era in America's Racial Justice Movement* (2016), explores the racial and social contours of Black Lives Matter through interviews with key actors in the movement. The work searches how the crusade sprang outward from deep inequality through interpersonal stories about the men and women who made the movement on the ground. The search here is for emotionality, to connect the reader with the human experience of feeling racial injustice as tacit knowledge, rubber bullets, and deadly force.

Lowery begins his narrative with a distanced reading of the arrest of Michael Brown as representative of the racialized structures of American policing. Lowery continues with what reads as an admission. His own life, sailing in Boston Harbor and writing about Northeastern politics, had sheltered the writer from the deep racial divides boiling within the country. But when Lowery entered Ferguson in August of 2014, that shielded cognizance drifted away, as residents engaged the young writer with constant stories of racial violence and corrupt policing. The great awakening of Lowery is portrayed as similar to the arousal of Black America at large, especially those citizens who tried to participate in Obama era post-racialism, even as black communities continued to be destroyed by racialized economic structures and African American bodies faced increased police violence.

They Can't Kill Us All summarizes the protests of Ferguson and examines how they spread through the potency of social networks. Exploring the role of networking in the making of the initial Ferguson protests, Lowery draws parallels between Ferguson and the false rumors that created the 1935 Harlem Riot. However, Ferguson was not created out of a fabricated anecdote, but through a series of injustices that residents proclaimed for decades, which only came to a culminating frenzy against increasingly militarized police forces in the days after Michael Brown's death. Lowery analyzes organizational activity in August, September, and October of 2014 as a process that awaited the coming moment of a possible indictment of corrupt law enforcement and the fires in St. Louis streets when prosecution did not come.

Lowery continues with a history of the killing of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice by a police officer in Cleveland. Through relationships with other journalists, Lowery searches the deep divides of Cuyahoga County through a reading of the racial and statistical history of the Cleveland Police Department and anecdotes from Lowery's college experiences living near the city. He summarizes these roots of Black Lives Matter in the depths of social media movements started by Alicia Garza, Opal Tometi, and Patrisse Cullors, and the spread of Black Lives Matter ideas due to figures like DeRay Mckesson, Shaun King, and Feminista Jones. Ferguson and Cleveland led increasing amounts of Black Americans to conclude that the post-racial goals of the Obama Presidency did not mean that black lungs could not be tear-gassed during peaceful protests.

Then, on April 4, 2015, Walter Scott turned to run. The police officer who shot Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina attempted to frame the fleeing man after firing bullets into his back, the action was all caught on camera, spread to the masses through the very connections of social media that gave Black Lives Matter broad audiences amongst younger generations. Despite the standard and repetitive police rhetoric about body cameras, instituting better training, and increasing funding that rose in opposition to those protesting in Charleston, Black Lives Matter continued to grow. As with his interviews of Scott's family, Lowery hits a moral and passionate tenor to each setting of racial injustice that frame his chapters.

Lowery's summary of what occurred in Baltimore after the death of Freddie Gray includes a well-rendered and emotional analysis of the tone-deaf peacemaking campaign of Presidential candidate, former Mayor of Baltimore, and previous Governor of Maryland Martin O'Malley. This brief examination illustrates the political blindness associated to racist policing within American cities. Countered by the intense political rhetoric of activists like Kwame Rose, the media stimulated the Baltimore protest movements through creating a focused news cycle that provided voice to social justice movements. Lowery's work ends with the growing hope of a new racial program in the face of continuing police violence, even as the vile acts of terrorism at Emmanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston turned hope to melancholy after a shooter entered the Church and took the lives of nine parishioners who pleaded with the methodical killer during a prayer meeting. Lowery identifies the white nationalist executioner as part of a larger syndrome of racial anxiety. Successful racial protests at the University of Missouri during November of 2015 are explored in the Afterword to *They Can't Kill Us All*, which situates a concluding hopeful tone that protest can create triumphs for social justice.

Princeton professor and political activist Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor's *From #BLACKLIVESMATTER to Black Liberation* (2016) offers a direct and protest-oriented summary of the emergence of Black Lives Matter for readers along a broader political spectrum. Appropriately for a Haymarket publication, she situates her analysis as a specifically Marxist treatise that offers significant potential to explore transnational aspects of radical resistance. In her analysis, Taylor engages racial moderates who have been unwilling to stand for resistance in the name of equality. For Taylor, colorblindness is not solely a denial of racism, but is also an assertion that racism has been transcended, usually trumpeted as a means to subversively further inequality through stopping progress in the name of a newfangled and false post-racial status quo.

Taylor discusses the dual nature of present Black America: a wealthier class that pursues the post-racial to subconsciously protect economic status, and of a larger working class Black America that protests continued structural inequality. Taylor therefore indicts the Black elite as a social class that pursued post-racialism at the expense of broader policies of racial justice. She consequently explores the future of black politics through a return of the wayward Black elite, who must re-learn their past as a means to tap into radical pursuits of labor resistance. Employing a historical look at black inequality in the roots of slavery and the political rhetoric that rose against the Civil Rights movement, Taylor interrogates Ferguson as a moment of awakening for portions of Black America that incorrectly believed they were immune to police violence.

Recent racial protests rose because of moments of vigilante violence and police brutality, and also from a longer narrative of manipulative rhetorics of race that prejudicially and deceitfully related a culture of poverty to black consciousness. The idea that welfare systems altered black minds to not pursue employment is a standard right-wing narrative. *From #BLACKLIVESMATTER to Black Liberation* explores how that rhetoric, after the Civil Rights Movement, defined many black Americans as separate from the possibilities of the American dream. The myth of the culture of poverty, a narrative which falsely defined that many Black Americans were purportedly trapped and willing to accept hand-outs, that family structures created citizens unwilling to access the fruits of American exceptionalism, further separated Black Americans from cashing the promissory note recited at the March for Freedom in 1963.

Taylor explores the politics of racial protest and social backlash in a radical history of the twentieth century. In doing, she offers a more causal narrative for Black Lives Matter than that described by Lowery. Her analysis of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, on the political shifts prophesied within Kevin Phillips' *Emerging Republican Majority (*1969), and the wide-ranging implications of Daniel Moynihan's distorted *The Negro Family* (1965), provides a clear history of changing forms of white racism. These customs shifted from the fire hoses of Bull Connor, to the Law and Order dog whistles of Richard Nixon that led to increasing mass incarceration, into the ideological purity of the Drug War espoused by Ronald Reagan, and through the semiotic manipulations within the modern Republican Party.

Taylor's integrated political knowledge also explores connections between black radicalism that rose in Midwestern cities during the 1970s and 1980s with the modern movement for black radical politics that is shaped by Black Lives Matter. These modern forces resist the tenets of the Southern Strategy that consistently re-birthed within rhetorical strategies that applied Willie Horton, the strapping young buck, and the crack epidemic into political discourse.

Through an analysis of the failures of police reform, Taylor's most aggressive argument is to proclaim Obama's racial politics as an illusion that failed to provide increased racial justice for the majority of black Americans.

From #BLACKLIVESMATTER to Black Liberation is a call for direct action, one that applies the historical attitude of W.E.B. Du Bois, Fred Hampton, and Angela Davis. This direct tone is part of a larger radical voice also found within the recent analysis of incarceration in Michelle Alexander's *The New Jim Crow* (2012) and within the tenors of black consciousness explored in Ta-Nehisi Coates' *Between the World and Me* (2015). *From #BLACKLIVESMATTER to Black Liberation* is a specific call to the Black elite to join the majority of Black America, and progressive Americans, with a trumpet to sound out super-predator and culture of poverty rhetoric. Taylor's voice is unswerving, calling out many leaders of the Civil Rights Movement as blind to the nature of present American racism on the ground. Taylor's text is therefore part of a black radicalism that finds the voice of Karl Marx in the proclamations of Martin Luther King, one that finds racial oppression as a fundamental aspect of labor repression.

Taylor's critical feminist perspective makes *From #BLACKLIVESMATTER to Black Liberation* the finest historical and social analysis of the emergence of Black Lives Matter thus far. Even beyond the confines of her analysis, Taylor's work takes on the racial consequences of mass incarceration after three strikes, mandatory minimums, truth in sentencing, and the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1994. This is the principal current work for remembering the four girls praying at Sixteenth Street Baptist, the open casket of Emmett Till, and the radical morality of Malcolm X. This is also the book to read in order to declaim the corporate and political links fermented by the American Legislative Exchange Council, the racial politics of Voter ID Laws, the disenfranchising consequences of *Shelby County v. Holder*, the profitable exploitation of labor in privatizing American prisons, and the racially disproportionate support of gun rights by the National Rifle Association, recently of importance with the killing of Philando Castille in July of 2016.

Like Taylor's book, Johns Hopkins Professor Christopher J. Lebron's *The Making of Black Lives Matter* (2017) offers historical ancestries to the causes of Black Lives Matter. Lebron tends to the deep tissue that made the radical body of Black Lives Matter through case studies on specific African American leaders and various themes of resistance. Despite a significant historical error early in the text that places Andrew Jackson within the Reconstruction Era, Lebron's work travels through a relatively informative history of moments when black liberation entered racially cooperative sections of the American public sphere.

Lebron articulates the idea of *shameful publicity* through exploring a broad history of Frederick Douglass and Ida B. Wells, who both searched human morality to re-align white American minds into perceiving the violence of slavery and lynching as against the common good. For Black Lives Matter, shaming those who commit racial violence and protect structural inequality comes from a root expectation of human respect that slavery and Jim Crow denied. Through *countercolonization of the white mind* later writers Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston explored ways to engage this destabilized racist mind with a renewed respect for equality. During the Harlem Renaissance, the New Negro of Alain Locke became a living symbol that aesthetics could arise from within the black community. In this project, the black artist became a performative representation of individual goals for the larger community. Lebron's specific work on Hurston explores that even as a listener may not engage within a conversation about social justice, the very act of aesthetic performance can offer paradigms for pursuing equality.

Through a combined reading of the tragic Eleanor Bumpers case in 1984 New York City, involving the fatal police shooting of an elderly woman during an attempted eviction, and the police negligence during a traffic stop that led to the July 2015 suicide of Sandra Bland in Texas, Lebron explores the idea of self-possession in the work of academic Anna Julia Cooper and poet Audre Lorde. These women discovered what Lebron terms *unconditional self-possession* as a way to accept individuality enough to honestly explore their own tragedies. With the works of James Baldwin and Martin Luther King, Lebron searches the idea of *fragmented compassion* as a way to push back against the racial foil that argues against a common ethic of human empathy. Lebron's historical roots are concise, offering a clear introduction to leading African American figures who articulated broad themes for the current Black Lives Matter movement.

Black Lives Matter was born of centuries of pain. It sparked to vigor in a momentary flash when that agony was awoken again in the past years of increased racial violence. The movement peaked before political discourse was altered with the election of Donald Trump in 2016. American neoliberalism of the Obama era had worked to limit racial perceptions in order to promote post-racialism, fomenting fluid market relationships between those previously considered ethnically incompatible. Most counter-hegemony is read through a romantic lens, often associated to the lower class struggle against the ideological apparatuses of capital. However, the most virulent strand of counter-hegemony against neoliberalism in 2016, and especially against the post-racial goals of neoliberal capital, was a recent turn towards insulated racial rhetoric when American nationalists trumpeted a narrative that argues American exceptionalism declines with increased globalization, cosmopolitanism, and cultural relativism. The rhetoric of the 2016 election turned the American white male into an underdog, a counter-hegemonic figure despite the hegemonic power the American white male obviously retains.

Today, hate has a renewed and legitimated sense of nobility, a new logic of racial romanticism. In the election of 2016, the concerns of progressive America were tactfully displaced by the fear, misogyny, and semiotic manipulations of the Republican Party and the Trump nationalists. In a triumph of the will, the ethnic nationalism of the American white male was legitimated through new controls on the signification of exceptionalism and equality. There is now a prevailing discourse, despite its absurdity, that asserts the American white male has become an underdog.

The works reviewed above speak to a moment before Trump, when Black Lives Matter occupied the media spectrum enough to educate the masses towards a more rational analysis of racial inequality. All three of these books are relevant because they explore the deep space between the history of racism and the overwrought signifiers employed in the current political sphere. These works should be read, and their historical narratives remembered, because ethnic resistance to neoliberalism and cultural relativism is now often considered a romantic racial narrative for many in the America First camp of the Republican Party. That romance is dangerous, as it has been exploited often within the focused political rallies, the contentious press conferences, and the ludicrous right-wing conspiracies of increasingly legitimated but objectively preposterous American populists.

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About the review author

Andrew Kettler is currently serving as Assistant Professor and Early American History Fellow at University College, University of Toronto. His research specifically focuses upon investigations into the sensory prejudices that justified the profits of the Atlantic Slave Trade. andrew.kettler AT utoronto.ca

Book review: Jodi Dean, *Crowds and Party;* Donatella della Porta et al, *Movement Parties against Austerity;* Richard Seymour, *Corbyn.*

Review author: Andy Mathers

Jodi Dean, 2016, *Crowds and Party*. London & New York, NY: Verso (276 pp., hardcover, $26.95/£16.99).

Donatella della Porta, Joseba Fernández, Hara Kouki & Lorenzo Mosca, 2017, *Movement Parties Against Austerity*. Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity (237 pp., hardcover, $70.31/£55).

Richard Seymour, 2016, *Corbyn. The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics*. London: Verso (248 pp., paperback, £12.99).

The crisis of neoliberalism and the associated austerity politics generated a global wave of protests which in turn has produced a renewed interest amongst activists and academics for political parties as means of expressing social movements and addressing their limitations in delivering an alternative project. Three new books, *Crowds and Party, Movement Parties against Austerity,* and *Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics* offer useful insights for how to consider fruitfully the relationship between social movements and parties.

Writing mainly in response to her experiences of Occupy amidst the broader protest wave, Jodi Dean writes in *Crowds and Party* that the lack of "capacity to give social struggles political form" (p. 264) warranted a serious attempt to revive and reimagine the party as a form of organisation and struggle. She rejects the Left's acceptance of individualism and fragmented identities as the basis for developing an alternative politics in that this merely expressed earlier political defeats and celebrated organising on the bases on which the subject is constituted by capital and state. Dean proposes the Left refound communist organisation ("the Party") as a means of realising the new political subject ("the people") that exists within the collective desire for justice ("the crowd").

Dean uses Le Bon's *The Crowd* and Canetti's *Crowds and Power* to identify the crowd's "collective courage, directed intensity and capacities to cohere" (p. 115) as a positive negation of the capitalist social relations that it ruptures, albeit temporarily. Crowd events, such as riots, strikes and protests, are a "beautiful moment" that manifests momentarily the political subject which only the party, through a political struggle of interpretation, can reveal fully. Following Lenin, *Crowds and Party* argues that the party concentrates and directs the struggle by providing it with its lacking political dimension.

The analysis that the Party is less concerned with state power (at least in the current period) than with enabling the formation of a new political subject by linking and universalising specific struggles suggests the "movement party" does not stand in an external relation to the movement and act merely as its political representative, but is persistently implicated in its development. This reveals that demands to defend the autonomy of the movement from political interference is itself a deeply political position. However, *Crowds and Party* dismisses the questions of "substitution, vanguardism, or domination" (p. 157) that may produce such a position by labelling such valid concerns as "attacks on mass, democratic, and people's politics" (p. 170) and by an analysis that focuses unduly on the affective, at the expense of the instrumental, dimension of the movement-party relationship.

This analysis results in a curious celebration of the oligarchic tendencies identified by Michels' *Political Parties* as necessary and normal political processes that indicate organisational capacity. The crowd, we are told, is relieved to delegate activities to leaders the idolisation of whom is represented as the displaced self-love of the crowd and deflected delight at its own power. The focus on the term "crowd" may be admissible due to the spontaneity of movements, but is suspect when it downplays the capacity for democratic self-organisation in social movements (particularly pertinent to Occupy) which prefigure egalitarian structures for party and state.

Crowds and Party presents a remarkably uncritical examination of the experiences of the activists of the Communist Party in Great Britain and the USA to demonstrate Dean's Lacanian analysis that the party acts as ideal ego, ego ideal and superego. This produces a constant collective self-examination that translates into incessant activity driven by a party discipline that, when not internalised, is reinforced through a show trial in which the accused party member is reduced to a shaking wreck incapable of speech. That this is presented as promoting an acceptable "communist sensibility" is a disturbing thought and one which should send social movement activists running for the hills. Moreover, presenting unproblematically the "lifeworld" of party organisations as the means through which a "red thread" runs through and connects "movements of the oppressed" (p. 262) does not consider how such organisations risk stifling the movement through its colonisation. The risks of substitution, vanguardism and domination simply cannot be finessed by a psychodynamic analysis. Although the book is a welcome corrective to ahistorical accounts of the party-form, by not interrogating this form fully it is unlikely to help rectify its previous shortcomings and disastrous consequences.

A more rounded analysis is provided by Donatella Della Porta et al's *Movement Parties against Austerity,* a study of movement parties in southern Europe which includes a theoretically and conceptually informed empirical investigation of Syriza, Podemos and the Five Star Movement (M5S). The genesis of these parties lay within anti-austerity protests triggered by the economic and political crises of late neoliberalism. In general, the movement parties examined developed where distrust in political institutions was greatest and where existing centre-left parties were most implicated in implementing austerity and so pressing issues arising from the movement arena were left largely unrepresented in the party system. The analysis of each case study proceeds by examining the interaction between the social movement field and the party system in terms of three key elements (framing, organizational model, and repertoire of action) using concepts drawn mainly from the field of social movement studies. *Movement Parties against Austerity* is sensitive to national variation yet the case studies show how although some movement qualities were present within each "movement party", this was a rather limited and, as electoral office was attained, an increasingly fragile development.

The parties offered ideological resources that enabled a translation of movements' conceptions and demands into a new political language and political identities. Diagnostic framing reshaped the political cleavage from "centre-left" versus "centre-right" to "the people" against "the establishment". Prognostic framing shifted the possible solutions beyond the framework of neoliberal inspired austerity to a revived social democratic programme (Syriza and Podemos) and a reformed capitalism favouring small and medium-sized enterprises and environmental protection (M5S) both within a framework of a "social Europe". Motivational framing generated hope as seemingly futile protests were displaced by voting "with excitement" (p. 119) with the realistic prospect of governmental power fuelling hope for real change. Yet this hope was attenuated as governmental office translated into policies that resonated much less with movement frames.

Movement Parties against Austerity examines how organisational structures and repertoires of action emanating from the movements were harnessed by the parties to create a new political culture that favoured participation and protest. Each party developed an unconventional repertoire of action which included the mobilisation of, and support for, extra-parliamentary protests and this partly filtered through into institutional activity that broke with parliamentary orthodoxy. Organisational innovations that enable participation through utilising new communication technologies remain strongest in Podemos that allows an open membership with no fees, is based on crowd funding, selects candidates through open primary elections, includes citizen inquiries to make policy, and has a structure centred on a citizen assembly the basis of which are "circles" reminiscent of the M-15 movement. This has enabled power to be distributed more horizontally than in either Syriza or M5S, yet it has produced a highly personalised leadership that is shared by M5S and increasingly by Syriza in government. This is an indicator that the "movement party" can take various forms (tabulated on p. 16) one of which is a populist party with a plebiscitary, rather than a participatory, relationship with citizens. That these parties are increasingly by-passing movements once in office may be explained partly by the fact that these parties arose during the downswing of the anti-austerity protest cycle. They were more the products of the remnants of movement energy than a synergy of movement and party. The limits of substituting the party for the movement have been increasingly apparent once in office.

Della Porta et al's study demonstrates well how breaks in political organisation are generated partly by social movements, but also how the trajectories of existing political parties are a crucial element in shaping political developments. This is evident in relation to the shift in direction of the British Labour Party since the election to its leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. In *Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics,* Richard Seymour explains this surprising result in relation to the same crisis of neoliberalism within the British context. This crisis was expressed particularly acutely in the Labour Party as its increasing orientation to office above electoral support resulted in a drastically falling party membership, itself largely disillusioned and disengaged. This was echoed by many of its traditional core supporters who increasingly abstained from voting, often deliberately as a means of punishing the party's bipartisanship on austerity and war. Labour's shift to the neoliberal centre-ground did not give rise to a radical left party as the "vacuum thesis" would suggest. This was due to the utter defeat of the Labour Left in the 1980s which demoralised the older generation of activists and the relative weakness of recent anti-austerity protests which, beyond the unions, were led mainly by the younger generation which was highly reticent about finding a political home. In this context, Corbyn was recognised universally, and elected unequivocally, as "a man of the movements, not of the markets" (p. 7).

Seymour offers a hyper-realist, indeed a pessimistic, assessment of the prospects for "Labour's nascent new Left" (p. 84) suggesting that under Corbyn the likelihood of election victory is slim, democratising the party is highly unlikely, and taking office would be a "poisoned chalice" (p. 86). This assessment is based on a historical analysis of the Labour Party as emerging from, and inextricably tied to, an ideology of labourism and a social democratic practice the successful prosecution of which was based upon sustaining economic growth and profitability. The likelihood of reproducing these conditions in contemporary globalised capitalism he argues is very low indeed. History also shows that prospects for transforming the Labour Party into "real Labour" are largely illusory and therefore "Corbynism" is a fleeting moment in the inevitable "degeneration of Labourism" (p. 90): a long process that accelerated during the New Labour years.

It is difficult to fault the almost entirely accurate account of the Labour Party as a parliamentary party, yet this is a largely one-sided account that pays little attention to the extra-parliamentary activities and movements associated with the party. In *Labour: A tale of two parties*, Hilary Wainwright (1987) provided a different reading which contrasted the "ameliorative, pragmatic" social democratic tradition expressed principally in the Parliamentary Labour Party with a "transformative, visionary" democratic socialist tradition associated mainly with the grassroots members engaged closely with extra-parliamentary struggles. This account enables a greater focus on the party-movement relationship and thereby opens up the analysis of the current situation to a different trajectory to the one offered by Seymour who states that "Syrizafication" (i.e. the neutralisation and defeat of the radical left in the party) is the highly likely outcome.

Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics spells out the dangers of favouring a shorter-term strategy of transforming the Labour Party above the long game of rebuilding social movements, and the labour movement particularly, as the basis for effective political organisation. Seymour does this though at the expense of missing the opportunities present in that although he suggests the need for a "vibrant and mobilised grass-roots Left in the unions and beyond" (p. 217), he fails to recognise the contribution that the resurgence of grassroots activity in the Labour Party could contribute to making this happen by developing a more organic link between party and movement and especially amongst the grass roots.

All three books make specific contributions to the field which can be comprehended through Roberts' (2015) model of the relationship between movement and party: vanguard, electoral, and organic. *Crowds and Party* celebrates a revival of the vanguard model in which the party controls social movements. *Movement Parties against Austerity* demonstrates how in Southern Europe the dominant form is tending towards the electoral model in which party relations with social movements are mobilised for electoral gain. *Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics* warns of the possibility, indeed the probability, of this model occurring in Britain. Seymour dismisses, however, the admittedly slight but still real possibility for the development of an organic model in which a mass party with a class basis becomes deliberately blurred with the movement. It is only to parties operating according to this organic model that we can satisfactorily attach the label of "movement party".

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About the review author

The author is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology & Criminology at UWE Bristol and is active in the trade union and anti-austerity movements. He can be contacted at Andrew.Mathers AT uwe.ac.uk

Book Review: Dylan Taylor, *Social Movements and Democracy in the 21st Century*

Review author: Laurence Cox

Dylan Taylor, 2017, *Social Movements and Democracy in the 21st century*. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave (xi+290 pp; £66.99)

The challenge of comradely criticism

There is a problem, today, with disagreement on the left. Disagreement itself is no bad thing: it can be a sign of movement democracy, or an indicator that a particular space is able to hold more than one social position, movement, organisation, political tradition or organising approach together. Given the forces we are up against if we want large-scale social change, we need this situation.

But we also need disagreement that can either be overcome in our own learning and alliance processes, or at least lived with as an enriching factor and a reminder of the need to engage the much wider social realities that our opponents often make manifest. Put another way, the really important strategic conversations are the difficult ones, because they represent alliances that have not yet been made, or learning that has not yet been gone through.

Disagreement often doesn't work like this. All too often it produces self-righteousness (a refusal of learning or alliances), denial of the realities represented by our comrades and comp@s, new grievances which stand in the way of further conversations, and widespread demobilisation of those who lack the time, energy or emotional resilience to continue. In some spaces, victory goes to the last person standing, as in earlier generations committee or assembly decisions were made by the faction willing to keep going longest.

A culture of deliberately vicious ("sectarian") polemic is nothing new, but recent decades are different. The material conditions of radical political action and theory have, in the global North at least, radically changed over the past fifty years. If in 1967 the primary context and point of reference was parties, unions, left periodicals or other movement institutions, today a greater proportion of radical positions are articulated within traditional intellectual relationships, those of academia or those of left celebrity, the building of niche markets largely disconnected from movement organisations.

Under these conditions, there are greater rewards for representing disagreement as unchangeable: as the result of a fundamental flaw, whether theoretical, moral or personal. Audiences can be built and satisfied in this way – and with information overload one of the main things even radical audiences need is easy dismissals, good reasons *not* to know more about this or that. The one-liner which presents a different movement, political tradition, organisation or theorist as not worth knowing about is an extremely welcome tool in this context.

How to overcome this? In *Interface* we ask authors to speak beyond their familiar audiences and write for those they do not usually speak to; this process is not always easy, and does not exclude forming alliances at the expense of a third party. It is not that we need to or should agree all of the time; the question is rather how to practice constructive disagreement without precluding future alliances.

Reading Dylan Taylor, I found myself disagreeing repeatedly, but not wanting a fight. I felt this book was a good representative of another left reality which cannot sensibly be ignored and needs to be engaged with rather than written off.

Structure and strengths

Social Movements and Democracy… is written in three sections. Part I gives us an introduction, a potted history of social movements, an overview of social movement theory, a summary of Marxist political economy and a discussion of "left political strategy". Part II gives us an empirical study of Occupy, organised around issues of internal decision-making, how the collective subject was understood and discussion of space and the Internet. Part III draws on Poulantzas' theory of the state and offers a conclusion in terms of political strategy.

The book is well-written and accessible. It has the great merit of opening up a wide range of issues and ways of thinking about movement politics to newcomers; clarity and ambition are a powerful combination. Its ambition lies in thinking these different things more closely together: contemporary social movement theory is often quite innocent of movement history; rarely does analysis of contemporary movements engage seriously with radical political theory; we need to think the relationship between movements and political economy more systematically; and so on. It is perhaps less important whether we agree with the specific conclusions that are drawn and more important to say that we should be having these discussions far more frequently.

This sort of work is a much-needed antidote to a positivist version of social movements research as an institutionally and intellectually narrow subdiscipline, and to the kinds of Marxist work that internalise the boundaries of the academic fields they seek a home in. Social movements, as a central aspect of the social world, enable connections: as the practical meaning of popular political subjectivity in ordinary times, without which "radical political theory" is either oxymoronic or theological; as a term which helps political economy become something other than either the hidden hand of subject-free structure or a dystopian account of elite agency alone; and as a positionality from which we can take the Feuerbach theses seriously.

The view from where?

The book's own positionality is not as clearly accounted for, but the ways in which its individual themes are approached will be familiar to Anglophone Marxists within the sorts of spaces marked out by points of reference such as Jacobin or the International Socialist Tendency, Left Forum and the Historical Materialism conference: a post-1968 left, neither social democratic nor Stalinist.

This approach is distinctly statist in tone, to the point of assuming at times that what defines Marxism *is* its relationship to the state, but characteristically Anglophone in that it is rarely expressed from within or in relationship to left parties of any electoral or governmental significance, or from any long-term position of strength in social movements, even (as the rhetoric might suggest) the labour movement. Put another way, in countries where radical left parties are permanent or occasional power-holders, or significant electoral presences, Marxists tend not to agonise about The Party as an ideal, but spend a lot of time discussing the many problems with the actual party or parties that they have to deal with.

The long-term institutional bases of this particular tradition, then, lie within micro-parties, the English-speaking Internet and the university. It shares a key weakness inherited from Trotskyism as "the last surviving Anglophone Leninist tradition" (Davidson 2017): a tendency to an abstract internationalism which seeks a single, universally applicable line (in English!) at the expense of in-depth engagement with the concrete and the national – and an underlying assumption that with the right line somehow everything else will fall into place.

At least, this was my impression as a reader trying to understand the book, although it tends to present itself as something of a "view from nowhere", reluctant to account for its own choices as to what to think about, who to read and how to interpret them. Taylor edits the interesting *Counterfutures: left thought and practice Aoteoroa*, whose self-description (counterfutures.nz) situates it between the left academy and social movements; but this book reads rather more like a rewritten PhD thesis.

An obvious example is in the chapters on political strategy. Rather than (for example) a critical analysis of people who are read today within different movements, or for that matter within different Marxist traditions, "reconceptualising political strategy" appears here as a task assigned to the academy (p. 99). We are presented with Badiou, Žižek, Rancière, Laclau and Mouffe, Hardt and Negri, Poulantzas as "prominent theorists in this field" (p. 100), although what the field is, and who determines prominence, is never quite specified. The questions of whether "contemporary left theory" is really best represented by an academic reading list, why the changing sociology of "the left" might make this so, or how culturally specific the authors chosen, are not discussed.

There is also no discussion of what *concrete* political challenges their reflections draw from, or how they have actually engaged with and been read by movements – surely an important question for Marxists thinking about theory.

Even with Poulantzas, presented (ch 9) as the way out of the difficulties of contemporary strategy (treated here as synonymous with theory), we are given no account whatsoever of his relationship to Greek or French parties or movements; we are told that things have developed since his death (p. 234), but not what he did while alive.

I do not think we should hand over responsibility for the strategic direction of our movements (or parties) to a purely academic logic, particularly one which assumes rather than justifies the significance of a particular set of authors and thus naturalises the local logics of an unspecified academic context. It is not that we can learn nothing from such debates; many of our best thinkers *do* operate within university contexts. But the touchstone has to be practice; as Marxists we cannot simply leave Theory to its own devices and be content to listen at the feet of different Masters.

Difficulties of the analysis

One point where I felt this strongly is in the book's repeatedly failing to learn from the left trajectories that constitutes our shared political ancestry, in the account of "after 1968", in chapters 2 (history of social movements) and 5 (political theory). There is a back-handed recognition that the Party, and its orientation to the State, had been seen to fail by 1968 on many fronts, though the discussion of these is often blurred. This failure lay in the reality of Soviet state socialism (if not yet, for some, the Chinese variant); in the reality of western Fordism, *particularly* where social-democratic parties had achieved some significant power; and in the reality of independent post-colonial states.

The once entirely reasonable assumption that the way forward lay in taking power within a state which was, in the mid twentieth century, more central to economic activity and social development than before or since, now came face to face not just with the disappointments of partial success in these areas, but with tanks in Prague and social-democratic support for the Vietnam War.

Yet in Taylor's account the reason activists turned away from a focus on parties and the state is not primarily explained by the disappointments of statism, or even by the defeat of the revolutionary struggles around 1968 and the question of how to continue fighting under conditions not of our own choosing. It seems to be the turn from unity to multiplicity in academic left theory. And here I have some questions.

Is this account not every bit as idealist as those liberals who ascribed the French Revolution to the influence of the *philosophes*? Does it not make more sense to treat academic left theory as a rarefied and often distorted reflection of learning and discussion processes within popular movements, rather than as "the conscious element" somehow imposing itself? If this is a material analysis, how are we to imagine the theoretical impact of Rancière or Žižek on the Arab Spring? Will we find, if we read through the tweets of the day, the turn to multiplicity as an ideological element imported from above?

I do not think so; even for a more obviously movement-connected thinker like Toni Negri it makes more sense to see his theorising as growing from the extraordinary richness of Italian struggles in the 1960s and 1970s, and subsequently his engagement with the movements of the 1990s and 2000s. I have met activists who have read Negri (far more than have read Rancière): and it would be unfair and self-defeating to suggest that theory never affects what people do. But surely a core Marxist proposition is that analysis needs to start from people's material realities and everyday praxis rather than to treat them as "cultural dupes"?[1]

One crucial strategic difficulty of idealism is in how it leads us to think about contemporary movements as somehow the incarnation in this material world of Ideas – rather than, as the historical analysis of ideas no less than movements would suggest, seeing the ideas expressed around particular movements as bearing in interesting, but indirect, relationship to their practice. Consider, for example, Marx's enthusiasm for the innovative *practice* of the Paris Commune as against the predominantly Blanquist, Jacobin and Proudhonist *ideas* of delegates to the Commune – or his comments in the *Eighteenth Brumaire* on how revolutions seek for a language to express what they are actually doing.

We should of course engage with movements' own fumbling attempts to articulate a theory of their own; but that engagement needs to be helpful and comradely, if we can: to understand that people are, of course, developing their ideas as they go, and engage as a peer, not judging them from a great height for the benefit of some external audience. The latter, will neither convince them nor help us to learn from them.

From a comparative perspective, what I found most telling was the failure to ask why Occupy was such an Anglophone phenomenon. It took place simultaneously with revolts across the Arab world and anti-austerity uprisings around the European periphery; yet the question of why Occupy took place *where* it did is barely discussed here. Of course, doing so would suggest that – far from being a general expression of a particular moment in history, to be responded to theoretically – it was deeply shaped by the politics of a small number of English-speaking countries with a particular history of neoliberalism. In these countries, at least up till Momentum, "the Party" is invoked by some kinds of Marxism precisely because of its absence in political reality. Understand the *difference* between these contexts and those of other global struggles, and we start asking different kinds of political question.

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[1] A more trivial, but indicative note: Taylor reads Alf Nilsen and myself as taking a broadly similar position to Laclau and Mouffe (p. 69), with the comment that either we are hiding our debt to them or that our putative similarities are due to a common awareness of Gramsci (which is not, perhaps, as unusual as it may seem for European Marxists). This point of similarity, however, turns out to be the question of how a movement or party can *find allies* and *convince others of the value of its strategy*. These are rather important, and pretty basic, questions for activists, and it speaks volumes about the "strategic" value of this kind of political theory that they are read simply as indicators of a particular intellectual tradition.

Models for the future?

In some ways this book recapitulates Barbara Epstein's (1993) arguments about the relationship between the grassroots-democratic practice and culturally-liberatory spirit of more recent movements and the rather bird's-eye view of Anglophone academic and sectarian Marxism, and arrives at a point not a million miles away from Hilary Wainwright's (2009) *Reclaim the State*[2]. We have been here before, in other words, because the relative isolation of an older model of left practice in the English-speaking world, and its consequent manifestation in universities and micro-parties, has tended to mean that a certain way of articulating Marxism in relation to (wished-for) parties and the state is a sort of boundary-definition exercise; or, to borrow a phrase, identity politics. From this perspective, social movements are both necessary and – in their actual practice – rather frustrating.

Politically, the book calls (chs 9 and 10) for a new relationship between parties and movements, in ways which have been common on the west European left since 1968 and sometimes before. There are spaces in which this is a new, and surprising, thing to say; but this position really outlines a question rather than providing an answer.

Chapter 9 rightly points to different experiences in southern Europe (Syriza, Podemos) and Latin America (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador). The logic of the book, however, suggests that these experiences are primarily the result of advances *in theory*, of having the right line: but from the point of view of empirical research into social movements and revolutions, much is missing.

Podemos, it is true, did have elements of this top-down origin – but situated within a long and massive tradition of anti-authoritarian movements in Spain. Syriza is a more classical representative of the "older" European new left. Tellingly, there is no discussion of Iceland, Portugal or Italy – though the comparison is instructive. The *diversity* of learning traditions on the European left in terms of how to relate parties and movements is perhaps a more useful resource when trying to make sense of our own local contexts. Otherwise we are doomed (for example) to become disillusioned with Podemos and start making eyes at Momentum; the search for a Model which proves us right and solves our own problems is always likely to be a moveable feast.

So too with Latin America: an account which excludes the 24-year-old Zapatista revolution and the *Argentinazo* in favour of a focus on Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador is making things easy for itself – but by the same token making it harder to think about what can be usefully translated for struggles elsewhere. There is little mention of the dialectics *between* movements and parties here (Cicciarello-Maher 2016 shows this for Venezuela, the most statist of the three);

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[2] It is Wainwright's great strength that, while remaining committed to the necessity for engagement with the state, she consistently does so from within movements, and with an open mind as to what such engagement might actually mean at different times in different countries.

nor of the increasing conflicts between movements and state in these specific countries, expressed in intensifying authoritarianism and (an important economic fact) shaped by the neo-extractivism underpinning these state models. Such accounts will not help us think what we should do where we are.

We cannot choose the situations we act within; but we can, perhaps, acknowledge the crucial importance of national context and not treat The Party as something that exists over and above these minor details of concrete place and history. Nor can we or should we assert the primary significance of The Party as an identity marker of Marxism or on the basis of political theory, separately from the history of actually-existing Marxist parties.

Put another way, the real historical question is what any given party is actually able to do to advance popular struggle in practice[3]. Given that in most countries in the world over the past half-century social movements have rather more successes to offer than radical political parties (and I imagine this is also true in Aoteoroa / New Zealand), movement activists may often and reasonably feel that party politics is not a great use of their time; and they are likely to judge parties in terms of how they actually relate to movements rather than in terms of how their adherents convince themselves of their own necessity.

Learning from movements

Marxism's "material force" has experienced a series of defeats, some external but some very much from our own side if not self-inflicted. As a practice-oriented theory, we have to take this experience seriously and try to learn from it. As a materialist theory, we need to understand the social realities of different kinds of Marxist practice, notably to account for the context and situational meaning of our own work in the way we seek to do for other theories. This also means a less schematic engagement with popular political practice.

Like 1968, the Occupy movement – and the far larger, contemporary struggles of *indignad@s* in southern Europe – helped both to show the possibility of new kinds of mass participation in movement activism and (for the same reasons) undermined the legitimacy of the currently-existing modes of capitalist organisation. Surely the most important intellectual question here is not the theoretical limitations of their exponents' rhetoric, but the question of how they could have got *so much* right in terms of mobilising large numbers of ordinary people around fundamental questions of power and inequality, not least by comparison with Anglophone Marxism's limited ability to do so. Posing the question this way, in terms of political practice, means writing not so much as academically-accredited specialists in How To Think and more as fellow-activists who are also contributing to struggles, hoping to learn from these movements while also having something useful to say.

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[3] Taylor criticises Alf Nilsen and myself (p. 248) for placing movements first and being interested in parties to the extent that they actually contribute to movements rather than instrumentalising them, substituting themselves for them and all the other experiences which have become so common. But to put it at its simplest, once a party winds up sending the riot police against popular movements that supposedly constitute its base – as in Greece and Bolivia – it is making a fundamental strategic error, which will irretrievably shape its future.

Conclusion

The richness of a book is often shown by how much one wants to argue with it: bad books are easily dismissed, while strong books require more detailed responses to cover even part of their material. My copy of *Social Movements and Democracy…* has dozens of corners marked down, each noting a point where I wanted to say more, respond or challenge the analysis, most of which I have not had space or time to return to here.

This book is a good read. Readers new to this terrain will find much of value here, while more experienced activists and scholars will still find many points of interest and a valuable challenge in the connections attempted, whether or not they agree with the author's approach. I look forward to the next book.

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About the review author

Laurence Cox has been involved in social movements since the 1980s but swore off activism in (actually-existing) political parties before the turn of the millennium. He has published widely on social movements and Marxism, most recently *We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism* (Pluto 2014, with Alf Nilsen), *Why Social Movements Matter* (Rowman and Littlefield forthcoming) and *Revolution in the Air? 1968 in the Global North* (Pluto forthcoming, with Bjarke Risager and Salar Mohandesi). He can be contacted at laurence.cox AT mu.ie

Book Review: Harald Bauder, *Migration Borders Freedom*

Review author: Sutapa Chattopadhyay

Harald Bauder, 2017, *Migration Borders Freedom.* London: Routledge (135 pp., hardcover, $145; softcover £36.99/ $49.95)

Undivided by commas, the title *Migration Borders Freedom* is open to many interpretations. The three concepts can be read as a set of nouns, a sentence or a phrase. Alternatively, as author Harald Bauder (2017, ix-xi) states: migration is not freedom, which conversely means that movement or mobility restricts freedom. Most times, host countries fail to free migrants from manifold insecurities that they attempt to escape. Moreover, with a lack of citizenship and legal documents to work or stay, migrants are denied access to the formal labor market, from a decent livelihood or regular pay, education, healthcare and other benefits or protection. Rather, migrants end up in conditions where they vacillate between hope and despair. The author's second explanation of the title takes us to feudal Europe. Bauder draws a parallel between serfs and modern-day migrants. Although the serfs were bound to the land, they entered the city for work like bonded slaves but lived in the hinterland while the wealthy land owning classes stayed inside the city. Neither the serfs were free inside the fortified walls of the city, nor are modern day migrants.

Bauder intelligibly takes full advantage of the three concepts of migration, borders and freedom to discuss many conceivable possibilities and contradictions that counter walls, borders, lines, and divides. Throughout *Migration Borders Freedom*, he contests increased securitizations and violence at borders and the internal policing of migrants as failed mechanisms. Henceforth Bauder introduces relevant and provocative policy measures on migrant rights to work and stay, by referring to restrictions imposed to citizenship, territoriality, and the nation-state. He explains that a problem with the state, and in particular the nation-state, is that it exercises its sovereign rights to exclude. He analyses free movements that link to dialectical connections between the regulatory measures imposed by the nation-state and local-scale sanctuary practices. Bauder broadly follows anarchist, post-structuralist and socialist alternatives, and Indigenous understanding of land and people. The book has two sections. First, he analyses discriminatory policies that prevents migrants from accessing a healthy living without fear and uncertainties while in the second section, he journeys through liberatory social movements, and sanctuary and solidarity networks that are spread out in Europe and North America.

Migration Borders Freedom departs from violence at borders to the urban scale in order to illustrate how migrants belong and can be included in urban communities through solidarity alliances, sanctuary or no-border/open border movements (93-100). Although the urban provides an important "strategic site"

(Sassen 2013, 69), the notion of sanctuary for migrants and refugees is not only an urban phenomena, but also exists at other scales (national) and in non-urban contexts[4]. According to Isin (2007, 212), the city "exists as *both* actual and virtual spaces." The "actual space" of the city includes physical infrastructures like housing, streets, bridges, and parks, which congregate bodies through physical proximity (Butler 2012, 117). In this way, the city captures formal belonging but also acts as a space for forging new social formations to articulate political identities. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cities responded as core sites of production, exploitation, and class struggle, and of proletarian/plebeian/non-conformist peoples' identities and revolutionary movements (Sassen 2013, 69). Similarly, urban social and political transformations led to the abolition of slavery and feudalism through practical engagements of everyday politics and demanding the willingness to embark on a path towards an unforeseeable reality. The city is also a "virtual space" that has an "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) as well links with supranational entities like the EU (Bauder 2017). In this space, ideas like the global village, global commons and global/subaltern citizenship burgeon. Thus, the urban is necessarily the scale at which "possibilia" are enacted.

Bauder sets out in search of what he coins a "possibilia", that links possibility with utopia and from a critique of utopia (see below). He advocates "possibilia" as a concept that does not have the language to describe itself yet, whereas contingent possibilities would be the multiple layers of possibilities that pro-migrant groups have to work with in order to open borders, and to make things immediately better for migrants. Political and social transformation mirror contingent possibility and "possibilia". Activists have argued that the nation-state must accommodate migrants by granting them domicile citizenship (acquisition of citizenship by residence/habitation/home), and simultaneously chip away at the state's legitimacy to grant or deny them their rights. Indeed, these positions are contradictory. In *Migration Borders Freedom,* contingent possibilities and possibilia must be pursued simultaneously as they are complementary and mutually exclusive. However, once we let go of the idea that politics or human life must always fit into a straitjacket of uniformity, we reach a necessary moment for social transformation. This realization has motivated activists to pursue various levels of possibilities.

Nandita Sharma's (2013) no-border call is "not a political proposal–it's a revolutionary cry," a fundamental reconfiguration of the way people live together and govern themselves (Bauder 2017, 112). The conditions, practices, and mindset that characterize such a world do not yet exits. Nevertheless widespread no-border networks (in Germany, Italy, the UK, and other European countries) illustrate how the evolution of a possiblia is possible. In the early 2000s, no-border networks organized camps in Strasbourg (France), Rotenburg (Germany), Bialystok (Poland), Tarifia (Spain), and Trassanito (Italy). The purpose of these camps was "to allow refugees, migrants and undocumented migrants and members of support/campaign groups from across Europe to forge new alliances and strengthen solidarities" (Allderd 2003, 153). The camps were organized and managed in symbolic locations, not only at or near borderlands, but also in cities that represented European integration (i.e. the triumph over national hostilities and fall of border walls) (Bauder 2017, 112). In the context of social activism, solidarity is fundamental to no-border politics, for "the creation of new political actors" (Bauder 2017), for the "community of interests, shared beliefs and goals around which to unite" (Hooks 2000, 67). It also entails listening and comprehending "other" experiences, needs, and desires. Solidarity affirms community by creating bonds of love, moral principle, respect, loyalty, empathy, and mutual aid (Walia 2013, 269). Following Hegalian and the aforementioned conceptualizations, *Migration Borders Freedom* understands solidarity as a new political consciousness. Moreover no-border politics follows a long tradition of critical practice, from workers' resistance (Marx and Engels 1953) to "consciousness-raising" (Pratt and Rosner 2006, 15) among marginalized communities to current acts of solidarity. Therefore no-border politics is not utopian, rather, "it is in fact eminently practical and is being carried out daily" (Anderson *et al* 2009, 12), and it should be carried out because it is urgent (Bauder 2017, 111-17)[5].

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[4] Similarly, No One Is Illegal (NOII), a migrant justice group led by migrants and racialized people in Canada.

The domicile principle of citizenship is a missing connection between jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood) and jus soli (citizenship by the place of birth, or soil/place/ground). In practice, most countries combine these categories in some way. Bauder's (2017, 82-90) argument expands beyond the citizenship principles, elevating the domicile principle over other principles that frame citizenship as a birthright. The principle of domicile can lead to far-reaching transformations in the realm of possibilia. Domicile-based citizenship affirms territoriality, emphasizing the territory in which one lives. Bauder's practical argument seeks to provide an intermediate or "meso-level" (Bauder and Matheis 2016) policy solution to the unequal treatments, social injustices, and other forms of oppression experienced by migrants.

Among many significant contributions of the book, one of the decisive offerings is its historical and context-particular analysis of migration. Pertinently, Bauder points to the lack of attention in migrant justice movements to settler politics, Indigenous exclusion and the interconnections between occupied lands and its foreign migrants in the academy. The book is timely and adds to a canon of scholarship on *Open Border* (Hayter 2000), *No Borders* (King 2016, Anderson et al 2009, Alldred 2003), *Undoing Border Imperialism* (Walia 2013), *Ethics of Immigration* (Carens 2013), *Migration, Squatting and Radical Autonomy* (Mudu and Chattopadhyay 2017) and *Migrant Activism* (Longhi 2013, Pojmann 2008). Bauder chose to provide a plainly worded analysis to some of the most convoluted and troubled issues around migration, migrant exclusion, bordering policies, and migrant situations across Europe and North America. Lastly, he opens a whole range of steps to move towards a better world. As he brings back a sense of utopian possibility that was lost in academic research and politics in recent decades, he also argues that the immediate goal is to stop violence directed at migrants of all ages, sexes, and ethnic and racial groups, and therefore that there is not time to wait for a perfect utopian solution (Bauder 2017, 108-119).

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[5] The solidarity between NOII and Indigenous organizations acts in unity with migrants to affirm the shared experiences and struggles of the racialized and dispossessed people as common struggle against other existing domination and exploitation of First Nations people. NOII demands for rights of all-people irrespective of their legality, color or creed and therefore rejects the categories and labels in which nation-states segregates its populations. Bauder finds similarity with the logic of "possibilia" with that of activist Ruby Smith Dias's dream that lies at the utopian horizon. Similar to NOII are Indigenous protests against the criminalization and oppression of illegalized migrants in Arizona, titled as Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhood Act (or SB1070). These movement practices are used by Bauder (2017, 115) to advocate for "possibilia" while arguing utopia.

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About the review author

Sutapa Chattopadhyay is a geographer and an affiliated scholar at University of Regina, and United Nations and Maastricht Universities. Her research focuses on the politics of development (Indigeneity, gender, and nature), Migrant incarceration, borders and autonomy, social and ecological movements. Sutapa thanks Leah Montange for her promptness in reading earlier drafts of the review and Dawn Paley's consistent suggestions. s.chattopadhyay AT maastrichtuniversity.nl and sutapajacob AT gmail.com.

Book Review: Nandini Sundar, *The Burning Forest*

Review author: Sutapa Chattopadhyay

Nandini Sundar, 2016, *The Burning Forest: India's war on Bastar*. New Delhi, Juggernaut (413 pp., hardcover, $31.68)

Background

If you are a cinephile, Nandini Sundar's (2016) shocking sketches of violent development in her book *The Burning Forest* will remind you of Satayajit Ray's 1980s political satire *Hirok Rajar Deshe*. Ray's film captured the forced grouping of precarious peasants in efforts to make their lands available for wealth generation through the employment of free-rein abuse, and an egregious and structural exploitation of the underclass. Similarly, James Cameron's trailblazing 2009 animated fiction, *Avatar*, illustrated the battle between mercenary earthlings and the hunter-gatherer Na'avi tribes whose lands were encroached upon for mining extraction (Ramani 2016). Ray's and Cameron's portrayals run parallel to Sundar's lucid depictions of the deep extortion of the Gondi Adivasis. *The Burning Forest* features textured and lurid description of Adivasis held in the crossfire of extreme barbarity and malice by Indian security forces and ordinary cops in the Bastar region in Eastern India.

In the three sections of the book, Sundar canvasses the origin and genealogy of state-led counterinsurgency *(Salwa Judum),* providing a harrowing analysis of various mechanisms deployed towards the apathetic destruction of Adivasi villages, assets and livelihoods, as well as exploring the miscarriages of the Indian judiciary system and state legitimization of violence against minority citizens.

In the 1980s, Maoist *dalams* (guerrillas) crossed into Bastar, in the south of Chhattisgarh, from neighboring Telangana in Andhra Pradesh to protect the Adivasis from exploitation by forest officers, contractors, traders, and land revenue officers; there they ran a parallel government. Delhi and Bhopal politicians were unconcerned with Maoist (Communist Party of India) control in the region until the liberalization of the mining sector in 2003. Sundar explains that since 2004, Bastar has been torn apart by the Indian government's war against Maoist guerrillas. Today, the forests in the northern Indrawati River are lacerated by heavy artillery, air raids, and land mines, and ground battalions spread out to hunt Maoists who operate through inscrutable circuits of information, covert networks, and limited resources (2016, 15).

Consequent to other Indigenous uprisings against the domination of the comprador class and colonial state, the *Bhumkal* rebellion in Bastar in 1910 was an attempt to protest against foreign rule and restore the Adivasi way of life. Maoist revolution is an offshoot of Naxalbari Andolan, which can aptly be described as a social movement (from below) that did not emerge abruptly, but evolved out of a long-standing agitation in response to deep extortion of the precarious workforce. Since the 1930s, Bengali communists in the region were organizing cadres, drawing on the experience of anti-capitalist mass struggles, most prominently the Tebhaga movement. Before long, the Naxal uprising proclaimed the 'annihilation line,' i.e, the killing of 'class enemies'. Nevertheless, Naxalbari evolved into a new political consciousness or a space for a new form of 'mass party politics' with 'democratization' (Sundar 2016, 3; Guha 2007). As Sundar documents, Adivasi marginalization meets the contours of economic neoliberalism, political indifference, and state-corporate greed.

Lives in exception

In 2004, when the Maoist war against the state intensified, Manmohan Singh, then-Prime Minister of India, called Bastar India's 'biggest internal threat' (Sundar 2016, 13). From 2005 onwards, the Indian state has made concerted efforts to undermine the Maoists' sources of food, recruits, shelter, and intelligence while Adivasi villagers are forcibly dislocated in temporary camps. The *en masse* encampment and internment of Adivasis is described by Sundar as a state tactic to segregate Adivasis from Mao guerrillas. Those who refuse to leave their lands or relocate to the makeshift camps are brutally tortured, humiliated, raped, and sometimes killed as Maoists or Maoist sympathizers and supporters. The manner in which grouping of Adivasis in 'relief camps' or 'model villages', or Salwa Judum 'base camps' is devised replicates British-controlled Malaya where the uprooted Chinese were contained in 'new villages' to 'wean them away' from the Communist Party. Sundar explains how Americans installed similar approaches in Vietnam, constructing 'strategic hamlets' to segregate peasants from the *Viet Cong* in order to deprive the latter of supplies and information (Sundar 2016, 17). In this manner the state has taken absolute control of the region to tap into Bastar's rich mineral wealth. Additionally the precarity of Adivasis in the region relates to the intrusion of large numbers of non-Adivasi migrants due to state-corporate partnerships around mining industries. Therefore, there can be many conceptualizations of Salwa Judum, depending on who is analyzing it.

Salwa Judum is a Gondi concept that means 'purification hunt'. The current Hindu State Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and opposition political party, such as the Congress, mobilized local people by fear and force to join Salwa Judum. They project the caucus of militarized cops as a 'spontaneous self-initiated people's movement' or counter-insurgent people's organization against the Naxalites, while the popular media manufactures Judum as a commonplace-overt uprising. Since November 2009, it has been called 'Operation Green Hunt', which in reality is a full-blown, nationwide paramilitary operation to cleanse the region of its Maoist insurgents. Paradoxically, as years pass, the death toll of ordinary villagers, Adivasi and non-Adivasi, has surpassed that of Maoist forces or state security squads (Sundar 2016, 15-16).

Some youths join the Judum because of the regular salary, while others are either former Maoist informants or apathetic to Maoists and forced to join the Judum after their villages are burned. Therefore, those involved in the Judum are impelled by desperation, force, or greed. Some special police officers, or SPOs, rose to become powerful leaders in their own right. Drawing from Doty (2007), I suggest that the manner in which the Indian state determines any particular situation as a factual danger to the state gives uncontrollable power to the agents of the state—in this case, Salwa Judum SPOs and their counterparts—to eliminate the underclass with impunity. Nandini Sundar documents how lives that are stripped of capital become damaged lives. The conceptualization of a life without value, such as the lives of the Adivasis, extends to Agamben's (1998) refinement of Aristotle and Hannah Arendt. Bare life is a life held in between *zoe* (i.e., "a particular life") and *bios* (i.e., "qualified" or "political life of speech and action"). In this case describes the Adivasi lives that transcend to a liminal position in between mere life and a good life. *Homo Sacer* is life in exclusion not purely a referent but an outcome of the violence of the sovereign. However it is not possible to analyze the shortcomings of

Agamben's conceptualizations, in this review, elsewhere I have argued for the agency of Adivasis (Chattopadhyay forthcoming; Agamben 1998, 114).

An important contribution of *The Burning Forest* is its account of the dysfunctional Indian justice system. Local police refuse to record any information on the offense of SPOs, and carry no responsibility to trace the accused. Further, police incarcerate a range of Adivasis and non-Adivasis for alleged connections to the Maoists. Some people are genuine *sangham* (Maoist) members, but many others are arrested arbitrarily. Bail is routinely denied. Court hearings are suspended while the accused spend years in squalid jails awaiting trials. Top-down revolutionary violence in Bastar is a perfect case of unharnessed power given to agents of the state (i.e, Salwa Judum) as the state declares itself in a particular situation (Doty 2007) that legalizes the tyranny of state agents over its subaltern citizens in the transition zones like Bastar. The latter has been extended in James Scott's (1998) 'Seeing like a State' and Johnson's (et.al. 2011, 68) 'Seeing like a border'. Both the concepts account the perspectives from those who shape and enforce the laws. This intricately connects with Sundar's problematization of Judum's selective control of the people, in the case of Bastar.

Conclusions

Sundar locates Bastar as a social space where guards, security forces, or paramilitary agents exercise unlimited power to act with impunity due to the exceptional nature of these spaces. Hence, the question remains – if Bastar was not endowed with metallic and nonmetallic mineral reserves would the state have orchestrated the war against its people? Following the sordid state of Bastar, economic development can be argued no longer as the responsibility of the state (Rist 1997, 223-6); rather, the state in collaboration with the private corporates sets the wider framework for capital accumulation with brutal alienation of people from their natural resources bases.

The Burning Forest is interdisciplinary and intersectional. Rarely do we come across books that are comprehensive and that attends to all levels of readership. Nandini Sundar's communicative and expansive appeal for reasoned humanity cannot be more eloquently expressed. This book does not praise Maoists for their sacrifices, "but disagree[s] with the wisdom of their path, and … recognize[s] that violence, even against injustice, can degenerate into brutality and corruption" (Sundar 2016, xiv-xv). However, it does applaud the heroism of the Adivasis who are challenged by extreme circumstances; in the absence of justice, it takes "superhuman efforts to merely survive" (Sundar 2016, xv). Sundar writes the book with the voice of a vulnerable researcher who witnesses the deep exclusion of Indian autochthonous people over three decades, and simultaneously marks the failures of Indian democracy, the violence of development, counter-movement from above, and the politics of state formation.

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About the review author

Sutapa Chattopadhyay is a geographer and an affiliated scholar at University of Regina, and United Nations and Maastricht Universities. Her research focuses on the politics of development (Indigeneity, gender, and nature), Migrant incarceration, borders and autonomy, social and ecological movements. Sutapa thanks Leah Montange for her promptness in reading earlier drafts of the review and Dawn Paley's consistent suggestions. s.chattopadhyay AT maastrichtuniversity.nl and sutapajacob AT gmail.com

Book review: *Kristian Lasslett, State Crime on the Margins of Empire*

Review author: Alexander Dunlap

Kristian Lasslett (2014). *State Crime on the Margins of Empire: Rio Tinto, the War on Bougainville and Resistance to Mining*, London, Pluto Press (220 pp. + Bibliography and Index. US$ 40.00)

Comprised of seven chapters and an afterword, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire* examines the early years of the Papua New Guinea (PNG) civil war ignited by the Rio Tinto subsidiary company, Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL). The lessons offered by author Kristian Lasslett have profound implications for understanding the actions and reactions of extractive industries and governments when their operations are challenged. A senior lecturer in criminology at Ulster University, Lasslett is director of the Institute for Research in Social Sciences, Editor-in-Chief of *State Crime Journal* and an executive board member of the *International State Crime Initiative*. This book is highly recommended to anyone interested in understanding the complexity of ecological conflicts triggered by extractivism, offering a valuable and detailed case study which dates back twenty-eight years.

The book begins by rooting itself theoretically, introducing the region, method and outlining the structure of the book. A special emphasis is placed on advancing classical Marxian theory as a means to approach the (formally) nascent study of state crime, which Lasslett blends with an acknowledgement of Foucauldian 'modalities of power' and 'governmentality' (pp. 5-6). A significant amount of space is dedicated to discussing orthodox Marxian theory, interview and archival research method, before providing a short book summary.

State Crime on the Margins of Empire then delves into the historical development and contextual specificities of Bougainville PNG. The section, like the last, begins with a discussion on Marxian theory, showing, despite Trotsky's use of modernist language (e.g. 'backwards country', 'savage'), that there is a nuance embedded in Marxian thought capable of accounting for flexibility and adaptability of imperial capital to different cultural circumstances that results in both 'uneven' and 'combined development' (p.27). Lasslett elaborates on the colonial-developmental history of PNG, and goes on to examine changes in the managerial dynamics within BCL, different tensions within the PNG government as well as land owners' associations to explain the emergence of 'social rupture' (p. 51) and/or conflict. Outlining textbook ecological distribution conflict dynamics triggered by the BCL/Rio Tinto mine in operation since 1972, protest erupted over exploitative (colonial) relationships, unequal benefit sharing and racism, which manifested in people engaging in non-violence civil disobedience and sabotage tactics against BCL, which quickly escalated.

Chapter 4 guides the reader from protest to guerrilla warfare against the BCL mine and PNG government. Detailing the different political positions of BCL, the PNG administration and later the Australian government (which has an interested in the mine), this chapter documents how economically and politically marginalized Bougainvilleans, 'dispossessed of land,' and mine workers, 'aggravated by the actions and attitudes of expatriate supervisors and managers,' 'rushed to join' the newly forming Marxist-Leninist inspired Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) (p. 88). Insurrection against the mine transformed into struggle for national liberation against the PNG government, which resulted in the government dispensing indiscriminate and widespread state terrorism in an attempt to control the population.

The following section details the conflict and varying political positions and dynamics between key actors in the years 1989-1991, highlighting how BCL along with the PNG and Australian governments facilitated a counterinsurgency campaign against the BRA. Drawing on rich archival and interview material, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire* outlines the relationships, negotiations and measures taken by the PNG government and collaborators to diminish a vibrant and increasingly successful insurgency. Initially the PNG government negotiated (indirect) concessions known as 'the Bougainville Package' and carried out direct political policing; the process eventually gave way to a 'hard' counterinsurgency campaign. In addition to scorched-earth style tactics targeting the population at large, the campaign included the clearing and resettlement of over 16 villages into strategic hamlets or misnamed 'care centres,' where spatial-confinement, surveillance, impoverishment and rape were commonplace. The 'hard' military tactics employed by the PNG government supported by BCL/Rio Tinto and Australian government actually resulted in increased popular support for the BRA. This led BRA to form a coalition government, which obliged them to (violently) regain control of their soldiers and the population at large. Meanwhile, BRA attempts to restore order in Bougainville led the government to adapt their counterinsurgency strategy to exacerbate social divisions in attempt to build support for the PNG state and weaken the independence movement. The end result, however, was an intensification of a civil war that would end only with a peace agreement in 2001.

State Crime on the Margins of Empire ends with a summary of the take aways of previous chapters, providing readers with the concluding analysis. Problematizing 'landowner conflicts', Lasslett's Marxian approach highlights important factors involved in this conflict, such as 'the coercive effects of competition and the spatio-temporal demands of valorization' that are enmeshed with geopolitical strategies of states (pp. 180-3). The chapter transitions to discussing six lessons emanating from the case study, which concludes by discusses attempts by Rio Tinto to re-open the mine, as well as the co-optation of once important anti-mine activists, and how this relates to aggravating civil war trauma.

The detail and conversation analyzing the mining inspired civil war in Bougainville is astounding. That said, *State Crime on the Margins of Empire* has a tendency to prioritize Marxian theory, trying sometimes too hard to fit this case study into state crime studies. This raises concern with the word 'crime,' which implicitly relies on state/colonial and international legal structures, which are not only responsible for enforcing political, economic and extractive violence—the structure of conquest— but also legitimizing it. When we approach these questions within the logic of state-centric institutions, how does state crime studies differ from human rights studies? I suspect state crime studies faces similar disciplinary-political dilemmas as human rights, attempting to hold governments and corporations accountable through a legal system that states themselves designed or at least influenced. In addition, acknowledgement of the impacted ecosystems and ecological ontologies were absent from the analysis, which might reflect classical Marxian theoretical concerns that have historically sidelined ecosystems and more-than-human relationships. Engagement with political ecology would have benefited this book.

The most impressive aspect of *State Crime on the Margins of Empire* is the level of detail regarding how Rio Tinto/BCL sparked a civil war and its role within a two year long counterinsurgency campaign. Rio Tinto/BCL is both familiar with counterinsurgency and has actively participated in coordinating war efforts with PNG and Australian government. This acknowledgment could re-situate the rise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and The Global Mining Initiative (GMI) that encourage corporations to seek 'social license' to operate and rebrand mining activities as environmentally 'sustainable' (see Seagle, 2012). These initiatives are preemptive responses to the anticipated resistance (and potential insurgencies) generated by large-scale development and mining projects. Corporate social technologies emerge from a continuum of environmental warfare, representing a (manipulative) strategic adaptation to advance company interests, which simultaneously attempt to reduce the economic and social costs for participating (directly or indirectly) in 'hard' counterinsurgency campaigns.

Counterinsurgency campaigns carried out in PNG (and elsewhere) have undoubtedly influenced resource extraction company policy and 'soft' approaches to manufacture politically and economically favorable extractive conditions. This is often done through public relation campaigns advertising the benefits of mining (e.g. jobs, social development, prosperity, etc); securing local collaborators (e.g. elites, politicians, landowners, church and civil society groups); and delegating political stability to participating collaborators (making them responsible for identifying, targeting and isolating dissident groups opposing the project). Lasslett's key contribution in this volume is to explain how Rio Tinto is no stranger to asymmetrical combat and navigating the complications of buying the 'hearts and minds' of governments and populations. Activists and scholars are remiss to ignore the fact that extractive companies are applying warfare techniques, in coordination with states, to secure their operations. For scholars to neglect this 'war component,' however subtle, tends toward erasing and forgetting the continuum of struggle by peoples—

Indigenous and otherwise—fighting for community control, alternative pathways to development and the ability to say 'no' to social, cultural, and ecological exploitation and degradation.

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About the review author

Recently awarded a doctorate in social anthropology from Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Alexander Dunlap's previous research examined the social impact and conflict generated by wind energy development in Oaxaca, Mexico. Other publications by Alexander appear in *Anarchist Studies*, *Geopolitics*, *the Review of Social Economy*, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, *Human Geography* and *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism*. alexander.a.dunlap AT gmail.com

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Book review: Adam Greenfield, *Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life*

Review author: Harry Warne

Adam Greenfield, 2017, *Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life*. London: Verso. (368 pp., £18.99).

There is a strong temptation to make broad, excited claims about the potentials of contemporary computer systems and the more-or-less worldwide network that connects them. On the left, the theoretical future possibilities of computer technologies have an inviting allure, giving us hope for how we might overcome the shortcomings and failures of our social movements. In subtle contrast to these cyber-utopian hopes, the undercurrent running through Adam Greenfield's new book *Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life* is an idea summed up by the tongue-in-cheek words of Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron: "technology is not the issue." (Barbrook and Cameron, 1995). New novelties may emerge from shifting material realities but politics is just as painful and prolonged as it has always been, forever situated in the socio-political fabric of the moment. And it is unlikely that technology will change this anytime soon, if ever. Greenfield does not dismiss the possibility of advances in technology catalysing more loving futures but he is not optimistic about the prospect. He claims such a dream "is troublingly founded on an *ex machina* retuning of human nature" (p. 290). And often it appears more likely that these technologies are paving the way for more inequality, not less.

Radical Technologies is a tour through some of the latest technological developments our increasingly information based, capitalist world has produced. Each chapter focuses on a different set of technologies: the smartphone, the internet of things, augmented reality, digital fabrication, cryptocurrency, the blockchain, automation, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. Greenfield claims they are all, in the forms that we are presented with today, indicative of what he calls the "contemporary technics" of "posthuman capitalism":

> that everyday life is something to be mediated by networked processes of measurement, analysis and control… and above all that human discretion is no longer adequate to the challenges of complexity presented to us by a world that seems to have absconded from our understanding (p. 308)

Greenfield's methodology is to first introduce a technology, its rudimentary functions and methods, and give some context for its deployment. He then proceeds to critique the forms of knowledge and power this may re/produce. Most of his explorations remain grounded in real world anecdotes, reflecting his unease with deterministic, futurist extrapolations many commenters on these issues lean towards - a breath of fresh air in a discourse often dominated by figures like the futurist Ray Kurzweil and Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg (Lev-Ram, 2017; Russell, 2017). For example, Greenfield offers a critique of the use of machine learning algorithms within juridical processes in the United States, where digital adjudicators have shown similar racial biases to their flesh and blood counterparts (Angwin et al, 2016). He paints us a picture of a world awash with information and offers up many examples of that information being utilised in flawed technical systems which - intended or not - reproduce inequality. In the words of cyberneticist Stafford Beer: the "purpose of a system is what it does" (p. 155). An auxiliary theme is the trust we put in technology and where this can take us.

I will avoid reiterating too many details from Greenfield's discussions in *Radical Technologies*. However, it is interesting to note his omissions. Whilst the machine learning chapter is 48 pages long, the chapter on artificial intelligence which follows it is a mere 12 pages. This chapter feels more like an extension of the one before it, which makes thematic sense. But its brevity is interesting considering the renewed interest in the prospect of advanced machine intelligence we have seen in recent years, particularly discussions around the existential risk this may pose and massive rewards this may bring (Bostrom, 2016: pp. 6-14). The moment of "Singularity" - the theorised time at which a machine intelligence is created as capable as any human, which could then set upon improving itself and start a runaway process manifesting a superintelligent entity beyond our control - is something which is being taken seriously by those in the halls of the United Nations to the likes of Stephen Hawking (Boffey, 2017). Perhaps for its headline grabbing quality but also out of genuine concern about what many consider an immanent possibility (Bostrom, 2016: p. 23). But Greenfield chooses to say almost nothing on artificial intelligence, appearing baffled in the face of an increasingly impenetrable world[6] (pp. 270-271). His comments on the possibilities of automation and the end of work, another hot topic, are similarly brief. Most of Greenfield's exposition is a critique of commentators (including Paul Mason, Jeremy Rifkin, Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams) who have placed these technological advances at the centre of their advice for social movements and other actors.

Greenfield seems unable to comment on Singularity or of the end of work. He acknowledges how stunted our discourse is and how bound we are to the present, drowning in speculation - much of it wild. Where others try to make colourful predictions, Greenfield is ready to hold his hands up and admit where he feels we are unqualified to stray. This is an area for development by social movements, however. Towards the end of his discussion on automation he writes:

> [W]e urgently need to reinvent (particularly, but not just) a left politics whose every fundamental term has been transformed: a politics of far-reaching solidarity, capable of sustaining and lending nobility to all the members of a near-universal unnecessariat. (p. 206)

Humans are less and less necessary for the reproduction of the economy but the left is yet to manifest viable political projects which can rescue humanity from irrelevance.

Greenfield wears his pessimism on his sleeve with regard to the direction in which humanity is moving. Perhaps we are in too deep, engulfed by the hegemony of late capitalism. This hegemony actively reproduces itself,

> sustaining and being sustained by a continuous and all but unquestioned framework of assumptions about what technology is for, how it is developed, and who makes it. And in doing so, it tends to deny the space in which alternatives might be nurtured, to the extent that those alternatives have all but literally become unthinkable. (p. 313)

Radical Technologies reads like an account of globalisation and technology written by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri on a day when the pair are both feeling more pessimistic than usual. In their 2004 work, *Multitude*, the pair go to great lengths to detail the communicative, connected nature of what they see as the emerging hegemony of "biopolitical production." Their analysis details a two-sided concept of globalisation, one of both new challenges and new possibilities - *Empire* and *the multitude*, in their words. They use Internet technologies as a symbolic example of the networked character of a world which they claim presents the opportunity, for the first time, of worldwide democracy. While they do not necessarily understate the challenges presented by the hegemony of capitalism and its related structures of power/knowledge, their project is one predicated on a more optimistic view of the landscape before us. The epigraph to their 2000 work, *Empire*, reads "any tool is a weapon if you hold it right." But Greenfield's concern is that the tools we are presented with are too embedded in structures of information based capitalism to serve as weapons.

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[6] Many advances in AI in recent years have been down to advances in techniques relating to artificial neural networks. One characteristic of the architecture of such systems is that very often even the human programmers do not understand exactly how their AI system produced its output (Knight, 2017).

Hardt and Negri argue that globalisation offers up new opportunities for a democracy which can overcome the new challenges that a globalised world presents. Greenfield borrows the term "path dependence" to speak of "the tendency of a dynamic system to evolve in ways that are determined by decisions made in its past" (p. 232). Few things are inevitable, but, in short: are we too far gone? Not to suggest that Hardt and Negri or other similar archaeologists of globalisation lack nuance and caution, but this is a possibility often missed or glossed over in many other inquiries. Perhaps for morale.

Almost every work which details some aspect of the shittiness of our world seems compelled to end with an optimistic proclamation. Despite the author's overall pessimism, *Radical Technologies* is no exception. However, one is left with the impression that his attempt is shoehorned. Many authors would offer up a chapter but, as with other things he feels ill-equipped to comment on, Greenfield offers only a few pages. And even within these he speaks less of the triumph of democratic movements and more of the indomitability of the human spirit and how, against all odds, life finds a way in the margins, in the cracks.

Greenfield's brief conclusion on how we should respond is nonetheless potent and pressing:

> If what we find in the radical technologies we've discussed is the power to transform the very ground of our social being in a particularly inimical way, it [is] difficult to imagine that any choice we can make as individuals or small clusters can do much to undermine the prerogatives of the institutions of scale that are interested in seeing this transformation made real … And yet, daunting as it may be, that is exactly the task that now lies before us, the charge that is ours to discover, inhabit and make our own.
> …
>
> It's absolutely vital, now, for all of us who think of ourselves as in any way progressive or belonging to the left current to understand just what the emerging technics of everyday life propose, how they work, and what they

> are capable of. *A time of radical technologies demands a generation of radical technologists* (pp. 313 - 314, emphasis added)

A bold battlecry. Albeit one that, in the thrust of *Radical Technologies*, feels tacked onto the end. If we are to take onboard the analysis presented in this book, its detailing of the current and emerging possibilities for the accentuation of an impoverished and violent world order, then what choice do we have? We must hope that we can find a way to hold the tools right and act as if we can.

Radical Technologies is a book that does not aim to present any answers. It is difficult to read it and not experience a few moments, sat back with eyebrows raised, thinking, “oh, they can do that now?” Every chapter leaves the reader with a growing impression that the future is being built elsewhere, by those with motivations that the progressive among us would find insidious. And soon these innovations are finding their way onto our streets, into our courts, into our pockets, and mediating our perceptions of the world. Many profound changes are not in the distant future: they are here.

Greenfield name drops a few groups he thinks are doing good work (Deep Lab and the annual Radical Networks conference) but his impression is of a world where progressive forces are left trailing behind the dizzying progress of posthuman capitalism, an economy that less and less needs humanity for its reproduction. As Greenfield stated following the book’s release: “We need a posthuman politics for a posthuman economy” (Greenfield, 2017b).

But the question remains: where are all the radical technologists?

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About the review author

Harry Warne is a UK based postgraduate researcher and an alumnus of Aberystwyth University, Wales. He is interested in the emerging possibilities and pitfalls of artificial intelligence and how critical theory can help nuance our discourses surrounding technology. Author contact: harry AT aftercalifornia DOT com.